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INTRODUCTION TO AN INTRODUCTION
This Article contests some of our most reassuring self-perceptions
and offers a new way of thinking about our legal theories, our laws,
our institutions, and, above all, ourselves.
In lieu of a conventional, preview-heavy opening, we will begin
with a suggestion that you, the reader, consider your situation. We
urge you to examine the internal and external influences that may
affect your experience of this Article. Uncommon advice, perhaps,
in a law review article, but consider the counsel of Italian novelist
Italo Calvino:
Relax. Concentrate. Dispel every other thought. Let the world
around you fade ....
Find the most comfortable position: seated, stretched out, curled
up, or lying flat. Flat on your back, on your side, on your stomach. In
an easy chair, on the sofa, in the rocker, the deck chair, on the
hassock. In the hammock, if you have a hammock. On top of your
bed, of course, or in the bed. You can even stand on your hands, head
down, in the yoga position. With the book upside down, naturally.
... Stretch your legs, go ahead and put your feet on a cushion, on
two cushions, on the arms of the sofa, on the wings of the chair, on the
coffee table, on the desk, on the piano, on the globe. Take your shoes
off first. If you want to, put your feet up; if not, put them back.
We urge you also to consider any internal influences that may affect
your reading-elements that cannot be so readily inventoried, such
as your attitudes, motives, and moods. These are less easily adjusted
than the lighting, but can be even more important to the reading.
Try to be aware of what you bring to this Article; be aware of how
you read, why you are reading, and even that you are reading. Do
you have expectations about what this Article will say or how you will
feel about it? Ask yourself: What am I looking for in this Article,
and why? Am I reading this because it has been assigned and I want
a good grade on my final? Because I am a law professor and that is
what law professors do? Because I need support for a proposition in
my own article? Because a friend recommended it? Because I am
snowed in and it is this or nothing? And as you react to what you
read, take a moment to examine those reactions and their possible
sources.
ITALO CALVINO, IF ON A WINTER'S NIGHT A TRAVELER 3-4 (William Weaver
trans., Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1981) (1979).
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In short, try as best you can to read this Article mindfully.4 This
promises to be a difficult, but revealing, process, for the situation
"determine[s] our mental life and our actions" far more than most
of us realize or care to believe.
I. SETTING THE STAGE: TWO PUZZLES
Throughout most of this introductory Article, we will focus our
arguments primarily on economics and law and economics. We
believe, however, that the implications of our inquiry extend far
beyond those domains. The tendencies we hope to elucidate find
their origins in the human animal, not in any particular legal
theoretic perspective. It happens that these tendencies are especially
prominent in law and economics, currently the dominant theoretical
paradigm for creating and analyzing legal policy. But the relevance
of our thesis is not confined to one approach, or even to legal-
political questions. All humans are more or less implicated,
whether they are liberals or conservatives, legal economists or
critical theorists, students or scholars, producers or consumers,
6elected officials or citizens.
A. The First Puzzle
Economists usually assume that each economic actor maximizes something:
consumers maximize utility... firms maximize profits, politicians maximize
votes, bureaucracies maximize revenues... and so forth.
-Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen7
I do not myself believe that many people do things because they think they are the
right thing to do .. .. I do not think that knowledge of what is morally right is
motivational in any serious sense for anyone except a handful of saints.
-Richard Posne
4 See ELLENJ. LANGER, MINDFULNESS 62 (1989) (describing the "key qualities of
a mindful state of being: (1) creation of new categories; (2) openness to new
information; and (3) awareness of more than one perspective").
Banaji, supra note 1, at 8.
6 Readers should not expect, and will not find, an exhaustive defense of many of
this Article's claims and conclusions. Our goal is to establish the basic premises of
our argument and the conclusions to which they lead. We hope to provide a
framework for a much larger project, where we and others defend those premises
and conclusions. That is the subject of numerous works now in progress, which we
cite to loosely by working tire.
7 ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 10-11 (3d ed. 2000).
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[Tlhe tendency to make unwarranted leaps from acts to corresponding
dispositions is perhaps the most fundamental and most common failing of social
inference.
-Lee Ross & Richard Nisbett?
Have you ever noticed how quick legal economists are to assume
that individuals and institutions are motivated by selfish interests,
usually wealth and profit?'0 Have you ever been puzzled by the fact
that they have not applied the same type of analysis to explain their
own work and remarkable success in the marketplace of ideas? Why,
in other words, has there not been "An Economic Analysis of the
Economic Analysis of Law?""
When legal economists write about their movement,'2 they write
of its historical affiliations, distinguished members, theoretical
breakthroughs, scientific methods, rapidly growing numbers,
sustained dominance within legal academia, and significant influence
over policy. '3  Implicit in these conventional narratives of the
ascension of law and economics is an abstract and idyllic model of a
tournament of ideas played on a level field, out of which law and
economics emerges, on the merits, as a champion legal theory.'
4
Such canonical accounts say nothing about the actors' motives,
except insofar as they imply that the participants have a
8 Richard A. Posner, Social Norms, Social Meaning and Economic Analysis of Law: A
Comment, 27J. LEGAL STUD. 553, 560 (1998).
9 LEE Ross & RICHARD E. NISBETI, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION 53 (1991).
to See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 7 (noting the basic assumptions of legal
economists).
I1 Cf Richard Posner, The Sociology of the Sociology of Law: A View from Economics, 2
EUROJ.L. & ECON. 265 (1995) (claiming to use sociological methodologies to anal)ze
and criticize sociological legal theories, but failing to apply the same methods to an
analysis of Law and Economics).
By "legal economists," we mean scholars in economics departments and, more
commonly, in law schools who apply neoclassical economics to law and law-related
issues.
13 See generally COOTER & ULEN, supra note 7, at 3 (identifying law and
economics as useful to lawmakers when evaluating policy); RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 21-22 (4th ed. 1992) (providing a history of the law and
economics movement) [hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW]; RICHARD
POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 1-2 (2001) [hereinafter POSNER,
FRONTIERS] (examining the contributions of other disciplines to the understanding
and improvement of law, including economics); Richard Posner, Some Uses and Abuses
of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 281 (1979) [hereinafter Posner, Uses and
Abuses] (explaining the applications and incorrect uses of law and economics).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 66-81 (describing widely held presumptions
regarding the "marketplace of ideas").
[Vol. 152:129
THE SITUA TON
magnanimous desire to advance scientific knowledge and, perhaps,
social welfare through normal, well-functioning, neutral processes.15
For example, in his famous exchange with Professor Whitford,
who was not a legal economist, on the enforceability of consumer
product warranties, George Priest, one of the founding fathers of law
and economics, wrote: "Our objectives ... are similar: to identify
policies that, other things equal, will reduce the seriousness and
frequency of injuries suffered by consumers."'6 Priest went on to
explain that Whitford, like other scholars who wrote on this topic,
relied on arguments lacking in social scientific rigor and born of feel-
good intuition and emotion. Of the former, Priest wrote: "Professor
Whitford's criticism ... rests upon a misunderstanding of the nature
of scientific reasoning." 7 Of the latter, Priest declared:
If I have distorted the approach of the exploitation theorists, it is
"distortion" that comes from the sharpened focus of any careful,
scientific study. Upon closer view, a flat world becomes round, and the
Martian canals are shown to be illusions. The brilliant and moving
calls of Professor Kessler in 1943 and of Professor Leff in 1970 to the
attack on incompletely bargained contracts provoked sympathy in man),
of us in the contracts field. Their ideas have dominated our thinking
about contractual relations, especially between manufacturer and
consumer, and have transformed the law of products liability.
Unfortunately, the suppositions upon which their ideas are based are
unsupported by the evidence. The time has come for a new view of the
world. 8
Regardless of what one thinks about the strength of Priest's
arguments or the reliability of his conclusions, the point is that Priest
clearly sees himself as a (winning) participant in a neutral process of
15 See, e.g., W. KIP ViSCUSI, SMOKING: MAKING THE RISKY DECISION 14 (1992)
("By adopting a policy approach that utilizes the choice process to promote market
competition for safer cigarettes, we could better foster individual health and
welfare."); George L. Priest, Can Absolute Manufacturer Liability Be Defended?, 9 YALE J.
ON REG. 237, 263 (1992) ("The great virtue of the economic approach to the study of
the law is that it attempts to isolate data that bear on conflicting theories to allow a
discerning reader to judge between them. I encourage [my critics] to turn their
prodigious energies to the discovery' of such data."); cf Posner, supra note 11, at 275
("I am sure that economic analysts of law would be . . . generous to any sociologists of
law who wanted to borrow some of the theoretical or empirical tools of economics to
illuminate sociological topics.").
16 George L. Priest, Comment, The Best Evidence of the Effect of Products Liability Law
on the Accident Rate: Reply, 91 YALE L.J. 1386, 1386 (1982).
17 Id.; see also id. at 1388 ("Whitford misconceives the nature of scientific
inquiry.").
is Id. at 1400 (footnotes omitted).
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generating knowledge about a topic that will save lives and reduce
injuries. This type of claim to the principles of science-neutral
testing of hypotheses against meaningful, hard empirical data-has
been extremely common among legal economists, particularly in
response to critics or potential critics.
To return to the puzzle: why don't legal economists analyze
themselves through the same models they apply to everyone else?
Why don't they explain their success in economic terms-the
predictable consequence of selfishly motivated, self-aggrandizing
scholars seeking to maximize their wealth, influence, or reputations?
We have an answer and, perhaps surprisingly, it is an answer that is
less about highlighting a contradiction than it is about locating an
underlying consistency.
Simply stated, legal economists are human ' and, being human,
they are subject to biasing cognitive tendencies. Among the most
fundamental biases is what social psychologists have appropriately
named the fundamental attribution error Our proclivity is to under-
estimate the role of situational influences, and to overestimate the
influence of individual dispositions in explaining people's behavior.2'
"[W]e tend to look for the person in the situation more than we
19 We do not mean to suggest that the humanity of legal economists should come
as news. We mean only to point out the obvious, and then to take its implications
seriously. While some critics have demonized or dehumanized legal economists, we
believe that this is wrong in fact and as a critical tactic. See, e.g., David Glenn,
Calculated Risks: Harvard Professor Says Smokers Know Exactly What They're Doing, CHRON.
OF HIGHER EDUC., May 31, 2002, at A14 (reporting economist W. Kip Viscusi's
account of someone reacting to him as if he were "Darth Vader"), available at
http://chronicle.com/free/v48/i38/38aol401.htm.
20 See infra Parts II, VI.C (describing in greater detail much of the social
psychological evidence regarding this attributional bias); see also SUSAN T. FISKE &
SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 67-86 (1991) (discussing the fundamental
attribution error, defined as a "bias in social perception" whereby a person's behavior
is attributed to "her own dispositional qualities, rather than to situational factors");
ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 430 (1999) (noting that
participants in psychological studies routinely make the fundamental attribution error
by "underestimat[ing] the extent to which behavior is shaped by the constraints of the
situation and overestimat[ing] the extent to which it is shaped by people's underlying
dispositions"); Ross & NISBETT, supra note 9, at 4 ("People's inflated belief in the
importance of personality traits and dispositions, together with their failure to
recognize the importance of situational factors in affecting behavior, has been termed
the 'fundamental attribution error."'); supra quotation accompanying note 9. See
generally Daniel T. Gilbert & Patrick S. Malone, The Correspondence Bias, 117 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 21 (1995) (providing an intellectual history of the fundamental attribution
error-or correspondence bias-and a description of some of its causes and limits).
1 KUNDA, supro note 20, at 429.
[Vol. 152: 129
THE SITUA TION
search for the situation that makes the person. 2 2 That is true even
though "human behavior is much more under the influence of
situational variables than we usually recognize or are willing to
admit. 
23
That tendency, like numerous other interpretive biases, is partially
the result of the mind's propensity to conserve scarce resources.24 It
is often easy to see a person's role in bringing about a particular
event, but it takes a good deal of thought to understand how the
situation may have wielded influence.25 A more general description
of this phenomenon is that the mind tends to downplay the role of
complexifying context and overplay the role of salient behavior.
"Background factors, social context, roles, or situational pressures
that may have given rise to the behavior are . . . relatively pallid and
dull and unlikely to be noticed in comparison to the dynamic
behavior of the actor.
2 6
A second powerful influence over human cognition stems from
the fact that people tend to arrive at conclusions they are motivated
to reach: "[M]otivation may affect reasoning through reliance on a
biased set of cognitive processes: strategies for accessing,
constructing, and evaluating beliefs .... [M]otivation can be
construed as affecting the process of reasoning: forming impressions,
determining one's beliefs and attitudes, evaluating evidence, and
making decisions.",
27
2 PHILIP G. ZIMBARDO & MICHAEL LEIPPE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF AlTIITUDE
CHANGE AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE 93 (1991).
23 Id. Daniel Gilbert and Patrick Malone also note that:
Three decades of research in social psychology have shown that many of the
mistakes people make are of a kind: When people observe behavior, they
often conclude that the person who performed the behavior was predisposed
to do so-that the person's behavior corresponds to the person's unique
dispositions-and they draw such conclusions even when a logical analysis
suggests they should not.
Gilbert & Malone, supra note 20, at 21.
24 Other cognitive biases with related origins include well-known heuristics such
as availability and hindsight bias.
25 See FiSKE & TAYLOR, supra note 20, at 67 (identifying the "fundamental
attribution error" as a tendency "to attribute another person's behavior to her own
dispositional qualities, rather than to situational factors"). For other possible or
partial explanations of the fundamental attribution error, see infra Parts II, VI.C.
26 FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 20, at 67.
27 Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 480
(1990).
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One key motivation-central to "one of the most influential
social psychological theories"2 8-is the desire to see ourselves in self-
affirming ways.29 People tend to view themselves as well-intentioned
and good, and will often engage in fairly dramatic cognitive
adjustments to maintain that self-image. Moreover, individuals en-
gage in the same kind of motivated reasoning regarding the
institutions, groups, and situations with which they identify. In those
contexts, however, the tendency is often referred to as the
"ethnocentric" or "group-serving" bias or, more popularly, as
jingoism, racism, sexism, heterosexism, and so on. The first lesson
of motivated reasoning, whatever its manifestation, is that we
humans tend to hold beliefs and reach judgments and conclusions
that we desire, and we vastly underappreciate that tendency
-particularly in ourselves.
When those sorts of human tendencies are taken seriously, the
initial puzzle begins to lose its mystery. The puzzle is simply an
expression of the larger human inclination to see disposition where
situation is largely controlling and to do so in a way that is self-
affirming. Legal economists view others as dispositionally-typically
selfishly-motivated because they can plausibly infer such
information from people's conduct. And the dispositions-which
legal economists typically call "preferences"-behind that conduct
are thereby "revealed." Or it at least appears that way to legal
economists, given the influence of the fundamental attribution error.
Legal economists, likewise, see themselves (and others in their move-
ment) as dispositionally driven, but their own purposes are presumed
less crass, in part because their personal sense of themselves does not
"reveal" such motives, and in part because they are motivated to
attribute their successes and their competitors' concomitant failures
to dispositional, not situational, forces.2
28 KUNDA, supra note 20, at 3.
29 Id. at 220-23.
30 Id.; see alsoJon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical
Realist Perspective on the Human Animal (unpublished manuscript, on file with
authors) (reviewing key studies and summarizing evidence on role of motivation).
31 See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 30 (describing group-affirming motive);
see also FIsKE & TAYLOR, supra note 20, at 80-81 (noting that the terms "ethnocentric"
or "group-serving bias" refer to "the tendency of in-group members to attribute
internal causes to positive in-group behavior and negative out-group behavior and to
attribute negative in-group behavior and positive out-group behavior to external
causes").
32 See infra text accompanying notes 106-10 (discussing the actor-observer bias).
[Vol. 152:129
THE SITUATION
It is not contradiction, then, but consistency that begins to
suggest the more illuminating dimension of this puzzle. Legal
economists presume a dispositional account of behavior, both in
their understanding of economic actors and institutions as selfish,
and in their view of themselves as relatively selfless. 3 Social psych-
ology, however, has demonstrated that seemingly dispositional
actions are very often more accurately identified as situational
reactions. Since economists consistently rely on dispositionist attribu-
tions, they may be consistently wrong, both as to others and as to
themselves.
The point-and this is a big one-is that even though individuals
and institutions may behave as if their goal were to maximize wealth,
such behavior may actually reflect the social stage of interactions
(the situation) more than it does the dispositions of the actors.
Moreover, legal economists have failed to take situation into account
in their understanding of their own success, both individually and as
a school of thought. This tendency, we believe, has blinded us all-
legal economists, their admirers, and their critics.
The first puzzle thus yields a glimpse of a central claim of this
Article: Legal economists are correct to presume the profound
influence of the profit motive over the behavior of individuals and
institutions in our society, but are mistaken to locate that influence
dispositionally rather than situationally. The latter possibility-that
situation accounts not only for the behavior that legal economists
analyze, but also for the success of their movement-brings us to a
second puzzle.
B. The Second Puzzle
Have you ever noticed that many of the most prominent legal
scholars actively reject the tenets of law and economics in their
teaching and writing? And have you ever wondered about the fact
that the criticisms that such scholars have advanced are rarely, if
ever, acknowledged-much less rebutted-by legal economists?
And, in light of all that, have you ever wondered why law and
economics is nevertheless commonly (and we think correctly)
33 In responding to these observations, we suspect that many legal economists
would stress that they too are moved by selfish dispositions to advance their own
interests, financial and otherwise. Our point is that they seem not to begin with that
presumption and build from there, but instead experience themselves and their ideas
as marching beneath the pennant of scientific truth and, in all cases, take a
dispositionist view of their own (and others') behavior.
20031
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described as the dominant legal theoretic approach? It may be
helpful to describe this puzzle in greater depth.
In a 1996 survey of the most cited law review articles published
from 1982 to 1991, 34 scholars taking the critical approach-critical
legal studies, critical race theory, and feminism-vastly outpaced
those taking a law and economics approach, forty-three to twelve,
respectively.35 From its origins, law and economics has been subject
to powerful and sustained criticisms from a diverse group of
distinguished legal academics3--including, among many others,
Bruce Ackerman,37 Jules Coleman,3 s Ronald Dworkin, 3  Grant
Gilmore, ° Mark Kelman, ' Duncan Kennedy,42 Frank Michelman,3
34 Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 751 (1996).
35 Id. at 751-59.
36 Cf LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 693 (2d ed. 1985)
("The 'law and economics' school was widely attacked as right-wing and excessively
narrow; but it had gained, by the 1980s, a significant place in legal teaching, thought,
and research.").
37 See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 45 n.16 (1984)
("[S]upporters and opponents rightly suspect that there is more to 'law and
economics' than disinterested science ... ."); Bruce A. Ackerman, Law, Economics, and
the Problem of Legal Culture, 1986 DUKE L.J. 929, 929-34, 946 (1986) (arguing that legal
academics need to adapt their rhetoric to subsume law and economics and thereby
"put law and economics in its place").
is See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 67-150 (1988)
(criticizing several branches of "the new law-and-economics" school); Jules L.
Coleman, The Economic Analysis of Law, in ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW:
NOMOS XXIV 83, 100-01 U. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1982)
(critiquing the notion of efficiency central to the law and economics approach); Jules
L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 526-40
(1980) (evaluating and rejecting Posner's concept of "wealth maximization"); Jules
Coleman, The Normative Basis of Economic Analysis: A Critical Review of Richard Posner's
The Economics of Justice, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1106 (1982) (book review)
(arguing that "neither of Posner's arguments, nor any plausible available arguments,
justify pursuing certain versions of efficiency").
39 See, e.g., Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191, 191
(1980) ("In this essay I consider and reject a political theory about law often called the
economic analysis of law."); Ronald Dworkin, Why Efficiency? A Response to Professors
Calabresi and Posner, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 563, 563 (1980) (criticizing "economists of law
who contemplate trade-offs" between justice and efficiency).
40 See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 100 (1977) ("So far as
we have been able to learn, there are no recurrent patterns in the course of human
events; it is not possible to make scientific statements about history, sociology,
economics-or law.").
41 Kelman writes:
[M]uch of the concrete institutional study done in the Law and Economics
movement, particularly by those whose work has been readily integrable into
mainstream law classroom teaching, is biased, not because of an inevitable
[Vol. 152:129
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Dierdre McCloskey, 4 Martha Nussbaum," Rick Pildes, Margaret
Radin 4 1 Jeanne Schroeder,8 Joe Singer,
49 and Mark Tushnet.50
Indeed, at the same time that legal economists were proclaiming
the strengths and dominance of their approach, prominent critics
were claiming to reveal some of its fundamental flaws and
social theoretical tilt but rather either because the people doing the work
explicitly and substantively favor certain traditional right-wing positions that
they have argued for rather disingenuously or because, in their frenzied desire
to demonstrate the possibility of an economistically governed utopia, they
distort or deny the insuperable difficulties legal institutions would have in
overcoming the problem of "otherness," the problem that selfish people will
inevitably harm others, no matter how we try to channel their selfishness.
MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 151 (1987); see also Mark Kelman,
Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L.
REV. 669, 673 (1979) (arguing that the Coase Theorem "is simply wrong as a
purportedly empirical hypothetical about whether liability rules would affect
substantive activity as well as distribution").
42 See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique,
33 STAN. L. REV. 387, 387-88 (1981) (arguing that "liberal law and economics" is
incoherent when applied to the whole system of private law rules).
43 See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Property, in
ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW: NOMOS XXIV 3, 3-4 (J. Roland Pennock &
John W. Chapman eds., 1982) (asserting that the presumptive efficiency thesis is false);
Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 711, 714 (1980) (arguing that "the efficiency of private property and free
contract cannot be deduced from the sole factual supposition of rational maximizing
behavior").
44 See, e.g., Donald N. McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Law and Economics, 86 MICH. L.
REV. 752, 753-54 (1988) (presenting law as a primarily rhetorical realm where
arguments dominate that are at odds with the mathematical and logical approach of
economics). Donald McCloskey subsequently changed names to Deirdre McCloskey.
45 See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, Hlawed Foundations: The Philosophical Critique of (a
Particular Type oj Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197, 1198 (1997) (arguing that
philosophical arguments cast doubts on the foundations of law and economics theory).
See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, The Unintended Cultural Consequences of Public Policy:
A Comment on the Symposium, 89 MICH. L. REV. 936, 936-40 (1991) (explaining that
public policy requires more than a simple cost-benefit analysis).
47 See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 1-15 (1996)
(critiquing the universal commodification of important aspects of human life).
4 See, e.g., Jeanne L. Schroeder, The End of the Market: A Psychoanalysis of Law and
Economics, 112 HARV. L. REV. 483, 491 (1998) ("I do not believe law can be reduced to
even the most sophisticated economics .... It is my judgment [that] .... the ideal of
the perfect market is... inadequate to the task of making concrete legal policy
recommendations.").
49 See, e.g.,Joseph William Singer, Something Important in Humanity, 37 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 103, 105-08 (2002) (criticizing welfare economics for discounting fairness
as a factor in normative analysis).
50 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, "Everything Old is Neo Again": Early Reflections on the
"New Chicago School, " 1998 WIs. L. REV. 579, 581-82 (asserting that traditional law
and economics has "become stale").
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weaknesses. 1  Legal economists rarely acknowledged, much less
rebutted, those criticisms. 52  Many thoughtful observers therefore
anticipated the eventual, if not imminent, demise of law and
economics. For example, Arthur Leff wrote in 1974: "[O]ne would
be forced to conclude that this kind of 'scientific' study is . . . , as an
attempt to present a total picture, ultimately doomed."53 By 1980,
Mort Horwitz wrote that the law and economics movement had
"'peaked out' as the latest fad in legal scholarship."04 He went so far
as to predict that "[fluture legal historians will need to exercise their
imaginations to figure out why so many people could have taken
most of this stuff so seriously.""
Outsiders' predictions were not altogether different from those
of insiders. Early on, even some legal economists admitted to being
surprised by their success. As Judge Posner, in a loose version of our
second puzzle, testified, "economics has an uphill fight in law, being
disliked both as politically conservative and methodologically radical.
This makes its success ... all the more striking.,
56
And yet despite that evidence, those criticisms, those predictions,
and that surprise, there is no dispute that law and economics has
long been, and continues to be, the dominant theoretical paradigm
for understanding and assessing law and policy. Not only is law and
economics not a faddish habit of the past, but in the twenty years
51 See C. Edwin Baker, Starting Points in Economic Analysis of Law, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 939, 948-53 (1980) (asserting that "Posner's wealth-maximization standard
has seemed normatively ungrounded" and that "Posner's inability to identify
normatively appropriate starting points leaves him unable to demonstrate that his
wealth-maximization .. criterion is either appealing or workable"); James R.
Hackney, Jr., Law and Neoclassical Economics Theory: A Critical History of the Distri-
bution/Efficiency Debate, 32 J. SocIo-ECON. 361, 370-79 (recounting various critiques
of law and economics scholars' focus on wealth-maximization as the basis for
evaluating societal utility); Duncan Kennedy, Law-and-Economics from the Perspective of
Critical Legal Studies, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE
LAW 465, 471 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (criticizing law and economics theorists for
'manipulating the apparently value neutral, technocratic discourse of efficiency to
support their preferred outcomes").'
" See generally Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Distribution Versus Efficiency:
Missing the Taste of the Pie (May 19, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
authors) (describing history of "distribution versus efficiency" debate and some ways
in which legal economists have avoided or postponed addressing profound criticisms
of their approach).
., Arthur Allen Leff, Law and, 87 YALE L.J. 989, 1007-08 (1978).
54 Morton J. Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV.
905, 905 (1980).
55 Id.
Posner, supra note 11, at 274.
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since Horwitz's prognostication, it has become even more
entrenched among lawmakers, judges, policy shapers, and aca-
demics." And, as we highlight, lay versions of the theory have been
gaining ground in our culture as a whole. As one critic laments,
"[t]he law and economics movement is quite strongly entrenched in
the law schools, and is more powerful there than any of the other
social sciences."'" Marc Galanter and Mark Edwards, proponents of
the "competing" law and society approach to legal theory, concede
that "the flourishing of law and economics [is] undeniable,"55 that
"[e]conomic analysis of law.., has transformed American legal
thought,"6 and that efficiency analysis has enjoyed "unparalleled
success in the legal academy and in the judiciary."" Professor Bruce
Ackerman has described law and economics as "the most important
development in legal scholarship of the twentieth century.
6 2
Numerous critics have displayed less equanimity in
acknowledging the dominance of law and economics, accusing its
adherents of ruthless "imperialism. ' 3 Judge Posner dismisses such
57 Richard Posner's seminal book, Economic Analysis of Law, supra note 13, is now
in its sixth edition. The fifth edition, published in 1998, recently won Harvard Law
School's prestigious Ames Prize. Press Release, Harvard Law School, Judge Richard
Posner Presented 2003 Ames Prize (Mar. 7, 2003), at http://www.law.harvard.edu/
news/2003/03/07ames.php. In fact, law and economics has its own Nutshell and
two encyclopedias devoted to it. JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A
NUTSHELL (2d ed. 2000); ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (Boudewijn
Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geewst eds., 2000); THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
58 J.S. Sterling, The State of American Sociology of Law, in DEVELOPING SOCIOLOGY
OF LAW: A WORLD-WIDE DOCUMENTARY ENQUIRY 805, 809 (V. Ferrari ed., 1990).
59 Marc Galanter & Mark Alan Edwards, Introduction: The Path of the Law Ands,
1997 WIs. L. REV. 375, 378.
65 Id.
61 Id. at 381.
62 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 7, at 2.
63 See W. Bradley Wendel, Mixed Signals: Rational-Choice Theories of Social Norms and
the Pragmatics of Explanation, 77 IND. L.J. 1, 29-30 (2002) (stating that "scholars in other
disciplines often object to the imperialist tendencies of economic analysis, because of
this tendency to translate the explanatory terms employed by humanistic and social
science disciplines into a few concepts that are deemed admissible in economics, such
as 'preferences' and 'expected utility"'). This characterization is not new. See, e.g.,
ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM: THE ECONOMIC METHOD APPLIED OUTSIDE THE FIELD OF
ECONOMICS, at vii (Gerard Radnitzky & Peter Bernholz eds., 1987) (attempting to
show that economics can explain the behavior of living systems, despite critics who
accuse economists of "disciplinary imperialism"); DAVID M. KREBS, A COURSE IN
MICROECONOMIC THEORY 9 (1990) ("Economists are well-known among social
scientists as imperialists in the sense that economists attempt to reduce everything to
economic notions and paradigms.").
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accusations as so much "[p]rofessional envy." And who wouldn't be
jealous? After all:
Economic analysis of law has grown rapidly, has become the largest,
most pervasive interdisciplinary field of legal studies in the history of
American law, has palpably influenced the practice of law and judicial
decisions, has launched lucrative consulting spin-offs, has spawned
courses and textbooks in economic analysis of law, has influenced
legislation (economic analysts of law played an important role in the
deregulation movement), has made it de rigueur for law schools of the
first and second ranks to have one or more economists on their faculty,
has seeded a number of its practitioners in university administration
and the federal judiciary, and has now crossed the Atlantic and begun
making rapid gains in Europe.64
In short, regardless of how different scholars feel about it, there
is no contesting the fact that law and economics is currently the
undisputed champion of the putative legal-theoretic competition.
So here, again, is the second puzzle: How is it that a theory that
is the subject of so much skepticism and criticism among legal
academics, and that seems to have been rejected (or at least, not
embraced) by huge segments of that community, has become the
dominant theoretical paradigm for understanding and assessing law
and policy?
That puzzle begins to come together when one understands that
scholars, as humans, are motivated to believe that the institutions
with which they have a strong affiliation are just-a motivation that
may be particularly intense in this case, given that the legal academy
is an institution to which academy members have committed their
professional lives and upon which their legitimacy is largely based.
Absent undeniable evidence to the contrary, scholars so motivated
assume that the success or failure of a theory reflects the outcome of
a reasonably well-functioning marketplace or tournament of ideas.
Success there, like evolutionary or market success, is thought to
reflect a meritocratic selection process.6
CA Posner, supra note 11, at 275 (citations omitted); see also POSNER, FRONTIERS,
supra note 13, at 35 ("It is not merely an ivory-towered enterprise, especially in the
United States, where the law and economics movement has influenced legal reform in
such fields as antitrust law, the regulation of public utilities and common carriers,
environmental regulation, the calculation of damages in personal injury suits ....").
See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 30 (discussing motivations relating to an
individual's group and system affiliations).
t To be clear, we do not believe that perceptive critical scholars (such as Mort
Horwitz) consciously think to themselves that the playing field of legal theory is a
purely meritocratic one. Our point is that even system-sensitive critical legal scholars
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Such a faith is implied in many legal theoretic histories. Robert
Cooter and Thomas Ulen, in their authoritative text, Law and
Economics,;7 attribute the success of law and economics to its
practitioners identifying "a vacant niche in the 'intellectual ecology"'
of legal theory and then "rapidly fill[ing] it."6" Thomas Ulen recently
expanded on that survival-of-the-fittest metaphor, boasting:
Law and economics has been one of the most successful innovations
in the legal academy in the last century. This intellectual revolution
began modestly in the 1960s and 1970s with a few important and
innovative articles and a comprehensive, masterful text that showed the
possibilities of the field. Then, in the 1980s the field exploded into
respectability and prominence-becoming a regular course in the
curricula of the best law schools, a vibrant legal research style that
figured in a torrent of important books and articles, a force that
transformed many faculty from exclusive practitioners of traditional
doctrinal research to a more social-science-oriented research, and a
substantial justification for important public policy changes. By the
early 1990s, economic analysis suffused a modern legal education, even
one devoid of an explicit course in law and economics.
Writing generally about economics, George Stigler explains:
"Economics is the only reasonably well-developed social sci-
ence ... in that it has an extensive, operable, tested theoretical
system. Posner beats the same drum when he proclaims that the
work of "anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, political
scientists, and other social scientists ... is insufficiently rich in
theoretical or empirical content to create serious competition for the
economists.' ', Elsewhere, he makes the point more concretely:
There is a dearth of arresting hypotheses to set off against the Coase
Theorem, the Hand Formula, the efficiency theory of the common
law .... the economics of property rights versus liability rules, the
implicitly reveal an unexamined trust in current institutional arrangements (or
perhaps situational pressures discouraging the articulation of distrust), as evinced by
the fact that such biases are rarely even hinted at in writing about what moves current
intellectual trends in legal academia.
67 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 7.
68 Id. at 3.
69 Thomas S. Ulen, Firmly Grounded: Economics in the Future of the Law, 1997 WIS.
L. REV. 433, 434 (footnotes omitted).
70 GEORGEJ. STIGLER, MEMOIRS OF AN UNREGULATED ECONOMIST 8 (1988).
71 POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw, supra note 13, at 26; see also Posner, supra
note 11, at 273 ("The sheer modesty... of American sociology of law has hurt the field
in its competition with critical legal studies, feminist jurisprudence, political theory,
economic analysis of law, and even law and literature for a place at the legal-studies
high table.").
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activity-level theory of strict liability, ... and the myriad of other
concepts, many counterintuitive, that have made economic analysis of
law intellectually exciting.2
When explaining their success, legal economists rely not just on
proud descriptions of methods, discoveries, and insights, but also on
the legacy of intellectual giants, from Jeremy Bentham and Adam
Smith to Gary Becker and George Stigler The internal histories of
the emergence of law and economics thus focus on the "great ideas"
and "great men, 74 of the movement, as if Coase and Copernicus
played analogous roles in advancing science. 75  Even if that is an
overstatement, it is patently clear that legal economists see themselves
as the rightful winners of a fair and effective process-a success that
is measured largely in terms of real-world influence and without
reference to the serious criticisms of their approach.
Professor Horwitz, though no doubt disappointed with the
outcome, also seemed to view the rise and fall of ideas and theories
as part of a fair competition, or at least that seems an obvious
Posner, supra note 11, at 273. Elsewhere, Judge Posner argues that law and
economics has benefited from "[r]apid increases in recent decades in the scope and
rigor of microeconomics (due partly to the increased incorporation of game theory
into economics)." POSNER, FRONTIERS, supra note 13, at 4.
Posner has been repeating the same basic historiographical thumbnail sketch
of the movement in his writings for decades. See, e.g., POSNER, FRONTIERS, supra note
13, at 31 ("What I try to do... in this chapter is to anchor a brief description of
the field by reference to two of its most illustrious progenitors, Jeremy Bentham
and (briefly) Gary Becker...."). For other Posnerian renditions of this sketch, see,
for example, Posner, Uses and Abuses, supra note 13, at 281-84 (1979), where he
discusses the role ofJeremy Bentham, Gary Becker, and others in the development of
law and economics. The same story unfolds in his chapter on the history of law and
economics in his ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 13, at 21-28.
74 Cf JULIE A. NELSON, FEMINISM, OBJECTIVITY AND ECONOMICS, at xi (1996)
("The mainstream academic and professional discipline of economics.., is built
around distinctly masculine-based notions .... ); Marianne A. Ferber, The Study of
Economics: A Feminist Critique, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 357 (1995) (describing the male-
centric bias contained in economics scholarship);Julie A. Nelson, The Study of Choice or
the Study of Provisioning? Gender and the Definition of Economics, in BEYOND ECONOMIC
MAN: FEMINIST THEORY AND ECONOMICS 23, 33 (Marianne A. Ferber & Julie A. Nelson
eds., 1993) ("Feminist theory suggests that the Cartesian divisions between rationality
and embodiment, and between man and nautre, reflect a masculinist and separate
view of the world ...."); Diana Strassman, Not a Free Market: The Rhetoric of Disciplinare
Authority in Economics, in BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN: FEMINIST THEORY AND ECONOMICS,
supra, at 54, 56-65 (using "stories" to illustrate the present narrowness of explanatory
accounts in economics, which is due to the exclusion of the woman's perspective when
formulating theories).
75 See supra text accompanying notes 16-18 (quoting George Priest for his claim
that law and economics, more so than other fields of legal scholarship, is grounded in
scientific reasoning).
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inference to draw from his prediction about the imminent demise of
law and economics." And Horwitz is by no means the only non-
economist exhibiting such faith. Indeed, it seems to be widespread in
legal academics, as revealed by the fact that unfairness or bias in the
marketplace of ideas is rarely discussed among its participants-even
among those scholars whose work is built on identifying and.• • 77
describing such unfairness and bias in other institutions. Thus,
while scholars have not always explicitly claimed that theoretical
dominance implies theoretical superiority, such an inference is
manifested in the legal economists' boasting and the critics'
collective (and now largely frustrated) expectation that law and
economics would pass quickly.
A closer look at the details of legal theoretic discourse reveals yet
another nuance to the pattern. Legal economists attribute their
success in the tournament to internal or dispositional factors. They
seem to view their methods and insights, perhaps even their
intellectual capacity, as simply superior to those of their competitors.
That dispositional perspective is amplified when economists
criticize their competitors. Not only are outsiders deficient method-
ologically, they are, as our 'just world"78 requires, also dispositionally
deserving of their fate. Posner, for example, claims that some
76 See supra text accompanying notes 54-55 (recounting Horwitz's prediction that
law and economics would be only a short-lived "fad" in legal academia).
77 For example, at two Harvard Law School panel discussions on the future of
progressive legal theory, panelists had little to say about the underlying sources of, or
possible solutions to, the fact that progressive legal scholarship has had comparatively
little influence over legal theory or policy while law and economics has grown
dominant. See Ari Z. Weisbard, Professors Debate Law, Economics, HARV. CRIMSON,
Mar. 20, 2002, http://www.thecrimson.com/article.aspx?ref=180698 (recounting a
progressive panelist's statement that "our institutions are being reformed
everyday" by law and economics); Press Release, Harvard Law School, HLS
Faculty Panel to Explore Future of Progressive Legal Scholarship (Feb. 22, 2002),
at http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/2002/02/22 scholarship.php (describing
the participants and sponsors of two panels discussing progressive legal scholar-
ship). Panelists included distinguished progressive scholars with an acute awareness
of legal theoretic trends and historical sensitivity such as Christine Desan, Kent
Greenfield, Janet Halley, David Kennedy, Duncan Kennedy, Mort Horwitz, Frank
Michelman, and Joe Singer. In our view, the lack of a theoretical explanation for
these trends reflects an implicit (and, we think, unexamined) faith on the part of even
the most institutionally and politically sensitive scholars in the academic process as
basically fair and self-correcting. One goal of this project is to provide an alternative
approach to assessing legal theoretic trends.
78 See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 30 (providing a more detailed discussion
of the 'Just world hypothesis" and "system-affirming motives"); infra notes 215, 635,
and 686 and accompanying text (briefly discussing related motives).
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competitors may have fared better if only they were not so spiteful
about their losses and, so unwilling "to pick up the analytic
techniques and models of economic analysis and use them in their
own work.' 79 According to Posner, "no one likes to retool with the
methods of a rival discipline; it is a confession of defeat."s The
source of the competitors' failure is, in Posner's account, not in the
situation of the competition, but in the dispositions of the
participants. And it is not just any disposition, but the disposition of
selfishness-the very disposition that motivates the agents of legal
economists' models. And it is also, in Posner's view, the disposition
of spite and smallness-the very sort of qualities that psychologists
have shown that we are motivated to see in "out groups" and to deny
in our own groups, and that consequently enable us to feel that the
misfortunes of "others" are warranted. 81
Consequently, there are two ways in which the largely uncon-
tested "tournament of ideas" notion reflects the fundamental
attribution error. First, as we just described, competitors are
presumed to win or lose because of dispositional factors. Second, the
operation and dynamics of the tournament itself is presumed to be
independent of broader situational influences. The metaphor of a
tournament or marketplace highlights the presumption that comp-
etition on the merits is the driving force and that the victor is
determined through successful competitive engagements, full stop.
Any forces exogenous to the tournament are rarely identified, much
less systematically analyzed.
Again, it is not contradiction, but consistency, that suggests the
more revealing aspects of this second puzzle. Both legal economists
and their critics presume a dispositionist account of scholarly
behavior. But again, social psychology instructs us that seemingly
dispositional actions are often more accurately understood as
situational reactions. The consistent dispositional attributions, there-
fore, may be consistently wrong. A more complete solution to this
puzzle, however, must await the balance of this Article.
We named this Part "setting the stage," not simply because it sets
the stage for the balance of the Article, but also because it is
79 Posner, supra note 11, at 274.
80 Id.
81 See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 30 (discussing that tendency in greater detail
and more general social psychological findings regarding inter- and intra-group
motivations); infra notes 689-90 and accompanying text (summarizing the human
tendency to see bias in others that we do not see in ourselves).
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intended to begin to illuminate the power of staging over acting.
The stage is not simply the place where independent, dispositional
actions occur, as is so commonly, so humanly, assumed. The stage is
itself an unseen participant-one that shapes, transforms, sometimes
determines, and almost always influences, the behaviors of the visible
characters. If that is correct, legal scholars and policymakers need to
ascertain how the stage is set, who has the power to set it, and what
the purpose of the staging is. We all need to be attentive to the
situation.
II. BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE SITUATIONAL CHARACTER
A. Seeing the Actors
Tastes are the unchallengeable axioms of a man's behavior: he may properly
(usefully) be criticized for inefficiency in satisfying his desires, but the desires
themselves are data.
-Gary Becker and George Stiglerf-
I find it difficult now to identify the motives for many things I have done ....
I do not have a good answer to the question of my own behavior ....
My memoiy has a strange way of selecting its contents.
-George Stigle'
In our view, legal theory and the law ought to be informed by as
realistic a vision of humanity as our learning can muster. This
Section begins to formulate such a vision through some of the
central lessons of social psychology. The bulk of this effort must
await separate articles. 4
82 George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 Am.
ECON. REv. 76, 76 (1977).
83 STIGLER, supra note 70, at 132, 133, 146.
84 See, e.g., David Arkush & Jon Hanson, Law and Emotion (unpublished
manuscript, on file with authors) (describing the role and influence of emotion, affect,
and feelings, and assessing their relevance for law and legal theory); Chen & Hanson,
supra note 52 (focusing on role and effects of schemas, scripts, stereotypes, and other
knowledge structures and their relevance for law and legal theory); Ronald Chen &
Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law 1: The Legitimating Schemas of Modern Policy and
Corporate Law (May 31, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors)
(describing the biased schemas of modern policymaking and corporate law and the
interests they serve) [hereinafter Chen & Hanson, Illusion of Law l];Jon Hanson, Ana
Reyes & Daniel Schlanger, Law and Attribution (unpublished manuscript, on file with
authors) (examining how people make attributions of causation, responsibility, and
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Suppose you are walking down the street, on your way to class,
when a man in a white coat comes up behind you, jabs a gun into
your spine and barks "get into that building." Inside the building,
you find yourself in a small room where the gunman explains that
you will be shot unless you flip a switch (labeled "DANGER: SEVERE
SHOCK-XXX-450 volts") on some sort of electrical box which is
attached by ires to an electric-chair contraption in which another
man is strapped. The gunman informs you that "although the shock
can be extremely painful to the person in the chair, it can cause no
permanent tissue damage." Meanwhile, that person is squirming,
sweating, and imploring you not to flip the lever. He seems almost
as scared as you are and is saying something about heart trouble and
pleading to be released. The gunman cocks his pistol, aims the
barrel at your temple, and tells you: "You have no other choice, you
must go on."
Despite this scene's surreal qualities, you believe everything about
it, including that the gun pointed at your head is real and that its
holder is ready to use it. What would you do?
We suspect that many of you would flip the lever, as we probably
would. And we suspect that even those of you who would not would
still sympathize with and hold relatively blameless anyone who did.
The situational pressure is simply too great to withstand. The power
of the gun is unmistakable, and the "choices" to enter the building
and to flip the lever are hardly choices at all, for the disposition of
the person who makes them seems so clearly constrained by the
situation as to render the results nearly determined.
Now, suppose you are strolling across your favorite university
campus when you are approached by a clipboard-toting, lab-
coated graduate student who is recruiting participants for an
ongoing psychological experiment testing learning techniques. You
agree to take part, and follow the graduate student into a building
where you meet the professor running the study and another person,
who, like yourself, has agreed to participate. You draw lots and find
that in the experiment you will be the "teacher," and your fellow
blame, and describing the relevance of attribution theory for law and legal theory);
Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 30 (providing a fulsome overview of the social
psychological and social cognition literatures, and, based on that, offering an
alternative conception of the human animal to the one imagined in law and legal
theory, and considering some of the implications of that new conception for law and
legal theory).
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volunteer will be the "learner." The professor explains that he will
read a list of pairs of associated words to the learner, after which he
will read one word from the pairs as a prompt for the learner to
supply the correct associated word. If the learner fails to provide the
correct word, you, as the teacher, are to flip a switch that will shock
him. With each incorrect answer, the strength of the shock will
increase by 15 volts. You follow the professor into an adjacent room
where you watch as the learner is strapped into a chair and
electrodes are attached to his body. Then you move back to the first
room where the professor begins the experiment. Very soon into the
procedure, the subject gets an association wrong. Do you flip the
switch?
Perhaps you do. Now the wrong answers continue to come.
With each mistake you increase the voltage, and you begin to hear
the learner moaning in pain. Poised at 150 volts, the learner
exclaims that his heart is bothering him. When you reach 210 volts,
he demands to be released, saying he refuses to answer any more
questions. At 300 volts, he is screaming in agony. After 330 volts,
the learner's room becomes silent. The professor continues to ask
questions and announces that continued silence will be interpreted
as a wrong answer, bringing another shock. You look at the control
panel and see that the next level reads "DANGER: SEVERE
SHOCK-XXX-450 volts." You hesitate, and the professor de-
mands, "You have no other choice, you must go on." Do you flip the
switch? Would you have made it to this point in the study?
If you are like most people, you have almost certainly answered a
resounding "no!" to those questions. And if you think others would
respond to the scenario similarly, you would expect them to refuse to
go along with the experiments as well. And you would not be alone.
College students asked to evaluate such a proposed experiment
estimated that, on average, most people would go to 135 volts before
refusing to go on, and they said that only one in a hundred would go
all the way to end of the scale-450 volts. Professional psychiatrists
surveyed about the same proposed experiment predicted that only
one in a thousand-"the sadists"-would go all the way.86
85 See ZIMBARDO & LEIPPE, supra note 22, at 67-68 (1991) ("Most said that no one
would go all the way to 450 volts.").
86 Id. at 65-74 (summarizing Stanley Milgram's obedience experiments); see also
STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY 27-31 (1974) [hereinafter MILGRAM,
OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY] ("Each one of the 110 respondents sees himself disobeying
the experimenter at some point."); Stanley Milgram, Some Conditions of Obedience and
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We humans do not understand ourselves well.
The scenario described above-the one with the graduate
student and not the one with the gun-was the basis of a series of
actual experiments that Stanley Milgram, a pioneer in the field of
social psychology conducted at Yale University beginning in the early
1960s. 7 In the actual experiment, however, the flipped switches did
not actually shock the learner."" The responses that the teacher heard
were scripted-a fact unknown to the teacher.s9  Milgram's
expectations matched those of the college students and psychiatrists
who he surveyed beforehand. 90 But out of the first forty teacher
subjects he tested, twenty-six of them (sixty-five percent) went all the
way to 450 volts.9' And that was only the beginning of a long series
of studies revealing the disturbing "banality of evil. ' 2
By now the reason for the experimental results should be clear:
situation, like an invisible hand, moves US. Milgram performed this
Disobedience to Authority, 18 HUM. REL. 57, 72-73 (1965) [hereinafter Milgram,
Some Conditions of Obedience] ("The psychiatrists predicted that most subjects
would not go beyond the tenth shock level [150 volts] .... ").
87 See Milgram, Some Conditions of Obedience, supra note 86, at 60 ("Pilot studies
• . .were completed in the winter of 1960.").
88 See Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 371, 373-74 (1963) (explaining the basic design of Milgram's experiments).
89 See id. at 372 (explaining that in most versions of the experiment the "learner's"
responses were tape recorded and played over a sound system in the "teacher's"
room).
qO See ZIMBARDO & LEIPPE, supra note 22, at 68 ("Milgram himself foresaw little
total obedience.").
91 See MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY, supra note 86, at 60 tbl.3 (identif-
ying these numbers as resulting from a base-line condition in which the "learner"
responded with more than just cries of anguish, including voicing concerns of a heart
problem).
92 See generally HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE
BANALITY OF EVIL (1994); DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN, HITLER'S WILLING
EXECUTIONERS: ORDINARY GERMANS AND THE HOLOCAUST (1996); ERVIN STAUB, THE
ROOTS OF EVIL: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND CULTURAL ORIGINS OF GENOCIDE (1992);
Philip G. Zimbardo, The Psychology of Evil, 5 EYE ON PSI CHI 16 (2000),
http://www.psichi.org/pubs/articles/article_72.asp.
As Milgram learned in his experiment:
With numbing regularity good people were seen to knuckle under the
demands of authority and perform actions that were callous and severe. Men
who are in everyday life responsible and decent were seduced by the
trappings of authority, by the control of their perceptions, and by the
uncritical acceptance of the experimenter's definition of the situation, into
performing harsh acts ....
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experiment hundreds of times using many different variations."4 By
manipulating the situation, Milgram was able to increase or decrease
conformity on the part of the teachers. For example, when it was not
the teacher administering the shock himself, but rather a peer
operating at the teacher's instruction, more than ninety percent of
subjects administered the maximum shock' When an ordinary
person rather than a scientist was demanding that the shocking
continue, however, far fewer teachers went to 450 volts. 6 The sixty-
five percent full compliance observed repeatedly at Yale shrunk to
forty-eight percent when the study was moved off campus and
purportedly run by "Research Associates of Bridgeport.",9
7
The vast discrepancy between ex ante predictions about the likely
behavior of subjects in these experiments and their actual behavior
reveals a central lesson of social psychology-namely, the profound
ways in which situation influences our behavior.9  The naive
predictions themselves reveal the gross extent to which we
underestimate the power of the situation and wrongly presume that
behavior is motivated by disposition."'
... A substantial proportion of people do what they are told to do,
irrespective of the content of the act and without limitations of conscience, so
long as they perceive that the command comes from a legitimate authority.
Milgram, Some Conditions of Obedience, supra note 86, at 74-75.94 ..
Milgram conducted at least twenty-one different variations on the initial
experiment. See MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY, supra note 86, at 207 n.6
("[Nervousness] data [of the subjects] are available for twenty-one experimental
conditions ....").
95 See id. at 119, 121-22 (concluding that "any factor that will create distance
between the subject and the victim[] will lead to a reduction of strain on the
participant and thus lessen disobedience").
96 See id. at 93-97 (finding that despite authority "hovering in the background,"
experiments in which an ordinary man gave the orders resulted in a "sharp drop in
comPliance" to twenty percent administering the maximum shock).
Id. at 68-69.
98 The discrepancy also reveals the extent to which even psychologists frequently
fail to anticipate how situation will move their subjects. SeeJerry Fodor, Why We Are
So Good at Catching Cheaters, 75 COGNITION 29, 32 (2000) ("When subjects appear to
behave peculiarly in an experimental task, that is not infrequently because they are
sensitive to a material[] variable that the experimenter has failed to notice.").
9q Milgram's research reflects what many, including Milgram, noticed about Nazi
Germany: the ease with which situational influence can lead humans to engage in
atrocious, morally reprehensible, individual acts. Recent primary research indicates
that "ordinary men"-those who previously led regular, civilized lives-overwhelmingly
accepted the Nazi regime's call to genocide despite an explicitly available "choice" to
evade the action. See CHRISTOPHER BROWNING, ORDINARY MEN 1-3, 55-57
(HarperPerennial 1998) (1992) (reporting how a Nazi battalion commander in World
War II Poland allowed "any of the older men who did not feel up to the task" of
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As Milgram's experiments help demonstrate, unobserved
(though observable) situation can be as potent as observed situation.
And when it is unobserved situation that moves us, we experience it
as dispositional consent.
Insofar as economics, and law and economics, have been
challenged by critics, most debate has taken place over the extent
to which people are rational Economists tend to assume that the
"rational actor model" is reasonably accurate, or that its inaccuracies
do not, for one reason or another, threaten their conclusions
substantially. °00  The critics tend to either roll their eyes at the
obvious absurdity of the rational actor model or, more carefully,
provide evidence to support a conclusion that the rational actor
model is flawed and should be adjusted to take into account the
irrational features of the typical human actor. In our view, both
perspectives miss the far more significant assumption behind the
rational actor model: that people are dispositional actors. As the
Milgram experiments so powerfully demonstrate, it is our
situations-far more than we realize, and often far more than our
dispositions-that move us. We are, in essence, not rational actors,
but "situational characters."
B. Missing the Stage
We are too ready to read personality and character traits into the behavioral
drama and too resistant to see stage settings as the basis for the action.
-Philip G. Zimbardo & Michael Leippe'°'
participating in a massacre to "step ott" and be given an alternative assignment); id. at
64-65 (describing how during one execution in the Polish woods "anyone who could
not take it any longer could report" and be excused); id. at 74 (reporting that despite
the opportunity to drop out, less then twenty percent of the Nazi policemen evaded
the killing of 1500 people-an entire town). But see id. at 65-70, 75 (relating the stories
of German policemen who chose not to kill, several of whom felt no need to impress
their comrades because of financial security and a lack of career military ambitions).
The author of Ordinary Men, Christopher Browning, dispositionalized the massacre by
focusing on those who avoided the situational influence-or responded to a less
prominent situation-despite the glaring fact that so few managed to do so.
100 See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 30 (reviewing responses of economists and
legal economists to social psychological evidence that conflicts with the rational actor
model).
101 ZIMBARDO & LEIPPE, supra note 22, at 93.
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All the world's a stage... And all the men and women nrely players ....
- Willim Shakesea12
The "situational character," introduced in this Article and
fleshed out in a companion article"' , and in other works,' 4 is
meant not to reconstruct, but rather to retire the basic rational actor
model of law and economics (including its chief competitors such
as the behavioral actor, the boundedly rational actor, the satisficing
actor, and the autonomous agent of classical liberalism). Our goal is
not, in other words, to offer an alternative dispositionist"' account,
but rather to develop an approach to legal theory that
conceptualizes people's behavior more accurately in the locus of
situation.
We thus introduce the situational character: an individual who
does not act with total freedom (even if she does sometimes act
extemporaneously) and who does not often choose her stage. She
instead finds herself, and we as legal scholars find her, already in
action on a given stage, among other characters, with dialogue and
plot proceeding apace around her, and subject to the powerful (if
less visible) influence of scripts, props, backdrops, and directors. To
be sure, such a character will often behave as if she is a dispositional
actor, but alter the stage, the script, and so on, and you will see the
pervasive role of situation as the actor's behavior conforms to it.
Consider the following thought experiment:
Your plane, a Boeing 747, is reaching cruising altitude in your flight
from Logan to O'Hare, and the pilot turns off the "Fasten Seatbelt"
sign. You recline in your aisle seat for a catnap when the elderly and
somewhat feeble gentleman next to you stands and politely asks to get
by. You move quickly into the aisle to aid his passage and then return
to your seat as he makes his way slowly to the back of the plane to the
lavatory-about one-eighth of the length of the plane. You don't re-
buckle your seatbelt because you expect him to return shortly and you
want to be prepared to again move into the aisle so that he can reclaim
his seat.
102 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, As You LIKE IT act 2, sc. 7.
1034 See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 30.
104 See sources cited supra note 84.
105 By "dispositionist" or "situationist," we mean to indicate the attributional
perception, and by "dispositional" and "situational" we mean to indicate the
attributional truth of the matter. Thus, describing people as situational
dispositionists is one way of saying that they are subject to the fundamental
attribution error.
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Ten minutes pass, and you begin to worry because the elderly
gentleman seemed a little unstable. Still, you are reluctant to meddle
and possibly embarrass him or yourself. When another five minutes
have passed, you decide to alert a flight attendant of your concerns. As
you reach for the call button, the man returns, apparently no worse for
wear. You jump out to let him in, and you both slide into your seats.
You breathe a slight sigh of relief that he is fine after all, and that you
did not have to press the button.
Now, without re-reading any portion of the preceding para-
graphs, estimate the distance that the old man traveled between
leaving and returning to his seat.
If you are like most people we asked about this scenario, you
estimated close to thirty feet. A more accurate estimate, however,
would be roughly 1000 times greater than that-approximately 150
miles. In other words, most people see the man moving within the
plane, but miss his situation, the plane itself.' But even the few who
see the plane tend to miss the movement of the Earth-a failure that
made Copernicus, one who did notice, the butt of ridicule, and
Galileo, another who saw what others were missing, a prisoner. And
even those great astronomers did not perceive, just as most of us
today do not, the immense currents of the solar system, the galaxy,
and the universe. Indeed, when one takes those additional situa-
tional forces into account, the old man moved, in his visit to the
bathroom, something closer to 350,000 miles.
0 7
106 Of the thirty-three people we asked, twenty-four of them provided answers of
between zero and one hundred feet. Nine gave answers that revealed that they
considered the movement of the plane: more than fifty miles. But of those nine,
seven indicated that they considered that movement because they were looking for
the "trick," and that it took them some time to figure out the second answer. It bears
mentioning that even the respondents in the first group appeared to be looking for
the trick, asking questions about what they had missed, but were still unable to
perceive the plane's movement when asked how far the man had "traveled" in fifteen
minutes. Within the seemingly fixed environment of the cabin, one individual's
movement was far more salient than the (forgotten) progress of the plane itself.
107 The Earth's average orbital velocity is 18.5 miles per second. See Scott Wilber,
How Many Miles Does the Earth Travel in Space Each Day?, PHYSLINIK.COM: PHYSICS &
ASTRONOMY ONLINE, at http://www.physlink.com/Education/AskExperts/ae548.cfm
(last visited Oct. 25, 2003) (stating that the "entire solar system, including the Earth,
moves through the cosmic background... for a total of 32 million miles per day"). In
one minute, the elderly man travels 1110 miles due to the Earth's orbital velocity; in
fifteen minutes, he travels 16,650 miles. Factoring in background movement-22,222
miles per minute-results in 350,000 miles in fifteen minutes.
[Vol. 152:129
THE SITUA 77ON
C. The Bounds of Dispositionism
We have already summarized some of the "evidence that people
are inclined to offer dispositionist explanations for behavior instead
of situationist ones, and that they make inferences about the
characteristics of actors when they would do well to make inferences
instead about the characteristics of situations ...."'s We have also
suggested that this fundamental attribution error has not spared the
professional and credentialed minds of economists and legal
economists-hence, our repeated emphasis on the fact that they too
are human.
But, if we humans are subject to a tendency to see disposition
where situation is largely controlling, a critical question emerges as
to the strength and expansiveness of that tendency. Of course, this is
a question for which no precise answer can be given. But it is
nevertheless a crucial issue for legal theory, and one that cannot be
papered over by implausibly presuming near-total dispositionism.
Some clarifying light can be shed on the matter by separating it into
two sub-questions. First, at what point and to what degree do lay
people and economists begin to see situation and to take it into
account? In other words, what are the limits to our dispositionism-
how fundamental is it? Second, to what extent do disposition and
situation actually move us? Put differently, how fundamental an
error is our dispositionism? The first question is about how we
perceive what we see, and the second question is about how accurate
our perceptions are.
1. How Fundamental Is Our Dispositionism?
Regarding the first question, our gun-to-the-head exam0ple l '
makes clear that our dispositionism does occasionally give way to
situationism. The example is particularly apt because it appears that
we rarely see situation unless the situation is thrust upon us in the
form of another hard-to-miss actor such as a person wielding a gun.""
108 Ross & NISBEr, supra note 9, at 125.
109 See supra Part II.A (suggesting that a threat of serious bodily harm would likely
cause one to inflict pain on another despite a disposition against such an action).
110 There are exceptions to those basic patterns. Most notably, when making
attributions about ourselves we often are more likely to attribute the cause of bad
outcomes or behavior to exterior situational influences. For example, if we do poorly
on an important test, we may be quick to complain about the distractions in the testing
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a. Economic incentives
Even a very obvious, controllable, and tangible situational
influence-money-is commonly overlooked in favor of dispositionist
explanations of behavior. The effects of financial incentives on lay
people tend to be understood in terms of stable dispositional
proclivities. This lesson is rendered explicit by experiments in social
psychology.
In one such study, a first group of subjects (the "observers") were
asked to monitor and later draw conclusions about the conduct of a
second group of subjects (the "volunteers") as part of a study on
decision making."' After describing a fictitious study to the
subjects, the experimenter announced that before they began
the experiment, she "happen [ed] to have sort of a real decision
for [them] to make."" 2 The corporate board and potential finan-
cial supporters of the college's "Human Development Institute" were
gathered in town for the weekend, and the Institute was seeking
students who would help with entertainment and campus tours for
the spouses of these businesspeople. The real experiment, of course,
was underway. Some subjects were offered $0.50 per hour and some
were offered $1.50 (or some amount closer to $3 and $9, respectively,
in 2003 values). Just twenty-four percent of the low-payment subjects
volunteered, while sixty-eight percent of the high-payment subjects
did so."1 Volunteering was therefore correlated with the amount of
money offered, hardly a shocking result.
environment or a biased professor who grades unfairly. Conversely, when things go
well for us we have a tendency to attribute the cause to our own dispositions-our
intelligence, diligence, etc.-rather than situational influences. Those patterns in the
actor-observer bias, as the phenomenon has been dubbed by social psychologists, echo
part of our basic claim here, which is that our behavioral attributions are often
motivated. See Emily Pronin et al., Understanding Misunderstanding- Social Psychological
Perspectives, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 636,
653-65 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) (reviewing social psychological findings
concerning the actor-observer bias); see also FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 20, at 72-75
(discussing actor-observer bias). Social psychologists have identified other limits to our
dispositionism. See infra text accompanying notes 411-41 (discussing cultural
influences over dispositionist and situationist attributions). Of course, even when we
attribute causation to situation, we often only recognize a tiny portion of the situation.
See also infra text accompanying notes 140-45 (describing other limitations to our
ability to appreciate the role of situation).
I Richard E. Nisbett et al., Behavior as Seen by the Actor and as Seen by the Observer,
27J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 154, 155 (1973).
112 Id. at 155-56.
11 I d. at 157.
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More revealing findings, however, came out of the second part of
the experiment. "Observers," who had been privy to all elements of
the first part of the study, were asked about their perceptions of the
volunteers' reasons for agreeing or declining to assist the Institute
over the weekend. The observers apparently attributed the
differences in volunteering to the stable dispositions of the individual
subjects, rather than to the amount of money that each was offered
in the situation. Asked "[h]ow likely do you think it is that [the
subject] would also volunteer to canvass for the United Fund?,"
observers responded that those who had volunteered in the present
experiment would be substantially more likely to volunteer for the
United Fund than would those who had not presently volunteered,
regardless of how much they had been offered. 1 4 "Observers were
apparently misled by the actor's behavior, assuming it reflected a
dispositional tendency to volunteer rather than a response to a
suitably compensated 'job opportunity.''1
5
This study suggests the depth of our dispositionism. It can run
deeper than any intuitive belief in the selfish or profiteering nature
of human behavior; we think people are the way they are,
irrespective of the influences under which they act at any moment.
We are prone to dispositionism even where situational factors are
visible, countable, and widely acknowledged to be a source of
incentives and influence. Of all the non-human, non-threatening
situational factors, it is difficult to think of one more obvious and
unmistakable than cash. And yet, even when money is the clear
motive, we still tend to see disposition.
This is one place where economists part ways with the rest of us,
though as argued in the next subsection, not nearly so far as it might
initially appear. The self-interested, rational actor of many economic
models acts pursuant to one primary situational factor-money-in
the forms of prices and incomes. An economist would not miss the
implied upward-sloping supply curve in the experiment just
described. The volunteer ratios would be explained immediately and
solely by the situational distance between $0.50 and $1.50.
b. The limits of economists' situationism
One should not be fooled by this fleeting attributional accuracy,
for it is just a consequence of the otherwise dispositional assumptions
114 Nisbett et al., supra note 111, at 156-57.
115 Ross & NISBETr, supra note 9, at 127.
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behind the rational actor model. It is actually the important
similarity between the economist and the non-economist as
dispositionists that is most striking.
As we have already suggested, the reason that economists see the
situational role of money is because of their preliminary assumption
that people are dispositionally motivated to pursue little else. Close
inspection reveals that economists actually provide an unjustifiably
anemic version of their favored situational factor, as their models
allow for only a fraction of the situational force of price. For
example, a fundamental assumption of legal economists, one that
quietly makes possible much of their analysis, is that a person's
willingness to pay equals her willingness to accept for the same item.
That is, a person would be willing to pay as much for a widget as that
person would be willing to accept in payment from another party for
selling that same widget. That assumption is, for example, central to
the Coase Theorem's instruction that well-functioning markets will
yield allocatively efficient outcomes.
Yet, even if one ignores the growing evidence from economic
behavioralists that willingness to pay tends to be significantly lower
than willingness to accept,'16 such a starting place entirely disregards
the role of external situation. More specifically, a "basic principle of
economics"" 7 that assets tend to "gravitate toward their most valuable
uses if voluntary exchange-a market-is permitted"' 8 ignores the
fact that a person's "willingness to pay," will to a great degree reflect
that person's "ability to pay." In other words, the basic principle of
economics treats situation (ability to pay) as disposition (willingness
to pay). Richard Posner describes this translation of situational
constraints into dispositional tendencies in the introduction to his
seminal law and economics text:
Suppose that pituitary extract is in very scarce supply relative to the
demand and is therefore very expensive. A poor family has a child who
will be a dwarf if he does not get some of the extract, but the family
cannot afford the price and could not even if they could borrow
against the child's future earnings as a person of normal height .... A
rich family has a child who will grow to normal height, but the extract
will add a few inches more, and his parents decide to buy it for him.
116 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect
and the Coase Theorem, 98J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1325 (1990) (declaring that "[c]on-
trary to theoretical expectations, measures of willingness to accept greatly exceed
measures of willingness to pay").
117 POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 13, at 10.
H s I d .
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In the sense of value used in this book [Economic Analysis of Law], the
pituitary extract is more valuable to the rich than to the poor family,
because value is measured by willingness to pay; but the extract would
confer greater happiness in the hands of the poor family than in the
hands of the rich one.
As this example shows, the term efficiency, when used as in this
book to denote that allocation of resources in which value is
maximized, has limitations as an ethical criterion of social
decisionmaking .... Although no effort will be made in this book to
defend efficiency as the only worthwhile criterion of social choice, ...
it is an important criterion. In many areas of interest to the economic
analyst of law .... it is ... the main thing that students of public
policy worry about." '
In short, economists are situationally sensitive in only the
narrowest sense-taking into account the way in which price might
influence people's actions based on their willingness to pay, but
refusing to look at the situational backdrop to that disposition 2 0  As
the Posner quotation exemplifies, economists do not typically go very
far to justify that situational blindness. 21 But it is a blindness that
arguably implicates even the most central features of their theory.
Indeed, it may be that same type of situational influence (ability
to pay as limited by "budget constraints" or prices) and not the
presumed dispositional forces (rational ranking of preferences) that
puts the "down" in the downward-sloping demand curve, the crown
jewel of economic theory. As Nobel Laureate Gary Becker taught
forty years ago:
Negatively inclined market demand curves result not so much from
rational behavior per se as from a general principle which includes a
wide class of irrational behavior as well. Therefore, households can be
119 Id. at 13.
120 There are arguably other minor ways in which economists take into account
situational considerations. For instance, they sometimes take into account the role of
collective, as compared to individual, decisions or decisions regarding uncertain
outcomes. But even then, their analyses are otherwise based on dispositionist assump-
tions. A group of people is usually assumed to act like a set of dispositionally
motivated individuals who are making a choice, and little or no adjustment is made to
consider the situational influence of even various group dynamics.
121 When pushed, they instruct those who see it otherwise that such
"distributional" concerns are not properly the province of either economists or legal
rules. See Chen & Hanson, supra note 52 (recounting Posner's argument that the
economic analysis of law does not take in account income distributional
considerations).
122 See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 7, at 23 (treating as axiomatic the
downward-sloping demand curve-i.e., the notion that "when the price of x goes up,
the amount of x that the consumer will purchase goes down, and vice versa").
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said to behave not only "as if' they were rational but also "as if' they
were irrational: the major piece of empirical evidence justifying the
first statement can equally well justify the second ....
[T]he change in opportunities resulting from a change in relative
prices also tends to produce a systematic response, regardless of the
decision rule. In particular, the fundamental theorem of traditional
theory-that demand curves are negatively inclined-largely results
from the change in opportunities alone and is largely independent of
123
the decision rule.
Not only utility maximization but also many other decision rules,
incorporating a wide variety of irrational behavior, lead to negatively
inclined demand curves because of the effect of a change in prices on
opportunities. 
1 24
Hence the market would act as if "it" were rational not only when
households were rational, but also when they were inert, impulsive, or
otherwise irrational.1
2
5
Indeed, the most important substantive result of this paper is that
irrational units would often be "forced" by a [situational] change in
opportunities to respond rationally. For example, impulsive
households would tend to have negatively inclined demand curves
because a rise in the price of one commodity would shift opportunities
toward others, leaving less chance to purchase this one even
impulsively. Other irrational households would likewise tend to have
negatively inclined demand curves, irrational firms negatively inclined
demand curves for inputs, and irrational workers positively inclined
supply curves to occupations. 6
Strikingly, despite Becker's demonstration that downward-sloping
demand curves do not imply rational behavior, many subsequent
economists (particularly legal economists) have ignored or trivialized
it . 12 7 The idea that situation is central and disposition is peripheral
123 Gary S. Becker, Irrational Behavior and Economic Theoy, 70 J. POL. ECON. 1, 4
(1962).
124 Id. at5.
125 Id. at 7.
126 Id. at 12.
127 Richard Posner is one of the few legal economists to address it. See Hanson &
Yosifon, supra note 30 (reviewing Richard Posner's discussion and dismissal of the
issue). Posner recently ridiculed Ronald Coase for suggesting that the insight might
be taken seriously. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 442 (1995) ("Could
Coase believe that some cognitive or psychological defect prevents us from moving up
the ladder of preferred alternatives in the manner that I described? That misfiring
brain cells make us disregard opportunity cost or fail to disregard sunk costs?
Unlikely."). Very recently, however, behavioral economists have identified several ways
in which arbitrary anchors can provide the illusion of stable preferences and how there
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has no purchase, given what economists seem to "know" about their
world (as confirmed by their human vision and, tautologically, by the
shape and slope of the demand curves they have "seen").'2 8  It is as
though legal economists, like the rest of us, are so swept up by the
play that they forget that they are watching one and come to believe
that the characters in it are internally, dispositionally motivated.
Becker's point has been regarded as a move in a logic game; it is
treated as a bizarre, if strictly speaking correct, theoretical insight. 1
9
His point is stripped of its power as the human figures are
caricatured as "irrational" actors and the more revealing depth of the
insight is not pursued: situation is often more potent than we
acknowledge, exerting a greater influence over our actions than
disposition.
Besides the narrow treatment of price and budget, the other
major exception to economists' dispositionism is, as for the rest of us,
the case in which someone acts in response to a significant threat
(usually of force) posed by another person-prototypically a bullet to
the brain. Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, in their highly regarded
law and economics text, provide a fairly conventional description of
when situation should be considered in the law of contracts:
[S]ometimes one of the parties to a bargain faces a dire constraint.
A dire constraint leaves the decision-maker with little or no choice.
Contract law treats dire constraints differently ....
Law prohibits people from making threats such as, "Work for me if
you want your sister to come home safely from school ....""')
Then, at the conclusion of their analysis, they ask the reader to
explain the efficiency argument against enforcing the following
arrangement: "Suppose that person A, while aiming a gun at person
B, invites B to write a check.' 13' As such hypotheticals illustrate,
can be "stable demand curves without stable preferences". See generally Dan Ariely,
George Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, Coherent Arbitrariness: Stable Demand Curves
Without Stable Preferences, 118 Q.J. ECON. 73 (2003).
128 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 127, at 441-42 (acknowledging the first point,
then trivializing it through brief tautological assertions).
129 See id. at 442 ("Becker's argument is that since consumers have limited budgets,
even irrational consumers will on average purchase less of a good when [the] price
rises, because the consumers' resources will become depleted sooner.").
130 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 7, at 261.
131 Id. at 263.
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situation is easy to see, if not impossible to miss, when it is
brandishing a revolver. 13
Along with those scenarios, Cooter and Ulen offer some less
dramatic examples, such as a crew threatening to walkout midway
through a chartered fishing voyage in an effort to extract higher
wages from their captain. 3  But even examples that do not involve
violent threats still involve "threats.' ' 4  And those threats are made
clear by one or more dispositionally motivated human actors seeking
to force one party to act contrary to his or her interests absent the
threat. In other words, only an extremely narrow range of situational
factors count-those of dispositionally bad actors. Cooter and Ulen's
lesson is that constraints less "dire" than the sort indicated in their
examples are ignored in contract law, and properly so from an
economic perspective.' 35
But these exceptions do not reveal a true sensitivity to situation;
they expose only the tiny and predictable exception to dispositionism
that proves the rule. Indeed, these departures flow from the very
same current that creates the more general phenomenon-the
fundamental attribution error-to which they are exceptions. That
current, recall, originates from our cognitive tendency to "see" salient
actors and features and to miss the rest. 36 The general result is that
we tend to attribute a person's actions to her free choices because we
do not see the influence of situation. However, when the situation
takes the form of a threatening actor, we see that "situation" and
alter our conclusion regarding how free, in fact, the first actor's
132 Revealingly, even in conditions of unmistakable situational duress, economists
sometimes see a person's submission as properly understood as voluntarily and
dispositionally motivated, albeit inefficient. For instance,Judge Posner writes:
A points a gun at B saying, 'Your money or your life.' B is very eager to
accept the first branch of this offer by tendering his money. But a court will
not enforce the resulting contract. The reason is not that B was not acting of
his own free will. On the contrary, he was no doubt extremely eager to
accept A's offer. The reason is that the enforcement of such offers would
lower the net social product, by channeling resources into the making of
threats and into efforts to protect against them.
POSNER, ECONOMIC A.NALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 13, at 116.
133 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 7, at 263.
134 Id. at 262 ("Bargaining, which involves demands and offers, is opposite
from coercion, which involves threats.").
135 See infra text accompanying notes 550-614 (discussing other legal theorists and
the law's treatment of similar issues).
136 See supra text accompanying notes 21-26 (explaining that the fundamental
attribution error is a function of numerous factors, including the dominant role that
human action generally takes in our causal construal processes).
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choices were. Put differently, a person is seen to give up her seat for
an 800-pound gorilla, not by free choice, but because of the half-ton
of hairy, menacing situation. If she gives up her seat for an elderly
person or a parent holding a child, in contrast, suddenly it is her
kind disposition that dominates the field, eclipsing situation.
In sum, there is little or no place in economists' models for
situational influences other than prices or narrowly defined threats.
It is not just the inability of poor parents to afford pituitary extract
for their children that the economic approach ignores; it is also the
myriad of situational influences that Milgram's studies and
countless other social psychological studies have exposed, and
137that economists have yet to see, much less explain. It is also the
countless situational influences that invisibly regulate us all-as they
would the impoverished dwarf in Posner's example whose future
earnings presumptively would be less than those of an affluent
person of normal height.' Thus, economists exclude most of the
vast range of situational influences in their analyses, and provide no
explanation for privileging guns and money over the situational
factors that they, like the rest of us, mostly ignore.
c. Some situation behind our dispositionism
Social psychologists have discovered that our day-to-day
dispositionism goes still further. When we observe a person's
behavior, we tend to first characterize that person in terms of her
disposition. Only then do we begin to correct our characterization
and take into account some of the situational variables that may have
shaped her behavior. 3 9 For instance, when we observe someone who
is acting nervously, we automatically infer that the person is a
nervous person. If we then discover that the person was talking
about her intimate life, we might adjust our initial inference to take
137 See, e.g., supra notes 86-99; infra notes 148-54, 180-81, 192, 242, 489-91, 616-34
(describing some of the situational manipulations in Milgram's studies and closely
related studies, and how they influenced behavior and expectations). See generally
Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 30 (providing an overview of situational influences).
138 See supra text accompanying notes 119-20 (presenting the pituitary extract
exarn le).
Daniel T. Gilbert, Thinking Lightly About Others: Automatic Components of the
Social Inference Process, in UNINTENDED TIiOUGHT 189, 193 (James S. Uleman &John
A. Bargh eds., 1989).
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that situational feature into account. We might, in other words, drop
or doubt our inference that she is dispositionally a nervous 
person.140
While initially inferring character and temperament from
people's behavior is an automatic process, correcting those initial
inferences to account for the situation requires effort. We must
expend cognitive resources to correct our initial dispositional
impressions. And if our cognitive resources are being utilized
because we are, say, preoccupied, tired, or intoxicated, then we will
be less able to correct our dispositional inferences about people's
behavior to account for the situation. Consequently, we will
inaccurately attribute a person's behavior to her disposition rather
than the underlying situation. 142  Put differently, our situations
influence the extent to which we take into account other people's
situations-a tendency discussed at greater length below.
43
More troubling still, "even when we appreciate the impact of the
situation, want to correct our inferences for it, and have the cognitive
resources necessary for doing so, we may still fail to make sufficient
corrections." The dispositional attribution that we initially and
automatically make acts as an anchor on the adjustments that we
allow for situational factors. "Our ultimate conclusions about a
person may remain contaminated by our initial inferences about this
person's character even if we consider these inferences unwarranted• . ,,145
and attempt to rid ourselves of this contamination.
140 KUNDA, supra note 20, at 431.
141 Gilbert, supra note 139, at 193-94.
142 Id. at 194 (finding empirical support for the hypothesis that a perceiver who is
distracted is more likely to engage in dispositional thinking than a perceiver who is not
"cognitively busy"); KUNDA, supra note 20, at 431 ("When we are preoccupied, tired,
intoxicated, or in a hurry, and so unable to devote careful thought to making sense of
others, we may fail to correct our impressions for situational constraints even if we
understand these constraints."); see also Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental
Contamination and Mental Correction: Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations,
116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117, 127-28 (1994) (citing this as an example of the fundamental
attribution bias and explaining that we often attribute a person's behavior to certain
traits or attitudes-i.e., disposition-implied by such conduct).
143 See infra text accompanying notes 415-56 (discussing the role of culture); infra
Part VI.C-E (discussing some of the situational influences behind our culture).
144 KUNDA, supra note 20, at 431-32; see also George A. Quattrone, Overattribution
and Unit Formation: When Behavior Engulfs the Person, 42 J. PERSONALrY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 593, 600-01, 604-06 (1982) (reviewing two experiments demonstrating that
there may be circumstances in which observers overattribute behavior to situational
causes while adjusting instufficiently for information about an actor's dispositions).
145 KUNDA, supra note 20, at 432; see also Wilson & Brekke, su/ra note 142, at 127-
28 (characterizing "the tendency to attribute people's behavior to their underlying
dispositions" as a "failure" of the "unacceptable process").
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2. How Fundamental an Error Is Our Dispositionism?
As the previous subsection suggested, considerable evidence
reveals that our dispositionism runs very deep. 46 But even if most of
us, including legal economists, are hard-core dispositionists, there is
a second, related question regarding the extent to which
dispositionism is wrong: That is, just how influential is situation vis-A-
vis disposition? How much like a play are the settings in which
humans actually find themselves and observe others?
It is difficult to read about Milgram's experiments and the
reactions to them without strongly suspecting that the human
presumption is exactly inverted; that what we do not see dominates
the little that we do see. That suspicion would, in our view, be
generally correct. But since those early studies, social psychologists
have managed to get a better measure of that inversion, a sample of
which we will highlight here.
When we introduced Milgram's famous experiments, we asserted
that most readers would, like us, predict that they themselves would
not have carried out the instructions to shock a fellow experimental
subject at high voltages. Most readers surely would have predicted ex
ante that the vast majority of others would not have gone through
with it either, just as the lay people and psychologists surveyed by
Milgram before his experiment predicted. 47 This divergence
between the common sense prediction and the actual behavior, we
indicated, was due to the erroneous presumption that people behave
dispositionally rather than situationally. In fact, the situational
features were central, leading many to shock their fellow subjects
despite having an otherwise normal or benign character. 43 Once
one is familiar with Milgram's experiments, it would seem difficult to
deny his central claim-that situation played a major role in causing
the subjects to perform as they did.
And yet, social psychologists have found that even when exposed
to the Milgram study, people continue to conclude that the subjects
were motivated dispositionally and thus miss the power of the
146 See KUNDA, supra note 20, at 432-41 (providing a fascinating review of
additional types of evidence of the fundamental attribution error).
:47 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
48 See ZIMBARDO & LEIPPE, supra note 22, at 70 (dismissing the argument that
Milgram's subjects were somehow "bad apples" by pointing out that the
experimental "results were the same: meek obedience to unjust authority" across
a wide demographic subject population).
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situation even when it is made explicit. For example, social psych-
ologist Martin Safer showed students Milgram's film, Obedience,"W,
which portrays the dynamics of the situational forces operating in
Milgram's experiments. One week later, Safer provided his students
with a description of the control experiment where the subject or
"teacher" was free to choose the shock level on his own, without any
direction by the experimenter to increase the voltage after each
wrong answer.' 0 Safer then asked the students to make certain
predictions, including the average shock level set by the teachers in
the control experiment and the percentage of teachers choosing the
maximum shock level.'0 '
Even after seeing the film of the obedience experiment and the
situational pressures of the experiment, Safer's students still believed
that disposition was driving the teachers and would do so even in
other situations, including that in which they were given no orders
from the experimenter. When comparing the students' forecasts to
the actual results of the control experiment, Safer's students
significantly overestimated both the average shock level set by the
teachers and the number of teachers who chose the maximum
amount of shock absent the most significant situational forces of the
original obedience experiment. 2  In other words, Safer's students
persisted in believing that the teachers in Milgram's original
experiment were motivated by stable disposition rather than the• 153
situation of the expenment.
This, of course, completely contradicts the findings of the ex
ante surveys in which people drastically underestimated the amount of
149 OBEDIENCE (Stanley Milgram 1969).
150 Martin A. Safer, Attributing Evil to the Subject, Not the Situation: Student Reaction
to Milgram's Film on Obedience, 6 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 205, 205-06
(1980).
151 Id. at 206.
152 Id. at 207.
153 Id. at 208. In Milgram's movie about the experiments, only one of the many
subjects is shown flipping the final switch, even though a majority of those
participating did so. OBEDIENCE, supra note 149. According to folk wisdom among
social psychologists, that is because the subjects who went that far did not want to be
shown on film doing so, presumably because they felt that their actions reflected
badly on their dispositions. In other words, it appears that even the subjects
interpreted what happened in largely dispositionist terms. As revealed in one subject's
reflections one year after the experiment, subjects and their family members construed
the experiment as revealing dispositionism: "As my wife said, '[ylou can call yourself
Eichmann.' I hope I can deal more effectively with any future conflicts of values I
encounter." MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY, supra note 86, at 54.
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shocking that would occur with situational pressures present. The
contradiction again reveals the underlying consistency of the
stubborn command of our dispositionism. Even when the power of
the situation was made explicit, "subjects continued to interpret
behavior in terms of presumed dispositions, rather than recognizing
the crucial role that Milgram's particular situation had played in
producing his disturbing demonstration . Our dispositionism runs
deep, despite the fact that situation often runs deeper.
In another classic demonstration of this phenomenon, subjects
were asked to read a short essay on "Castro's Cuba" and to judge the
true attitude of the writer toward Castro. The subjects were
informed that the essay was a prepared answer to an examination
question, in which some exam takers were asked to criticize Castro's
Cuba and other exam takers were asked to defend it. Subjects thus
understood that the writer of any exam had little choice with respect
to the position he or she took regarding Castro's Cuba. Surprisingly,
many of the subjects nevertheless associated the writer's true attitude
(disposition) toward Castro with the content of the essay. If the
writer wrote a pro-Castro essay as (situationally) directed, many
subjects concluded that the writer was privately (dispositionally) pro-
Castro, and vice versa. 55 Thus, even when situational influences
should be obvious and even when people are watching what is
tantamount to a play, humans still tend to overestimate the role of
disposition.
Consider another exemplary experiment. In this one, college
students participated in a simulated quiz game and were randomly
assigned to either of two roles: contestant or questioner.
Questioners were asked to compose general-knowledge queries to be
posed to the contestants, and the contestants were instructed to
answer as many of the questions as they could.157 The situational
IA Ross & NISBETr, supra note 9, at 132.
155 See Edward E. Jones & Victor A. Harris, The Attribution of Attitudes, 3 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 4-8 (1967). Jones and Harris observed similar
results in a second experiment that had the subjects draw dispositional inferences
based on hearing an opening statement in a debate. Id. at 8-14.
J56 Lee D. Ross et al., Social Roles, Social Control, and Biases in Social-Perception
Processes, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 485, 485-94 (1977). In a separate
experiment, observers of the simulated quiz game exhibited the same dispositional
bias as the contestants. Thus, even though the observers were aware of the situational
advantage of the questioners, the observers nonetheless ranked the questioners as
more generally knowledgeable than the contestants. Id. at 490-91.
157 Id. at 489-94.
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advantage of the questioners is clear, given that they could draw
from their areas of personal expertise, while contestants were forced
to answer questions on unfamiliar topics. Therefore, it should not
have been surprising that contestants could only give a small
percentage of correct answers. Yet, when it came to estimating
the intelligence of the two groups, the situational advantage
was forgotten: both questioners and contestants grossly under-
appreciated the situational benefit of being a questioner. As a
result, both groups ranked the questioners as more generally
knowledgeable than contestants. In other words, the game was
perceived as a fair measure of general knowledge, and the failure of
contestants was attributed to disposition. Put differently,
158 This study (and the many like) it would be, if they were well known, a favorite
among law students and anyone else on the business end of the Socratic method. Cf
LANi GUINIER ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN: LAW SCHOOL AND INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE 28 (1997) (noting that many women are alienated by the use of the Socratic
method, especially in the first year of law school); Lani Guinier et al., Becoming
Gentlemen: Women's Experiences at One Ivy League Law School, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 6-59
(1994) (describing in detail the results of the study discussed in Guinier's book).
In another important study, a group of subjects was asked to divide a set of their
peers into two categories: those the subjects thought would be likely to contribute to
a tood drive, and those they believed would be unlikely to contribute. ROSS &
NISBETT, supra note 9, at 132. Half of each group-the "most likely" and the "least
likely"-was then sent a personalized letter asking for a specific food donation,
including a map of where to deliver the item. Id. The other half of each group
received a generic form letter requesting only a general food donation, and with no
map. Id.
The study confirmed both the prevalence of dispositionism and the dominance of
situation in determining actual conduct. The subjects who selected the "most likely"
and "least likely" groups predicted that dispositional ascriptions, not the type of letter
received, would determine who would actually donate food. Id. at 133. Specifically,
subjects predicted that disposition (the type of person) would be nearly five times
more influential than situation (the type of letter). But when the letters were sent
aud the food was collected, it turned out that the influence of situation was over four
times greater than the influence of disposition-those who received personal letters
mth a map were much more likely to donate food. Id. Of course, even that figure
oxerstates the role of disposition, because even those seemingly "dispositional"
influences may be explained in part by situational influences beyond the channeling
effect of the letter. In any event, the subjects tended to see what mattered least and
miss what mattered most.
DISPOSITION
Most Likely Least Likely
SITUATION Channeling Letter 83% predicted/ 17% predicted/
42% actual 25% actual
Non-Channeling 80% predicted/ 16% predicted/
Letter 8% actual 0% actual
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participants saw the players and missed the playing field, thus
presuming that it was level.
Finally, consider the following experimental inquiry into the
social-psychological lessons of the classic Christian parable of the
Good Samaritan. In the biblical version of the story, Jesus, in
response to questioning by a lawyer about the meaning of
neighborliness, tells of a man mortally wounded and left on a road
by thieves.1 The man was passed first by a priest, who saw the hurt
man but did not stop to help him. Next, a Levite (a priest's
assistant) passed the man, saw him, but continued on without
stopping. Finally came a man from Samaria-a Samaritan. He saw
the wounded man and "was moved to pity. He went up and
bandaged his wounds.., brought him to an inn, and looked after
him there."'6 Having told this story, Jesus turns to the lawyer and
asks, "Which of these three do you think was neighbor to the man
who fell into the hands of the robbers?"" ' The answer, of course, is
that the Samaritan was the neighborly one, hence earning the,, 162
dispositional moniker the "Good Samaritan.
Social psychology, however, instructs that situation may provide
a better explanation for the conduct of the characters in this tale, as
it does in so much of our social life. This is not merely conjecture; it
has been subject to experiment.16'c  Princeton Theological Seminary
Subjects predicted that eighty-three percent of the "most likely" group would
donate if they received the detailed channeling information, and that eighty percent
of the "most likely" group would donate if they received the general letter. Id.
Subjects further predicted that only seventeen percent of those deemed "least likely"
would donate if they received the letter with the channeling information, and that
sixteen percent of the group would donate if they received the general request. Id.
In other words, the subjects expected that the different letters would have virtually
no effect, but that the different "types" of recipients would have an immense effect.
The predictions failed: only four percent of subjects donated food in the non-
channeling condition (none of the "least likelies" and eight percent of the "most
likelies"), while thirty-three percent donated food in the facilitory condition (twenty-
five percent of the "least likelies" and forty-two percent of the "most likelies."). Id. As
the authors of the study noted, "[t]he situational variables proved more important
than the relevant actors' dispositions-more important, at least, than any dispositions
salient to their peers." Id.
159 Luke 10:29-37.
166 Id. 10:33-34.
11 Id. 10:36.
'6' Perhaps revealingly, the phrase is not found in the biblical tale at all; rather,
it has come down to us through dispositional interpretations of the parable.
163 See John M. Darley & C. Daniel Batson, From Jerusalem to Jericho: A Study of
Situational and Dispositional Variables in Helping Behavior, 27 J. PERSONALITY SOC.
PSYCHOL. 100, 100-08 (1973).
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students were asked to prepare a brief extemporaneous talk that
would be recorded in a nearby building.6 4 The experiment thus
neatly managed to have its subjects parallel the priestly
vocations of the characters in the biblical tale. Some of the
students were told to discuss possible jobs for seminary students,
while the others were told to discuss the parable of the Good
Samaritan. 165 After informing them about their respective talks, the
experimenter told some of his subjects, "Oh, you're late. They were
expecting you a few minutes ago. We'd better get moving." 6  These
students were given the high-hurry situational condition. Another
group of subjects was given an intermediate-hurry situational
condition. This group was told, "The assistant is ready for you, so
please go right over.' 167  Finally, for a low-hurry situational
condition, the experimenter told the remaining subjects, "It'll be a
few minutes before they're ready for you, but you might as well head
",168on over.
Along the route between the two buildings was a man, the
experimenter's undisclosed confederate, "slumped in a doorway,
head down, eyes closed, not moving[, coughing, and groaning] ."
169
Only ten percent of the seminarians who had been told they were
running late (the high-hurry situational condition) stopped to help
the ailing man, and only forty-five percent of the seminarians who
were pressed for time (the intermediate-hurry situational condition)
offered help.170 In contrast, among those who were not pressed for
time (the low-hurry situational condition), sixty-three percent offered
to help. Again, a minor situational manipulation produced a
major behavioral difference. Perhaps most indicative of the power of
situational influence is that several of the seminarians who were
pressed for time and who were to speak on the parable of the Good
Samaritan "literally stepped over the victim" on the way to give their
talks. 1
72
16C4 Id. at 103.
165 Id.
163 Id. at 103-04.
167 Id. at 104.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 105.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 107.
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What about dispositions? Before the experiment began, the
seminarians filled out a survey, answering a variety of questions about
themselves.1 3  For example, the seminarians were asked whether
their interest in religion stemmed primarily from a desire to assure
their own personal salvation or whether it was primarily related to
their desire to help others. 74 Such dispositional self-ascriptions had
"virtually no role in determining whether the subject stopped to
help.""' After analyzing psychological evaluations of their forty
subjects, the experimenters found that the only significant variable
that correlated with "helping behavior" was time, a situational
factor. 7' The fact that some of the seminarians were to speak on the
parable of the Good Samaritan, thereby raising the salience of
dispositional helping norms, did not significantly affect helping
behavior in the students.
7
Taken together, these experiments help bring into relief the
profound power of situation over human action. They also reveal
that such influences are usually left unexamined in our daily lives, in
our stories, and in our theories about what moves people. There was
little evidence of a "good seminarian" or a "bad seminarian," but
there was much evidence of "situational seminarians." The differ-
ence between the priest who passes on and the Samaritan who stops
may be more a function of a bad or good situation than of a bad or
good disposition.7
We humans tend to perceive disposition as dominating situation
even though evidence from social science strongly suggests the
reverse; this is, again, the fundamental attribution error. The
objective here is not to prove or to claim that disposition plays no
role in our behavior, or even that it does not sometimes play a very
important role. Rather, the objective is to make clear what social
science reveals about just how surprisingly slight that role is most of
the time-at least as compared to what most of us believe and,
173 Id. at 102.
174 Id.
175 Ross & NISBETr, supra note 9, at 131.
176 Darley & Batson, supra note 163, at 104-06.
177 Id. at 107; see also Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 30 (discussing a related
portion of this experiment).
178 See also MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY, supra note 86, at 205 ("[T]he
social psychology of this century reveals a major lesson: often, it is not so much the
kind of person a man is as the kind of situation in which he finds himself that
determines how he will act.").
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perhaps, want to believe. 179  Readers may, as we do, take some
reassurance from the fact that ten percent of the hurried
seminarians did stop to assist the ailing man, despite their perceived
time crunch. But again, it is easy to miss even the profound
situational influence wielded in that experiment by the groaning,
slumped elderly man. Settings with less compelling situational
pressures for help are likely to yield even less "goodness." Indeed, a
disheartening finding is that, in the many versions of Milgram's
studies, not a single subject ever went to check on or assist the
learner whom they believed was being shocked, despite the learner's
protests and ultimate silence during the "experiment" and despite
the teacher's own concern about hurting the learner.' Why not? A
good guess would be that offering such aid was somehow not
situationally scripted.'"
D. Some Sources of Dispositionism
Why do we see what isn't and fail to see what is? We have already
discussed several reasons. First, part of the answer stems from the
fact that human actions dominate the field in our causal
attributions-we see what is most obvious and salient, and tend to
miss the rest. Is2 Perhaps that would not be such a problem were we
not so inclined to believe in the accuracy of our vision-that we see
all there is to see, and that what we miss does not exist. Second,
even when there are situational features that we might recognize as
influential, we make dispositional attributions automatically, while
our situational adjustments require cognitive effort-meaning that
dispositionism is the default inference, mutable only when our minds
179 See infra text accompanying notes 193-95, 393-401, 454-56, 638-81 (suggesting
some of the ways in which dispositionism may be linked to the motive to affirm
ourselves, our groups, and our systems); supra note 110 (describing our tendency to
attribute cause to situation when doing so is self-affirming).
180 ZIMBARDO & LEIPPE, supra note 22, at 73-74.
is) Without a model of action, our feelings of upset and our desire to help often
lead to no action. Milgram discussed the frustration of a specific "teacher" as such:
This subject did not want to shock the victim, and he found it an extremely
disagreeable task, but he was unable to invent a response that would free him
from [the experimenter's] authority. Many subjects cannot find the specific
verbal formula that would enable them to reject the role assigned to them by
the experimenter. Perhaps our culture does not provide adequate models for
disobedience.
Milgram, Some Conditions of Obedience, supra note 86, at 67.
182 See supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
[Vol. 152: 129
THE SITUA TION
are not otherwise occupied. "" Third, even then our automatic dis-
positional attributions will contaminate the adjustments for situations
that we do have the cognitive energy to make.114 As significant as
those reasons are, there is more to consider.
To comprehend the robustness of dispositionism, it is necessary
to understand that the causal ambiguities that fog our experiences
allow, and often encourage, it. As Lee Ross and Richard Nisbett
have argued at length, our dispositionism often appears to be
confirmed in the evidence we encounter in our daily lives.115 That is
true in part because we tend to see what we expect to see, and,
particularly in Western culture, disposition is the general
expectation." We will return to both of these points below.8 7 For
now it is enough to say that our construals of what we experience (or
of our memories of what we have experienced) are far more
malleable in service of our expectations than we recognize.
But even if we were seeing what "is," our dispositionist theory of
human conduct will tend to be confirmed by the evidence we
encounter, though our interpretation of that evidence is often
fundamentally wrong. We constantly see people behaving in ways
consistent with our assumptions about their personality traits, and we
often conform our own interactions with them based on those
dispositional accounts. Our predictions are confirmed, however, not
because dispositions are in fact stable, but because situations so often
are:
In the course of ordinary experience, we rarely have a chance to
observe the same people in radically different roles or situations in a
way that would test fairly the cross-situational consistency of their
geniality, generosity, or ability to delay gratification. Nor do we
systematically vary our own behavior, or our status and circumstances,
or the nature of our relationships with others, to determine how their
responses might change as a result.188
And even if "the many situations in which we observe our
acquaintances are quite diverse, they all share an important
See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
84 See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
185 Ross & NISBETr, supra note 9, at 145-58.
86 See infra text accompanying notes 418-52; see also KUNDA, supra note 20, at
442 (asserting that Western culture's emphasis on personality traits leads to the
expectation that human behavior will be consistent across different situations).
187 See infra Part VI.C.
188 ROSS & NISBETr, supra note 9, at 147-48.
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element-our presence. What we see and what we expect to see
operate as self-fulfilling, situational forces on those we are
observing' 9 0-our dispositionism is part of the situation. As Ross and
Nisbett explain, none of this implies that dispositionism is correct; it
implies only that people will experience dispositionism as a
reasonably reliable heuristic for predicting behavior. Because the
people we observe will tend to behave as if they are motivated by
disposition and not situation, the data we collect will appear to
confirm our flawed dispositionist conception of the humans we are
observing:
It is precisely the confounding of person and situation that allows
people to be well served by their naive dispositionism. When we
predict that the behavior of professors will be professorial, that the
behavior of dictators will be dictatorial, that the behavior of servants
will be servile . . . it makes little difference whether we do so because
we are aware of the impact of the respective roles, because we have
made stereotyped judgments about the types of individuals who occupy
such roles, or because we have taken role-prescribed behavior at face
value and ascribed corresponding personality traits to the actor. In
each case, the performances we observe more often than not will
confirm our predictions.., provided that no other powerful
situational factors suddenly intrude.
9
In all those ways, our dispositionism is shielded from having to
regularly confront unambiguously anomalous evidence.
189 KUNDA, supra note 20, at 442.
1 See id. at 442-43 (summarizing the "considerable amount of evidence [that]
suggests that our expectations of others can be self-fulfilling").
191 Ross & NISBETr, supra note 9, at 150. Briefly below, and in some detail in
Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 30, we discuss other motives that amplify our
dispositionism. See infra notes 193-94, 393-401, 454-56, 638-81 and accompanying text
(highlighting some of the connections between motivation and dispositionism).
Research in system legitimation theory, for example, suggests that when we perceive
our social systems to be under threat-as in periods of social instability-we exhibit a
heightened tendency to dispositionalize out-groups and individuals within out-groups,
blaming their stable character traits for the threat, and missing situational factors that
may be the real cause of the threat. See, e.g., John T. Jost, Outgroup Favoritism and the
Theory of System Justification, in COGNITIVE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 86, 101 (Gordon B.
Moskowitz ed., 2001) (noting that "the presence of an ideological threat directed
against the national system increases stereotypic differentiation" between inside groups
and outside groups).
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E. The Fundamental Interior Attribution Error
(or, Getting Ourselves Wrong)
We all wear glasses that cany a date in time and the name of some geographic
area, and with even the keenest of vision these glasses allow us to see only limited
distances and partial motion of our world.
-George Stigler"'
The upside-down causal ascriptions behind the fundamental
attribution error are also explained by a more subtle, though as
we've emphasized is often the case, no less important understanding
of the human animal. Appreciating its significance requires distin-
guishing between two types of fundamental attribution error. The
first is the sort that we have been discussing since opening the Article
and that social psychologists have in mind when they use the term.
We will call this the exterior fundamental attribution error. When
humans look at any setting and make causal attributions, certain key
features of that setting-the observable actions of individuals-exert
disproportionate influence over their evaluations. They see what is
easy to see and tend to miss what is not. Thus, observers give little
or no weight to the fact that Milgram's shock box had many switches
instead of just one-a distinction that most social psychologists now
recognize was likely influential. All the observers see is the teacher
shocking (or, if they are imagining themselves in the teacher's role,
not shocking) the learner.
The theoretic primacy of dispositionism also reflects what we call
the interior fundamental attribution error. That error, which is
analogous to its exterior counterpart, is the tendency to "see" and
attribute a powerful causal role to certain salient features of our
interior that exercise comparatively little causal influence over our
behavior while, at the same time, failing to see those interior features
that are highly influential. Those salient features of our interior that
we see, in turn, make possible (if not likely) a theory of ourselves in
which dispositions play a role-usually the dominant role-in our
behavior. We are primed by our felt interior experience to see
dispositions and to overlook a potentially more significant
influence-the situation. In that way, the interior fundamental
attribution error contributes significantly to the exterior fundamental
attribution error.
192 STIGLER, supra note 70, at 219.
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In a companion article, we describe what many people-
particularly those of us in the West-"see" when we look into our
interiors: above all, we "observe" ourselves thinking, perceive that we
have preferences, experience our "wills," and see our actions,
which we attribute to that salient combination of thought,
preferences, and will.'1" Again, that myopic vision of our interiors,
just like our vision of our exteriors, is fundamentally distorted by our
oversight of many far more important influences that elude our
conscious awareness.
The bulk of our companion article is devoted to bridging
-though only loosely-that gulf and examining the implications of
the fundamental interior attribution error. More specifically, that
article describes at length how causal attributions, motives,
emotions, visceral factors, implicit attitudes, knowledge structures,
affiliations and group memberships, and behavior itself invisibly
influence our more visible cognitions, attitudes, and actions. It
explains how the desire to see ourselves, the groups and institutions
with which we identify, and our world in self-affirming ways, has an
immense effect on how we construe our environs and ourselves,
including our own interiors. 194 In doing so, the companion article
helps to clarify how the interior and exterior fundamental attribution
errors combine to render "axiomatic, though generally implicit, in
many modern Western cultures," the beliefs that:
* Actions are freely chosen.
* Choices imply a preference.
* Preferences are stable over time.
" Preferences implicate the identity of the self.
" Outcomes are mostly controllable.
* People are responsible for (and hence the self is implicated
in) the choices they make and the resulting outcomes.
" Smart (good) people make good choices whose outcomes
they are happy with.'95
See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 30.
194 Id.
195 Alan P. Fiske et al., The Cultural Matrix of Social Psychology, in 2 THE
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 915, 939 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed.
1998).
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Those axioms are implicit for most of us, and, as this Article and
our next illuminate, they define the starting points for most scholars
and policymakers. Indeed, neoclassical economists have built their
theory around a formal version of those basic axioms. According to
conventional economic assumptions, a person's preferences can be
inferred from that person's choices-the latter reveal the former. ' 6
As illustrated in this Article and its companion, the starting points of
dominant legal theories are unrealistic and are based on fundamen-
tally inaccurate visions of humanity.
III. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO CRITICAL REALISM
[The search was on, from World War H onwards, for a new method to replace
the deductive approach of the late nineteenth century with some criterion for
judicial lawmaking other than open-ended, contextualized policy analysis, one
that would be plausibly non-political.
-Duncan Kennedy'
197
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.
-Oliver Wendell Holmes'"
In light of evidence about how real humans actually behave,
most conventional legal theories, which are based primarily on
dispositionist premises, seem suspect. By way of an alternative,
therefore, this Section introduces critical realism-the legal theoretic
approach hinted at above, named and cursorily defined here, and
employed in this Article and in others to follow.""
Because terms like "critical" and "realism" have been widely used
to describe a variety of legal-theoretic approaches, and because they
have been infused with a variety of meanings, we begin by offering a
loose, simple explanation of what we hope to capture by the phrase
"critical realism., 20 0
196 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 7, at 348 (explaining economists' use of
directly observable choices to impute the decision maker's unobservable preferences);
Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 30 (summarizing revealed preference theory and the
dispositionist assumptions of economics and law and economics).
197 Kennedy, supra note 51, at 468.
198 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW I (Little, Brown & Co. 1946)
(1881).
199 For a sample of these works, see manuscripts cited supra note 84.
200 We are not the first to employ the term "critical realism." In fact, legal
scholars have previotsly formulated several variants of the phrase, though none of
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them have adopted quite the meaning that we intend. Morton Horwitz, for example,
used the term to denote an approach within the tradition of American legal realism
that emphasized the practical political applications of legal theory. See MORTON J.
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF
LEGAL ORTHODOXY 209-10 (1992). Horwitz distinguishes "critical" realists from
"constructive" realists, who he describes as having been more dedicated than critical
realists to "subordinat[ing] political and moral passion to social science expertise" in
the study of law. Id. Horwitz characterizes this brand of critical realism as a
predecessor to the critical legal studies movement. Id. at 270-71.
More recently, a few contemporary scholars have adopted the term "critical
realism" to describe their own approach to legal scholarship. Ruben J. Garcia has
employed the phrase to name his work, which, in the tradition described by Horwitz,
is aimed simultaneously at a critical and a political agenda. See Ruben J. Garcia, New
Voices at Work: Race and Gender Identity Caucuses in the U.S. Labor Movement, 54
HASTINGS L.J. 79, 117 (2002) (presenting his project as one that embraces a
"'critical' view of the endemic nature of racism and sexism in society but seeks to be
'realistic' about potential legal reform programs in light of contemporary realities and
the limits of legal change").
Howard Engelskirchen employs another modern variant of "critical realism" that
is concerned more particularly with analyzing the "generative structures or
mechanisms at work in nature and society that cause the manifest phenomena of our
natural and social world." Howard Engelskirchen, Consideration as the Commitment to
Relinquish Autonomy, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 490, 500 (1997). While part of our
endeavor shares in that basic effort, our approach differs dramatically from that of
Engelskirchen in two ways. First, he emphasizes that he "want[s] to distinguish
sharply... between the genesis of human actions, lying in the reasons, intentions and
plans of people, on the one hand, and the structures governing the reproduction and
transformation of social activities, on the other." Id. at 508 (quoting ROY BHASKAR,
THE POSSIBILITY OF NATURALISM 35 (2d ed. 1989)). Second, he "rel[ies] on the fact
that the market economy in which we live is characterized by the private autonomy of
its agents." Id. at 510. As will become clear, if it is not already, we do not adopt either
of these premises.
Finally, Anthony Fejfar has undertaken still another version of critical realism
based on the work of Bernard J. F. Lonergan, a knowledge theorist within the
philosophy of science tradition. See Anthony J. Fejfar, Insight into Lawyering: Bernard
Lonergan's Critical Realism Applied to Jurisprudence, 27 B.C. L. REV. 681, 682 (1986)
(presenting Lonergan's theory that knowledge is rooted in "affirmations which are
made on the level of judgment," a presumption that serves as the foundation of
Fejfar's approach). According to Fejfar, "critical realism envisages a system which is
flexible enough to deal with the human world as it actually exists in the concrete and
particular." Id. at 717. Fejfar has also employed concepts from developmental
psychology in his critical realist approach, particularly with respect to a study on the
concept of corporate voluntarism. See Anthony J. Fejfar, Corporate Voluntarism:
Panacea or Plague? A Question of Horizon, 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 859, 863 (1992)
(analyzing corporate voluntarism from the perspective of liberal rationalist, critical
rationalist, and critical realist "horizons" to determine the extent to which one's point
of view impacts one's analysis of the subject).
As described in the text, we derive our notion of critical realism from our
understanding of the American legal realist tradition and the critical legal studies
movement. Our use of the term is meant to signal our intention to incorporate the
best of what we find in each of these traditions, but in a manner that we hope
advances legal theory in ways that differ from both of them. We have not been
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A. "Realism"
By "realism" we mean, first, to suggest that our approach is a
descendent of American legal realism and to claim allegiance to the
basic assumptions and attitudes that its other descendents, including
law and economics20' and law and society, claim. The theoretical
foundation of the legal realist tradition includes "a 'scientific
outlook' that posits a knowable world out there beyond the text, a
world whose workings are not transparent and which invite
exploration to discern their deeper and truer contours., 0 2  This
tradition of realism has been driven by the desire to "explain legal
realities" through a commitment to the belief that "legal scholarship
(and law) will be enriched by the application of science. 2 0 3 The
"science" of this tradition is a social science, for the realist is
committed to the consequentialist belief that "the meaning of law
resides in its effects on human well-being (variously conceived)
directly informed by, nor have we attempted to directly engage, the notions of critical
realism employed by the scholars whose use of the term we have noted here, though
we have little doubt that some of our work and some of theirs are mutually
supportive in significant ways.
We also want to distinguish our "realism" from that employed in international
relations theory, where the word "realism" has come to be associated with a somewhat-
stylized school of thought focusing almost exclusively on states. Theorists of this
school assume states to be rational, unitary, and functionally identical in their desire
to maximize "power" and their unwillingness to subject themselves to international
institutions except where it serves self interested, power-maximizing goals. See, e.g.,
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Liberal International Relations Theory and International Economic
Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 717, 721-24 (1995) (defining and discussing
"realism" in the context of international relations theory). This dispositionalizing
brand of realism intentionally downplays the role of non-state actors, ideology, and
countless other factors, holding that a simplified, state-centric view is the most useful
heuristic for understanding the operation of international relations. Thus, in
international relations theory, realism at times becomes somewhat detached from
reality; perhaps ironically, other theories purporting to be more realistic often define
themselves in opposition to "realism." See id. at 724-31 (describing "institutional-
ism" and "liberalism" as alternatives to "realism" in international relations
theory). By contrast, the kind of realism articulated in this project differs
substantially in that its basic principles are an openness to rethinking traditional
starting principles and a willingness to question familiar heuristics in light of empirical
observations.
201 But see POSNER, supra note 127, at 3 (criticizing legal realism and downplaying
its relationship to law and economics).
202 Galanter & Edwards, supra note 59, at 377. For an overview of the develop-
ment and historical significance of American legal realism, see HORWITZ, supra note
200, at 169-92 (1992).
203 Galanter & Edwards, supra note 59, at 377.
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rather than in its formal characteristics. 2 0 4 Perhaps most import-
antly, legal realists believe that their task is not only important, but
promising; the history of realism has been advanced under "a
conviction that knowledge derived from [its] undertaking can
promote greater felicity by modifying social arrangements."2 5 We
will return to this discussion of realism, but we first want to briefly
explain the "critical" side of critical realism.
B. "Critical"
By "critical," we mean to suggest that our theory is also a
descendent of critical legal studies and other post-modem
approaches to law, such as feminist legal theory and critical race
theory.0 6 To be critical, we believe, means to have (as we do) serious
reservations about how "knowable" our world is, about the existence
of truly neutral, apolitical social sciences and legal doctrines, and
about the independence of judges, scholars, and other reputedly
neutral actors and institutions from the influence of existing
allocations of power.
We do not see any necessary contradiction between the "realism"
leg and the "critical" leg of our approach, and it is in part our belief
that a successful legal theory must stand on both legs that motivates
this project. Social scientists are never free from the deep biases that
shadow human thinking, and they should therefore be continually
self-critical and suspicious of the "knowledge" they produce.
Nevertheless, social science done well can help us understand those
biases and limitations, and, in turn, their influence over our theories
and institutions. Such insights can assist us in better understanding
our social arrangements and in improving overall well-being.
Holmes believed that the life of the law is experience, and so it
may be, but to make sense of and to guide that life, legal scholars,
among others, should be skeptical of how that experience is
construed. Legal analysis, in other words, should begin with a
critical examination of our experience and our perceptions of that
experience. So critical realism is dedicated to gaining knowledge
204 [d.
205 Id.
206 For an overview of the meaning and significance of the critical legal studies
movement, see ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
MOVEMENT 542 (1986). Although Galanter and Edwards might disagree, see Galanter
& Edwards, supra note 59, at 377-78, we consider critical legal studies and other critical
schools to be as much the heirs of legal realism as law and economics, if not more.
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about our world through scientific inquiry and theoretical analysis,
while simultaneously seeking to unearth and understand the myriad
biases that render suspicious the "knowledge" that our inquiries and
2017theories produce.
C. What Is So Critical About Realism?
We have been moving in a direction in which we have an increasingly limited
control over our own lives, and that movement has been nourished by a series of
arguments which, quite simply, are untrue.
-Milton Friedman
2 0 8
With that, we can describe a second, even more important facet
of what we mean by "critical realism." For reasons that were
suggested above and will become more evident below, we believe
that, to best promote human understanding and well-being, legal
theories must be anchored in a reality-based understanding of
human thinking and behavior. Realism, we think, is critical. To be
realists, on this telling, means to begin with real humans and to
build models from there, rather than to begin with models and then
view and interpret humans through them. The distinction may be
better understood by contrasting our approach with what we do not
mean by realism, and by describing and distinguishing among the
quasi-realistic commitments that some legal scholars have recently
made.
In a related article, we detail the justifications that economists
offer for dispositionism in economics and the extent to which
economic and legal-economic theorists have, in the name of realism,
begun to relax some of the traditional assumptions behind the basic
rational actor model.2°9 As we conclude in that article, there is no
compelling justification for the various shades of unrealism of
economics and law and economics, which are more or less premised
207 In important ways, we understand our admittedly loose and ambiguous
epistemology to resemble that of positionatity, which "acknowledges the existence of
empirical truths, values and knowledge, and also their contingency," Katharine T.
Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARv. L. REv. 829, 880 (1990), and "sets an ideal
of self-critical commitment whereby I act, but consider the truths upon which I act
subject to further refinement, amendment, and correction." Id. at 883.
208 Milton Friedman, Economic Myths and Public Opinion, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 1976,
reprinted in BRIGHT PROMISES, DISMAL PERFORMANCE: AaN ECONOMIST'S PROTEST 60, 75
(William R. Allen ed., 1983) [hereinafter BRIGHT PROMISES].
209 Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 30.
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on the same fundamental attribution error that distorts all human
reasoning.2'0 In this Article, we want to focus briefly on just one of
the more common justifications offered for eschewing a realistic
account of the human animal. It seems that a key reason why legal
economists have been so unwilling to get real about human nature
has to do with a somewhat amorphous, but nonetheless powerful
fear, that realism is dangerous.
1. Facing Our Fears of Reality
For example, in an article devoted to considering the implications
of cognitive psychology for existing products liability laws, Professors
Henderson and Rachlinski generally assume that consumers are
dispositional, if cognitively biased, actors. However, they con-
clude their article by briefly acknowledging the possibility that stable
preferences may not in fact underlie consumer "choices":
The notion that manufacturers distort consumer risk-perception
assumes that there is some natural and appropriate risk-benefit
assessment from which manufacturers lead consumers astray. If we
take seriously the psychological proposition that all preferences are
constructed, then there is no magical correct level of risk that
consumers should endure. 1 1
Their point seems to be that if policymakers were to take
seriously that possibility, then policy theory as we know it
would be rendered largely meaningless. We may agree with
that claim. But Henderson and Rachlinksi's closing observation
highlights a troubling and common unwillingness-even among
cognitive psychologists like Rachlinski-to confront the reality that
the available evidence reveals. If the implications of cognitive
psychology are as drastic as Henderson and Rachlinski suggest they
might be, then why highlight those implications only in a concluding
comment, rather than beginning with them? And why would
Henderson and Rachlinski largely ignore those implications in
reaching definitive policy prescriptions throughout their article (and
work) ?
212
210 Id.
21 James A. Henderson, Jr. & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Product-Related Risk and
Cognitive Biases: The Shortcomings of Enterprise Liability, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV.
213, 258 (2000).
212 It is not as if Henderson and Rachlinski's policy analysis has no real-world
influence. Henderson, as a leading academic scholar and teacher, a busy litigation
consultant and expert, and one of the Chief Reporters for the Third Restatement of
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Likewise, numerous psychology-sensitive scholars emphasize the
influence of context or situation when downplaying the relevance of
social psychological insights for policy, but then ignore the
behavioral implications of context in applying the theoretical model
of law and economics to policy analysis.2 3 One important reason for
this tendency, we suspect, is that these scholars are human, and we
214
humans want our world to make sense. We do not easily relinquish
a model of behavior or a vision of ourselves that provides us with a
feeling of predictability, manageability, and control, or that allows us
to maintain positive self-conceptions. We are afraid of letting go of
comforting, if false, images of our world and of ourselves:. And that
fear, like most, can be manipulated and exploited.
Like Henderson and Rachlinski, Samuel Issacharoff concludes
his review of behavioralist literature by emphasizing the need for
"humility" among those who apply its insights. He does not dispute
many of behavioralism's findings; instead, he worries about their
application. As he sees it, individualism and autonomy are themselves
threatened by what behavioralism demonstrates, a threat that
counsels caution:
[Behavioralism's insights] cannot possibly translate into a justification
for greater constraints on individual decision making. Bounded
rationality should not become the pretext for the imposition of an
overarching regulatory structure on individuals .... [I]t would indeed
be ironic if greater insight into the complexity of human decision
making became the justification for taking the freedom to decide, even
imperfectly, from those very individuals.
Issacharoff implies that if a more accurate understanding of
human behavior interferes with our preferred conception of who we
Torts, has had as much real-world influence on tort law as virtually any other living
person.
213 See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, Comment: The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of
Law, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1765, 1765-68 (1998) (arguing that while behavioral psycholo-
gists' findings undermine rational choice theory, their resulting understanding of
human behavior is too uncertain to formulate a credible alternative to the
conventional law and economics framework).
214 See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 30.
215 See id. (reviewing evidence of such motives from social psychology and related
fields). For other examples of this propositions, see MELVINJ. LERNER, THE BELIEF IN
A JUST WORLD: A FUNDAMENTAL DELUSION (1980); John T. Jost et al., Non-Conscious
Forms of System Justiflcation: Implicit and Behavioral Preferences for Higher Status Groups, 38
J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 586 (2002).
216 Samuel Issacharoff, Can There Be a Behavioral Law and Economics?, 51 VAND. L.
REV. 1729, 1745 (1998).
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are, then the former must yield. Beware of those who challenge the
basic economic model, no matter how unrealistic it may be, he seems
to argue, for their apparent realism may be mere pretextual cover for
,,2 17the imposition of an "overarching regulatory structure.. Beware of
those who interfere with your "individual decision making," for what
is at stake is your "freedom to decide."218
Posner brings Issacharoff's closeted bogeyman out into the open.
In responding to Jolls, Thaler, and Sunstein's important work on
behavioral economics, he writes, again in a concluding paragraph:
I wish to consider .briefly [behavioral economics'] possible
normative implications. On the one hand, the picture of the human
being that [Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler] draw is one of unstable
preferences and (what turns out to be related), infinite manipulability.
If you give a worker childbirth coverage, she'll like it (endowment
effect); but if you don't give it to her, she'll dislike it (more precisely,
won't pay for it in lower wages) .... If you describe the threat of breast
cancer to a woman in one way, she'll want a mammogram, but if you
describe it another although logically equivalent way, she won't.
It seems then that the politically insulated corps of experts that [Jolls,
Sunstein, and Thaler] favor would be charged with determining the
populace's authentic preferences, which sounds totalitarian. On the
other hand .... [t]he expert, too, is behavioral man. Behavioral man
behaves in unpredictable ways. Dare we vest responsibility for curing
irrationality in the irrational?
In our view, Posner misrepresents Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler's
far more nuanced and restrained normative prescriptions.
(Rest assured, they never proposed a Bureau of Authentic Prefer-
ences.) But, for our purposes, it is enough to point out the method
by which Posner seeks to persuade his readers. More vividly than the
others, he seems to be stoking-and perhaps revealing his own-fear
by embracing the very phenomena that he is attempting to have us
disregard. He accepts the influence of the framing and endowment
effects, while at the same time suggesting that their very invocation
raises the specter of totalitarianism or a "confederacy of dunces."
217 Id.
218 ld.
219 Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1471 (1998).
220 POSNER, FRONTIERS, supra note 13, at 286-87.
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2. Thinking the Unthinkable
Legal economists often take pride in the fact that they are willing
to reach the conclusions that their theories yield, no matter how
unpopular or unconventional they may be. To them, that willingness
helps prove that they are neutral scientists. 2  "Should the sale of
babies be made legal?" Richard Posner asks. "The idea strikes most
people as bizarre and offensive .... However, economists like to
think about the unthinkable, so let us examine in a scientific spirit
the objections to permitting the sale of babies for adoption. ,
222
Posner acts as if he is broad-minded, compelled by principles of good
science to apply his paradigm in all settings no matter how much
non-economists disagree with his result.
But this habit of ending articles with a caution to readers about
the perils of taking seriously a realistic account of human behavior
(as noted in the previous subsection) reveals a different picture.
These are not the words of social scientists pursuing truth wherever it
leads them. Rather, these are more the words of a fundamentalist
preacher warning members of his flock to avoid having their minds
polluted or confused by anyone who would argue that dinosaurs
once roamed the earth or that our species "evolved." These, more
broadly, are the words of someone guarding, for himself and his
audience, the comfort and reassurance of a worldview that faithfully
yields familiar, easy, and agreeable answers.
There is far more at stake than whether or not preferences are
manipulable or what products liability law should be. These scholars
seem worried about the threat posed to an entire school of thought
and to their ability to generate credible conclusions using the
methods of that school. They also seem worried about the threat
posed to an entire socioeconomic system that is built on the same
basic dispositionist assumptions that they refuse to challenge.
Their implicit warning to readers is to close their minds, because
otherwise something between chaos and communism will surely be
loosed upon us. Because we are human, taking seriously evidence
that thoroughly challenges our worldviews, our frames of reference,
221 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 141 (3d ed. 1986); cf
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 13, at 25 ("Economic analysis of law
has aroused considerable antagonism, especially but not only among academic lawyers
who dislike the thought that the logic of the law might be economics.").
222 POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed.), supra note 221, at 141.
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our theories, and our systems, is truly "think[ing] ... the
unthinkable. 223
Our biggest problem with this sort of scare tactic is not that there
is no truth to it. If, as the evidence suggests, preferences are
unstable, constructed, and manipulable, this should give rise to
concern about the legitimacy of our systems, about our being
manipulated, and even about our being subjected to some form of
totalitarianism. The bogeyman that law and economics scholars
seek to keep at bay may be real. But relying on models that ignore
that possibility does not make the evidence or its repercussions go
away, any more than lying motionless under a blanket would provide
a defense against an authentic monster. Hiding our heads as a
defense tactic succeeds only when the danger is just in our heads.
If we are anything close to infinitely manipulable, as Posner
conjectures, 2 4 or if all preferences are "constructed," as Henderson
and Rachlinski hypothesize,2 5 then the "free choice" that scholars
presume to be reflected in our behavior (and claim to want to
protect) may be an illusion. We may already be in the grips of a
bogeyman-a situation closer to the totalitarian nightmare than
inadequately realistic models enable us to see.
This returns us to one of our main themes: if situation is far
more influential than we realize, then the dispositions that we
assume are primary to the human experience may be largely an
illusion. Social scientists should be committed to examining the
implications of what we know to be true, no matter how much we
want to deny it, and rejecting what we know to be false no matter
how much we want to embrace it. That is what is critical about
realism.
223 Id.
224 See supra quotation accompanying note 220.
225 See supra quotation accompanying note 211.
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3. Faith or Social Science?
[Flindings ought not to be judged by the level of comfort they provide about
acceptable views of human nature or the personal comfort the findings
afford.... It is not surprising when a lack of synchrony between our view of
ourselves as unbiased ("I am a morally good person") and evidence of ourselves
as biased ("I am not a morally good person ") controls assessments of the finding
of such discrepancies on the part of laypeople; it is a bit embarrassing when the
same is possibly true of scientists themselves.
-Mahzarin R Banaj 
226
We are now ready to return to our earlier discussion of law and
economics and Posner's claims regarding the dominance of that
approach.22v  In describing his commitment to objectivity and
empiricism, a commitment that is shared (at least implicitly) by most
legal economists, Posner has written earnestly of the need to employ
the scientific method. In one of his early articles, for example, he
wrote:
As biology is to living organisms, astronomy to the stars, or economics
to the price system, so should legal studies be to the legal system: an
endeavor to make precise, objective, and systematic observations of how
the legal system operates in fact and to discover and explain the
228
recurrent patterns in the observations-the "laws" of the system.
Nearly two decades later, he wrote similarly about the aspirations of
the approach he helped found:
To me the most interesting aspect of the law and economics
movement has been its aspiration to place the study of law on a
scientific basis, with coherent theory, precise hypotheses deduced from
the theory, and empirical tests of the hypotheses. Law is a social
institution of enormous antiquity and importance, and I can see no
reason why it should not be amenable to scientific study. Economics is
the most advanced of the social sciences, and the legal system contains
many parallels to and overlaps with the systems that economists have
studied successfully.229
226 Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Attitudes Can Be Measured, in THE NATURE OF
REMEMBERING 137 (Henry L. Roediger III et al. eds., 2001).
227 See supra notes 56, 64, 71-72 and accompanying text.
228 Richard A. Posner, Volume One of The Journal of Legal Studies-An Afterword, I
J. LEGAL STUD. 437, 437 (1972).
229 Richard A. Posner, Foreword to ESSAYS IN LAw AND ECONOMIcs 5, 5 (Michael
Faure & Roger Van den Bergh eds., 1989).
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And recently, he has written about the concomitant need to dismiss
the work of those who do not operate accordingly:
The rotation of the moons of Jupiter was anomalous in medieval
cosmology because each planet (other than the earth, which was not
considered a planet, but instead the center around which the planets
revolved) was thought to be fastened to a crystalline sphere, which the
moons would have collided with in their rotation. The anomaly could
be dispelled by assuming that the sphere was permeable, or by
assuming (as Cardinal Bellarmine did in his famous dispute with
Galileo) that the telescopic observations that had disclosed the rotation
of Jupiter's moons were a deceit by the devil. Whichever route was
taken, the amended theory would not generate any predictions about
planetary satellites; all it would predict was that whatever would be,
would be.23°
Posner's message is clear: the scientific approach should be
embraced, and those theories grounded in little more than faith or
non-falsifiable assertions should be rejected, particularly when they
compete with a viable social scientific theory.
And it is purportedly based on that Galileo-like self-image that
Posner has asserted that "the economic theory of law seems the best
positive theory of law extant."231 It is simply "rich[er] in theoretical
and empirical content" than any of its competitors.32 And Posner's
views are held at least implicitly by most legal economists. So, for
example, Cooter and Ulen "can say that economics provides a
behavioral theory to predict how people respond to changes in laws,"
and that this behavioral "theory surpasses intuition, just as science
surpasses common sense.
2 3
We wholeheartedly agree with the general case for relying on the
scientific method. But, for the reasons we have provided, we reject
the claim by legal economists that the dominance of law and
economics has much to do with its theoretical and empirical content
or their loyalty to the scientific method-at least in the way they
suggest. Legal economists have missed, among other things, that
230 POSNER, FRONTIERS, supra note 13, at 264.
231 Richard A. Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEX. L. REV. 757, 774
(1975).
232 Id.
233 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 7, at 3; see also Mark Klock, Are Wastefulness and
Flamboyance Really Virtues?: Use and Abuse of Economic Analysis, 71 U. CIN. L. REv. 181,
252-53 (2002) ("I predict that the future of law will be characterized by less
commentary arguing that economic analysis is inappropriate and more reliance on
alternative economics models .... ").
[Vol. 152:129
THE SITUA TION
they have unconsciously adopted, not the scientific approach of
Galileo, but the faith-based approach of Cardinal Bellarrnine.
234
It is the economists who resist seeing or taking seriously what
others are revealing, through the scientific method, about what235
moves us. And they are doing so based on a theory that has been
falsified (or is non-falsifiable) and, which, therefore, is based, at
bottom, on an evidence-blind intuition or faith. Although Posner
and other legal economists do not stoop to warning readers about
the "devil" being behind the heretical visions of social psychologists,
they do, as we have noted, commonly raise the specter of a close
cousin: "the totalitarian bogeyman. 236
D. Some Presuppositions of Critical Realism
What we do and do not mean by "critical realism" will become
clearer below. But before introducing one of its important
implications, it may be helpful to summarize several strong
presumptions or axioms that we intend critical realism to build
upon-principles that we have suggested in our discussion to this
point:
* First, we-scholars and non-scholars alike-do not understand
ourselves well, and certainly not as well as we think we do.
234 See Maurice A. Finocchiaro, Introduction to THE GALILEO AFFAIR 1, 30 (Maurice
A. Finocchiaro ed. and trans., 1989) [hereinafter THE GALILEO AFFAIR] (noting that
Bellarmine rejected Copernican theory because it conflicted with the scriptures)
Our claim is not that law and economics is totally devoid of social science; far
from it. But where social science does play a role, economic legal theory rarely
generates clear answers to problems. For example, there is still considerable debate
about what the most efficient liability rule is in tort law, despite the fact that this is
one of the oldest, most discussed issues in law and economics. See, e.g., Richard S.
Markovits, The Allocative Efficiency of Shifting From a "Negligence" System to a "Strict
Liability" Regime in Our Highly-Pareto-Imperfect Economy: A Partial and Preliminary
Third-Best-Allocative Efficiency Analysis, 73 CHI-KENT L. REV. 11, 133 (1998)
(analyzing "efficiency of a shift from negligence to strict liability and various
other standard-of-liability allocative-efficiency issues"). See generally John C.
Moorhouse et al., Law and Economics of Tort Law: A Survey of Scholarly Opinion, 62
ALB. L. REV. 667 (1998). There is, in other words, considerable scholarly debate
about most areas of law, even where efficiency is accepted as the law's underlying
normative goal. This is where the social scientific features of law and economics take
place-a competition among legal economists offering different efficiency-oriented
stories and, where possible, different empirical evidence to support their views. Thus,
with respect to the application of the basic theory to various social and policy issues,
social scientific methods are welcome. With respect to the basic theory and its
underlying axioms, in contrast, social scientific methods are disallowed.
236 See supra text accompanying notes 221-23.
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* Second, the process of developing theories or models is a
human one and is therefore subject to all sorts of biases and
unperceived influences. It is largely for that reason that the
impressions and models-informal and formal-that we legal
scholars have created to help us understand ourselves tend to
be flawed and self-serving.
* Third, we cannot hope to make sense of our institutions or
ourselves until we better understand how humans go about
trying to make sense of themselves and their institutions. To
develop a theory that is free of, or at least less distorted by,
such biases, it is necessary to more closely examine both
the process that yields those biases and the biases themselves.
* And, fourth, a promising way to understand human
cognition and behavior is to begin with those schools of
thought and those institutions that are devoted to
understanding human cognition and behavior. In this
Article, we look primarily to one such source, social
psychology,237 but we will also look briefly at what market
practices can teach us about ourselves.
It is by bringing these principles together with the lessons
taught by social psychology and markets that critical realism
provides unique and, for many, unsettling insights about who we are,
why we behave as we do, and what we should do about it, if
anything.
237 By "social psychology," we include not only the traditional field of research
that goes by that name, but also numerous related fields, including social cognition,
cognitive neuroscience, and cognitive psychology. For accessible overviews of the
history of relationships between the various fields, see FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note
20, at 1-18; KUNDA, supra note 20, at 1-7.
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IV. BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO POWER ECONOMICS
Most Marxists ... [believe] politics is but a reflection of the underlying
economic order. The bourgeoisie, and especially the large corporations, will
acquire and use the power of the state to protect and enhance their interests....
But many non-Marxist scholars also doubt that the government will regulate
an industry over the objections or against the interests of business. This view,
held chiefly.. by certain economists, does not arise out of any conviction that
the historically formed interests of the dominant social class always find
expression in the prevailing political structure, but rather out of the assumption
that individual behavior can best be understood by assuming that it is rationally
self-interested. Indeed, most economists find the Marxist argument murky and
unconvincing precisely because it lacks any psychological theory that would
explain how class position determines individual behavior.
-James Q. Wilson..
It's true that if you had concentrated power in the hands of an angel he might
be able to do a lot of good, as he viewed it, but one man's good is another man's
bad. The great virtue of a market capitalist society is that, by preventing a
concentration of power, it prevents people from doing the kind of harm which
concentrated power can do.
-Milton Fredman2
9
It is certainly the case that many Nazi concentration camp guards led blameless
lives, both before and after their horrible service. To explain such complicity,
therefore, we must assume the existence of a specific social and situational
context that could induce ordinary people to commit extraordinarily evil deeds.
-Ross & Nisbet?
4 °
A. Power
Think back to our example of the gunman who commands you
to flip a switch that will deliver a violent electric shock to a pleading
victim.
2 4
' That is an example of power, as we mean it in this Article.
Power is the use of situational devices (like guns) to influence
238 James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in TIE POLITICS OF REGULATION
357, 357-58 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980).
239 Milton Friedman, Is Capitalism Humane?, in BRIGHT PROMISES, supra note
208, at 83, 89.
240 Ross & NISBETT, supra note 9, at 53.
241 See supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
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people's choices and to weaken the effect of their dispositions in
order to achieve some goal. This sort of power is often viewed as
illegitimate; offers of "your money or your life" are unacceptable
negotiation tactics. Governmental regimes that rely on such power
to exact obedience are typically labeled authoritarian. Particularly in
America, we respect only actions that are consensual and the actions
and institutions that reflect the autonomous choices of those
involved-hence, our culture's celebration of democracy and
capitalism. As we hope readers have begun to see, however, situation
can have enormous consequences for our behavior, even when there
is no gun to our head. Stanley Milgram's groundbreaking experi-
ments demonstrate the incredible power of situation over our
actions. People delivered what they believed were dangerous and
painful shocks to fellow humans simply because of the situational
pressures of a seemingly benign psychology experiment. That is
frightening. But perhaps more frightening is that even after
learning about Milgram's experiment, most of us still have little
242appreciation for the power of situation.
242 If members of the law school community believe they are immune to the power
of situation, they should consult Steven Hartwell's study of students at the University of
San Diego. Steven Hartwell, Moral Development, Ethical Conduct, and Clinical Education,
35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 131 (1990). Hartwell set up an experiment in the guise of a
clinical class exercise. Id. at 142. Each student was to individually advise litigants in a
small claims court, although Hartwell was available in the next room for consultation.
Id. Unknown to the students, each "litigant" presented her student-advisor with an
identical problem: how best to make her case in a rent dispute. Id. As Hartwell
recounts, "I told each student to advise the client to lie under oath that she had paid
the rent. When students asked for clarification, I uniformly responded.., my advice is
that, if your client wants to win her case, then you must tell her to perjure herself." Id.
The idea was for students to feel the "pull between loyalty to authority... and
prescribed ethical conduct." Id. Like the evaluators in Milgram's initial experiment,
Hartwell predicted that the students would uniformly "reject my advice and refuse to
tell their client[s] to lie." Id. And, like Milgram's evaluators, he was surprised to find
out how wrong he was. "Although many of the twenty-four participating students
grumbled either to me or to the client about my proffered advice, twenty-three told
their client to perjure herself." Id. at 142-43.
A more famous example of the power of situation over students (although not law
students) was demonstrated in a classic experiment conducted at Stanford University,
in which students took on the roles of "prisoner" or "guard" in a realistic prison
environment. Craig Haney et al., Interpersonal Dynamics in a Simulated Prison, I INT'LJ.
CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY 69 (1973). Although the students had been specifically
chosen for their apparent emotional maturity, within only a couple of days the
"guards" began to demonstrate extreme cruelty toward the "prisoners." Id. at 80-81.
On the other side, several of the "prisoners" experienced severe emotional depression,
while others were prompted to rebel. Ultimately, the experiment had to be cancelled
less than a week after it began. Id. Rather than showing dispositional consistency
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1. Power Blindness
[The] systematic structuring of institutions to reflect the viewpoint and position
of those in power is most often invisible.
-Martha Chamalla
2 4 3
There is reason to suspect that in our daily lives, we routinely
overlook the power of our situations. As social psychology teaches,
situational factors are cognitively hidden (often in plain sight), easily
camouflaged and naturalized as mere background. Put differently,
in most situations there is no gun, only an invisible hand and the
seemingly consensual, choice-driven behavior of individuals.
Perhaps that is what political scientists Herbert Kaufman and Victor
Jones were driving at when they wrote:
There is an elusiveness about power that endows it with an almost
ghostly quality. It seems to be all around us, yet this is "sensed" with
some sixth means of perception rather than with the five ordinary
senses. We "know" what it is, yet we encounter endless difficulties in
trying to define it. We can "tell" whether one person or group is more
powerful than another, yet we cannot measure power. It is as abstract•244
as time yet as real as a firing squad.
This is an insight of critical realism. As the quotation indicates, it
is hard to think of anything more "real" than power. And, yet,
despite its undeniable existence, the mechanisms of power are often
hidden, ghostlike, in the setting. Hidden there, they tend to be
disregarded, literally overlooked.
Legal economists have reacted to the elusiveness of this realism
characteristically and understandably-they have ignored it.245  For
the most part, economic thinking has no place for the concept of
power. A perusal of the indices of the major law and economics
texts, for example, yields no references to the word--except when
across environments, the students' behavior corresponded with situational cues and
roles.
243 MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 16 (1999).
244 Herbert Kaufman & Victor Jones, The Mystery of Power, 14 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
205, 205 (1954); see also ROBERT DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? 90 (1961) ("One who sets
out to observe, analyze, and describe the distribution of influence in a pluralistic
democracy will... encounter formidable problems.").
245 Economics does occasionally take power into account in exceptions that prove
the rule. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 130-34 (recounting Cooter and
Ulen's examples of economic threats); infra text accompanying notes 267-80
(describing Stigler's "shallow capture" theory).
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coupled with the word "market."246  Moreover, many economic
presuppositions, such as the presumed autonomy of choice-making
agents, implicitly remove the role of power from the analysis. If one
type of "autonomy" is given, then there is no place for the sort of
power illustrated in Milgram's experiment to emerge.24' The subjects
of the experiment chose to engage in the experiment. They could
have stopped; they could have walked out, but they didn't.
Obviously, they were made better off by shocking the other agents to
the fullest extent possible. Economic models are as blind as we are
to situational forces.
This problem of "unrealism" in law and economics has been
largely unrecognized by even its critics. 248 That may be partially
because the failure, like the problem, is hard to see. And in the rare
instance where legal economists have acknowledged that their
models disregard power, they use it as a basis for claiming that their
power-blind approach is superior to competing theories. Thus,
Richard Posner admonishes sociologists for incorporating power in
their work given that the concept is "difficult to operationalize."
249
2. Looking for Power
We have three problems with Posner's rationale for ignoring
power. First, what good is a theory that ignores a force so potentially
influential that it is actually called "power," purely for the sake of
maintaining an operable model? "Power economics," an element of
246 When economists speak of "market power," they generally use the term to refer
to a firm's control of a significant share of a particular market. Often the term is
associated with monopoly practices, as when a firm enjoys such "market power" that it
can reduce output and raise prices without experiencing a total loss of sales to
competitors. See, e.g., W. KP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND
ANTITRUST 164 (3d ed. 2000) ("Generally speaking, the market power of a firm is the
ability to raise price without suffering a significant decline in demand. This is typically
measured by the price elasticity of the firm's demand curve.").
247 See supra text accompanying notes 85-91 (recounting Milgram's obedience
experiments).
248 The law and traditional legal education also have no place for the concept of
power. Critical theories represent an important exception inasmuch as they have
influenced law and legal education. For instance, feminist legal scholarship has been
particularly attentive to the operation of power dynamics in law and related social
institutions. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 207, at 849-62 (summarizing and discussing
feminist legal scholarship about relationships between power, gender, and social
institutions).
249 Posner, supra note 11, at 272.
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critical realism, is committed to starting with power and developing
our understanding or model of human behavior from there.
Second, any obstacle in operationalizing the concept of power
may reflect the unrealistic starting presumptions of legal economists
more than the inherent difficulty of incorporating power into a
viable social scientific theory. Were economists more committed to
understanding human behavior, they would be better able to model
it. The ghostly quality of power, we hope to show, is less in the
object and more in the lens. Change the lens and power is more
likely to come into focus and will sometimes be as obvious as a gun to
the head. This leads to our third point.
The clear message of Milgram's experiments is that situation
influences us. But Milgram's decades-old findings serve as just one
example of a much larger situation. "Social psychology has by now
amassed a vast store of such empirical parables. ' '150  The deeper
implication of those experiments is that situation can be managed,
shaped, arranged, and constructed to influence us in ways that we do not
anticipate or appreciate. Situation is thus a source and vehicle of
power. Milgram, after all, designed and created the situation in his
laboratory. Unfortunately the pursuit of academic or scientific
knowledge is not the only motive that might shape the scenery that
surrounds and moves us.
B. Economics
And here is where the economics of "power economics" comes into
play. What we know about the situational character makes clear that
people's behavior is influenced by situational factors. Thus, the
ability to influence the situation is also the ability to influence
people's behavior. Such power can be profitable. Because power is
valuable to those who wield it, and insofar as power can be exercised
through (invisible or, at least, unobserved) situational variables, those
variables are themselves manipulable. And because those variables
are manipulable, profit-driven agents will compete to control or
influence them and, in turn, the people and institutions that tend to
be blindly moved by them. More succinctly, once situation is
understood as the locus of influence, it follows that situation will
trade like mousetraps and widgets.
250 Ross & NISBETT, supra note 9, at 4.
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Market actors will exert power-whether or not they are aware
of it-because of the situational pressures of the market. If profit
can be made by influencing the situation, we predict that it will be.
Market competitors will, to survive in the long run, "discover"
precisely which situational manipulations most efficiently influence
us and how. Market actors who fail to manipulate situational
variables effectively will sooner or later be supplanted by those who
do.
If there is uncertainty regarding the precise workings of power-
the particular mechanisms by which situational influence is
wielded-that is a problem of description, not of economics. The
market will discover those workings and exploit them. Because
market actors will, indeed must, attend to the operation of power,
legal economists have no excuse, even on operational grounds, for
ignoring it. Market forces guarantee the exercise of power through
situational manipulation-that is the essence of power economics.
25
1
C. Some Implications of Power Economics
More than when I first wrote these pages, I am now impressed with the role of
power in economic life-and with the great if largely innocent service of the
conventional economic instruction in concealing it .... [The modern business
firm's] influence and power extend to politicians, Presidents and the Pentagon.
This power would be much more remarked and resisted were it not for the social
conditioning of economics and its instruction. The latter contends that all
producers-all business firms and corporations, from the smallest to the largest,
from the corner drugstore to Exxon and General Motors-are substantially
subordinate to the impersonal authority of the market. So matters are presented
in all reputable economic discussion .... Power is much enjoyed, and its
economic and political exercise can also be pleasingly remunerative. Nothing
serves it better than a theology that disguises its exercise.
-John Kenneth Galbraith
252
251 For an earlier statement of power economics, though not by name, and for
considerable evidence from consumer-product markets confirming our claims,
see Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem
of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 (1999) [hereinafter Hanson &
Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously I]; Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking
Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420
(1999) [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously I1]; Chen &
Hanson, Illusion of Law 1, supra note 84; see also infra text accompanying notes 393-414
(illustrating how commercial interests have, through situational manipulations,
promoted dispositionism).
252JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY, at xiv (4th ed. 1984).
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What we know from economics is that markets will eventually
discover and exploit profit-enhancing opportunities for power.
Economics also helps us predict that the market actors who will
exploit those opportunities most successfully will be those with the
greatest wealth and willingness to pay. Large corporations meet
those criteria because they amass extreme amounts of wealth
25 3
and possess the overriding, narrow interest in profit maximization.
2 5 4
253 Comparing the 2001 Gross National Income of all nations with the 2001 total
revenues of the Global Fortune 500 companies helps bring this into relief. For
example, Wal-Mart's 2001 revenues ($219.8 billion) were greater than those of eight-
five countries combined. Home Depot had greater revenue ($53.6 billion) than
Hungary ($49.2 billion). The Gap had greater revenue ($13.8 billion) than Bulgaria
($13.2 billion). Toys "R" Us ($11.0 billion) had greater revenue than Kenya ($10.7
billion). The revenue of the #500 company, a Japanese construction firm called
Takenaka, surpassed ninety-four countries. In fact, the sum of the revenues of the
Global 500 firms ($14 trillion) accounts for forty-five percent of the total world GDP
($31.3 trillion). Compare WORLD BANK, 2003 WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS
(describing the 2001 gross national income of each nation), with The Global 500:
The World's Largest Corporations, FORTUNE, July 22, 2002, at F-i to F-10 (listing the
gross revenues of the five hundred largest corporations).
254 Cf Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously I1, supra note 251, at 1467-
1553 (providing a case study of how the tobacco industry, based on shared interest.
managed to manipulate consumer perceptions, preferences, and behavior in order to
increase profits). With exceptions that we will explore in future research, corporations
tend to behave as if their sole-or, at least, primary-goal is to maximize profits. See,
e.g., Chen & Hanson, Illusion of Law 1, supra note 84. That is true not because
corporations have dispositions, but because of a confluence of stable and significant
situational factors. Most importantly, firms participate in a number of market
competitions-for products, for capital, for managers, for labor, and for acquisitions
of firms themselves. All of these markets work to winnow out those firms and
managers that do not effectively profit maximize. Firms have charters and bylaws,
situational restraints that typically set profit-maximization as the firm's stated goal, and
they operate within a legal environment that places, according to most corporate law
scholars, fiduciary duties on managers to maximize profit.
Moreover, the situational characters who work within firms face strong cultural
norms to maximize profits and are given extensive training in business schools or by
the firms themselves. The American business culture promotes the idea that
"business is business" and considerations other than profit are irrelevant to decisions.
For a history of the basic scripts of business and corporate, see id. Together, these
and other situational forces push firms (and the situational characters who occupy
them) to behave "as if" maximizing profit. Of course, those situational forces are
limited, and corporations and their managers do not always behave in profit-
maximizing ways. Still, most scholars agree that, at least in the long run, the
situational imperatives of profit and the dispositions and situations of corporate
managers combine to push corporations firmly towards profit-maximizing conduct. It
bears noting that our interpretation of firms as situationally motivated, at least in the
long run, to behave as if they are profit-maximizing is conventional among
corporate law scholars. See id.; HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTER-
PRISE 23 (1996) (explaining why it is reasonable to assume that firms will, over
time, tend toward profit-maximizing, or cost-minimizing, practices); cf Milton
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Power economics predicts that we are living within an ongoing
Milgram experiment, in which we, the subjects, perceive our acts to
be free and dispositionally motivated, but in which the
experimenters-large business entities-wield far greater influence
over our movements through situational manipulations than we tend
to recognize. As in Milgram's experiment, we predict and report, in
our common sense views and formal theories, that we are largely
immune to such situational manipulations. Power economics
predicts that the totalitarian bogeyman is invisible but real, and that
we commonly behave as if there is a gun to our head.
Of course, very often market actors compete against each other
for situational supremacy. In a previous work, one of us (with Doug
Kysar) has examined the battle for prime placement of products in
S 255
supermarket aisles.. Placement at eye level sells, and someone has
got to be on the bottom. In those cases, competition for situation is
often a zero-sum game.
But there are other situational factors that help all firms: for
example, the Muzak that wafts over the entire supermarket and has
256been found to increase overall purchasing. In the same manner,
competing firms within industries often act in ways that further
their shared interests2 57 or even join forces when their collective
self-interest is at stake.25s  All firms share a broad goal of profit
maximization. This leads to secondary shared interests in promoting
markets, preventing profit-restricting regulation, and, most impor-
tantly for our argument here, supporting a concept of human
Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMIcs 3,
21-22 (1953) (examining the hypothesis that individual firms behave as if they were
seeking rationally to maximize profits).
See Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously II, supra note 251, at 1448.
256 See id. at 1445 (describing how marketers manipulate consumers' "mood
states").
257 See generallyJon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: A
Response to Market Manipulation, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 259, 337-370 (2000)
[hereinafter Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously III] (describing reasons
why firms tend not to engage in activities that increase consumer risk perceptions).
258 For one very recent example, competing automakers joined together this
year in a lawsuit challenging California's strict fuel emission standards. See Bob
Egelko, California, Bush Spar over Clean Air Rules: Appeals Court Ponders Block on
Emissions Standards, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 14, 2003, at A8. For other examples of firm
cooperation in self-interest, see Hanson & Kysar, Faking Behavioralism Seriously II, supra
note 251, at 1467-1502 (describing tobacco industry's response to industry-wide
threats); Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously llI, supra note 257, at 361-66
(describing how even competitive industries often manage to cooperate to advance
their shared interests).
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behavior that serves profit-maximizing interests. Because commercial
interests-particularly corporate entities-are incredibly wealthy
and powerful forces in society, when they work in complementary
ways, they can have far-reaching effects on how we view society,
justice, and ourselves.
Power economics predicts that situation is sold to the highest
bidders through largely unseen market processes. Corporate entities
manipulate situation to influence our conduct and dispositional
self-conceptions, thereby building their wealth and increasing their
power. 260 The analogies undergirding our conclusions in this section
may appear to be loaded. By likening situational forces to a gun, it
may appear that we have likened market forces to a gunman.
Indeed, we have. We are thinking the unthinkable. Posner-'s
bogeyman reigns, but he rules from where Posner and others have
least looked for him-that is, outside of us, or at least out of our
sight, in the situation.
This talk of power may look like the product of some pretty
radical thinking. However, one can instead see our thesis as nothing
more than the careful application of the logic unhesitatingly
embraced by many of academia's most conservative scholars. Here,
again, is where the economics of "power economics" plays a role. We
are making the same assumptions as neoclassical economists about
how markets work, but we add a more realistic account of the
humans involved in that process. And, as will become clear in the
next Section, we also accept the conventional economic
presumptions with respect to the way regulatory processes operate
-indeed, in some ways, we take that understanding more seriously
than economists have.
259 As will become clear below and in our future work, it is not necessary that
corporate decision makers make conscious decisions to cooperate with others for
corporations to be acting in complementary ways toward shared goals. See infra Part
VI.B (providing evidence of how dispositionism has been promoted by commercial
interests).
260 See id.
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V. BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO DEEP CAPTURE
A. Shallow Capture
One cannot mention regulatory agencies without adding the observation that, of
course, such agencies are likely to be 'captured' by the interests they are supposed
to -regulate. To suggest that matters are any different from this is to mark oneself
as hopelessly naive, or even disingenuous.
-James Q. Wilson
261
The basic story of regulatory capture has become so well
known-indeed, such a truism-that we think it appropriate to begin
as Steven Croley began his recent retelling: "You've heard all of this
before ."6
Because no one wants us to rehearse the details yet again, and
because we also value efficiency, we will base our introductory
overview on the brief rendition offered by an extremely credible
source. In his Memoirs of an Unregulated Economist,263 George Stigler
describes how he came to the work central to his winning the Nobel
Prize in Economics.2 64  According to Stigler, prior to his work,
academic economists writing about state policies commonly offered
their advice on "what [the government] should do, or refrain from
doing.' '26 ' They published their normative conclusions naively
believing that governments, charged with enhancing the public
welfare, would readily heed sound prescriptions. But after "two
centuries" of being disregarded on issues like free trade, Stigler and a
few other economists came to believe that government officials were
266not very interested in the "truths" of economics. It was time to
"undertake the different and more fundamental task of explaining
261 James Q. Wilson, Introduction, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION, supra note 238,
at ix.
262 Steven P. Croley, Public Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 7, 9 (2000).
263 STIGLER, supra note 70.
264 Also significant was Stigler's work on the "economics of information." See
generally George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213
(1961) (calling on economists to pay more attention to the importance of
information, for example, in ascertaining market price); George J. Stigler, An
Introduction to Privacy in Economics and Politics, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 623 (1980)
(demonstrating how economic analysis illuminates choices in favor of privacy and
the concealment of information).
265 STIGLER, supra note 70, at 114.
266 Id. at 114-15.
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what states actually do, of discovering what are the forces that
determine which policies will actually be adopted by a government.
'
,2
6 7
Stigler began that undertaking (much of it with co-author Claire
Friedland) by examining "the actual effects of economic regu-
lations." 6 By understanding the effects of regulation, he believed he
could infer something about the forces that created the regulation.
Through empirical testing unlike any that had previously been
conducted, 2 3) he discovered that several prominent regulatory
policies of the 1960s-including the regulation of electricity rates
and the SEC's "elaborate review of the prospectuses for new security
issues"-were not having the effects or yielding the benefits that
ostensibly motivated them.27°  To be sure, the regulations were
creating benefits. The problem was that those benefits were accruing
to the wrong recipients. For instance, the beneficiaries of electricity-
rate regulation were large commercial customers instead of con-
sumer households. Additionally, the effect of the SEC reviews was
to inhibit competition and raise the public's costs.
From these and similar findings, the now-dominant conception
of regulation emerged: the "general theory of the behavior of
governments" 272 is that "groups possessing political influence use the
political process effectively to increase their incomes. "213 According
to the "economics of regulation," as this approach was initially
dubbed, 74 causal relationships and the direction of influences are the
267 Id. at 114. Reflecting the immodesty that seems to characterize those who
employ this approach, see supra text accompanying notes 71-75, Stigler went out of his
way to add that it was "economists [who] initiated the theoretical study of the actual,
in contrast to the desired, functions of the state," because "[o]f all the social scientists,
only economists possess a theoretical system to explain social behavior." STIGLER,
supra note 70, at 115.
268 STIGLER, supra note 70, at 115.
269 Id. at 117-18.
270Id. at 116-17.
271 Id. at 116; see also George G. Stigler & Claire Friedland, What Can Regulators
Regulate? The Case of Electricity, 5J.L. & ECON. 1, 7-8 (1962) (describing how commercial
customers benefited from regulation).
272 STIGLER, supra note 70, at 118.
279 Id. at 120.
274 Stigler, like many of his contemporaries, eschewed an anthropomorphic view
of the state and, true to the tenets of his discipline, looked for answers under the
assumptions that governments are made up of individual people who are rational
actors, and who therefore behave according to the very same principles, and in
response to the same sorts of incentives, that motivate market participants. What they
assumed was true of private choice, Stigler and his contemporaries assumed was also
true of "public choice" (the name given to the now-immense field of research that,
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reverse of what had been supposed. The seemingly autonomous
administrative agency is, upon inspection, captured,27 5 and the
seemingly constrained industries are liberated and enriched.
Consequently, the industry tail wags the regulatory dog. As Stigler
laments, "no matter how disinterested the goal of public policy, the
policy is bent to help politically influential groups at the cost of the
less influential.' 76 And the problem is not just that for every winner,
there are losers-the real kicker is that the winners often win less
than the losers lose.277 Regulation is, in a word, inefficient.
278
The finding that industries tend to benefit from regulation led to
another question for Stigler: "Why are some industries and activities
regulated by the state, and not others?, 279  One of the most
significant developments that emerged from this dismal perspective
on regulation was a set of insights regarding the sources of political
influence-or, as we would put it, power. As Stigler recounts,
economists could explain, for example:
[W]hy smaller groups do better than large in the political arena.
[First, t]he smaller group is more cohesive: It is easier to organize the
small group, collect funds for lobbying, and keep it informed. There
are only about 70,000 beekeepers concentrated in a few western states
(yes, there is a federal program for them) but millions of occasional
consumers of honey. And secondly, it pays each member of a small
group to invest resources in politics, because the payoff will be larger.
Each beekeeper gets hundreds of times as much out of the federal
program as each taxpayer loses.2
s°
Such insights regarding how groups of individuals could
effectively coordinate their behavior in pursuit of common interests
were more the product of some of Stigler's contemporaries than of
for the most part, has a similar premise). See supra text accompanying notes 303, 314-
17 (discussing dispositionism of regulators).
275 This is not meant to imply that the people who run agencies are captured by
the process. According to the basic theory, their interests are advanced by the quid
pro quo inherent in the process. See George Stigler, The Theory of Economic
Regulation, 2 BELLJ. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3, 12-13 (1971) (arguing that regulators
may not antagonize regulated firms because they want to keep their options open
for a high-paying job with a firm upon departing the regulatory agency).
276 STIGLER, supra note 70, at 119.
277 Id. at 118-20.
278 This was one of several ways in which neoclassical economics was attempting to
demonstrate how good regulatory intentions tend to create unintended (i.e.,
inefficient) consequences. For an overview, see Milton Friedman, BRIGHT PROMISES,
supra note 208, at 127-28.
279 STIGLER, supra note 70, at 118.
280 Id. at 119.
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Stigler himself: But before leaving our discussion of Stigler, a few
observations are in order regarding his important contributions.
Look carefully at the structure of Stigler's work-at least as we
have summarized it. Stigler was challenging a long-held conven-
tional wisdom that governments and their agencies create beneficial
regulations. Underlying that conventional wisdom was the supp-
osition that regulatory processes were fair and that regulators were
dispositionally motivated to serve the public interest. Stigler's
challenge to those suppositions was initiated by his discovery that, in
fact, a sanguine view of our regulatory institutions had no empirical
basis and that, if anything, those institutions' actions were
counterproductive to their espoused goals. To explain the
phenomenon, Stigler looked to the outside influences on regulators
and described how different groups were able to exert power over
the regulators. Thus, Stigler contested the reassuring conventional
wisdom that our institutions are neutral and well-functioning and
rejected the idea that the stated goals of regulators are controlling.
He did so by downplaying dispositional factors and emphasizing
situational factors. By taking situation seriously, he raised the issue
of power inasmuch as situations are largely defined by allocations
and dynamics of power. As Stigler and many others writing in this
area have taken for granted (without ever actually using the term),
power is central.
In this way, Stigler's work on the economics of regulation pro-
vides a paradigmatic example of power economics. We believe that
this Article finds confirmation in the fact that Stigler and other
economists stopped there-why, in other words, neoclassical
281 See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 53-57 (1971) (discussing the effectiveness of small
groups); RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 42-45 (1982) (reviewing Olson's
analysis of the correlation between group size and effectiveness). This topic of what
interests will be best able to influence regulation is central to power economics and
our theory of deep capture. We hope to return to it in much greater detail in future
works. In any event, we hope readers might begin to see its relevance for questions far
broader than simply administrative regulation.
282 This is not to say that Stigler and other scholars, did not still see an
important-we think too important-role for dispositions. The work he began
initiated a great deal of scholarship that assumed that regulators were dispositionally
inclined to be captured. See, e.g., George J. Stigler, Can Regulatory Agencies Protect the
Consumer?, in THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE: ESSAYS ON REGULATION 178, 181
(1975) (arguing that regulators and regulation have often failed to protect the public
interest relative to the interests of the regulated industry because "the logic and basic
forces of regulation ... dictate what type of men ... will typically be appointed" and
emphasizing dispositional factors).
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economics has not evolved into to power economics and why
capture theory has not evolved into deep capture theory.
B. Deep Capture: An Historical Example
I, Galileo [Galilei], ... seventy years of age, arraigned personally for judgment,
kneeling before you Most Eminent and Most Reverend Cardinals Inquisitors-
General against heretical depravity in all of Christendom, . . swear that I have
always believed, I believe now, and with God's help I will believe in the future
all that the Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church holds, preaches, and
teaches .... I have been judged vehemently suspected of heresy, namely of
having held and believed that the [S]un is the center of the world and
motionless and the [E]arth is not the center and moves.
Therefore, desiring to remove from the minds of Your Eminences and eveiy
faithful Christian this vehement suspicion, rightly conceived against me, with a
sincere heart and unfeigned faith I abjure, curse, and detest the above-mentioned
errors and heresies, . . . and I swear that in the future I will never again say or
assert, orally or in writing, anything which might cause a similar suspicion
about me ....
-Galileo Galilei...
With the foundation of shallow capture in place, we can now
build upon it, or dig beneath it, to introduce deep capture. To catch
your first glimpse of the phenomenon, recall the Galileo story. We
argued, in a flip of Posner's version of the story, that it was Galileo
who was committed to realism and Bellarmine who, like legal
economists, was wed to an unrealistic, reductionist model.2 4
Let us push the analogy further. Galileo was, for most of his life,
devoted to the idea that humans could, through methods of obser-
vation, discover and make sense of the natural order. 8' He was
committed to basing theories about our world and the place of it in
the universe on all the evidence and clues available for human
inspection, even if doing so challenged widely held self-affirming and
283 Galileo's Abjuration ofJune 22, 1633, in THE GALILEO AFFAIR, supra note 234,
at 292, 292.
284 See supra text accompanying notes 230-36.
285 In 1611, Galileo described his research methodology this way:
Over a period of two years now, I have tested my instrument (or rather
dozens of my instruments) by hundreds and thousands of experiments
involving thousands and thousands of objects, near and far, large and small,
bright and dark; hence I do not see how it can enter the mind of anyone that
I have simple-mindedly remained deceived in my observations.
DANIELJ. BOORSTIN, THE DIscovERERs 316 (1983).
[Vol. 152:129
THE SITUATION
28s,faith-based beliefs about the Earth's centrality in the universe.
Recall that Galileo lived at a time when most people believed
themselves to inhabit a stationary world. The intellectual
establishment of the Renaissance, controlled to a large degree by the
Catholic Church, perceived human knowledge as a fundamentally
static thing. Certain environmental features seemed obvious: the
Earth was not moving, and the Sun was rotating about the earth.
The validity of those notions was bolstered by everyday experience
and found confirmation in several biblical texts, and in the basic
assumption that heaven reigned above the Earth and hell below.8
286 Galileo had, in his lesser-known work in mechanics, divined the truth of
Copernicus' revelations long before his invention of the telescope. GIORGIO DE
SANrILLANA, THE CRIME OF GALILEO 5-6 (1955). But Galileo was aware of how
Copernicus had been mocked and marginalized for expressing those views and thus
opted to wait until he had compelling proof before endorsing Copernican ideas. Id.
at 11. In a letter to Kepler, Galileo remarked:
Like you, I accepted the Copernican position several years ago and
discovered from thence the causes of many natural effects which are
doubtless inexplicable by the current theories. I have written up many
reasons and refutations on the subject, but I have not dared until now to
bring them into the open, being warned by the fortunes of Copernicus
himself....
Id. The telescope provided Galileo with what he thought would be "irrefutable proof
to any man in good faith," id., or, with what we might describe as evidence so
irrefutable as to pierce the ambiguity supporting the then-conventional view.
287 At the same time, it is important to note that the Catholic Church was not an
institution that inherently spurned logic and empirical study. Its guiding philosophy,
Scholasticism, represented an attempt to wed divine revelation, buttressed by faith, to
Aristotelian logical deduction. Id. at 56-57. Thus, the Church had no problem with,
and actually encouraged, Aristotelian science that generally limited itself to the basic
study of the natural world. Id.
What the Church (and with it, most of European society) valued above all else,
however, was not creativity but authority. Hence, the intellectual establishment
inhabited, and later critiqued, by Galileo was in many ways profoundly backward-
looking, in the sense that the "the progressive nature of human knowledge" was
entirely alien to it. WILLIAM R. SHEA, GALILEO'S INTELLEcTUAL REvOLUTION: MIDDLE
PERIOD, 1620-1632, at 31 (1972). Traditional science and philosophy were rooted in
the insights of the Bible and the work of Ancient Greek thinkers (notably Aristotle).
Scholars were to approach such authorities, not as advocates of debatable propositions,
but as bodies of revealed truth from whom added insights could then be gained via the
process of deductive reasoning. See PIETRO REDONDI, GALILEO: HERETIC 52, 54-55
(Raymond Rosenthal, trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1987) (1983) ("Nature-the
Aristotelian professors of philosophy said-has spoken through the mouth of
Aristotle.").
288 See, e.g., Psalms 103:11 ("For, as high as heaven is above the [E]arth ... 
Matthew 11:23 ("[W]ill you be exalted to the skies? No, brought down to the depths!").
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Galileo, informed by the work of fellow astronomical realist
Copernicus,289 was interested in exploring and studying elements of
our planet and the celestial bodies whirling "above" it for hard-to-see
clues into the reality of celestial dynamics. Mathematics and a
telescope both provided critical lenses through which he could get a
* 290
better view.
Using these tools, Galileo helped to turn the dominant
Aristotelian model of the universe, and our place in it, on its head. 9'
289 Galileo wrote of Copernicus' dedication to realism:
And so he began to investigate what the system of the world could really be
in nature, no longer for the sole convenience of the pure astronomer, whose
calculations he had complied with, but in order to come to an understanding
of such a noble physical problem; he was confident that, if one had been able
to account for mere appearances by means of hypotheses which are not true,
this could be done much better by means of the true and physical
constitution of the world.
Galileo's Considerations on the Copernican Opinion (1615), in THE GALILEO AFFAIR,
supra note 234, at 70, 74 (1989).
290 Galileo stated that:
"Philosophy is written in this grand book the universe, which stands
continually open to our gaze .... But the book cannot be understood unless
one first learns to comprehend the language and to read the alphabet in
which it is composed. It is written in the language of mathematics, and its
characters are triangles, circles, and other geometric figures, without which it
is humanly impossible to understand a single word of it ......
DAVA SOBEL, GALILEO'S DAUGHTER 16 (1999) (quoting Galileo's The Assayer, in
STILLMAN DRAKE, GALILEO (Oxford Univ. Press, 1996) (1980)).
Galileo's use of mathematics is crucial. The notion of scientific empiricism was
not, in and of itself, offensive to the Aristotelian mindset embraced by the Church.
Yet, in contrast to Aristotle's relatively simplistic system that relied entirely on concrete
observations that human beings could make with their own senses, Galileo posited a
framework of analysis that was just as abstract and theoretical as that of the Scholastics.
See REDONDI, supra note 287, at 52-53 (describing the intricate process of deciphering
The Assayer). In doing so, Galileo saw himself as a kind of "philosopher of nature,"
whose work was every bit as important to the project of understanding Creation as that
of the moralist or the theologian. Id. at 53. Thus, to the established intellectual and
religious hierarchy, Galileo's ideas were deeply threatening.
M Neither Galileo nor Copernicus was the first to discover the basic astronomical
insights that later made each of them famous. Indeed, many of the early "discoveries"
associated with the origins of modern science had been, in other cultures, long
known. As Dick Teresi recently summarized:
[Tihe ancient Indians, long before Copernicus, knew that the [E]arth
revolved around the [S]un and, a thousand years before Kepler, knew that
the orbits of the planets were elliptical; the Arabs invented the observatory
and named most of our popular stars; the Chinese mapped the sky; and the
Amerindians noted important events with daggers of light or optical snakes
that thrill us to this day.
DICK TERESI, LOST DISCOVERIES: THE ANCIENT ROOTS OF MODERN SCIENCE-FROM
THE BABYLONIANS TO THE MAYA 92-93 (2002). The belief that Copernicus or Galileo
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It is important to note, however, that the Aristotelian model (as
enhanced through Ptolemy's refinements) 29)2 provided an adequate
"as if' theory, for most purposes. Through theory and observation,
Galileo removed the Earth from its stable center, around which the
Sun was revolving, and placed the Sun at the immovable center of
the Earth's rotations. Put differently, by studying our astronomical
situation more closely, Galileo discovered our astronomical
fundamental attribution error attributing the movement of the celestial
situation to the centrality and fixity of the Earth instead of
attributing our own movement, like that of the other heavenly
bodies, to the celestial situation. Galileo did not provide absolute
proof for his challenging worldview, although he believed the
telescopic observations were sufficient to overturn the geocentric
model. What he did provide was a refined theory and new
observations-such as the discovery of four moons orbiting Jupiter,
the phases of Venus, and an exegesis of the tides-that strongly
discovered that the Earth circled about the Sun is tantamount to saying that
Columbus discovered South America. It is accurate only from an ethnocentric
vantage point, a problem that plagues many of our presumed accuracies. See supra
text accompanying notes 28-30 (explaining the social psychological findings that
people tend to view themselves in self-affirming ways and make mental adjustments to
preserve that self-image).
292 Aristotle originally proposed that all celestial bodies were immutable perfect
spheres, the Earth being fixed at the center. See SOBEL, supra note 290, at 170-71
(describing the geocentric Aristotelian world view in contrast to the views of Salviati,
Galileo and others). Ptolemy reasoned that this must be so, since "if the [E]arth were
not at the center of the stellar sphere, we should not be able to always see half of this
sphere; but we do see it .... Galileo's Reply to Ignoli (1624), in THE GALILEO
AFFAIR, supra note 234, at 154, 168. When one looks at two fixed stars opposite each
other, such that one rises when the other sets, this shows that the part of the sky
above the Earth is equal to the part below, and consequently that each is a
hemisphere, and, since this phenomenon is observable for all horizons, that the Earth
is at its center. See id. at 168-69 (explaining the basis for Ptolemy's reasoning).
Galileo called the argument "beautiful and worthy of Ptolemy" but pointed to the
(now obvious) alternative explanation that "if we let this sphere be still and let the
terrestrial globe turn on itself (as Copernicus does), then regardless of where it is
placed the same thing will happen to the two fixed stars, namely their simultaneous
rising and setting." Id.
293 See Albert Van Helden, Plolemaic System, at http://es.rice.edu/ES/humsoc/
Galileo/Things/ptolemaic-system.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2003) ("Ptolemy was able
to account for the motions of heavenly bodies within the standards of observational
accuracy of his day. The idea was to break down the complex observed planetary
motion into components with perfect circular motions.").
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suggested that the astronomical situation was far more influential
than the then-dominant geocentric view allowed .
We want to push this analogy even further. Despite Galileo's
compelling evidence that the Earth revolved around the sun, he
appeared to have been wrong. To be sure, we might look today and
judge that he was (comparatively) right, after all. But forget for a
moment the revival and celebration of Galileo's pre-abjuration views,
beginning in the eighteenth century, and temporarily ignore his
stature today as a father of modern science. Instead, imagine
yourself living in early seventeenth-century Italy. It is Bellarmine's
view-informed by biblical passages, religious authorities, popular
perceptions, experience, and naked-eye observations-which con-
firms your intuitions and the formal positions of the most powerful
groups and institutions in Italy.)G And it is Galileo, not Bellarmine,
294 Of course, Galileo's theory was more complicated than the geocentric view
and consequently left many questions unanswered. Among other problems, a
heliocentric Earth, without gravity (a concept which was unavailable at the time)
could neither rotate nor revolve without sending its occupants flying. The fact that
most of the Earth's objects seemed fairly secure (with the exception of the tower in
Pisa) was a major reason that he (incorrectly) turned to the tides for support of his
view. See SOBEL, supra note 290, at 75 (outlining the problems with Galileo's theory
that the principle of gravity, then undiscovered, would have explained).
Legal economists justify eschewing realism in the name of maintaining a theory
that is falsifiable. As the Galileo story indicates, however, there are major problems
with that justification. First, there is no reason to believe that the more realistic a
model, the less falsifiable it is. That much is clear from Posner's own example of the
debate between Galileo and Bellarmine. See supra text accompanying note 230.
Bellarmine's theory was clearly neither realistic nor falsifiable. Second, even if more
realistic theories are less falsifiable, that fact does not justify ignoring reality. Absent a
meta-rule explaining how realism and falsifiability are to be traded off (again,
assuming that there is such a tradeoff), identifying the problem does not identify how
the tradeoff should be resolved. Thus, Posner's claim seems to be a makeweight
argument against realism. Furthermore, if Posner's position is that his theory is
superior because it is falsifiable, then he needs to acknowledge that it has, indeed,
been thoroughly falsified (or been rendered, by his defenses, non-falsifiable). As we
discuss elsewhere, many previous economic theories have been falsified, including
those that resemble the simplistic models of law and economics. See Hanson &
Yosifon, supra note 30 (discussing biology's theory of "spontaneous generation" and
economists' theories of intertemporal choice, revealed preference, and assumptions of
"perfect information" and "stable preferences" have been more or less falsified.");
Hanson et al., supra note 84 (arguing that Posner's positive theory of tort law has been
falsified or is non-falsifiable, and provides an alternative positive theory of tort law).
295 Albert Einstein himself dubbed Galileo "the father of modem physics-indeed
of modern science altogether." SOBEL, supra note 290, at 326.
296 As expressed in the Papal Condemnation of June 22, 1633:
That the [S]un is the center of the world motionless is a proposition,
which is philosophically absurd and false and formally heretical for being
explicitly contrary to Holy Scripture;
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who recants and renounces his earlier "findings" and opinions.
Chances are that you, that we, would have believed Galileo was a
heretic and never doubted the process that "proved" him to be one.
From this perspective, Bellarmine was obviously right, and Galileo,
clearly wrong.
So how could one of the greatest scientists of all time be so
wrong? The answer is obvious, indeed it is one of the reasons that
the story is so well known: the scientific community was not
sufficiently insulated from powerful institutions with a stake in
297scientific outcomes. More concretely, because Galileo's work was
threatening to the Catholic Church and its teachings, and because of
the Church's encompassing power, Galileo was under intense
pressure-indeed, was ultimately convicted by the inquisitors-to
"restate" his views on the structure of the universe. Galileo's
recantation was the result, not of scientific observation, but of
religious persecution and the very real threat of a horrible death .
''
The situational forces behind Galileo's "restated" views are thus
unmistakable. Galileo made his recantation decision with the
equivalent of a gun to his head. Of course, as we have argued
That the [E]arth is neither the center of the world nor motionless but
moves even with diurnal motion is philosophically equally absurd and false,
and theologically at least erroneous in the Faith.
Sentence ofJune 22, 1633, in THE GALILEO AFFAIR, supra note 234, at 287-88.
297 The adherence to the Ptolemaic model by university professors was a
recurrent theme in Galileo's attempt to bring forth evidence to support the
Copernican view. Professors from Pisa to Bologna to Padua rejected the telescope:
Magini, professor of astronomy in Bologna, promised the new planets would be
"extirpated from the sky." DE SANTILLANA, supra note 286, at 9.
Daniel Boorstin nicely summarizes the sweeping threat of Galileo's findings to
the fabric of conventional theological and philosophic understandings of the
universe:
Each of his simple observations shook another pillar of the Aristotelian-
Ptolemaic universe. Now, with his very own eyes, Galileo had seen fixed stars
beyond his capacity to count them (Was the Universe infinite?). He had seen
that the moon was not more perfect in shape than the earth itself (Was there
perhaps no difference, after all, between the substance of celestial bodies and
that of the Earth?). The Milky Way then proven to be simply a mass of
countless stars (Was there nothing, after all, to the Aristotelian theory of
celestial exhaltations? Were heavenly processes not essentially different from
those on Earth?).
BOORSTIN, supra note 285, at 320.
299 See SOBEL, supra note 290 at 4, 171 (describing how Dominican friar Giordano
Bruno was burned at the stake in 1600 in Rome for asserting heliocentric views of the
world, a fact of which Galileo was aware).
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throughout this Article, such situational pressures are rarely so
obvious.
This can all be expressed, somewhat stylistically, in Stiglerian
terms. In recanting, Galileo was "captured" by the Church much
like, say, the now defunct Civil Aeronautics Board was once said to
be captured by the airline industry.300 He claimed to be saying what
he believed "with sincere heart and unfeigned "h,, 30' independent
of any pressure from the Church, when in fact he was serving the
Church's interests, despite his own beliefs.
C. Deep Capture: Histoy Repeating Itself
[TIhere have been opened up to this vast and most excellent science, of which my
work is merely the beginning, ways and means by which other minds more acute
than mine will explore its remote corners.
-Galileo Galilei
2
1. Some Deep Implications of Shallow Capture
In identifying the phenomenon of capture, Stigler and his
contemporaries obliterated the once-conventional view of regulation.
They refuted the naive presumption that had long been protected
behind the ambiguous (and, therefore, easily defended) concept of
"the public interest," and provided a far more realistic (albeit
disturbing) account of the sources and effects of regulation.
Regulation was "caused" less by public-spirited and well-advised
regulators and more by the situational constraints imposed upon
them by competing economic entities, with the most powerful
entities wielding the most influence. In other words, Stigler,
identified and substantially overturned what might be called the
regulatory fundamental attribution error. The older "public interest"
regulatory theory maintained a kind of dispositionist view of a
constant figure, evaluating influences, measuring public welfare, and
300 See generally Bradley Behrman, Civil Aeronautics Board, in WILSON, supra note
238, at 75.
301 Galileo's Abjuration ofJune 22, 1633, in THE GALILEO AFFAIR, supra note 234,
at 292, 292.
302 GALILEO GALILEI, Two NEW SCIENCES 153-54 (Henry Crew & Alfonso De
Salvio, trans., Macmillan 1914) (1638).
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making decisions accordingly.30 3 Regulatory theory essentially rested
on a view of the regulator as a rational actor whose stable preferences
were in the public interest. By studying the regulator's actions and
ignoring the regulator's words, economists like Stigler were able to
see new patterns and surmise some of the situational influences that
generated them.
But Stigler's work barely breaks the surface of situationism and
identifies only a very shallow form of capture. When one takes
seriously the power of the situation-exterior and interior 304-- one
can begin to understand the potential depths of capture. There are
several ways in which capture is likely to run much deeper than
Stigler, or others applying and advancing his insights, have
recognized.
2. The Depth of Capture
Again, returning to Galileo's story may help make evident what is
invisible in our midst. First, as the Catholic Church's efforts
revealed, there are other capture-worthy and capturable institutions
and individuals beyond merely administrative regulators. Recall that
Galileo had no official regulatory authority either in the state or in
the Church. What he had was a certain level of public legitimacy,
and therefore power, as a renowned scientist. 3°  His theories,
evidence, and conclusions were important as a confirmation of, or
306challenge to, the "truth" of the Church's teachings. As a result,
Galileo's positions were well worth capturing. Similarly, today any
institutions or individuals capable of influencing existing wealth and
power distributions will be subject to the pressures of capture. In
this sense, Stigler and those who subscribe to his theory are, like the
public-interest theorists they replaced, far too shallow.
If administrative regulators are vulnerable to the forces of
capture by certain interests, as most everyone agrees they are, then
303 See STIGLER, supra note 70, at 114-15 (asserting that recent theories on
government behavior no longer attribute public policies to the suggestions of
informed economic advisors, but rather characterize policies as a response to pressure
from interested parties who aim to benefit from them).
304 See supra Part II.E (briefly describing "interior" and distinguishing it from
"exterior").
305 See SOBEL, supra note 290, at 6-7 ("Galileo found himself lionized as another
Columbus for his conquests....").
306 Id. at 11-12 (describing Galileo's complex relationship with religion and the
Catholic Church).
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the likelihood of a deeper capture seems undeniable. There is
nothing special about administrative regulators-except, perhaps, the
general concern that they may be captured. Virtually every other
institution in our society seems just as vulnerable. After all,
contemporary scholars and commentators have rarely even
considered, much less taken seriously, the problem of deep capture.
Given that nescience, one would expect other institutions to be
constructed without heed to the dynamics of capture. In a
world without foxes, a farmer will not guard the hen-house. And
because deep capture occurs situationally-outside of view by, and
with the induced consent of, the captured-any loss of eggs will
either go unnoticed or will be perceived as natural and just.
There is a second general way in which traditional capture theory
is too shallow. To see this, it is necessary to look deeper than the
behavior of the captured institutions and individuals. Beneath the
surface of behavior, the interior situation of relevant actors is also
subject to capture. Indeed, much of the power of deep capture
comes from the fact that its targets include the way that people think
and the way that they think they think.
The Catholic Church would have been far less troubled by
Galileo, we suspect, if he had not been writing and publishing his
ideas broadly in an attempt to persuade others to reject then-
conventional wisdom. °7 Eschewing the scientific conventions of his
day, Galileo published many of his discoveries not in Latin but in
Italian. He was committed to altering the opinions of people in his
society, not simply to recording his measurements for a narrow
scientific audience .0  It was the danger Galileo posed to the
Church's basic knowledge structures-which were embraced by most
of the intelligentsia and lay people of the time-that led forces,
including vested academic interests, to urge the Church to literally
M7 Galileo was well-known and well-liked by prominent Catholics, including the
Medicis and Pope Urban VIII. DE SANTILLANA, supra note 286, at 118, 160-62. Thus,
the pressure applied by the Inquisitors might have been reduced had Galileo
attempted only to persuade fellow professors or the Church hierarchy. By taking his
case to the Italian prelates, princes, gentlemen, and men of business, however, and by
writing in Italian rather than Latin, Galileo presented a significant challenge to the
Church. See MARIO BIAGIOLI, GALILEO, COURTIER: THE PRACTICE OF SCIENCE IN THE
CULTURE OF ABSOLUTISM 33-37 (1993) (analyzing Galileo's use of patronage
relationships as a source of power throughout his career).
308 See BoORSTIN, supra note 285, at 323-25 (describing Galileo's campaign to
"interest literate laymen in this new way of thinking").
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capture Galileo.3°  Galileo's work went beyond offering a simple
challenge to established propositions such as geocentric cosmology; it
advocated an entirely different intellectual and moral approach, one
that aimed to discredit the "cult" of tradition 1 0 Thus, when Galileo
advanced heliocentricism, as he did in his famous letter to the Grand
Duchess Christina, he did so in the context of a more comprehensive
rejection of the view of knowledge as nothing more than a set of pre-
ordained revelations:
[W]ho wants the human mind put to death? Who is going to claim that
everything in the world which is observable and knowable has already
been seen and discovered? ... one must not, in my opinion ... block the
way of freedom of philosophizing about things of the world and of
nature, as if they had all already been discovered and disclosed with
certainty. Nor should it be considered rash to be dissatisfied with
311
opinions which are almost universally accepted ....
The message that common sense notions should be challenged
was deeply threatening to the Catholic Church of the seventeenth
century, which defined faith as it had since the Middle Ages-as
obedience to the teachings of religious authorities. The highest crime
an individual could commit was that of heresy-the word itself
deriving from the Greek word hairesis, meaning "choice. 31  In order
309 Following the guilty verdict, at which time he was seventy years old, Galileo was
imprisoned in his own home for the remainder of his life. Like so many radicals
before and after him, Galileo continued his work while imprisoned, smuggling out of
captivity two books for publication under an assumed name, which would ultimately
become the basis for the theory of dynamics and gravity developed by Sir Isaac
Newton. Boorstin notes that Galileo's imprisonment was mitigated somewhat
before his death:
Eventually the Pope allowed him the companionship of a young scholar,
Vincenzo Viviani, who reported Galileo's death on January 8, 1642, a month
before his seventy-eighth birthday. "With philosophic and Christian firmness
he rendered up his soul to its Creator, sending it, as he liked to believe, to
enjoy and to watch from a closer vantage point those eternal and immutable
marvels which he, by means of a fragile device, had brought closer to our
mortal eyes with such eagerness and impatience."
Id. at 326-27.
310 See REDONDI, supra note 287, at 501.
311 Galileo's Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina (1615), in THE GALILEO
AFFAIR, supra note 234, at 87, 96-97.
312 BERNARD HAMILTON, THE MEDIEVAL INQUISITION 13 (1981). Heresy extended
far beyond the act of challenging the Church's central theological teachings; any
intellectual project that called into question the Church's fundamental intellectual
authority was subject to censure. Thus, Cardinal Bellarmine condemned the
Copernican cosmology as heretical not only (or principally) because it ran afoul of a
few passages in the Bible, but because it stood in sharp contrast to a fundamental
Aristotelian law of physics, which said that "the [E]arth, insofar, as it is the greatest
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to prevent the wider populace from realizing that a "choice" existed,
Galileo had to be silenced.
Those in power thus captured the institutions and individuals
that threatened their dominant position, including an individual
scientist capable of altering ideas or knowledge in a way that might
weaken their power. They did so through a process intended to
suggest that Galileo freely chose his recantation and resultant silence.
Galileo, wisely, did not proclaim that he was being forced to recant
under the threat of death; he stated instead that he was trying to
clarify the possible confusion that his errors had created and make
clear that he, upon reflection, "abjure[d], curse[d], and detest[ed]
the above-mentioned errors and heresies . . ."3'3 The Church thus
applied situational pressure to generate the appearance of
"dispositional" recantation. And the people at that time, inasmuch
as their knowledge structures and understanding of the world were
influenced by the Church, and insofar as the Church managed to
squelch other ideas or knowledge structures, were also deeply
captured.
Understanding that capture is directed at both our exteriors and
interiors clears up some confusion and debate in the shallow capture
literature. When Stigler's evidence of capture emerged, economists,
political scientists, and public choice theorists got busy trying to
identify the precise mechanics of the regulatory black box that
Stigler mostly ignored. True to form, they began with the rational
actor model of human behavior and sought to explain capture as the
consequence of the self-interested, maximizing dispositions of
314individual regulators. Yet, while simple formulations have given
way to increasingly elaborate ones,3" public-choice theory is still
dogged by the fact that it is unrealistically "cynical" (meaning that
the assumed dispositions of regulatory actors are perceived to be
weight, tends naturally to that natural point which is the center." REDONDI, supra note
287, at 39. Because the Church had accepted Aristotle as the final authority on the
laws of nature, all others were bound to do the same. Id.
"13 Galileo's Abjuration of June 22, 1633, in THE GALILEO AFFAIR, supra note 234,
at 292.
314 This is yet another example of the tendency to infer dispositions from actions.
See supra text accompanying notes 150-78 (describing several experiments in which
participants tended to overestimate the role of disposition even when situational
influence should be obvious).
315 See, e.g., DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL
CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 47-71
(1994) (analyzing the failure of traditional rational choice theory to explain voter
turnout).
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unrealistically selfish). After all, many governmental actors and reg-
ulatory agents often claim, and actually seem to be, motivated by the
public interest and try to act that way;31 6 that is, many regulators'
actions appear more consistent with their ideological beliefs than
with a narrow conception of self-interest17
The problem with shallow capture is not that it cannot always
explain the part played by the dispositions of regulatory actors, but
rather that it takes dispositions so seriously in the first place. Deep
capture makes clear that people's intentions and beliefs may have
little to do with their behavior and that, insofar as they do, those
intentions and beliefs are part of what interests compete to capture.
When Catholic astronomers of the seventeenth century stated
that they believed, as most profoundly did, that the Earth was at the
center of the universe, deep capture was at work. Their astronomy
was part of a larger, interconnected set of truths taught to them in
seminary and reinforced at many turns-some seen, some unseen
-in their society. Similarly, lay people had no reason to dispute
those truths and faced situational influences just as powerful, despite
being less visible, as the gun to the head or fire to the feet that
Galileo experienced. That a regulator may act out of ideological
dispositions no more implies that she is free from capture than the
changing lengths of shadows on a summer afternoon implies that the
sun is revolving around the Earth.
316 See, e.g., Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical
and "Empirical" Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199, 217-23 (1988)
(arguing that shifts in public policy demonstrate that public leaders are not motivated
purely by self-interest); see also DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRIcKEY, LAw AND PUBLIC
CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 31 (1991) (describing evidence that "one
factor in how a legislator votes is simply that legislator's view of the public
interest").
317 See FARBER & FRIcKEY, supra note 316, at 24-25, 28-33 (discounting the public
choice theory as the sole explanation for legislators' actions). In such circumstances,
the literature sometimes accommodates such ideological behavior by treating it as a
manifestation of self-interest. See generally Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, Capture
and Ideology in Law and Economics, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 279 (1984); James B. Kau &
Paul H. Rubin, Self-Interest, Ideology, and Logrolling in Congressional Voting, 22 J.L. &
ECON. 365 (1979). Instead of pursuing the analytic inquiry that this increasingly
non-falsifiable definition of self-interest would entail, scholars relying on it typically
just move on, leaving the dispositionist rational actor whole and ready to be employed
for the next analysis. A critical realist approach places the exploration of the nature
of preference formation, and the location of its influences, at the start of an analytic
inquiry, instead of avoiding it as an unfortunate impasse to simple, if unrealistic,
analyses and seemingly clear policy conclusions.
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The question that should be asked is not: "Who among the
regulators is corrupt or so selfishly motivated as to disregard the
'public interest?"' The question that should be asked is: "Who
among us is the most powerful and most capable of deeply capturing
our exteriors and interiors and, even, of capturing what we mean by
the 'public interest?"'
3. The Invisibility of Capture
By "deep capture," then, we are referring to the disproportionate
and self-serving influence that the relatively powerful tend to exert
over all the exterior and interior situational features that materially
influence the maintenance and extension of that power-
including those features that purport to be, and that we experience
as, independent, volitional, and benign. Because the situation
generally tends to be invisible (or nearly so) to us, deep capture
tends to be as well.
This raises the question: if deep capture is so hard to see, then
why is it so obvious in the Galileo example? There are several
reasons. To begin with, at the time, we doubt that it was so visible.
We suspect that few observers saw anything untoward or illegitimate
about Galileo's inquisitorial experience or any reason to doubt the
"knowledge" that it produced. 18 The situational pressures that, to us,
were glaringly excessive during the Inquisition were probably not
perceived as excessive at the time.
The situational forces confronting Galileo may be easier for us
to see now because we live in a radically different environment.
We are looking at another generation of people in another country
318 Cf REDONDI, supra note 287, at 303 (suggesting that news of Galileo's
condemnation, although greeted "by a salvo of Aristotelian criticism," did not rise
above the level of "routine academic skirmishes"). Galileo's trial itself was, of course, a
hidden proceeding-a series of private interrogations that the world did not learn
about until after the fact. Id. at 326.
319 Such situational pressures are less likely to be visibly employed today. The
fact that burning people at the stake is now considered to be an unacceptable
violation of human rights does not mean that blatant situational force is no longer
used to elicit the appearance of free, voluntary action. The still-significant problem of
"forced confessions" is just one of many possible examples of that phenomenon. See
Jim Dwyer & Kevin Flynn, New Light on Jogger's Rape Calls Evidence into Question, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 1, 2002, at Al (discussing recent evidence that the convictions in the
Central Park jogger rape case were based on confessions that likely were coerced);
Susan Saulny, Convictions and Charges Voided in '89 Central Park Jogger Attack, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2002, at Al ("[L]awyers for three of the men.., contend that the
confessions were coerced by the police.").
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whose situational worldviews we reject and whose victim, Galileo, we520 ,
revere. They are "them," and Galileo is "us." People are
motivated to attribute bad outcomes to in-group members .
The contrast is heightened by the historical construction of the event
as a lesson on the horrors of the Inquisition and the dangerous
distortions that result when religion is allowed to dominate (or,
we might say, "capture") science. The role of disposition and deep
capture in the Galileo story is, today and to us, conspicuous, almost
palpable. But seeing our own situation and its deep capture is not.
4. Learning from History
For some of the same reasons that it is difficult to convince
people that they would have been influenced by the situational cues
in the Milgram experiment, 32 2 it is nearly impossible to convince
people that they live in, and are part of, a deeply captured world. To
make our preliminary case, therefore, we will attempt to demonstrate
that the situation today is very similar to the situation that existed in
Galileo's Italy. Because the existence of deep capture is easy to see
and accept there, by observing it, we may be better able to see and
accept deep capture now. Perhaps by seeing that we are subject to a
parallel influence over a parallel issue, we may be able to more
clearly see ourselves, not in the heroic Galileo, but in the complacent
and complicit adherents of the common sense of his day, or even in
the reactionary Bellarmine.
a. Institutions to deeply capture
The first parallel is the existence of an institution or collection of
institutions with immense wealth and power and, thus, both the
ability and desire to influence exterior and interior situations to
enhance those advantages. In the Galileo story, that collection of
320 The rehabilitation of Galileo as an object of reverence was not accomplished
until the nineteenth century, when his cause was taken tip by radicals like Auguste
Comte who portrayed him as a "martyr of the religion of humanity." REDONDI, supra
note 287, at 321. Today, Galileo is depicted in a similar-if not somewhat anach-
ronistic-light as a great crusader for scientific fact against the superstitious monolith
that was the early modern Catholic Church. As the Indigo Girls sing, "Galileo's head
was on the block, the crime was looking up the truth." INDIGO GIRLS, Galileo, on RITES
OF PASSAGE (Sony Music Entertainment 1992).
321 See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 30 (describing some phenomenon between
groups); supra note 110 (discussing actor-observer bias).
See supra text accompanying notes 86-100 (outlining the Milgram experiment).
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institutions is, for the sake of simplicity, often treated as an individual
actor under the heading of "the Catholic Church" or "the Vatican."
Today, we hypothesize that the institutions with the means and the
motive to engage in deep capture are large corporations. 23 In
virtually any present metric and manner of understanding power,
corporations easily qualify as immensely powerful.
Let us start with corporations' immense wealth, a fundamental
component of power in our market economy. As is so often
emphasized by legal economists, resources have a tendency through
market processes to move to those who value them most, as
324measured by relative willingness to pay. Willingness to pay, of
course, is heavily determined by ability to pay. No institutional actor
controls as much wealth in so concentrated a fashion in our society
today as do corporations and those individuals with an important
stake in promoting the power of corporations.32 ' Thus, valuable
resources (including influence over the situation) tend toward those
with the greatest ability to pay-that is, corporations.
Large corporate interests have several other power advantages
beyond their wealth-advantages that likely help them to amass that
326wealth in the first place. For instance, like Stigler's beekeepers,
they enjoy a common single interest and thus an advantage in the
competition to influence-an assertion that finds considerable
support in the shallow capture literature.3 7  Insofar as each
corporation is devoted to the single goal of profit maximization, they
are, even as they compete in the marketplace, collectively committed
323 Of course, there are many dimensions of power, many of them overlapping.
We believe that this theory also predicts the operation of power in other social
institutions and along other dimensions and sources of power, including species,
gender, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, age, and physical attractiveness.
324 See supra text accompanying notes 117-21 (discussing the ways in which
measuring value by willingness to pay highlights a disposition while overlooking an
important situational element-namely, ability to pay).
325 See supra note 253 (providing evidence of the wealth controlled by
corporations). Corporate interests, to be sure, are not without competitors, such as
churches, foundations, nonprofit organizations, labor unions, trial attorneys,
aggregations of consumers, and individual consumers. In subsequent work we hope
to examine the relative power of such institutions vis-A-vis corporations, and also
the ways in which all of those institutions are themselves targets of deep capture
by large commercial interests.
32F See supra text accompanying note 280 (describing beekeepers' advantages over
honey consumers in influencing beekeeper regulations).
., See supra Part V.A (summarizing that literature)
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to a uniform regulatory end: the creation and maintenance of a
world that maximizes profit opportunities .
Moreover, corporations are-in part because of market
processes-profoundly effective at uncovering and exploiting the
most efficient and reliable means of influencing people and insti-
tutions, a pursuit that will extend through situational influences. 29
Advertising, marketing, lobbying, and public relations are only the
most obvious activities that corporations have refined in their profit-
maximizing pursuits. Even those practices are largely obscured by
our dispositionism and largely invisible in our theories°-an
obscurity that renders them all the more effective. In future work,
we hope to describe those practices in more detail. For now, our
point is that the situation of market competition has led corporations
to become far more expert at manipulating situational factors than
other institutions or individuals have had the need or wherewithal to
accomplish.
Finally, the livelihood or economic well-being of the majority of
our population is perceived to depend directly or indirectly on the
health of corporations-individually and collectively. For example,
many people work for corporations, many people invest in corpor-
ations, and, more generally, the overall health of the economy, in
which most of us feel we have a significant stake, is perceived to
depend on the collective health of corporations. Corporate scholars
Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, for instance, recently
described the expanding base of shareholders as follows:
Stock ownership is becoming more pervasive everywhere. No longer
is it confined to a small group of wealthy citizens. In the United States,
this diffusion of share ownership has been underway since the
beginning of the twentieth century. In recent years, however, it has
accelerated substantially. Since the Second World War, an ever-
328 See supra text accompanying notes 257-59 (briefly describing shared
commercial ends); Chen & Hanson, Illusion of Law I, supra note 84 (analyzing the
schemas of corporate law and how it benefits corporate interests)
329 See Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously I, supra note 251, at 724-43
(describing and predicting methods by which manufacturers manipulate consumers);
Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously I, supra note 251, at 1428-1501
(illustrating consumer manipulation tactics, including those used by the tobacco
industry).
330 See Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously I, supra note 251, at 725
("[S]cholars... have failed to see that manufacturers can take advantage of such
manipulability." (emphasis omitted)); Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously
II, supra note 251, at 1548-49 (describing "Viscusi's failure to consider how the industry
itself might have influenced consumer risk perceptions and preferences").
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increasing number of American workers have had their savings invested
in corporate equities through pension funds. Over the same period,
the mutual fund industry has also expanded rapidly, becoming the
repository of an ever-increasing share of nonpension savings for the
331
population at large.
This is not just an academic point. President George W. Bush
has been emphasizing this theme repeatedly in the wake of corporate
debacles since he took office. In response to Enron revelations, for
instance, he explained:
The reason that a single bankruptcy can cause so much concern in
America is that more Americans than ever have invested their money in
public corporations. Today, about 80 million Americans own stock,
either individually or through their pension plans. This is one of the
causes for the expansion in personal wealth over the past 20 years.
This has been an incredibly positive development for America. Stock
ownership allows citizens from all walks of life to own a part of the
economy and to share in its growth. The people who run public
companies owe a special obligation to these investors, many of whom
have put their savings and future security on the line.
33
2
The widespread sense that our collective welfare turns
importantly on the wealth and success of corporations empowers
corporations. It does so by giving the general population a stake in
the health of those institutions that are already the most wealthy and
influential in our culture. As Hansmann and Kraakman put it:
No longer do labor and capital constitute clearly distinct interest
groups in society. Workers, through share ownership, increasingly
share the economic interests of other equity-holders. Indeed, in the
United States, union pension funds are today quite active in pressing
the view that companies must be managed in the best interests of their
shareholders.
3 3
331 Henry Hansmann & Renier Kraakman, The End of Histoy for Corporate Law, 89
GEO. LJ. 439, 452 (2001) (citations omitted).
332 President George W. Bush, President Outlines Plan to Improve Corporate
Responsibility, Remarks at Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award Ceremony (Mar.
7, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020307-
3.html; see also President George W. Bush, President Reiterates Call for Corporate
Responsibility, Remarks to Employees of America II Electronics (Mar. 8, 2002), 2002
WL 14547111 ("We've got thousands of citizens who own shares of publicly held
companies, many in pension plans, mutual funds, a lot of them direct ownership.
And this country must hold corporate CEOs-CEOs of publicly held companies, to
the highest of high standards."), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2002/03/20020308-4.html.
3 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 331, at 452.
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In this way, according to Hansmann and Kraakman, "a public
shareholder class" has developed into "a broad and powerful interest
group in both corporate and political affairs across jurisdictions"
334
promoting corporate interests.
b. Fundamental attribution errors
The second major parallel between our world and Galileo's is the
existence of a widely held attributional intuition that is false, but
generally viewed as a "truth"-and an obvious one at that. At that
time, it was about what, if anything, moved the Earth and the
celestial bodies "above" it. Now, it is about what moves us and our
institutions.3 3
c. Incentives to deeply capture
The third parallel is that in our world, too, those in power have a
stake in maintaining the apparent veracity of that "truth" and, thus,
in heavily promoting it. Instead of the Catholic Church sustaining
geocentricism and dismissing Galileo's observations regarding the
role of astronomical situation, today, in our world, it is large
corporate interests promoting dispositionism and dismissing obser-
vations regarding the influence of exterior and interior situations on
behavior.
i. The stakes of geocentricism
To the Catholic Church, maintaining an allegiance to the biblical
account of astronomical structure, no matter how logically dubious,
was extremely important. Although Galileo himself saw no tensionS 3363
between his scientific findings and his Catholic faith,' portions of
934 Id.
335 Note that in both cases, the attributions are self-affirming. We like to see
ourselves as thinking, free actors, and we like to think of our Earth as being placed,
apparently by God, at the center of the universe.
336Galileo wrote that:
[T]hough the Scripture cannot err, nevertheless some of its interpreters and
expositors can sometimes err in various ways.... [N]ature is inexorable and
immutable, and she does not care at all whether or not her recondite reasons
and modes of operations are revealed to human understanding ....
... [T]herefore, whatever sensory experience places before our eyes or
necessary demonstrations prove to us concerning natural effects should not
in any way be called into question on account of scriptural passages whose
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the Catholic hierarchy saw in his discoveries the direct
contradiction of several theological tenets. 337  In their eyes,
such weakened links threatened to destroy a whole chain of logic
upon which the Church relied.33 s
The insistence on intellectual conformity in scientific and
philosophical subjects was intimately connected to the
Church's reaction to a far more fundamental challenge to its
authority, that of the Protestant Reformation. That Galileo was
linked in the minds of many Catholic Church leaders to the
Protestant Reformation is ironic, since Galileo probably
objected to the Protestant's literal interpretations of the Bible,
if not their reformist spirit, even more than he did to Catholic
orthodoxy. 3 39  At the same time, Protestantism seemed to be
advancing the same kind of challenge to core Catholic beliefs
that Galileo's scientific approach posed to Aristotelian
naturalism. 4 ° On a broader level, at its inception, Protestant-
ism was fundamentally anti-authoritarian in the sense that its
leaders, beginning with Luther, encouraged the radical
decentralization of religious authority and the rationalization
words appear to have a different meaning, since not every statement of the
Scripture is bound to obligations as severely as each effect of nature.
Correspondence from Galileo to Castelli (Dec. 21, 1613), in THE GALILEO AFFAIR,
supra note 234, at 49, 49-50.
337 In 1546, at the Fourth Session of the Council of Trent, Church leaders
launched the Counter-Reformation, declaring that:
[Nbo one relying on his own judgment shall, in matters of faith and moral
pertaining to the edification of Christian doctrine ... presume to interpret
[the Holy Scriptures] contrary to that sense which holy mother Church, to
whom it belongs to judge of their true sense and interpretation, has held and
holds, or even contrary to the unanimous teachings of the Fathers.
Maurice A. Finocchiaro, Introduction to THE GALILEO AFFAIR, supra note 234; see also id.
at 11-12 (summarizing the political background of the Counter-Reformation).
338 As one scholar of Galileo has noted:
Bellarmine's logic is relentless. If God is the author of Scripture, everything
in the Bible is true, whether it is essential to salvation or merely a piece of
accidental historical information. And his reason for this is of crucial
importance. "It is necessary to believe them because they were written." ... This
truth condition, which is certainly not limited to only Bellarmine's
presentation, was clearly destined to clash with Galileo's scientific standard of
truth.
RiCHARDJ. BLACKWELL, GALILEO, BELLARMINE, AND THE BIBLE 32 (1991).
33Q Cf DE SANTILLANA, supra note 286, at 326-27 (noting that Galileo was an
"anticlerical Catholic," not a Protestant).
340 See REDONDI, supra note 287, at 209 (describing the Protestant challenge to the
Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation).
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of scriptural interpretation. The result was a more personal,
individualized experience and interpretation of the scriptures.
To the Catholic hierarchy, this was the work of the devil. And
maintaining a strict biblical understanding of astronomy was of
critical importance in their broader battle against diabolical
corruption of Church dogma.34'
ii. The stakes of dispositionism
Similarly, today, large corporate interests have a great deal at
stake in maintaining and promoting a dispositionist worldview. As
we argued earlier, it is possible to speak of a "corporate interest" in
maximizing profit not because corporations are dispositionally
motivated, but because there are robust and stable situational
pressures encouraging corporations to act "as if' they want to pursue
that end.342
341 The battle was not played out merely in the minds of Europeans-great armies
also were clashing on European soil. On the eve of Galileo's trial, the Thirty Years War
(1618-1648) was going extremely badly for the Catholic side. In 1632, the Protestant
King of Sweden, Gustavus Adolphus, broke through the armies of the Catholic Holy
Roman Emperor in Germany and advanced on Italy. He probably would have crossed
the Alps and marched on Rome itself but for his own untimely death that same year.
See id. at 231. It was at this time, in February of 1632, that Galileo published The
Dialogue, in which he called into question the entire framework of Aristotelian
cosmology advanced by the Church. See DE SANTILLANA, supra note 286, at 38, 186.
(acknowledging dispute between Galileo and Aristotelians and citing 1632 as the date
of publication). So it was that Galileo slammed into an entire framework of
intellectual, spiritual, and political power and authority that already felt itself to be
under attack. Consequently, the Pope was in no mood to be indulgent, especially since
Bellarmine had forbidden Galileo to advance heliocentrism in 1616. In response to a
plea by the Tuscan ambassador for lenience, the Pope supposedly "exploded in anger,"
saying that in his "perverse material," Galileo had, "dared enter where he should not,
into the most grave and dangerous subjects that one could possibly raise at the
moment." REDONDI, supra note 287, at 256.
Had Galileo and his discoveries come earlier, at a time when the Catholic Church
was not losing power and influence, his findings and ideas might have met a more
hospitable audience. Indeed, it was not until well into the twentieth century and the
current Pope's tenure that the Church apologized for silencing Galileo. See William
D. Montalbano, Earth Moves for Vatican in Galileo Case, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2002, at A3
("The Roman Catholic Church has admitted to erring.., in formally condemning
Galileo Galilei for entertaining scientific truths it long denounced as against-the-
Scriptures heresy."); Alan Cowell, After 350 Years, Vatican Says Galileo Was Right: It
Moves, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1992, at Al ("More than 350 years after the Roman
Catholic Church condemned Galileo, Pope John Paul II [will] rectify one of the
Church's most infamous wrongs-the persecution of the Italian astronomer and
physicist for proving the Earth moves around the Sun.").
.42 See supra text accompanying notes 248-51 (noting the situational pressures
on market actors to maximize profits); see also Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note
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And, in a similar vein, just as one can speak of corporations'
individual interests, one can also speak of their shared or collective
interest. Although corporations are often in direct competition with
one another, they share a collective interest in maximizing profits-
which translates to an interest in maximizing available markets and
minimizing profit-reducing regulation. Phenomena such as trade
associations for lobbying, industry- and sector-wide advertising and
public relations, and illegal collaborative activities such as price-
343fixing, evince these shared interests amongst competitors.
Coordinated lobbying efforts for policy initiatives like NAFTA344 and
for one-or-another political candidate, demonstrate a shared corp-
orate interest across markets. But corporations share an interest in
more than just promoting, for example, global trade policy. They
also share a deeper interest in promoting certain perceptions of global
trade policy, and of many other issues that can influence their
common pursuit of profits. It is our contention that a dispositionist
worldview benefits both individual corporations and the shared
corporate interest, and that corporations therefore individually and
jointly will act situationally to promote it. Because this claim is a
major feature of our larger thesis, and because defending it is
somewhat complex, it will be the topic of a separate article.4 6 We
urge the reader to accept, or at least suspend disbelief in, this claim
until we can flesh it out and (we hope) thoroughly substantiate it.
For now, we will only cursorily highlight portions of that article.
One important reason that corporations have a stake in
dispositionism is that it is the dispositionist perspective that largely
justifies their profit-seeking behavior as socially beneficial. If
consumers are assumed to be dispositional-that is, if they act
according to a stable set of preferences that only they can access
directly-then it plausibly follows that the best way to maximize
331, at 441-42 (describing the "interests" of institutions-profit maximization); Chen
& Hanson, Illusion of Law I, supra note 84 (describing those situations in detail).
3 See also supra notes 256-60 and accompanying text (making a related point and
providing some evidence in support).344
See Coalition of Business Interests is Mobilizing Support for NAFIA, 10 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 314, at 314-15 (Feb. 24, 1993) (reporting that a coalition of business
interests comprised of over a thousand organizations was lobbying in support for
NAFTA).
345 See David R. Lagasse, Undue Influence: Corporate Political Speech, Power and the
Initiative Process, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 1347, 1385 (1995) (describing the collaborative
creation of the Business Roundtable as a corporate lobbying organization).
.146 SeeJon Hanson, Adam Wright & David Yosifon, The Situational Stakes of
Dispositionism (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
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welfare is to allow consumers to satisfy their preferences through
free-market transactions. It is through free markets that otherwise
invisible preferences are satisfied (and revealed) through mutually
beneficial transactions that enhance overall social welfare. As profit-
maximizing entities, corporations act to maximize social welfare by
serving consumers' supposed dispositional preferences. Profit is the
substantiation of those welfare-enhancing transactions and is there-
fore, by definition, good. In short, profit-maximizing corporations
act in the public interest:
47
A dispositionist worldview is similarly valuable to the corporate
interest because it helps minimize profit-reducing regulation.
Markets, which allow the free exercise of dispositions, are understood
as more responsive to consumer preferences than regulators who
lack good information and the appropriate incentives. The
dispositionist presumption translates to a presumption against
regulatory intervention even against visible harms, for the actors
involved are presumed to be choosing the inevitable risks that gave
rise to those harms. Regulatory intervention is warranted only in
circumstances in which markets demonstrably fail to respond to
consumer dispositions-for instance, when consumers clearly lack
information or when a transaction creates significant negative
externalities. But, even in the presence of such market
imperfections, calls for regulation may be rebutted on the grounds
that imperfect markets might be preferable to imperfect regulations.
Expressions like "the nirvana fallacy" and "the law of unintended
consequences" have been coined to capture this fallback defense of
markets.
3 4
Dispositionism also helps support common arguments for why
regulators cannot be trusted. Regulators, like the rest of us, are•349
presumed to be motivated to satisfy their self-interest, ) an end that
is often in tension with their purported goal of serving the public
interest. Regulators are often depicted as concerned with job
security, career advancement, and larger budgets, as well-meaning
but ill-informed bunglers, or as zealous intermeddlers seeking to
347 Aspects of this script are described in Chen & Hanson, Illusion of Law I, supra
note 84.
348 See Melvin Aaron Eisenberg, Bad Arguments in Corporate Law, 78 GEO. L.J. 1551,
1551-52 (1990) (discussing the use of the Nirvana Fallacy to defend markets); Kenneth
Sanney, Cyberjacking, Mousetrapping and the FTC Act: Are Federal Consumer Protection Laws
Helping or Hurting Online Consumers?, 3 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAc. 221, 233 n.40 (2001)
(defining the law of unintended consequences and discussing its invocation).
349 See supra text accompanying notes 7, 303 & 314.
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impose their visions of society upon otherwise free consumers. Such
dispositions are likely to lead to wrongful interference in free choices
and, consequently, inefficient outcomes-the apparent dispositional
mechanism behind Stigler's findings.
Another benefit of dispositionism is that it helps to preserve and
legitimate the status quo, in which corporations are the wealthiest
and most powerful entities. Dispositionism places consumers, not
corporations, in the driver's seat. Corporations are viewed as com-
peting to fulfill consumers' desires in a fair competition; they are
viewed as having no role in creating or influencing consumers'
behavior. If consumers are unhappy with one or another outcome of
that competitive process, they are rebuffed with the observation that
the process is fair and that consumers have no one but themselves to
blame. If consumers claim not to like a given market outcome, they
can be told to change their consumption choices, reexamine their
perceived preferences, or take it up with their fellow consumers.
In addition, corporations gain in innumerable ways from the
general human tendency-reflected in the fundamental attribution
error-to attach disproportionate weight to what we see and to see
only a small, salient subset of our environs and interiors. This
phenomenon has many manifestations that tend to benefit large
commercial interests. For example, when the situation is not obvious
(as is generally the case), people believe they are acting
autonomously when they are actually responding to unseen
situational cues. Not only do they miss the situational influence, they
don't believe there is a situational influence. Consumers are like
competitors in a sprint, who, not seeing the track, presume that it is
flat and fair. The runners measure their dispositions-talent and
drive-according to the outcome of the race, without regard to its
situation. In such a setting, corporations can camouflage their
situational manipulations behind reassurances that those subject to
them are, in fact, dispositionally moved. That same tendency permits
corporations to attribute particularly egregious corporate activities to
the dispositions of the handful of human actors involved or the
rather unique corporate disposition (culture) of one corporation,
and not to larger situational influences that might implicate, say, all
corporations or all of corporate law.
Galileo's conflict with the Church was not a neutral scientific
debate. It had profound implications for power-who would have it
and how it would be wielded-in seventeenth-century Europe.
Similarly, the divide between dispositionism and situationism is not
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an academic point. It has profound implications for the distribution
of power in our society. Large corporations have a stake in a
dispositionist worldview because it helps them create and maintain
vast situational power. Indeed, by promoting a lopsided worldview,
based on individual stable preferences and autonomous individual
choices, corporations can actually curtail individual autonomy and
alter perceived preferences. That is possible, we assert, because of
dispositionism.
D. The Deep Capture Hypothesis
The universal spirit of the laws, of evey country is always to favor the strong
against the weak and those who have against those who have not. This
difficulty is inevitable, and it is without exception.
-Jean Jacques Rousseau 3
5
0
The twentieth century has been characterized by three developments of great
political importance: the growth of democracy, the growth of corporate power,
and the growth of corporate propaganda as a means of protecting corporate
power against democracy.
-Alex Carey'
5
All of the key elements are in place. As with Galileo's capture,
today we have an extremely powerful institutional force with an
immense stake in maintaining, and an ability to maintain, a false,
though intuitive, worldview.'" Our basic hypothesis (and prediction)
is that large commercial interests act (and will continue to act) to
capture the situation-interior and exterior-in order to further
entrench dispositionism. Moreover, they have done so largely
undetected, and without much in the way of conscious awareness or
collaboration. Hence, large corporate interests have, through
350 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, EMILE 236 (Allan Bloom trans., Basic Books 1979)
(1762).
351 ALEX CAREY, TAKING THE RISK OUT OF DEMOCRACY: CORPORATE PROPAGANDA
VERSUS FREEDOM AND LIBERTY 18 (Andrew Loh rey ed., 1995).
352 It is important to note that the deep capture prediction that large commercial
interests will wield disproportionate influence over "knowledge" is not limited to
simply dispositionism and dispositionist tendencies. We use dispositionism as an
extremely important example of pro-commercial "knowledge." For other examples,
see Chen & Hanson, Illusion of Law I, supra note 84 (describing the deeply-captured
schemas of policymakers and corporate law).
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disproportionate ability to control and manipulate our exterior and
interior situations, deeply captured our world.
This is a hypothesis that finds support not just in the axiom of
history repeating itself, although the lessons of history do indeed
provide significant support. And it is a hypothesis that follows from
more than just laboratory and field experiments of social psychology,
although that literature alone should be sufficient to reverse our
current presumptions . The deep capture hypothesis is also the
logical extension of several basic economic insights, including those
associated with capture theory and market theory-informed by a
realistic understanding of the human animal (or situational
character). The question remains, however, whether such a
provocative, counterintuitive hypothesis finds much support in the
various institutions that shape our exterior and interior situation.
VI. SOME EVIDENCE OF THE DEEP CAPTURE HYPOTHESIS
The deep capture hypothesis is too provocative to leave totally
undefended, but covers too vast a set of institutions to adequately
defend here. Much of the remainder of this Article, therefore, will
be devoted to providing a sample of observations that provide
support for our framework. The sample is intended to foster open
minds in our readers (if not to thoroughly destabilize existing
dispositionist worldviews) until we can return with a more fulsome
defense of, and more compelling evidence for, our claims.
Here, we will attempt to show that history is, as usual, repeating
itself-that we live in a world much like that of Galileo. 54  The
dispositionist worldview, which is so valuable to the most powerful
institutions in our culture, is widely accepted in our population as
common-sensical, even though that view is, according to the best
available evidence, fundamentally lop-sided. Furthermore, those
powerful institutions use their power to advance that view by actively
promoting it themselves, by rewarding others who do so, and by
seeking to penalize or delegitimate those who challenge it. Again,
further evidence regarding (1) precisely how dispositionism is
incorrect, (2) exactly how dispositionism serves large commercial
interests (and not the public interest), and (3) how, in practice, deep
capture occurs are the topics of research now in progress.
353 See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 30.
'454 See supra pp. 307-12 (describing Galileo's struggle against the intellectual
establishment of the Renaissance).
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In this Article, we are, like Stigler was, initially concerned with
just the consequences of (de)regulatory actions. Unlike Stigler,
however, we look less at who benefits from particular regulatory
changes and more at what the regulators say, for it is in framing their
regulations and in assuming one or another vision of the human
being that they reveal their dispositionism. Furthermore, we define
"regulation" far more broadly than Stigler did, to include, as we
believe his analysis should have, all institutions that could possibly
influence the fortunes of large commercial interests. 3 5 5 In this Part,
we will touch on only a few of those.
A. Some Shallow Evidence of Deep Capture
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the
government's purposes are beneficial. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to
repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greater dangers to
liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding.
-Justice Louis Brandeis'
First, we will consider the view of human beings adopted by the
sort of administrative regulatory institutions that Stigler and his
cohorts did focus on. Take, for example, the Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC) and Chairman Michael Powell's3 57
355 See supra text accompanying notes 305-17 (explaining why Stigler's shallow
capture theory and evidence have far deeper implications than he appreciated).
356 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928).
357 Michael Powell, son of Colin Powell, was appointed by President Clinton to the
Commission in 1997 and was designated Chairman by President Bush in 2001. Since
joining the FCC, Powell's deregulatory rhetoric has coincided with wide-ranging
deregulatory action. It may be helpful to highlight a few of the key deregulatory
actions of the FCC within the past several months. On February 20, 2003, the FCC
voted to eliminate regulations that required the Bell telephone companies to lease
broadband Internet access to competitors at discounted rates. Jonathan Krim, FCC
Delivers Mixed Vote on Competition: Phone Giants Prevail on High-Speed Internet, WASH.
POST, Feb. 21, 2003, at A]. On May 15, the FCC voted to eliminate a 40-year-old
standard that restricted the leasing of airwaves. The new regulation allows airwaves
license-holders to work out leasing deals without prior FCC approval. Yuki Noguchi,
FCC to Let Companies Sublease Airwaves, WASH. POST, May 16, 2003, at E5. On June 2,
the FCC relaxed regulations that limit the cross-ownership of newspapers and
television stations. Frank Ahrens, FCC Eases Media Ownership Rules: Party-Line Vote
Clears Way for More Consolidation, WASH. POST, June 3, 2003, at Al. The FCC regulation
would combine two cross-ownership rules-one preventing newspaper and broadcast
station ownership in the same city and another limiting radio and TV station
ownership in the same market-into a single rule that would lift most current
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conception of consumers and the corresponding presumptions about
markets and regulation:
I am committed to building policy that is centered around market
economics. At times, this foundation of my thinking is often
questioned as being somehow anti-consumer. In a television interview,
the question goes something like this: "Many consumer groups express
grave concern that your laissez-faire approach will harm consumers.
They say you are out of touch with consumers and living in an ivory
tower. What say you?"
I am always a little puzzled by this question, for the premise of it has
been so thoroughly discredited in this nation and in countries around
the world that it should be beyond challenge. Market systems, far from
being the bane of consumers, have unquestionably produced more
consumer welfare than any other economic model devised by mankind.
How is it that anyone can argue that the pro-market policies of the
United States have not yielded enviable productivity in our economy,
jobs for our citizens, a higher standard of living than nearly any other
country in the world, and a tradition of innovation and invention that
has brought new products, tools and services to our citizens?
A well-structured market policy is one that creates the conditions
that empower consumers:
It lets consumers choose the products and services they want-
which is their right as free citizens.
It allows market forces to calibrate pricing to meet supply and
demand. Consumers get the most cost-efficient prices and enjoy the
benefits of business efficiencies.
The result for consumers is better, more cutting edge products, at
lower prices.
Contrary to the classic bugaboo that markets are just things that
favor big business and big money, market policies have a winning
record of delivering benefits to consumers that dwarfs the consumer
record of government central economic planning. Thus, if you are
restrictions. Frank Ahrens, FCC Plan to Alter Media Rules: Spurs Growing Debate, WASH.
POST, May 28, 2003, at Al [hereinafter Ahrens, FCC Plan]. The plan would
substantially raise the number of television stations a company may own and allow a
company to reach up to 45% of the national audience, up from 35%. It would also
relax a ban on newspaper and broadcast cross-ownership in local markets. Mark
Wigfield & John R. Wilke, FCC Plan Draws Fire: Senators Introduce Bill to Keep Current
Media-Ownership Limits, WALL ST. J., May 14, 2003, at B4. The decision has met with
strong resistance. Senators and House Representatives both sponsored bills that would
return the cap on television ownership to 35%. Frank Ahrens, FCC Rule Fight Continues
in Congress: Opponents of Ownership Consolidation Also Plan Legal Strategy, WASH. POST,
June 4, 2003, at El. In fact, on September 16, the Senate voted 55 to 40 to override all
of the new media ownership rules. Frank Ahrens, Senate Votes to Block FCC Media Rules,
WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2003, atA14. The White House has refused to back down. Id.
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truly committed to serving the public interest, bet on a winner and bet
on market policy.
3 '6
Thus, Powell views consumers as "free citizens," who should
therefore be allowed to "choose the products and services they want."
And, according to that conception of consumers, free choice should
be enabled through "market systems," which are the best mechanism
ever "devised by mankind" for "delivering benefits to consumers,"
"empower[ing] consumers," and thereby producing "more consumer
welfare."')
There are other noteworthy features of Powell's remarks. For
example, Powell frames his goals in terms of serving the "public
interest," but this is the same type of assertion that Stigler claimed
could not be trusted.3 60  And certainly this "trust" issue has been
raised." But Powell reassures critics by claiming that deregulation
tends toward the "public interest:" "In capital[ist] economies," he
writes, "the central premise is that the interests of producers (i.e.,
money-makers) and consumers need not diverge, but, in fact, can be
synchronous." 36  That may be true, but it is equally true that a
358 Michael K. Powell, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission,
Consumer Policy in Competitive Markets, Remarks Before the Federal Communica-
tions Bar Association, at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Powell/2O01/spmkpI06.html
(June 21, 2001).
I59 d.; see also Stephen Labaton, Policy Defeat Puts E C. C. Chief in Awkward Spot, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 22, 2003, at C1 ("Powell ... has set an ambitious agenda of relaxing or
removing many regulations that have limited the nation's largest media
conglomerates from becoming bigger or entering new markets.").
See supra text accompanying notes 282, 303 (describing Stigler's critique of the
supposed neutrality and public spirit of regulatory agencies).
61 At a three-hour hearing on June 4, 2003, before Republican Senator John
McCain's Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, many senators
expressed criticism over several of Powell's FCC decisions, most prominently the vote
to allow broadcast networks to buy more television stations. See, e.g., Frank Ahrens,
Senators Attack FCC Rules: Most on Oversight Panel Sign on to Revise Changes, WASH. POST,
June 5, 2003, at E4 ("'It looks for all the world like you could not or would not stand
up to corporate interests ....') (quoting Democratic Senator Byron L. Dorgan); id.
("'Where in the world do you find the grounds for 45 percent?"') (quoting Democratic
Senator Ernest F. Hollings).
362 Powell, supra note 358. Much of Powell's rhetoric is based on the idea that
regulations inhibit innovations that would directly benefit the public. In defending
the vote to allow airwaves license-holders to lease without prior FCC approval, Powell
said, "'[o]ur decision unlocks value trapped for too many years in a regulatory box."'
David Ho, FCC Votes to Let Cell-Phone Finns Lease Airwaves, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 16,
2003, at C2 (quoting Powell). He added that the decision "'will expand spectrum
access for innovators and entrepreneurs, increasing the number and variety of wireless
applications available to consumers."' Id. (quoting Powell).
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central p'remise behind regulation is that the interests of producers
and consumers sometimes do diverge. As if to respond to that
potential criticism, Powell takes a page from Stigler's scholarly
agenda, writing:
I am the first to admit that deregulation for its own sake is not
responsible policy. What is good policy is to carefully examine rules to
determine if they are actually achieving their stated purposes, or if,
instead, they are, in fact, denying consumers value by impeding
efficient market developments that these consumers would welcome.
Regulations are not innocuous simply because they are promulgated in
the name of consumers. No matter how worthy the purpose, rules that
constrain markets can, in fact, deny or delay benefits to the consuming
public."'
Stigler himself could hardly have said it better. If you want to be
sure that regulations (or deregulations) actually serve the public
interest, then look at their effects. Thus, Powell's vision of
consumers, like that of virtually all of the country's most prominent
regulators, appears to be very close to the one that George Stigler
complained regulators generally lacked.
But our hypothesis is that shallow capture is still a problem, in
part because the advantages favoring large business interests in the
competition for regulatory influence have not changed, even if the
Powell sees the recent move to deregulate cross-ownership rules as similarly
bolstering the public interest by expanding consumer choice. According to Powell, in
situations where a corporation has received a waiver to own both a newspaper and a
television station in the same city, the result has been better local news coverage.
Ahrens, FCC Plan, supra note 357, at Al. In addition, he has suggested that network
owned-and-operated television stations typically produce more local news than those
not owned by networks. Id. In his words, it "'has become more difficult to simply
assert that an ownership restriction is essential to promoting diverse viewpoints where
so many outlets and owners thrive .... '" Associated Press, FCC to Vote on Media
Ownership Rules, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Mar. 28, 2003, at C2 (quoting Powell).
Powell also justifies the cross-ownership changes by claiming they help support
public-interest programming. In his view, if cable continues to eat away at broadcast,
public-interest programming will be jeopardized because cable channels are under no
FCC obligation to provide such programming. Ahrens, FCC Plan, supra note 357.
Allowing media companies to buy more stations, which typically return profits of 20 to
30%, would help ensure continued free, over-the-air public-interest broadcasting to
the roughly 15% of viewers who do not have cable or satellite television. Id.
Although Powell has described public-interest programming as necessary, he is
uncomfortable with the FCC deciding what it should be. "'If you're using the
government will to impose "castor oil" or "eat your vegetables" programming, you'd
better be a little bit concerned that you're going to allow three of five unelected
officials to unduly impose what they prefer to see on TV.' Id. (quoting Powell).
Powell, supra note 358.
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conceptions of consumers, markets, and regulations have. Thus, the
same evidence that, to many scholars, might constitute proof of the
absence of shallow capture, strikes us as evidence of deep capture
-the faith in pro-market, anti-regulation dispositionism.364
364 While our main emphasis in this Article is on how corporations indirectly
capture the way we see and understand the world, we do not mean to suggest that
corporations are not expending a great amount of energy on directly influencing
regulators as well. In anticipation of the FCC's recent decision on how Bell telephone
companies lease lines to competitors, "[t] he Bells spent hundreds of millions of dollars
in a furious lobbying campaign to convince Congress and the FCC that they could not
be expected to push broadband out into rural areas, or invest in new, advanced
networks, if they were forced to then lease them to rivals." Krim, supra note 357, at A].
Moreover, between 1999 and 2002, the top twenty-five media companies spent $82
million on lobbying the FCC and Congress and contributed $26.7 million in
individual, PAC, and soft money donations. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Tracking the
Payback: Media Ownership, at http://www.opensecrets.org/payback/issue.asp?issueid
=MOl&CongNo=108 (last visited Oct. 16, 2003).
One of the main forces behind the FCC's recent decision to relax regulations that
limit the cross-ownership of newspapers and television stations was Victor Miller, a
media analyst at Bear Stearns. Coincidentally, Bear Stearns has banking and
underwriting relationships or has rated stocks in at least fifteen media companies
directly affected by the FCC's proceedings. Mark Wigfield, Bear Stearns Analyst Helps
FCC Reshape Ownership Rules, WALL ST. J.. June 2. 2003. at Cl. Yet. the media ties do
not appear to have resulted in Miller's advice being discounted. According to Susan
Eid, Counsel to the FCC Chairman, Miller "'is enormously helpful as you sort through
the economic issues and financial issues in the industry."' Id. (quoting Eid). In the
words of Eid, "'His analysis is rock-solid."' Id. (quoting Eid).
Miller's example highlights a general trend. "Wall Street's views have become
increasingly important at the FCC since the 1996 Telecommunications Act began
substituting market competition for regulation as the best way to ensure that the
nation's airwaves are used in the public interest." Id. Today, the FCC appears to rely
heavily on non-governmental private data for a range of critical regulatory factors such
as "ownership, audience reach and cable subscribers." John Dunbar, Ctr. for Pub.
Integrity, A Penchant for Secrecy: Why is the FCC So Determined to Keep Key Data from the
Public?, at http://www.openairwaves.org/telecom/report.aspx?aid=18 (May 22, 2003).
A more general reliance on corporations, analysts, and investors in policy making has
led some critics to question the neutrality of the regulatory process. Between
September 2002 and June 2003, the nation's top broadcasters had over seventy face-to-
face meetings with FCC officials behind closed doors. Bob Williams, Ctr. for Pub.
Integrity, Behind Closed Doors: Top Broadcasters Met 71 Times With FCC Officials, at
http://www.publicintegrity.org/dtaweb/report.asp?ReportlD=526&L1 =10&L2=I 0&L3
=0&L4=0&L5=0 (May 30, 2003).
The closed-door sessions, which are officially called ex parte meetings, are
allowed under FCC rules. The meetings are not recorded, nor are the
participants required to keep detailed minutes of the sessions. Non-FCC
people who participate in the meetings are supposed to file a notice of the
session by the end of the following day. The notice is supposed to include a
summary of what was discussed.
Id. During that same period, the FCC met with two major consumer groups only five
times. Id. Faced with this heavy lobbying, even Powell has begun to question the
benefits of an increasingly close relationship with interest groups: "'I do think.., that
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sometimes it gets out of hand .... I often think that we need time to do our work
rather than hear pitches."' Id. (quoting Powell).
But then as bad as "pitches" are, they may not be as troubling as the "perks" passed
on to FCC employees in recent years by big business. The Center for Public Integrity
reports that companies and industry groups paid $2.8 million over the past eight years
for 2,500 trips by agency officials. Bob Williams & Morgan Jindrich, Ctr. for Pub.
Integrity, On the Road Again-And Again: FCC Racks up $2.8 Million Travel Tab with
Industries They Regulate, at http://www.openairwaves.org/telecom/report.aspx?aid=15
(May 22, 2003). Ninety-eight of the trips were to London, which is not even in the
FCC's jurisdiction. Id. The biggest sponsor happened to be the National Association
of Broadcasters. Id.
There are still other unsettling statistics concerning the "revolving door" between
industry and regulators. For example, before coming to the FCC, Powell worked at the
law firm of O'Melveny & Myers LLP, of which the GTE Corporation was a major client.
GTE later merged with Bell Atlantic to form Verizon, the largest local phone company
in the United States, but Powell never recused himself from participating in
deliberations or votes relating to either company. Nathaniel Heller, Ctr. for Pub.
Integrity, New FCC Chairman Had Big Telephone Player as a Major Client, at
http://www.public-i.org/dtaweb/report.asp?ReportD=135&L1=]0&L2=70&L3=1 5
&L4=0&L5=0&State=&Year=2001 (Feb. 13, 2001). To be sure, his actions appear to
have been within the letter of the law. The Code of Federal Regulations requires only
a one-year cooling-off period. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502(b) (1) (iv) (2003). However, one
wonders how well his actions comport with the spirit of that law. Since the time Powell
took office through the present, Verizon has had many regulatory issues before the
FCC, relating from cell phones to the Internet. And in his role as Commissioner,
Powell has often taken the pro-Verizon position, bemoaning what he sees as the harsh
"interconnection and market-opening requirements" imposed on GTE and others. Id.
Passing through that same door, but in the opposite direction, Dorothy Attwood
quit her job last year as chief of the FCC's Wireline Competition Bureau and two
months later was working at SBC Communications, guiding the telecom company
through the FCC policies on local telephone competition that she helped draft. John
Dunbar, Ctr. for Pub. Integrity, The FCC's Rapidly Revolving Door, at http://
www.public-i.org/dtaweb/report.asp?ReportlD=510&L1 =10&L2=10&L3=0&L4=0&L5
=0 (Feb. 19, 2003) [hereinafter Dunbar, FCC's Rapidly Revolving Door]. Attwood was not
a minor player. As Powell stated several months before Attwood departed, "She has
played an integral role in the FCC's implementation of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, and in shaping our policies in the transition to a more competitive
telecommunications environment." Press Release, Federal Communications
Commission, Powell Announces Changes in Wireline Competition Bureau 1, at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-223658A (June 21, 2002).
Yet, according to the letter of the law, she was not senior enough to fall under the
"cooling-off period" ban. 5 C.F.R. § 2637.204 (2003). Since she began at SBC,
Attwood has met with FCC officials, including Powell's senior legal advisor, four times.
Dunbar, FCC's Rapidly Revolving Door, supra.
Attwood and Powell are not anomalies. In fact, over the last decade, several dozen
FCC workers have crossed the busy threshold from regulated industry to regulator or
the other way around. Id. Some have taken to straddling the worlds on both sides of
that threshold. Former FCC Chairman Richard Wiley is now a senior partner at the
lobbying firm of Wiley, Rein & Fielding LLP. Steven Weiss, Interview: Richard Wiley,
CAPITAL EYE (June 2, 2003), at http://www.capitaleye.org/inside.asp?ID=85. He often
appears on the so-called eighth floor of the FCC to lobby key decision makers on
behalf of media clients like Belo Corporation, Clear Channel, and Gannett. Id.
[Vol. 152:129
THE SITUA TION
Not everyone is turning a blind eye to the matter. On June 13, 2003, Senator
McCain proposed a reauthorization bill that would give the FCC greater authority to
regulate and limit the "revolving door" influence on the agency. Statement by Senator
John McCain on the Federal Communications Commission Reauthorization Act of
2003 (June 13, 2003), available at http://www.senate.gov/~commerce/newsroom/
printable.cfm?id=205012. To decrease the influence of the media industry, the bill
would bar top staffers from lobbying for one year after leaving the FCC. See id.
(recounting the various elements of the reauthorization bill). It would also bar
companies and other interest groups from paying travel expenses of FCC officials for
flights to nongovernment sponsored conferences, meetings, and events. Id.
Unfortunately, these remedies may not ultimately solve the regulatory capture
dilemma because they do not go far enough. They do not acknowledge the problem
that people perceive the playing field as reasonably level even when it is not. In the
debate leading up to the recent changes in media ownership rules, former FCC
Chairman Riley saw a fair tournament of ideas between consumer groups and media
corporations: "[A] lot of players have gotten onto the field and are participating in the
process at the commission. So there's a lot of lobbying, pro and con." Weiss, supra. In
his opinion:
Money may permit you to get in the door, but I don't think it buys people's
votes. Members of Congress are elected because they have strong viewpoints
and they're very well-informed people. I don't think they're bought and sold
quite as effectively or quite as much as people allege in the campaign finance
area.
Id. That he once ran the agency, he believes, is largely irrelevant:
Decisions of the commission are made on the merits. I don't want to put
myself or other former commissioners down, but it's what you're bringing in
there in terms of the merits that is going to win cases at the FCC. I truly
believe that. Hopefully people who know the commission process can help
their clients sort through it, but... I don't think anybody rolls over because a
former chairman or former commissioner comes in.... I've won some, I've
lost some, and I think that's true of other lawyers around town.
Id.
We do not claim that there is no competition for regulatory influence, or that all
commercial interests will always agree on every regulatory policy, or that one side of
the competition will always win. There does appear to be a playing field, and, as these
examples illustrate, the competition over regulatory policy can be robust. See Stephen
Labaton, FCC. Chief Talks of Frustration and Surprise, N. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2003, at C1
(describing the competing interests in regulatory policy). The existence of a
competition, however, is not proof of a fair, meritocratic process, as Wiley seems to
suggest. It is still possible to predict which groups will be advantaged or disadvantaged
by the playing field and the rules of the game. And that is the stuff of shallow capture.
Furthermore, and this is a major theme of this Article, there are ways of
conceptualizing human actors, markets, and regulations in a way that is broadly pro-
commercial. As we have argued, the dispositionist perspective that frames the
discussions and debates about regulatory policy itself tends toward pro-market and
anti-regulatory policies. That is part of what we mean by deep capture.
Consider the following metaphor: In Major League Baseball, there are thirty
teams, which compete not just on the field in games, but also off the field in recruiting
the best players to play for their teams. While on-the-diamond competition is played
on a level field, the off-the-field competition is not; the wealthiest teams have a huge
advantage in recruiting top players because they can offer much higher salaries. So
while there is still some competition-you still have to throw strikes and score runs-
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Finally, it is worth pointing out how Powell dismisses those who
doubt that faith.365  He finds such apprehensions, not just
"puzzl[ing] ,'3  but "so thoroughly discredited ... that [his view]
should be beyond challenge., 36 7 A major part of the discrediting
comes from the fair competition that is presumed to have occurred
in the global marketplace of political-economic systems, a
competition that led to the "winning record" of markets and a
"higher standard of living [in the United States] than nearly any
other country in the world." 36 The not-very-hidden implication is
that those who don't embrace his views are favoring a turn toward
"central economic planning," perhaps even communism.369 Powell,
in other words, dismisses what he calls "the classic bugaboo that
markets ... favor big business and big money 37° by raising the
familiar specter of the totalitarian bogeyman.
371
off-the-field situational advantages have tremendous impacts on on-the-field outcomes.
In 1999, for example, all eight teams that made the playoffs were among the top ten
highest salaried teams in the league. Although the tenth-highest salaried team made
the playoffs and the fourth-highest did not, none of the twenty lowest salaried teams
made it. In the 1999 World Series, the team with the league's highest payroll, the New
York Yankees, defeated the team with the league's third-highest payroll, the Atlanta
Braves. While there is a playing field, the playing field is not level, and the situation of
the playing field affects outcomes. See Lani Canfield Fisher, October is For the Rich, 19J.
CosMic BASEBALL ASS'N (2000) (describing the payroll figures for major league teams
and their relationship to post-season appearances), at http://cosmicbaseball.com/
jcbal9_octo.html.
365 Powell's convictions as to the righteousness of deregulation are unflappable.
After being challenged by those calling for more public input into the FCC's changes
to media ownership rules, Powell retorted: "'You don't govern just by polls and
surveys... We have to exercise difficult judgments and abide by the law. If all of our
rulemaking was just a case of put them out and take a referendum, things would be a
lot easier."' Ahrens, FCC Plan, supra note 357 at Al (quoting Powell). "'I have had to
make peace with myself, to know myself, to know with every fiber of my being and
intellect and faith with the law that this is the right answer, at least in the short
term.... Though it's not the popular answer.' Frank Ahrens, FCC Set to Vote on Easing
Media Ownership Rules, WASH. POST, June 2, 2003, at A6 (quoting Powell).
366 Powell, supra note 358.
367 Id.
368 Id.
369 Id.
370 Id.
371 Powell is quite adamant in this respect:
I don't know of another economic system in the history of the world that's
produced as much consumer welfare for its citizenry as American capitalism
has. You name to me the state central plan system that better served the
maximum consumer welfare of its citizens as the free market did in American
stock capitalism? I think that's the penultimate conclusion of the end of the
20th Century that not only did democracy prevail, as a social value and
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A look at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), whose "efforts
are directed toward stopping actions that threaten consumers'
opportunities to exercise informed choice, 3 72 is similarly revealing.
The current FTC Chairman, Timothy Muris, seems to share Powell's
preference for free markets, and for all the same reasons. In 1980,
for instance, Muris wrote (with a co-author) that
[t]he relatively unregulated marketplace has significant advantages in
allocating resources and promoting consumer welfare. The market
tends to minimize waste by permitting continuous individual balancing
of economic costs and benefits by consumers and producers. In
addition, greater productive efficiency and more innovation result from
the reliance on market incentives. Competitive markets also reduce the
need for central collection of information; their price signals allow
producers and consumers to respond quickly to change. Finally,
competitive markets tend to decentralize power and make decisions
that are fair in the sense of being impersonal. For these reasons,
reliance on the market should be the norm. 
S73
More recently, he has supplemented that pro-market view by
emphasizing the need for certain types of regulatory interventions in
political value, but the capital economy prevailed as the leading environment
for the welfare of citizens and for the ferment of innovation and revolution.
Transcript of Conversation Between FCC Chairman Michael K. Powell and Sam
Donaldson at the NAB 2001 Convention 4 (Apr. 24, 2001), available at http://
www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Powell/2001/spmkpIO2.pdf.
372 Fed. Trade Comm'n, Vision, Mission & Goals, at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/
mission.htm (last updated June 17, 1999).
Kenneth W. Clarkson & Timothy J. Muris, Constraining the Federal Trade
Commission: The Case of Occupational Regulation, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 77, 81 (1980)
(citation omitted). The FTC made a similarly revealing statement in 1978:
The public policy of this country favors the existence of free markets to the
maximum extent possible. While the complexity of the modern economy
often necessitates a departure from free market organization, as a general
proposition a market-perfecting solution to a perceived problem is
preferable. There should be a heavy burden of proof on those who would
opt for a different form of economic organization ....
Advertising of Ophthalmic Goods and Services, 43 Fed. Reg. 24,001 (June 2, 1978).
Former FTC Commissioner Thomas B. Leary stated that, "consumer freedom implies
the right to buy in open markets ...." Thomas B. Leary, Freedom as the Core Value of
Antitrust in the New Millennium, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 545, 553 (2000); see also Thomas B.
Leary, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission, The Federal Trade
Commission and the Defense of Free Markets, Remarks Before the David T.
Chase Free Enterprise Institute, Eastern Connecticut State University (Oct 7,
2002) [hereinafter Leary, Defense of Free Markets] (describing how the FTC is
devoted primarily to protecting the freedom of sellers to sell and buyers to buy
what they choose and the role of efficiency-oriented scholars in promoting that
now-conventional view of the FTC), available at http://u v.ftc.gov/speeches/
leary/willimantic.pdf.
20031
240 UNI.VERSTY OFPENNSYLVANIA LA WREVIEW
markets. In 1991, for instance, he wrote that "[o]ne of the crucial
roles for government, as we are seeing in Eastern Europe, is to
define and allocate property rights. '3 7 4 And although he acknowl-
edges the need for certain types of regulation when a market fails, he
cautions that
it is important to talk about the concept of market failure with care
because the issue is failure compared to what. In the real world,
institutions are imperfect, both government institutions and market
institutions. It makes no sense to compare an imperfect reality to a
hypothetical perfection. A vast literature exists on government failure,
as large as or larger than the literature on market failure.
With that caution, Muris appears to be emphasizing the work of,
among others, George Stigler, for Muris goes out of his way to stress
that
[g]overnment agencies are not run by philosopher kings who descend
from Olympus to protect us. Instead, government agencies are,
themselves, governed by rules that constrain what they can do, and they
are run by individuals who are striving to advance or succeed, just as we
all are. These constraints and incentives will influence how an agency
376
acts in the public interest.
Muris also describes how FTC regulation of advertising has
moved from protecting industry members from competition toward
serving consumers by encouraging competition 7
Again, the chairperson of a major federal regulatory institution
seems to embrace the dispositionist case for markets-as does the
Commission itself. Ts Again, that regulator seems quite sensitive to
374 TimothyJ. Muris, Economics and Consumer Protection, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 103, 104
(1991).
375 Id.
376 Id. at 105-06.
377 See id. at 117 (contrasting the competition-motivated FTC enforcement in the
1950s and 1960s with the consumer-oriented policy that developed in the 1970s). •
378 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 98-156, pt. 1, at 37 (1983) ("Normally we expect the
marketplace to be self-correcting, and we rely on consumer choice-the ability of
individual consumers to make their own private purchasing decisions without
regulatory intervention-to govern the market."); Leary, Defense of Free Markets,
supra note 373, at 5 (describing the "New Learning- an efficiency-orientated view of
antitrust [as], today, mainstream competition law"). According to Leary:
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the insights of shallow capture theory. And, again, we would
conclude that, insofar as Chairman Muris fails to consider the role of
exterior and interior situation, his views and, indeed, his position at
379,the FTC, evince deep capture.
We could continue in this vein at some length, but for everyone's
sake, we will stop here: s° In the following Section, we aim to dig a
little deeper and provide some illustrative examples of how other
"regulators," from courts to hard-hitting news networks, reflect and
contribute to deep capture.
Although we may differ on the facts of individual cases, all of my [FTC]
colleagues agree that the objective is to maximize efficient outcomes. We all
start in the same place and we are all trying to do the same thing. This broad
consensus is a great demonstration of the power of ideas and, in my view, has
made an immense contribution to consumer welfare.
Id.
79 Although we were unable to find much of his writing, it is widely understood
that Hal Stratton, Chair of the Consumer Product Safety Commission has similar,
strong pro-market, anti-regulation presumptions. See, e.g., New Mexico Attorney General
Stratton Repudiates NAAG's Horizontal Guidelines, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP., Issue
No. 1314, at 869-70 (May 7, 1987) (describing Stratton's objection that the merger
guidelines proposed by the National Association of Attorneys General ("NAAG")
"needlessly impose government regulation in the market place" in a way that
"unnecessarily interfere [s] with market forces" and "that will prejudice both legitimate
business reorganization and consumer welfare"); Hal Stratton, Attorneys General in State
of Collusion, WALL ST.J., June 10, 1988, at 22, col. 4 (attributing NAAG's movement in
this direction to "[s]ome ambitious, high-profile attorneys general [that] ... are
using the cover of 'consumer protection' to impose their own anti-business, pro-
government-regulation views on the entire nation and are bypassing the legislative
process to put in place 'enforcement guidelines' that Congress itself refuses to pass").
One critic complains that Stratton
inhabits a world in which government has no right to tell business what to do,
a world where consumer choices are the best marketplace regulators, a world
in which product-liability lawsuits stifle innovation. This would be the same
world in which consumer products never are unsafe, only used incorrectly by
careless people. In other words, a fantasy world.
Editorial, From Bad to Worse, THE BLADE (Toledo), Nov. 28, 2001, available at
http://www.toledoblade.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?Date=20011128&Category=OPINI
ON02&ArtNo= I 1280045&Ref=AR.
380 For a different but complimentary analysis of the pro-market and anti-
regulation schemas of policymaking, see Chen & Hanson, Illusion of Law I, supra note
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B. Some Less Shallow Evidence of Deep Capture
The myth that holds that the great corporation is the puppet of the market, the
powerless servant of the consumer, is, in fact, one of the devices by which its power
is perpetuated.
-John Kenneth Galbraith38'
Consider briefly courts. Consider, for instance, the 1979
dispositionist language of then-Chief Judge Irving Kaufman of the
Second Circuit:
[N]o one can determine with any reasonable assurance whether one
product is "superior" to another. Preference is a matter of individual
taste. The only question that can be answered is whether there is
sufficient demand for a particular product to make its production
worthwhile, and the response, so long as the free choice of consumers
is preserved, can only be inferred from the reaction of the market:'
Kaufman, in now-common fashion, treats the market as little
more than a highly responsive conduit of stable, exogenous
consumer preferences. The preferences and free choices of the
consumers come first, and the success or failure of the product
comes second, depending on its ability to satisfy those preferences.
More recently, Judge Frank Easterbrook has expressed a similar
deference to markets, adding that, with respect to reducing at least
some kinds of personal injury risks, courts should defer to the
incentives of the marketplace rather than attempt to fashion judge-
made incentives. As he puts it, market incentives, "[i]mperfect as
they are, . . . work better than the alternatives the legal system can
offer." 384 In this vein, too, we could go on. After all, like Judge
Easterbrook, many of the most prominent and influential judges
today made their careers as academics devoted to promoting the
dispositionist views of law and economics and libertarianism,
including: Judge Ralph Winter, Judge Stephen Williams, Justice
381 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 258-59 (1977).
382 Berkey Photo v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 287 (2d Cir. 1979).
383 Thus, "in its advertising, a producer is ordinarily permitted, much like an
advocate at law, to bathe his cause in the best light possible." Id.
384 Carroll v. Otis Elevator Co., 896 F.2d 210, 217 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.,
concurring).
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Stephen Breyer, Justice Antonin Scalia, and, of course, Judge Richard
Posner. Moreover, some who did not begin as academics
nonetheless rose to fame and influence in significant part because
hard-core dispositionism was central to their judicial identity, such as
Judge Alex Kozinski, Judge Michael Luttig, and Justice Clarence
Thomas. Indeed, at this moment in history, it is difficult to imagine
that any federal judge will be appointed or promoted who does not
substantially embrace the hard-core dispositionism promoted by
President Bush, his advisors, and the Federalist Society, which now
has immense influence over thejudicial selection process.
Dispositionism, as we have already indicated 386 and will return to
below, also dominates legal academia. For instance, when, in the
mid-1980s, the American Law Institute (ALl) amassed a large,
381somewhat representative 7, cast of influential tort scholars to assess
the tort system and to recommend possible reforms, those scholars
began their substantial work by embracing dispositionism. In their
words:
Utilitarian theorists ... accept as a factual premise that people are
generally the bestjudges of what actions will maximize their own utility.
This premise implies that society should strive to let states of affairs be
determined by the choices of the individuals affected rather than by
public decision makers.
We reject hard paternalism here both because we find it
unpersuasive and because we think that most Americans do not accept
385 See Martin Garbus, A Hostile Takeover: How the Federalist Society is Capturing the
Federal Courts, AM. PROSPECT, Mar. 2003, at A16 (discussing the increasing influence of
the Federalist Society on both legal and non-legal affairs). By 2001 the Federalist
Society had become so powerful that President George W. Bush felt comfortable
eliminating "the longstanding role in the evaluation of prospective judges by the
resolutely centrist American Bar Association (ABA), whose ratings had long kept
extremists and incompetents off the bench. Today the Federalists have more
influence in judicial-selection than the ABA ever had." Id. The group's efforts have
also been directed beyond judicial appointments and clerkships through "publications,
strategy sessions and panel discussions." Id. at Al 7. With millions of dollars of backing
from pro-market organizations such as the John M. Olin Foundation, the Federalists
have attacked individuals and agencies who attempt to regulate business, and have
celebrated those espousing dispositionism. Id. at A16.
386 See supra Part I.B.
387 SeeJames A. Henderson, Jr., Revising Section 402A: The Limits of Tort as Social
Insurance, 10 TOURO L. REv. 107, 114-15 (1993) (describing the committee
membership as "a balanced representation of well-known plaintiffs' lawyers and well-
known defendants' lawyers").
20031
244 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW
it. Hence, we suppose that, presumptively at least, consumers should
choose the accident level.
s8
The idea that consumers "choose the accident level," might strike
some readers as an unfamiliar notion. Few of us are conscious of
having much influence over, much less selecting, the accident level.
But what the ALI Reporters are indicating, of course, is that through
decentralized individual choice, a collective determination or
variety of determinations is made by consumers. The belief that
consumers best know their own interests and, through choice-based
behavior, are best able to act on that knowledge, is sometimes known
as consumer sovereignty-the normative principle that the ALI
Reporters explicitly endorsed38 9
The ALI Reporters' terms are revealing (not to mention,
constraining).3 9 0  "Hard paternalism" conjures up notions of
considerable governmental interference-something akin to central
planning. 9" In underscoring the rejection of such an approach by
"Americans," the Reporters seem again to be implicitly using the
shadow of the then-freshly fallen Soviet Union as an important
justification for embracing pro-market dispositionism and rejecting
any alternative.
Whether the ALI Reporters were in fact making such an analogy,
we (and perhaps they) cannot know. But we do know that legal
scholars have been explicit in making just that comparison. For
example, in a recent article, Robert Lande writes:
An optimal level of consumer choice, which has elsewhere been termed
"consumer sovereignty" is the state of affairs where the consumer has
the power to define his or her own wants and the ability to satisfy these
wants at competitive prices. The concept of consumer choice even
embodies some implicit notions about the rights of the individual in
the broader society; it is implicitly part of the Western world's response
to Marxism and the other totalitarianisms of the Twentieth Century.392
388 ALl, 1 ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY: REPORTERS' STUDY
205-07 (1991) (citation omitted).
389 See id. at 204-08 (justifying their commitment to consumer sovereignty).
390 See id. at 203-32 (illustrating the ALl Reporters' use of the common, though
false, dichotomy between a "pure" market solution and "hard paternalism").
391 See id. at 207 (noting that according to hard paternalism, "people do not have
preferences so much as they have 'interests"' and that "the state should choose the
legal rule that is in the citizens' real (rather than their subjectively perceived) best
interest").
392 Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice as the Ultimate Goal of Antitrust, 62 U. PITT. L.
REv. 503, 503 (2001) (citations omitted).
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Again, the belief in dispositionism appears to be motivated, at
least in part, by a fear that any other belief would place us on a
slippery slope toward totalitarianism.
But there is more to it than that. If one looks beyond the legal
reporters and law reviews, one will encounter many other, far less
formal, "regulatory" institutions that seek to promote dispositionism.
In these contexts, the goal seems to be to present to consumers a
vision of ourselves that we want to hold-a self-affirming image that
we are not being moved by the situation. For example, Fidelity
Investments tells us:
You are not the kind of investor who blindly reacts to each and
every new market condition. You're informed. You're involved.
You're focused.
Being in control of your financial future has never been more
important.
THERE ARE BULLS AND BEARS. BUT YOU ARE A THINKING
ANIMAL.
393
In other words, you, unlike all the other animals on the planet,
are uninfluenced by situation. You think, you prefer, you choose,
and you thereby enjoy dispositional control of your life.
Advertisers do not mind casting the shadow of those un-
American totalitarian regimes to drive the self-affirming dispositionist
point home. For instance, one cable news network recently placed
this ad:
393 Fidelity Investments, Advertisement, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2002, §1, at 15. In
light of recently burst bubbles and other corporate debacles, it is unsurprising that
other strategies include actually emphasizing cognitive quirks. A recent TIAA-CREF
advertisement reads:
Economist Robert Shiller wonders why we have such faith in the utter
rationality of markets when we can be kinda, you know, irrational. Bad
judgment, lousy information, half-baked strategies-there are times when
money brings out the worst in people. That's why Professor Shiller's
retirement dollars are invested with a company whose level-headed thinking
stands out in a world where impulse and intuition are bucking intelligence
and insight.
Teacher's Ins. & Annuity Ass'n-Coll. Ret. Equities Fund, Advertisement, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Jan./Feb. 2003, at 84-85. Thus, the ad encourages those with doubts in
their own rationality to trust the rationality of a dispositionalized institution and the
benevolence of privatized paternalism. The company is our agent (or friend)
looking out for our interests and avoiding the pulls of our flawed disposition (here
portrayed as "irrationality"). The ultimate message is that the rational dispositional
choice of investors can correct for the flawed dispositional choice of investments: you
+ TIAA-CREF = rational dispositional actor.
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What makes America. . . America? It's the freedom to have an
opinion . .. the freedom to speak your mind.... [W]e know you can
think for yourself. When it comes to covering the news, we don't have
an agenda ... and don't take orders from anyone. Just like every
American. Just like you. America's News Channel MSNBC.3 94
The point seems to be not just that Americans are situationally
independent (able to think what they want to think and speak what
they want to speak), but also that MSNBC is uninfluenced by outside
forces.
MSNBC's competitor, FOX News Channel, takes the
dispositionist view a step further and credits its own success to the
free-choice-making dispositions of its viewers:
Thanks to the American people. You've made FOX News Channel
the most watched, most trusted name in news. As active participants in
the American experience, you ensure a free and fair press for all.-- , -395
We Report. You decide.
And:
For the 3 out of 4 Americans who believe the news is biased, we present
something quite rare: a news network dedicated to providing fair and
balanced coverage. It's cable news for the independent thinker, 24
hours a day.
This practice of portraying the consumer as nobody's fool is
extremely widespread. According to some analysts, two of the most
common themes of cigarette advertising historically were "choice"
and "autonomy., 397 The Marlboro Man, as we will highlight below,
was nothing if not free and autonomous. And this imagery was not
exclusive to men. The demise of the taboo against women smoking,
394 MSNBC, Advertisement, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2002, at Al1.
395 FOX News Channel, Advertisement, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 21, 2003, at C3.
396 FOX News Channel, Advertisement, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1997, at D16. But cf
Bill Carter &Jim Rutenberg, Fox News Head Sent a Policy Note to Bush, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
19, 2002, at A27 (describing claims of connections between FOX News and the
Republican Party); Jim Rutenberg, Cable's War Coverage Suggests a New "Fox Effect" on
Television Journalism, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2003, at B9 (asserting that FOX News "casts
aside traditional notions of objectivity [and] holds contempt for dissent"); Matt Wells,
TV Watchdog Checks Claims of Bias on Murdoch Channel, GUARDIAN (London), May 8,
2003, at 5 (explaining investigation in the United Kingdom into the alleged bias of
FOX News).
397 See WORLD HEALTH ORG., WOMEN AND TOBACcO 4-5 (1992) (noting that the
early twentieth century witnessed the beginning of public smoking by women as they
sought to assert their newfound emancipation; this habit increased greatly during
World War II as women contributed to the war effort and smoking became associated
with working, independence, emancipation, and patriotism).
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and the concomitant doubling of potential cigarette consumers, was
reinforced by a clever public relations campaign devised by Edward L.
398Bernays. To cap off that campaign, Bernays enlisted the coopera-
tion of feminist Ruth Hale to organize a contingent of ten cigarette-
puffing women to walk down New York's Fifth Avenue in the 1929
Easter Parade. The feminists' involvement was billed and reported as
an act of protest and a call for equality. 39 And the cigarettes were,
themselves, described as "torches of freedom. °  So it was that
American Tobacco managed, through public relations, to promote
smoking in the name of liberation and autonomy. A look at Virginia
Slims' more recent advertising campaign slogans from 1968 until
today reveals that the beat goes on: "You've Come A Long Way,
Baby," "It's a Woman Thing," "Find Your Voice," and "See Yourself as
a King.,
40 1
The similarity of "seeing yourself as a king" and "consumer
sovereignty" is hard to miss and may not be an accident. The
message not only encourages consumers to purchase cigarettes, it
also suggests some of the larger possible stakes that commercial inter-
ests have in dispositionism. After all, if the consumer is king, then it
is hard to justify making manufacturers pay for simply following
orders. And this ability to place responsibility squarely on
consumers-to say in a tort case, for instance, that they "assumed the
risk" of their actions-has been fundamental to the tobacco
industry's success in selling a product believed to cause more than
402440,000 premature deaths per year in the United States alone.
398 See LARRY TYE, THE FATHER OF SPIN: EDWARD L. BERNAYS AND THE BIRTH OF
PUBLIC RELATIONS ch. 2 (1998) (discussing Bernay's efforts in the 1920s and 1930s to
encourage women to smoke); see also CASSANDRA TATE, CIGARETTE WARS: THE
TRIUMPH OF "THE LITTLE WHITE SLAVER" 105-17 (1999) (describing how such efforts
reinforced, but did not initiate, cigarette smoking by women, and describing many of
the situational-social, political, and economic-forces that were more influential).
39 See Stuart Ewen, Overrated and Underrated: Public Relations Campaign, AM.
HERITAGE, May/June 2000, at 77, 77-78 (describing and quoting Bernays's conception
of the campaign); Steve Craig, 'Torches of Freedom': Themes of Women's Liberation
in American Cigarette Advertising 8 (Feb. 25, 1999) (noting that the campaign sought
to distinguish cigarettes as "explicit symbols of a woman's defiance of traditional social
norms"), available at http://www.rtvf.unt.edu/people/craig/pdfs/torches.PDF.
400 Ewen, supra note 399.
401 See Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, Warning: Smoking is a Women's Issue,
at http://tobaccofreekids.org/reports/women/ (last modified May 31, 2002)
(describing the tobacco industry's historical targeting of women and girls).
402 SeeJon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case
for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1171 (1998) (describing the
long-time trend of holding smokers responsible for their resulting health problems);
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Thus, an important reason that sellers might embrace and encourage
dispositionism is their hope of shifting responsibility and avoidingS •• 403
costly regulation or liability.
A recent Pfizer Forum advertisement echoed that message:
"Medical professionals must help patients understand that in return
for greater power, control, and choice over the services and
treatments they receive, they must bear greater responsibility for
their own care."40 4  The pharmaceutical company's message, which
comes at a time when it seems to be facing growing threats of
405liability, taps into a well-established human tendency: where we see
the ingredients of autonomous, volitional, preference-satisfying
disposition, we place responsibility.
4 °6
see also Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Annual Smoking-Attributable Mortality,
Years of Potential Life Lost, and Economic Costs: United States 1995-1999, 51 MORBIDIThY &
MORT.ALiY WKLY REP., Apr. 12, 2002, at 300 (reporting the 440,000 figure and noting
that smoking continues to be the leading cause of preventable death in the United
States).
403 SeeJon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, The Failure of Economic Theory and Legal
Regulation, in SMOKING: RISK, PERCEPTION, AND POLICY 229, 253-54 (Paul Slovic ed.,
2001) (describing how the cigarette industry adopted just that strategy and its
success).
404 Liz Kendall, Pfizer Forum, Advertisement, Improving Healthcare by Empowering
Patients, ECONOMIST, July 13, 2002, at 10 (explaining that patients can and should take
on more responsibility regarding their own healthcare).
405 See Editorial, No Access to Law, 9 MULTINAT'L MONITOR (June 1988) (describing
lawsuits and settlements over a heart valve produced by Pfizer), at http://multinational
monitor.org/hyper/issues/1988/06/mm0688_03.html; Elisa Odabashian, Consumer
Union, Concealed Danger: Who Is Really Behind the Bid to Kill the Calfornia Corporate
Criminal Liability Act, at http://www.consumersunion.org/products/pfizenvc900.htm
(Apr. 24, 1996) (suggesting that Pfizer has lobbied against a California liability statute
in order to avoid criminal sanctions and further fines).
406 We feel it is important to reemphasize that we intend only to scratch the
surface of the evidence for, and mechanisms of, deep capture in this Article. Future
work, much of it well in progress, will flesh out the many ways that dispositionism
benefits powerful interests, particularly large commercial interests, and the mostly
situational mechanisms-both abstract and practical-of deep capture.
On a similar note, we recognize that our small sample of evidence has the
potential for bias, as we have searched for evidence to support our hypothesis and
have postponed any attempt to consider contrary evidence or to talk much about
overall trends. Still, at this point, we do not believe that the trends that we are
suggesting are all that controversial. For an overview of some of the relevant
trends, see Chen & Hanson, Illusion of Law I, supra note 84. With those who
would claim that our examples are on the extreme side of the dispositionism
spectrum, we might agree but would argue that they represent the vast bulk of the
most influential policymakers and policy theorists today. In any event, we believe
that those who do not occupy that extreme are nonetheless fairly described as
dispositionists. For evidence supporting that claim, see Hanson & Yosifon, supra
note 30; infra Part VII
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And so we see countless instances of groups latching on to
consumer sovereignty in order to meet the threats of heightened
regulation and liability. Take, for example, the Center for Consumer
Freedom, "a nonprofit coalition supported by restaurants, food
companies, and consumers working together to promote personal
responsibility and protect consumer choices., 40 7 The group is one of
several created by Berman and Company, a public relations firm
headed by Richard Berman, whose numerous projects have been
heavily funded by the tobacco, alcohol, and restaurant industries.4
The Center for Consumer Freedom has, among other things,
published and broadcast numerous advertisements purporting "to
stand up for common sense and personal choice"40)-by which it
seems to mean, stereotypes and dispositionism. In one advertisement,
the group warns:
YOU ARE TOO STUPID ... to make your own food choices. At least
according to the food police and government bureaucrats who have
proposed "fat taxes" on foods they don't want you to eat. Now the trial
lawyers are threatening class-action lawsuits against restaurants for
serving America's favorite foods and drinks. We think they're going too
410
far. It's your food. It's your drink. It's your freedom.
To those suggesting that the food industry is partially responsible
for the obesity epidemic,41' the Center for Consumer Freedom main-
tains its hard-line dispositionism: "We need individual solutions for
individual problems. And the best individual solution is personal
responsibility. 412 And just behind that dispositionism lurks the total-
itarian bogeyman. Richard Berman, for instance, describes those with
whom he disagrees as
407 See Ctr. for Consumer Freedom, What is the Center for Consumer Freedom?, at
http://.w.consumerfreedom.com/mainjfaq.cfm (last visited Oct. 15, 2003).
408 See Ctr. for Media & Democracy, ActivistCash.com/Center for Consumer Freedom,
IMPROPAGANDA REV. (last visited Oct. 15, 2003) (claiming that Berman receives advice
and funding from industry representatives), at http://www.prwatch.org/improp/
ddam.html.
409 Ctr. for Consumer Freedom, supra note 407.
410 Ctr. for Consumer Freedom, Advertisement, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 27,
2002, at 21.
411 See, e.g., KELLY BROWNELL & KATHERINE BArrLE HORGEN, FOOD FIGHT: THE
INSIDE STORY OF THE FOOD INDUSTRY, AMERICA'S OBESITY CRISIS AND WHAT WE CAN
Do ABOUT IT (2003).
412 Ctr. for Consumer Freedom, Obesity: Individual Problem Demands Individual
Responsibility, at http://www.consumerfreedom.com/headline_detail.cfm?HEADLINE
ID=1962 (June 11,2003).
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aggressors [who] are a blend of self-anointed "food police" activists;
overzealous public health "experts" who'd like to raise our children for
us; advocates of "Twinkie taxes"; lawmakers who use the cudgel of
government to appear "enlightened" enough to be re-elected; and, yes,
those trial lawyers who smell a payday where most of us just smell
dinner.4 1 "
And to underscore the point, the Center for Consumer Freedom
labels a recent book criticizing the food industry's role in contributing
to the obesity epidemic as a "'Big Brother' Manifesto."4 4
C. Some Cross-Cultural Evidence of Deep Capture
My research has led me to the conviction that two utterly different approaches to
the world have maintained themselves for thousands of years. These approaches
include profoundly dfferent social relations, views about the nature of the world,
and characteristic thought processes. Each of these orientations-the Western and
the Eastern-is a self-reinforcing, homeostatic system. The social practices promote
the worldviews; the worldviews dictate the appropriate thought processes; and the
thought processes both justify the worldviews and support the social practices.
-Richard E. Nisbett 
15
The previous Sections provided a sample of evidence suggesting
that various regulatory institutions are, indeed, highly dispositionist.
This evidence should not be surprising, given that social
psychologists have demonstrated that we humans tend to see the
world dispositionally. So, although the evidence might be consistent
with our deep capture hypothesis and might well reveal a major
cause for concern, it may only evince a shared cognitive illusion-a
worldview that emerges solely from forces outside of anyone's
control.
An important implication of deep capture is that our
dispositionism is, at least in this market-oriented culture, more
413 Richard Berman, All-out Assault by Food Cops: Vhen Will it End?, USA TODAY,
Aug. 15, 2002, at A13; see also Richard Berman, Beef Against Fast Food Could Lead to
Economic Indigestion, BOSTON HERALD, June 21, 2003, at 16 ("Laugh now if you must,
but this is serious business. How long before parents are criminally accountable for
allowing their kids to be obese? How long before restaurants post width scales at the
fast-food counter similar to the height scales on amusement park rides?").
414 Ctr. for Consumer Freedom, Would You Take Dietary Advice from this Man?: Kelly
Brownell's "Big Brother" Manifesto, at http://vvw.consumerfreedom.com/article
_detail.cfm?ARTICLE_ID=125 (Aug. 26, 2003). For a look at the supposed
"manifesto," see BROWNELL & HORGEN, supra note 411.
415 RicHARD E. NISBETT, THE GEOGRAPHY OF THOUGHT: How ASIANS AND
WESTERNERS THINK DIFFERENTLY... AND WHY, at xx (2003).
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profound than it would otherwise be. Corporations exercise their
enormous power over situation to encourage and reinforce
dispositionism because it is valuable to them. This presumes that the
basic contours of our outlook are malleable, that even dispositionism
is not stable but is subject to situational influence.
A question thus emerges as to whether dispositionism reflects
anything more than our hardwiring as humans-a shared interior
situation. The answer seems to be that it does. As we have already
indicated, dispositionism varies somewhat across contexts. Thus,
exterior situation matters too. Social psychologists have begun
looking more specifically at the significance of culture. In a revealing
study by Takahiko Masuda and Richard Nisbett, for example, students
at Kyoto University and the University of Michigan were shown
animated underwater scenes containing images of various undersea
objects, such as rocks, small fish, plants, and a "focal fish. 416 The focal
fish was larger, brighter and faster moving than the others-the sort
of characteristics that would, according to conventional
understandings, make them more salient to the observer.4" v After
viewing the scenes, students were asked to describe what they saw.
Predictably, American students spoke immediately of the focal fish
(e.g., "a trout, moving off to the left") and only later added references
to its surroundings.418  The Japanese students, on the other hand,
tended to begin by describing the context (e.g., "It looked like a
pond"). 41 9 During the course of their descriptions, students from both
universities made roughly equal references to the focal fish, but the
Japanese participants made over sixty percent more references to
contextual elements and twice as many references to relationships
with inanimate aspects of the environment (e.g., "the big fish swam
past a rock") .420
According to Nisbett, such evidence confirms the hypothesis that
members of some cultures are more inclined to take in the world as if
through a wide-angle lens, whereas members of other cultures tend to
see the world as if through a zoom.4 2' Nisbett argues that this
416 NISBET', supra note 415, at 89-92; Takahiko Masuda & Richard E. Nisbett,
Attending Holistically Versus Analytically: Comparing the Context Sensitivity of Japanese and
Americans, 81 J. PERSONALITY& SOC. PSYCHOL. 922,924-25 (2001).
417 Masuda & Nisbett, supra note 416, at 924.
418 NISBETT, supra note 415, at 90.
419 Id.
420 Id.
4 Id. at 89. Recognizing the differences between self-conceptions in the East
and in the West has long been a theme in both anthropology and philosophy. See
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distinction across cultures has ancient roots and may even help
explain why the Chinese made connections that Aristotle and Galileo,
with their telescopic vision, missed:
The Greeks' focus on the salient object and its attributes led to their
failure to understand the fundamental nature of causality. Aristotle
explained that a stone falling through the air is due to the stone having
the property of 'gravity.' But of course a piece of wood tossed into water
floats instead of sinking. This phenomenon Aristotle explained as being
due to the wood having the property of 'levity'! In both cases the focus
is exclusively on the object, with no attention paid to the possibility that
some force outside the object might be relevant. But the Chinese saw
the world as consisting of continuously interacting substances, so their
attempts to understand it caused them to be oriented toward the
complexities of the entire 'field,' that is, the context or environment as a
whole. The notion that events always occur in a field of forces would
have been completely intuitive to the Chinese. The Chinese therefore
had a kind of recognition of the principle of 'action at a distance' two
thousand years before Galileo articulated it. They had knowledge of
magnetism and acoustic resonance, for example, and believed it was the
movement of the moon that caused the tides, a fact that eluded even
Galileo.
4 22
Thus, the tendency goes beyond perception of non-human objects
and is revealed as well in how "Easterners" and "Westerners"
conceptualize and construe social contexts."'
KUNDA, supra note 20, at 515, (noting that anthropologists have long explored
cultural differences in self-perception and social understanding) (citing CULTURE
THEORY: ESSAYS ON MIND, MIND SELF, AND EMOTION (Richard A. Schweder & Robert
A. LeVine, eds. 1984)); see also Clifford Geertz, The Impact of the Concept of Culture on the
Concept of Man, in NEW VIEWS OF THE NATURE OF MAN (J. Platt ed. 1966). For a
collection of Geertz's influential writings on cultural anthropology, see THE IN TER-
PRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED ESSAYS BY CLIFFORD GEERTZ (1973). More
recently, social psychologists have begun to demonstrate and examine the difference.
One of their key discoveries is, as we will review in this Section, that dispositionism
varies across cultures. See generally KUNDA, supra note 20, at 515-60 (comparing
differences in social cognition amongst different cultures, and in particular between
Easterners and Westerners).
422 KUNDA, supra note 20, at 21-22.
423 We recognize and apologize for the breadth of these categories. To date, the
distinctions by social psychologists have rarely been refined much past those of
"Easterners" and "Westerners." Still, as broad and inadequate as those two categories
may be, they represent a key advance over the nearly complete lack of categories that
otherwise exists in many social scientific theories and lay theories of human actors.
And that criticism, we confess, applies to much of social psychology and to virtually all
of this Article, which too frequently speak of "human" tendencies-as if there is just
one relevant category of humans as revealed through studies of mostly college
students. This practice is particularly striking in light of the fact that, as we'll describe,
the work comparing "Easterners" and "Westerners" has demonstrated significant cross-
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The evidence about cultural variations in dispositionism provides
some additional support for our hypothesis that humans are both
"individually" and "culturally" dispositionist, but it may go further. It
suggests that dispositionism is greatest where the situational
influence of large corporate interests has likely been greatest.
Recall the fundamental attribution error that is at the heart of
dispositionism fallacy-the tendency to miss the influence of
situation and to overstate the power of disposition in understanding
one's own and other people's behavior. Earlier, we described the
centrality of that bias to human perception and experience.424 Cross-
cultural comparisons, however, indicate that the fundamental
attribution error may be more fundamental in Western societies thanS . 425
it is in other societies. People in Asia, for example, appear to be
less prone to see disposition than are Westerners.42  The "focal fish"
experiment provides some support for that conclusion. This disparity
cultural differences. See infta text accompanying notes 425-50; see also NISBETT, supla
note 415, passim (providing evidence of how groups in different parts of the world not
only think about different things, but actually think differently). Future work will
likely yield a more refined understanding of how we conceptualize our worlds and of
how those conceptualizations reflect and influence those worlds.
Additionally, we may find that much of the cognitive processes and emotions that
social psychologists have understood as involuntary may be somewhat malleable. That,
at least, was a recurring theme at a very recent two-day conference and discussion
entitled, Mind and Life XI: Investigating the Mind: Exchanges Between Buddhism and the
Biobehavioral Sciences on How the Mind Works, (held at MIT, Sept. 13-14, 2003, and co-
sponsored by the McGovern Institute at MIT and the Mind and Life Institute, and
attended by, among others, Daniel Kahneman, Daniel Gilbert, and the Dalai Lama).
For an overview of the conference and materials, see, Mind & Life Inst., Mind and Lfe
XI: Investigating the Mind, at http://www.investigatingthemind.org/index.html (last
visited Nov. 22, 2003). For a brief account of some of the exchanges and dynamics
that led to the conference and research that has been initiated in reaction to previous,
related conferences and discussions, see Stephen S. Hall, Is Buddhism Good for Your
Health?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 14, 2003, at 46.
The problem is not just that the category "human" is too broad. In fact, it may
also be too narrow. We suspect that our conceptions of other animals will demonstrate
that "humans"-there we go again-are unique in fewer ways and to a lesser degree
than "humans" have historically tended to believe. For recent general accounts along
those lines, see JEFFREY MOUSSAIEFF MASSON & SUSAN MCCARTHY, WHEN ELEPHANTS
WEEP: THE EMOTIONAL LIvES OF ANIMALS (1995); GEORGE PAGE, INSIDE THE ANIMAL
MIND (1999).
424 See supra text accompanying notes 86-107 (discussing various studies that reveal
the persuasiveness of the fundamental attribution error).
r, See KUNDA, supra note 20, at 525-33 (discussing several studies that compare
Western and Eastern paradigms about dispositional and situational attribution);
NISBETI, supra note 415, at 123-27 ("Westerners tend to assume that events are caused
by the object and Asians are inclined to assign greater importance to the context.").
426 KUNDA, supra note 20, at 526-27, 529-32.
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has been demonstrated in numerous experiments, including
variations of the famous pro-Castro, anti-Castro speech experiment
highlighted above.2 7
In the basic version of that study, recall, subjects who knew that a
student had been instructed to write and deliver a pro-Castro speech
nevertheless thought that the views the student expressed in her
speech were representative of her true dispositional beliefs. -8 The
same dispositionist mistake appeared when the study was conducted
with a group of East Asian subjects-that is, subjects at first
429overstated the role of disposition in the students' speeches. A
number of similar studies have documented this basic commonality
between Westerners and Easterners in the tendency to overstate
disposition.43 °  Social psychologists therefore do believe that
dispositionism, in its most basic form, is a widely shared human
431
tendency. 43
Differences begin to emerge, however, when the basic design of
the experiment is altered to highlight the role of the situational
pressure even more prominently to subjects-by, for example,
placing the subject in the target's shoes and requiring her to
write an essay that takes a particular stance. American subjects
continue to exhibit the fundamental attribution error in significant
proportions, while East Asians become far more likely to acknowledge
432the role of situation in the speeches they hear. This variation in
dispositionism has recurred in several studies comparing Eastern to
Western subjects. 433  Such cross-cultural differences in the power of
427 Id. at 532-33 (concluding that "East Asians are more likely than North
Americans to pick up on cues pointing to the importance of situational constraints");
see also Eric D. Knowles et al., Culture and the Process of Person Perception: Evidence for
Automaticity Among East Asians in Correcting for Situational Influences on Behavior, 27
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1344, 1348-54 (2001) (discussing an experiment
that asked students from the United States and Hong Kong to characterize the attitude
of a speaker, based on the speaker's speech about a political issue). For our earlier
description of the Castro experiments, see supra text accompanying note 155.
42 See supra text accompanying note 155.
429 KUNDA, supra note 20, at 532.
430 Id. at 525-32 (discussing several studies focusing on the dispositional tenden-
cies of Westerners compared to non-Westerners); NISBETr supra note 415, at 125
(explaining that "the illusion is sufficiently powerful that even East Asians are
susceptible").
I KUNDA, supra note 20, at 532; Fiske et al., supra note 195, at 915, 930-33;
Knowles et al., supra note 427, at 1354.
432 KUNDA, supra note 20, at 532; NISBEY supra note 415, at 125.
433 KUNDA, supra note 20 at 525-32; Fiske et al., supra note 195, at 930-33. Other
studies have yielded more specific evidence of the contours of cultural difference and
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the fundamental attribution error suggest that, although disposition-
ism may be universal, the degree of dispositionism varies across
cultures.34 Overall, the findings suggest that dispositionism is itself
subject to situational influence, a reality that helps to make deep
capture possible.
Another dimension to these cross-cultural experiments confirms
that hypothesis. In a number of studies, people who are from the
East but living in the West exhibit an outlook that falls between the
strong dispositionism seen in Western subjects and the weaker
dispositionism seen in Eastern subjects. 3  A compelling explanation
how it manifests in broader outlooks and motivations. One study of American and
Japanese subjects, for example, compared self-enhancement biases in Western and
Eastern subjects. Groups of American and Japanese subjects were asked to provide a
list of examples of situations that they felt had enhanced their self-esteem, and others
that they felt had diminished it. See Shinobu Kitayama et al., Individual and Collective
Processes in the Construction of the Self: Self-Enhancement in the United States and Self-
Criticism in Japan, 72 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PYSCHOL. 1245, 1249-54 (1997); see also
KUNDA, supra note 20, at 542-47 (summarizing Kitayama's experiments). The
researchers then took a list of four hundred responses culled from both groups and
administered the list to new subjects, again comprised of American and Japanese
subjects. Id. at 544. The subjects were asked to select the situations that they felt
were applicable to themselves, and how their self-esteem had been affected by the
situation. Id. The results revealed strikingly different self-perceptions between the
American and Japanese subjects. American subjects exhibited a more pronounced
self-serving bias, claiming that a higher proportion of the self-enhancing situations
applied to themselves than did the Japanese subjects. So significant was that
tendency among Westerners that it held true even for self-enhancing
characterizations that had been provided by the earlier Japanese subjects; that is,
Americans were more likely than Japanese subjects to claim that those characteriza-
tions applied to themselves. Id. at 546-47.
The self-enhancement tendency is one aspect of the broader dispositionist
character that social psychology has documented in Western society. See supra text
accompanying notes 194-95; see also Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 30. The results
of the above study, and others like it, suggest that the tendency to see oneself as
interacting with the world as a stable dispositional actor is more pronounced in
individuals in Western society than it is among people in the East. Related studies,
for example, demonstrate that self-enhancement biases are less prevalent in the East
than in the West. See KUNDA, supra note 20, at 538-43 (recounting a study that
suggested Canadians demonstrate a greater self-enhancing bias than do Japanese).
434 "All these studies point to the same conclusion. Westerners tend to view
social behavior as driven by internal, stable dispositions such as traits and attitudes.
In contrast, Easterners tend to view social behavior as determined by the individual's
interTersonal relations, roles, circumstances, and cultural milieu." Id. at 531.
See id. at 540 (describing studies that show that Asian Canadians' dispositionist
tendencies fall somewhere between the dispositionist tendencies of Asians and those of
European Canadians). In the self-enhancement study discussed above, see supra
note 433, Japanese subjects living in the United States were less prone to self-
enhancement than American subjects, but more prone than Japanese subjects living
in Japan. KUNDA, supra note 20, at 546. Another study found that Canadians of
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for these findings is that when subjected to different situational
influences-that is, different cultures-people develop differences in
436how they perceive behavior. In other words, situation, not
dispositional factors such as biology or race, makes the difference.
And importantly for our deep capture thesis, the Western cultural
situation appears to drive people into a deeper dispositionism and
away from situationism. Undoubtedly, differences in basic outlook
remain among the many subcultures within Western society.43 7 The
general patterns, however, are reasonably clear that dispositionism is
stronger in the West than in the East, and that the situational
influences of Western culture powerfully alter outlooks toward
dispositionism.
4 s
The evidence suggesting a greater sensitivity in Eastern society
than in Western society to situational influences over behavior at first
appears to challenge explanations of the fundamental attribution
error that are rooted in the mechanics of human perception. In our
earlier discussion we stressed, as have social psychologists, that one
reason for the fundamental attribution error is the relative facility of
seeing individual behavior compared to the situational influences
that may give rise to it. 439  Our limited perceptual and cognitive
resources focus on what is stark and miss what is subtle. Therefore,
we see the person who would administer painful shocks to a test-
subject as dispositionally bad or sadistic, rather than account for the
myriad of situational influences that help account for that behavior.44 °
Notably for our thesis, social psychologists have not abandoned the
basic perceptual explanation of the human tendency to overstate
Asian heritage exhibited self-enhancing biases at rates lower than those registered by
European Canadians, but higher than those that were seen in Japanese subjects living
in Japan. Steven J. Heine & Darrin R. Lehman, The Cultural Construction of Self-
Enhancement: An Examination of Group-Serving Biases, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1268,1278 (1997).
436 See KUNDA, note 20, at 540 ("Canadians of Asian heritage who may be assumed
to absorb Asian culture at home while being exposed to North American culture
everywhere else show[] some but not total adoption of Western cultural patterns.").
See id. at 549-56 (describing studies on differences in outlook between people
in the Northern and Southern United States).
438 Of course, it should be recognized that cross-cultural social psychology is a
nascent field; findings are at this point preliminary, and more will be learned about
differences between the social psychologies of different cultures as this field grows.
See KUNDA, supra note 20, at 547-49 (cautioning that the work in this area is at an early
stage and therefore "not conclusive").
439 See supra text accompanying notes 19-23, 13945, 182-96 (defining the
fundamental attribution error and describing some of the causes).
440 See supra text accompanying notes 86-99 (discussing the Milgram experiments).
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dispositionist explanations of behavior. Indeed, this basic perceptual
account explains the baseline of similarity seen in the cross-culturalS 441
Castro speech experiments.
According to social psychologists, the ultimate divergence in the
commitment to dispositionist explanations is a product of the
difference in the two cultures' lay theories of the relationship
between individuals and society.' In the West, the perceptual
foundation of the fundamental attribution error is surrounded by lay
441 Supra notes 425-31 and accompanying text; see also David M. Buss, Human
Nature and Culture: An Evolutionary Psychological Perspective, 69 J. PERSONALITY 955, 968
(2001) (acknowledging a universal human nature, and recognizing that the human
mind contains many complex psychological mechanisms that are selectively activated,
depending on cultural contexts).
442 Cf KUNDA, supra note 20, at 537-38 (concluding that maintaining and
enhancing one's self-esteem, [which is linked to dispositionism], is more important in
Western cultures than in Eastern cultures because of differing views on the relation
between the individual and society). The Japanese legal system seems to reflect
elements of their lay theories, which focus on the role of the individual as
interdependent with the collective. See, e.g., Koichiro Fujikura, Administering Justice in a
Consensus-Based Society, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1529, 1541-42 (1993) (discussing the position
of Hamilton and Sanders that in Japanese society "those who insist on their legal
rights may be seen as free riders, exploiting the collective benefit, and modern legal
reforms in Japan can be interpreted as a 'process of constant adjustments to thwart
the corrosive impact of litigious free riders on a nonlitigious legal order"') (quoting
V. LEE HAMILTON & JOSEPH SANDERS, EVERYDAY JUSTICE: RESPONSIBILITY AND THE
INDIVIDUAL IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 193 (1992)); V. Lee Hamilton &
Joseph Sanders, Punishment and the Individual in the United States and Japan, 22 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 301, 304 (1988) (suggesting that in Japan, "the individual is seen as
operating in networks and contexts... [so] sanctions for wrongdoing are influenced
by individuals' embeddedness in roles"); Erik W. Ibele, Government Regulation of
Technology Licensing in the Pacific Rim: The Legacy of Industrial Policy, 15 WiS. INT'L L.J.
299, 301 (1997) (noting that the "collective focus is evident in the language of Article
I of the Japanese Patent Law which states, 'the purpose of this Law shall be to
encourage inventions by promoting their protection and utilization so as [sic] to
contribute to the development of industry"') (quoting Tokkyoho [Patent Law], Law
No. 121 of 1959, art. 1, translated in [VI Japan] EHS Law Bull. Series No. 6850A, at SA-A
2 (1994)); Mark A. Levin, Essential Commodities and Racial Justice: Using Constitutional
Protection ofJapan's Indigenous Ainu People to Inform Understandings of the United States and
Japan, 33 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 419, 484-88 (2001) (discussing the conception of
individualism in Japan and how that outlook has shaped interpretation of the
American-influenced, individualistically-worded constitution); Glenn Theodore
Melchinger, For the Collective Benefit: Why Japan's New Strict Product Liability Law is
"Strictly Business," 19 U. HAW. L. REv. 879, 931 (1997) (arguing that Japan's new
products liability scheme may seem toothless by our standards because it takes the
cost of social conflict into account); Masumi Anna Osaki, Comment, A Look at Damage
Awards Under Japan's Trademark Law and Unfair Competition Prevention Law, 8 PAC. RIM
L. & POL'Y J. 489, 492 (1999) ("Traditional collectivist values that frown upon
personal gain have contributed to the inadequate enforcement of individual
intellectual property rights in Japan . .. [and have] traditionally resulted in limited
awards .. "),
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theories of the self as an autonomous, free, dispositionally stable
individual.'"' In this fashion, the fundamental attribution error serves
to confirm the dispositional worldview for Westerners. On the other
hand, cultures in the East entertain lay theories that portray the
individual as situated in an array of interdependent social
relationships in which roles, rather than individual actors, are
emphasized.444 Social psychologists, thus, attribute to culture the fact
that Eastern subjects appear to correct more easily for the
fundamental attribution errors received from basic perceptual cues
than do Western subjects.44" That explanation finds support in a
number of cross-cultural studies. For instance, individuals who have
been "multiply enculturated"-that is, exposed extensively to two or
more cultures-can be situationally primed to activate the causal
schemas characteristic of either culture. In one study, students in
Hong Kong were shown one of the following: Western images (such
as a cowboy on a horse), Eastern images (such as a dragon), or neutral
446images (such as a landscape).. Afterwards, when making causal
attributions, subjects in the first group were most dispositionist,
subjects in the second group were most situationist, and those in the
control group fell in between.44' Studies by developmental psycholo-
gists have found that Eastern and Western children exhibit common
fundamental attribution errors and, unlike their parents, Eastern
children do not correct for those errors when situational constraints
443 See supra text accompanying notes 194-95; see also Hanson & Yosifon, supra note
30.
444 See KUNDA, supra note 20, at 537-38 (noting that Eastern cultures tend toward
the notion that individuals are highly interdependent with others in society). But see
Yohtaro Takano & Eiko Osaka, An Unsupported Common View: Comparing Japan and the
U.S. on Individualism/Collectivism, 2 ASIAN J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 311, 316-30 (1999)
(reviewing empirical studies comparing conceptions of individualism and collectivism
in the two nations, and finding that the standard view, which holds thatJapanese are
more collectivist than Americans, is based on flimsy grounds and might be attributable
to the fundamental attribution error).
445 See supra notes 416-23 and accompanying text (reviewing experiments that
illustrate this hypothesis).
446 Ying-yi Hong, et al., Bringing Culture out in Front: Effects of Cultural Meaning
System Activation on Social Cognition, in PROGRESS IN ASIAN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 139,
14146 (Kwok Leung et al. eds., 1997).
447 Id. at 146. Researchers have discovered the same situational sensitivity to
cultural primes on the part of Asian Americans. See Kaiping Peng & Eric Knowles,
Culture, Education, and the Attribution of Physical Causality, 29 PERSONALIY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1272, 1279-83 (2003) (demonstrating that culturally instilled folk
theories affect Chinese Americans' interpretations of physical phenomena).
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are highlighted. 44" Having not yet learned the situational lay-theories
that their culture provides, their perceptions appear to rest on the
limitations that give rise to the fundamental attribution error in
Easterners and Westerners alike.44
It is important to note that Easterners' tendency to correct for
dispositional overstatements is itself an unseen, subtle process. The
studies revealing the relative depth or shallowness of the fundamen-
tal attribution error show that the adjustments for situation are often
made automatically; they are not the result of a conscious, explicit,
intentional adherence to an ideology or worldview.450 The difference
in outlook, driven by cultural differences, is attributable to unseen
processes, not dispositional choice. Consequently, while exterior
situation helps explain the depth of our dispositionism, that
influence is registered automatically, beneath our conscious control
in the situations of our interiors.
The fact that situational influence determines the depth of our
dispositionism is extremely advantageous to corporations, which, as
we have indicated, have an interest in encouraging such an
outlook.45 '  The capture of this outlook can be accomplished by
exercising power over situation, a pursuit that is itself enabled by the
strength of the dispositionist theories that support corporate
452
power.
448 See KUNDA, supra note 20, at 527 ("Cultural differences in attribution appear to
emerge only in mature individuals who have been well-socialized into their culture's
view of the person."); see, e.g., Joan G. Miller, Culture and the Development of Everyday
Social Explanation, 46 J. PERSONALIY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 961 (1984) (comparing
attributions of Indian Hindu children with those of American children and finding
that children in the two cultures did not differ in the sorts of explanations they gave
and that explanations did not begin to take culturally scripted form until adolescence).
449 See KUNDA, supra note 20, at 526-27 (discussing the findings of Miller, supra
note 448, with regard to Eastern children's attribution behavior).
450 See Knowles et al., supra note 427, at 1354 ("East Asians... have the ability to
automatically correct [dispositionist] inferences in light of situational constraints.").
451 See supra Part V.C.4.c.ii (arguing that a dispositionist worldview benefits
corporations, both individually and collectively).
452Hence, one might expect dispositionism to grow more robust in the East, as
Western corporations strive to maximize profits in Eastern markets. On the other
hand, we might expect to see differing methods of deep capture in markets where
dispositionism is less pronounced. Certainly, even in the West, there is evidence of
corporate appeals to group identities and situationist conceptions, such as is seen in
patriotic or racially identified messages. It is the situation, and not our dispositionism
directly, that makes deep capture possible. If deep capture can be accomplished
more effectively or more efficiently by promoting other worldviews, then such efforts
may take different forms in different cultures.
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D. Some Direct Evidence of Deep Capture
As we just reviewed, evidence about cultural variation of
dispositionism is consistent with our deep capture hypothesis in a
number of ways. However, that evidence, by itself, does little to
demonstrate that corporate efforts are an important cause of the
heightened dispositionism of the West. Many would argue that any
causal connection is actually the reverse of the one we have
hypothesized. For instance, the prominence and success of commer-
cial interests in America could well reflect the heightened
dispositionism of Americans.
There is almost certainly some truth to that view. The American
self-conception is one of individualism, a sibling concept of what we
refer to as dispositionism. This individualism seemed to emerge
without much obvious encouragement by large commercial interests
and is sometimes associated with people like Henry David Thoreau,
who seem anything but deeply captured. President Herbert Hoover
saw individualism as the cornerstone of the American character (or
disposition):
Individualism has been the primary force of American civilization
for three centuries. It is our sort of individualism that has supplied the
motivation of America's political, economic, and spiritual institutions in
all these years. It has proved its ability to develop its institutions with
the changing scene. Our very form of government is the product of the
individualism of our people, the demand for an equal opportunity, for
a fair chance.
The American pioneer is the epic expression of that individualism,
and the pioneer spirit is the response to the challenge of opportunity,
to the challenge of nature, to the challenge of life, to the call of the
frontier.5
3
In this way, Americans have long seen their individualism as both
obvious 54 and the most significant factor behind their relative
economic and political success. That self-affirming self-conception
may, however, be yet another example of the fundamental
attribution error. In our view, attributing our success to our
individualist disposition misses the more significant role of our
453 HERBERT HOOVER, AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISM 63-64 (1922).
4A Of course, as we have emphasized, the fact that something is obvious does not
mean it is entirely true. See BARRY ALAN, SILAIN, THE MYTH OF AMERICAN INDI-
VIDUALISM: THE PROTESTANT ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 21 (1994)
("Contrary to popular belief, Americans in the years surrounding the Revolution were
not adherents of political individualism . . ").
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situation, which itself has fostered success and rendered more
plausible our self-conception. Put differently, the American pioneer
may not be "the epic expression of ... individualism, as many
tend to presume. Rather, the individualism is as much the conse-
quence of the existence of a valuable situation, including an
immense frontier.i
455 HOOVER, supra note 453, at 63.
456 Again, the cultural disposition of individualism may well reveal more about the
situation than is commonly recognized. See supra text accompanying notes 444-49
(discussing the link between a culture's regard for individualism and that culture's
tendency toward dispositionism). "The frontier" provided to those who ventured to
America a chance to change their lives-an escape in some cases, an opportunity in
others. By sailing West to get to America and then "going West" once here, the
situation would have seemed far less constraining: gone were many of the shackles of
religious persecution, population density, employment pressures, and rigid class
norms. Those who survived and thrived did so perceiving they had acted according to
their choices. Seemingly boundless land and natural resources, together with growing
markets and changing technologies, provided many Americans with a strong
perception of self-reliance and self-determination. To a large degree, that perception
held true-but largely because the situation permitted it. In other words, the
freedom that we attribute to the disposition of individuals may more accurately be the
consequence of the options afforded by the situation in a "land of opportunity."
Particularly when compared to the Old World-where famine, poverty, and political
strife rendered the situation oppressive and salient-the New World would have felt
to many people (particularly young, strong, entrepreneurial, free, and white men) as
a land where disposition decided one's fate. Again, the frontier on which the
American pioneer was permitted to venture was itself a great situational source of
both perceived individualism and this country's success.
With that commentary, we have here inadvertently stumbled into the midst of a
long-standing historiographical battle. The classic work that initiated that battle was
written in the late nineteenth century by Frederick Jackson Turner. FREDERICK
JACKSON TURNER, The Significance of the Frontier in American History (1893), reprinted in
THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 1 (1920). Turner challenged the then-
conventional "germ theory" that the American character was a dispositional legacy of
the Old World and emphasized instead the situational effects of the frontier in giving
shape to a distinctly American disposition. In his words:
[T]o the frontier the American intellect owes its striking characteristics. That
coarseness and strength combined with acuteness and inquisitiveness; that
practical, inventive turn of mind, quick to find expedients; that masterful
grasp of material things, lacking in the artistic but powerful to effect great
ends; that restless, nervous energy; that dominant individualism, working for
good and for evil, and withal that buoyancy and exuberance which comes with
freedom-these are the traits of the frontier, or traits called out elsewhere
because of the existence of the frontier.
Id. at 37. A century of historical analysis and debate has discredited many of the details
of Turner's frontier thesis. See, e.g., Donald Worster, New West, True West: Interpreting
the Region's History, 18 W. HIsT. Q. 141, 144-46 (1987) (rejecting the process idea
central to Turner's thesis, preferring instead to define the West as a fixed geographical
region). But there remains, we believe, a strong case that situation-including our
interior situation, which may be motivated to see ourselves as the rugged individuals
20031
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Be that as it may, the fact that different cultures tend to be more
or less dispositionist reveals how dispositionism can itself be
influenced by the situation, thus leaving the door open for deep
capture. However, it does not, in and of itself, provide direct
evidence of deep capture. If our culture is especially dispositionist,
one would expect our legal theorists, lawmakers, and laws45 7 to share
or reflect that fundamental bias. Similarly, one would expect
advertisers to reflect that same view, by design or not, in marketing
their products in America. The Marlboro Man, as a cigarette-
smoking frontiersman, may reflect little more than a shared sense
that he is us and we are him: autonomous, free, and unfettered,...
the epic expression of individualism." 8 Thus, to support the portion
of the deep capture hypothesis that predicts that large commercial
interests actively and sometimes consciously promote dispositionist
worldviews directly, we need a different sort of evidence, a small
sample of which we will highlight here.
Fortunately, providing evidence is quite simple. All one has to
do is point to the hundreds of billions of dollars spent each year on
advertising, marketing, and public relations.4 9 Large commercial
entities are using and developing the sort of social psychological
research of which the rest of us are either ignorant or dismissive. As
one of us has argued at length (with Doug Kysar), marketing texts
and marketing firms are steeped in an understanding of the
460
powerful role of situation. Moreover, they use what they know
(and learn from market experience) to manipulate consumer
perceptions and behavior.
that Turner idealized-plays far more of a role in defining who we are, or like to
believe we are, than we recognize. Cf JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS & STEEL: THE
FATES OF HUMAN SOCIETIES 25 (1997) ("History followed different courses for
different peoples because of differences among people's environments....").
457 For examples of the influence of dispositionist presumptions on laws, see
Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 30 (examining dispositionism in contract, tort, and
criminal law); infra text accompanying notes 598-614 (describing the dispositionism
inherent in contract law).
458 See also Bruce A. Lohof, The Higher Meaning of Marlboro Cigarettes, 3 J. POPULAR
CULTURE 441, 447 (1969) (comparing the Marlboro image to Frederick Jackson
Turner's vision of the frontier).
459 See Ticker, BRILL'S CONTENr, Oct. 2000, at 33 (detailing the level of advertising
expenditure in the United States).
460 For a discussion of this point, see Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously
II, supra note 251.
For more on this idea, see id.; Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously I,
supra note 251; Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously III, supra note 257. See
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We will not review that work here. For now, we hope it is
sufficient to point out that when social psychologist Robert B.
Cialdini 462 wrote his popular book, Influence: The Psychology of
Persuasion,4'3 he devoted one of six main chapters to the Milgram
experiments and their lessons for marketing.6 4 A review of the book
in the Journal of Retailing raved that "[Influence] could be required,
profitable 'weekend reading' for business majors. ''  Another review
stated that "[fWor marketers, [this book] is among the most
important books written in the last 10 years., 466  Similarly, many
other marketing-oriented writings on consumer behavior under-
score the importance of situation over disposition in determining
individual behavior. "An actor in a play takes his cue from a line or
some other happening or event. The human mind takes its cue
from its intentions and its immediate environment. Such cues can
influence what we think about next., 467 Such is the starting point for
one influential marketing guide promising to "demystif[y] the effects
of advertising and describ[e] some of the psychological mechanisms
underlying them... written primarily for those who foot the bill for
advertising and those who produce advertising.""8
Marketing and advertising practices thus reveal the deep, though
apparently unseen, irony in the advertisements that we summarized
earlier.469 Advertisers commonly present to us a vision of ourselves
that confirms our self-affirming, dispositionist (and non-manipula-
ble) self-image. They do so, it would seem, in order to manipulate
our perceptions and behavior. The manipulation apparently works,
as revealed by their choice to continue doing so at a substantial cost.
In a way, that is our entire case in a nutshell. We are subject to
influence and manipulation from sources that we do not see or do
also Hanson & Kysar, supra note 403 (showing how tobacco manufacturers manipulate
consumer perception and preferences to increase profits).
462 Robert B. Cialdini is the Regents' Professor of Psychology at Arizona State
University in Tempe.
+53 ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION (rev. ed.
1993).
464 Id. at 208-36.
465 Roger A. Dickinson, Influence, 60J. RETAILING, Winter 1984, at 126, 128 (book
review).
466 Alan J. Resnik, Influence: Science & Practice, 23 J. MARKETING RES., Aug. 1986, at
305, 305 (1986) (book review).
467 MAX SUTHERLAND & ALICE K. SYLVESTER, ADVERTISING AND THE MIND OF THE
CONSUMER: WHAT WORKS, WHAT DOESN'T, AND WHY 17 (2d ed. 2000).
468 Id. at 4.
469 See supra text accompanying notes 393406.
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not consider relevant. Those with the ability to influence those
sources wield immense influence over us, while we continue to
believe that we are acting independently, according to our prefer-
ences. We conclude that advertising works, but deny that it
works on us. 470  But, to borrow one of the oldest strategies in the
book, do not take our word for it-listen to what those in the
industry say about what they do. For example, the Web site for
Burson-Marsteller, a public relations firm, has this to say about their
industry:
What makes public relations so important is that people's opinion
of ... a company, or a company's products or services is to a great
extent beyond that ... company's control. A public relations agency
offers these ... companies the resources necessary to make today's
incredibly diverse influences work for them. It accomplishes this by
having messages about the... company or company product or service
communicated through a credible third party such as a tnsted journalist,
physician, television or radio commentator, entertainer, or influential
Internet figure. In essence, a public relation agency optimizes the power of
endorsement by successfully influencing those who influence a targeted
• 471
audience.
Hill and Knowlton, one of Burson-Marsteller's chief competitors
and the firm responsible for designing the tobacco industry's
response to evidence that smoking caused lung cancer,4' describes
their role in very similar terms:
Powerful communications that make a difference[,].., that can
transform, inspire, move and educate is why we exist. This power can
be accessed by our clients wherever and whenever they need it; in
specialist arenas and in global campaigns; in the corridors of
470 SeeJEAN KILBOURNE, CAN'T BUY MY LOVE: HOW ADVERTISING CHANGES THE
WAY WE THINK AND FEEL 27 (1999) ("U]ust about everyone in America still feels
personally exempt from advertising's influence."); see also Emily Pronin, Daniel Y. Lin
& Lee Ross, The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others, 28 PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 369, 370-78 (2002) (summarizing several studies finding that
people see motivational and cognitive biases much more readily in others than in
themselves).
471 Burson-Marsteller, Inc., Why You Need a PR Firm, at http://vww.bm.com/
resources/whypop.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2003) (emphasis added).
472 See KAREN S. MILLER, THE VOICE OF BUSINESS: HILL & KNOWLTON AND
POSTWAR PUBLIC RELATIONS 121-45 (1999) (remarking on Hill & Knowlton's role in
"promot[ing] the notion that the case against smoking has not been proved," and the
later description of Hill & Knowlton's work as "one of PR's best finger-in-the-dike jobs
ever").
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government; in the financial centers and in the minds of consumers
everywhere.4 73
Richard Berman's public affairs firm, Berman and Company,
which represents the cigarette, restaurant, and alcohol industries,
describes in like fashion its bold mission to "[c]hange the debate" for
the sake of its clients:474
Many PR firms promise access to the media. Law firms pledge to defend
their clients. Lobbying firms promise access to friendly legislators. At
Berman and Company we do all this. But we go further. We change the
debate. If necessary, we start the debate.
... Our success is based on three core competencies: credible
research as the foundation for effective messages disseminated via
475
aggressive communications.
By analyzing the way marketers, advertisers, and public relations
firms view us, it is clear that we are not as dispositional as we think we
are. A major sector of our economy is making a huge profit by
maintaining two visions of the human animal. The public vision is
often that of the dispositional, independent, rational actor. The
private vision is that of the situational character, capable of
manipulation through situational influence. Those with the greatest
stake in perpetuating the illusion that we are dispositionists
encourage, promote, and market our dispositionism, in significant
part because doing so helps make the situation that much more
invisible. It is largely through the unseen situation that consumers,
like other individuals, institutions, and entities in our culture, are
deeply captured.
From this vantage point the Marlboro Man reveals himself not as
a reflection of what we-advertisers and consumers alike-all see
about ourselves. Rather, he embodies that dispositionist self whom
marketers want us to see, but whom they understand is almost as
fictional as the Marlboro Man himself.
The Marlboro Man first saddled up in the 1950s, as part of a
concerted effort by Philip Morris to attract male smokers who may
473 Hill & Knowlton, Homepage, at http://wwv.hillandknowlton.com/global (last
visited Oct. 24, 2003).
474 Berman & Co., Homepage, at http://www.bermanco.com/ (last visited Oct. 24,
2003).
475 Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 483-500 (describing in more detail the
use of third-party spokespeople for credibility, and detailing some of the particular
strategies and tactics used to create and maintain access to such third parties).
2003]
266 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYL VANIA LAW REVIEW
have been frightened by then-fresh reports of the health risks of
476
smoking. Marlboro was a filtered brand that had originally been
marketed, with limited success, as a woman's cigarette behind the
slogan "Mild as May. 4 77  The cowboy image eventually proved the
most popular of a group of potential pitchmen, including explorers,
sailors, athletes and other rugged men. 47 In a three-page spread in
the January 1957 issue of Life magazine,479 the caption read, "The
Marlboro Man speaks for himself. 40 Introducing his Western way
of life, the Marlboro Man states: "Own my own ranch .. . [I] ride
from one end of it to the other every day... I like the life a man
leads out here .. .the good feeling of being your own boss.",4 8  Over
the next four decades, the Marlboro Man would help Marlboro
become, in the words of a Phillip Morris competitor, "the most
valuable brand item in the world." 8 2  The cowboy image was so
successful because it tapped into the same American ideal of the
independent frontiersman that Hoover credits as the "primary force
of American civilization:,
483
476 The tobacco industry refers to the publication of the first lung cancer reports
as the "Big Scare," a transformative moment for virtually all industry practices, not just
their advertising. Plaintiff's Complaint at 68-73, Commonwealth ex rel. Fisher v.
Philip Morris, Inc. (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Apr. 1997) (No. 2443), available at
http://www.attorneygeneral.gov/ppd/tobacco/complaint.cfm; see also Hanson &
Kysar, Taking Behaviorism Seriously 1I, supra note 251, at 1483-87 (describing the
"Big Scare" and the industry's initial concerted response). See generally Richard
Doll, Cancer by the Carton, READER'S DIG. (Dec. 1952).
477 See Katherine M. West, The Marlboro Man: The Making of an American Image, at
http://www.people.virginia.edu/-tsawyer/mman/mman.html (last visited Oct. 24,
2003) (describing the evolution of the Marlboro marketing campaign).
478 Lohof, supra note 458, at 443-44 (noting that by the early 1960s the cowboy had
surpassed these other concepts and "was promoted to supremacy"); see also Leo
Burnett, Advertisement, The Marlboro Sto"y, NEW YORKER, Nov. 15, 1958, at 4143
(describing the marketing campaign of Marlboro in the 1950s).
479 Advertisement, The Marlboro Man: What's He Like, LIFE,Jan. 21, 1957, at 7, 7-9.
480 Id. at 8.
481 Id. at 8-9.
482 Cover Letter, MKTG. INTELLIGENCE DEP'T, BRIT. AM. TOBACCO Co., How
MARLBORO LED THE PACK, (1994), available at http://www.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/
batco/OCR/100/177.txt [hereinafter BATCo REPORT]. According to the report,
"Marlboro [i]s the most successful brand in the history of consumer marketing, more
so even than Coca Cola, which has a higher awareness level but lower profitability....
[I]n 1993, Financial World reported that [the Marlboro Man was] the world's most
valuable trademark[,] valued at $39.5 billion." Id.
483 See supra text accompanying note 453 (quoting Hoover) (discussing individual-
ism as the cornerstone of American character).
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[T]he cowboy proved to be the advertising "Big Idea" achieving
universal appeal. During the 1950s and 60s the popularity of American
cowboy films meant that for most people the cowboy became [tihe
symbol of America and the American "dream," cutting across barriers
of sex, and social and cultural divisions.
... [T]he underlying themes of adventure, freedom, independence,
being in charge of your destiny, open spaces and escapism for the
urban dweller have proved appealing to several generations. They still
have contemporary relevance; the cowboy is an icon of sturdy inde4endence,
the kind of person who chooses to smoke, a quiet defender of free choice.
That the Marlboro Man portrays an image of "free choice"
should come as no surprise. It is more than an appeal to an active
American script; it also deepens that script. Of course, it also helps
to sell a product that most would agree gains its appeal from almost
entirely situational sources. Those sources can be either exterior
situational influences, such as peer pressure, or interior situational
influences, such as addiction. From that perspective, it is striking
that "autonomy" and "free choice" are the banners behind which
cigarettes are sold and the self-image that consumers gain from
smoking them. To confirm this (incorrect) self-image, cigarette
advertisers portray smoking as something we simply choose to do.
The R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company used similar means to
attract young customers to smoke Camels. As one internal
memorandum put it, "Advertising will rely on clearly aspirational
appeals (the me I want to be versus the me I am) to provide the
motivation for target smokers to select CAMEL., 4s5 A second RJR
memorandum states:
484 BATCo REPORT, supra note 482, at 7-8 (emphasis added).
485 Memorandum Regarding CAMEL New Advertising Development from R.T.
Caufield, R.J. Reynolds, to D.N. lauco, R.J. Reynolds 2 (Mar. 12, 1986), available at
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/cgi/getdoc?tid=pil75dOO&fmt=pdf&ref=results
[hereinafter Memorandum from R.T. Caufield]. Camel's campaign had two goals.
First, it attempted to convince young smokers that Camels give them the masculine
ideal of "strength, authenticity and self-confidence." Id. at 3. "Reinforcement of
masculinity is an important want among a large percentage of males and this is
particularly true among less educated and younger adult males. (i.e., CAMEL's prime
prospect)." Id. Second, the advertising campaign sought to
create the perception that CAMEL smokers project a non-conformist, self-
confident cool attitude which is admired by their peers.
Aspiration to be perceived as cool/a member of the in-group is one of the
strongest influences affecting the behavior of younger adult smokers.
Personality attributes respected by target smokers and inherent in their
definition of cool include a degree of rebellion or non-conformity, along
2003]
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The fragile, developing self-image of the young person needs all of the
support and enhancement it can get. Smoking may appear to enhance
that self-image in a variety of ways. If one values, for example, an
adventurous, sophisticated, adult image, smoking may enhance ones
self-image. If one values certain characteristics in specific individuals or
types and those persons or types smoke, then if one also smokes he is
psychologically a little more like the valued image. This self-image
enhancement effect has traditionally been a strong promotional theme
486
for cigarette brands and should continue to be emphasized.
Again, cigarette manufacturers know exactly "who we are"-we
are beings who want to believe that we are autonomous, free
choosers, but who, in reality, are very susceptible to situational forces.
We are especially susceptible to situations that make us feel as if we
really are free choosers acting according to our own will. These
advertising campaigns seek to exploit our situational weaknesses. As
a result, cigarette smoking, a deadly addiction, becomes the epitome
of free choice.487
As Americans, we see ourselves as particularly immune to the role
of situation. We see "individualism as the primary force" in defining
our institutions and our lives. In fact, we are not immune to
situation, nor are we as individualistic as we suppose. The fact that
profit-driven actors spend billions of dollars per year to promote a
false dispositionist image of ourselves is direct evidence of both of
those claims and of deep capture.
with the self-confidence to remain in control of the somewhat risky, exciting
lifestyle associated with these characteristics.
Id. at 4. The irony is striking-RJR is trying to convince people they are "self-
confident non-conformists" by using advertising that situationally manipulates this
very aspiration.
486 Memorandum from Claude E. Teague, Jr., R.J. Reynolds, Research Planning
Memorandum on Some Thoughts About New Brands of Cigarettes for the Youth
Market 7 (Feb. 2, 1973), available at http://tobaccodocuments.org/rjr/502987357-
7368.html.
487 Widely produced advertising campaigns can affect the self-images of everyone,
not just those who purchase cigarettes. They reinforce our tendency to see ourselves
as dispositional free choosers. RJR recognized this:
Campaigns which rely on literal depiction of smokers to communicate
desired user imagery will ensure that models and situations selected are
highly relevant and appealing to not only target smokers but broader
demographic groups as well. Additionally, the exploratory will cover
approaches which employ universal cues and symbols that effectively
communicate the strategies with motivational value that transcends
demographics.
Memorandum from R.T. Caufield, supra note 485, at 2.
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E. Some Deeper Evidence of Deep Capture: The Puzzles Revisited
We have reviewed a sample of the evidence indicating that pro-
commercial dispositionism has been widely accepted as the
presumptive starting place for policy analysis. Many administrative
regulators, judges, and legal scholars, like most consumers-from
cigarette smokers, to investors, to television-news enthusiasts-take
dispositionism as the obvious truth. Implicitly, we have also reviewed
one of the most common and effective strategies for promoting pro-
commercial views. Before explicitly naming that strategy, it may be
helpful to return briefly to the Milgram experiments and some
variations of the rendition that we described above.
1. The Demand for Credible Messengers
With numbing regulaity good people were seen to knuckle under the demands of
authority and perform actions that were callous and severe. Men who are in
everyday life responsible and decent were seduced by the trappings of authority,
by the control of their perceptions, and by the uncritical acceptance of the
experimenter's definition of the situation, into performing harsh acts.... A
substantial proportion of people do what they are told to do, irrespective of the
content of the act and without limitations of conscience, so long as they perceive
that the command comes from a legitimate authority.
-Stanley Milgram488
After discovering the unexpected power of the situation in his
initial experiment, Milgram altered the situation in the hope of
making visible some of the previously unseen influences. One of the
key factors he varied was the credibility or authority of the person
who gave orders to the teacher. In the basic experiment, recall that
the person prompting the teacher to continue shocking appeared as
a scientist, complete with a white lab coat. He seemed to have
considerable knowledge and authority. When Milgram replaced that
"experimenter" with an "ordinary man" to give the orders, the
percentage of teachers who administered the maximum shock (450
volts) dropped from approximately sixty-five percent to twenty
percent. 4s9  Apparently, the same words were less persuasive or
488 Milgram, Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to Authority, supra note 86,
at 74-75.
489 MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY, supra note 86, at 93-97. As part of the
experiment, when "teachers" refused to go on, the common man, in apparent disgust,
would assert that he would take over administering the shocks. Id. at 97-99. The
action was met with strong resistance-virtually all protested and five out of sixteen
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influential when they came from a less credible or authoritative
source. In addition, when Milgram replaced the one lab-coated
experimenter with two lab-coated authorities who gave contradictory
orders, the complete compliance percentage dropped to zero.9  In
that variation, teachers could more easily justify ending the shocking
because one person with authority was encouraging them to do so.
Those and other variations help make clear that the credibility of
the messenger is often more important than the message itself.
49 '
This underscores an important element of the deep capture
hypothesis: the quest to promote certain ideas will include an
endeavor to locate, create, and sponsor credible means of conveying
those ideas. Often, those with the greatest stake in an idea have, for
precisely that reason, questionable credibility when speaking on
behalf of the idea. Thus, the search for an effective means of
communication often includes a search for trustworthy spokespeople.
The public relations firm Burson-Marsteller makes the point in just
those terms when it describes its primary strategy as that of "having
[one's] messages ... communicated through a credible third party"
in order to "influenc[e] those who influence a targeted audience."
49 2
Berman and Company emphasizes that the "key" to its success "is
getting the most credible messengers to carry the strongest
messages. 4 9 3  To access such credible messengers, Berman and
Company developed what it calls an "academic research network:,
494
We commission more than a dozen major research projects each year to
independent academics at leading research universities, including:
" University of Chicago
" Florida State University
* University ofTexas
" Johns Hopkins University
subjects took physical action to prevent the confederate from completing the
experiment. Id. As Milgram noted, subjects "felt free to threaten the common man
and were not reluctant to criticize his judgment or personally chastise him; their
attitude contrasts sharply with the deferential politeness subjects invariably displayed in
other experiments, when an authority was at the helm." Id. at 97-98.
490 Id. at 105-07.
491 See generally CIALDINI, supra note 463, at 216-29 (describing some examples of
people's willingness to obey authority and how "compliance professionals" take
advantage of that willingness).
492 Burson-Marsteller, Inc., supra note 471.
493 Berman & Co., at http://www.bermanco.com/public_affairs.cfm (last visited
Oct. 25, 2003).
494 Berman & Co., at http://www.bermanco.com/research.cfm (last visited Oct.
25, 2003).
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" University of Wisconsin
* Massachusetts Institute of Technology
" University of North Carolina
" University of California, Los Angeles
" Boston University
* Michigan State University
The credibility of the material produced by these independent research-
ers is unparalleled among "brand name" trade associations, law firms, or
49;5
consultants active in the public policy arena.
Berman and Company relies on several other tactics to create
favorable, credible third-party messengers for its clients:
Sometimes, the best messengers are line managers from affected
employers. We have more than a decade of experience building and
maintaining sophisticated grassroots activation systems through which
managers can have maximum impact with a minimal investment of time.
CEOs of major employers, working in teams managed by Berman and
Company, repeatedly deliver powerful messages to key legislators and
the White House.
Whether drawing industry allies from associations, think tanks, or the
private sector, Berman and Company reaches out to potential allies on a
daily basis, providing data, information, and refined messages that
others use to make their cases-and ours-in the policy arena. Our
clients benefit when more allies use our research and repeat our
messages.
When Berman and Company publishes research from independent
academics, we craft our publicity efforts so that the authors' credibility
shines in the legislative spotlight.
Sometimes, uncommon allies can get more attention than
"traditional" spokespersons. Our staff has developed strong ties to
individuals who are often perceived as "anti-industry" but who agree with
496focused messages that we seek to publicize.
To aggressively disseminate the credible third-party messages,
Berman and Company attempts to "design unique programs for
maximum impact in the debate ... [and to] stick with the issue for as
long as it takes to win."4" Those programs include creating and
maintaining "web sites that constantly elicit the 'Wow!' factor from
,,498 499users. ConsumerFreedom.com, discussed above, is an example of
that creative approach. To "change the debate," that Web site seeks to
expose and resist "the Nanny Culture"-"the growing fraternity of
495 Id.
496 Berman & Co., supra note 493.
497 Berman & Co., supra note 494.
498 Berman & Co., supra note 493.
499 See supra notes 407-14 and accompanying text.
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'food cops,' health care enforcers, militant activists, meddling
bureaucrats, and violent radicals who think they 'know what's best for
you'"-"and protect consumer choices."
°0 0
The same basic principle was at work in the Galileo story: the
Catholic Church dealt with Galileo's threatening astronomical views
by having its own worldview "communicated through" Galileo's
recantation. 50' Likewise, the principle seems to underlie Stigler's
basic shallow capture message: institutions or groups with the requi-
site power employ the legitimacy of regulators to advance their own
interests.
50 2
2. The Creation of Credible Messengers
There is a vast range of interconnected evidence (too vast to do
justice to in this subsection) of pro-commercial interests investing
to deeply capture the many "credible third parties" that might
influence the many "targeted audiences" (including all of us) to
accept pro-commercial worldviews. In this subsection we will focus
on a small sample of that evidence. Although the sample is small,
it will hit close to home for much of our audience and will, we hope,
strike a more direct and personal chord than the Galileo discussion
may have.
Consider the world of legal scholarship. Large business
interests have attempted to locate, create, and sponsor the
production and dissemination of pro-commercial legal scholarship by
legal scholars who have served as credible, if often unwitting,
spokespeople for business ends. More specifically, consider some of
the evidence regarding the goals and influence of the John M. Olin
Foundation.
According to the Olin Foundation's Web site,
the general purpose of the John M. Olin Foundation is to provide
support for projects that reflect or are intended to strengthen the
economic, political and cultural institutions upon which the American
heritage of constitutional government and private enterprise is based.
The Foundation also seeks to . . .encourag[e] the thoughtful study
500 Ctr. for Consumer Freedom, supra note 407.
50 See supra text accompanying notes 297-314 (reviewing and evaluating Galileo's
recantation).
52 See supra Part V.A (summarizing Stigler's arguments and evidence).
503 In work now in progress, we provide a more fulsome description of that
evidence.
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of the connections between economic and political freedoms, and the
cultural heritage that sustains 
them.
50 4
To advance that goal the Olin Foundation has, among other
things, awarded tens of millions of dollars to prominent law schools
for the promotion of law and economics scholarship. Over the past
twenty years, Olin money has established law and economics
programs, or "centers," at several prominent law schools: the Univer-
sity of Chicago, Yale, Stanford, Harvard, Columbia, Georgetown,
Duke, the University of Michigan, the University of Pennsylvania,5 • .05
George Mason, and the University of Virginia. In 1999, a year in
which the Foundation paid out almost $20 million in grants to
organizations around the country,"06 Harvard Law School's John M.
Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business was in the middle of a
four-year, $6 million grant,0 7 Yale Law School's John M. Olin
Program in Law and Economics was in the middle of a three-year,
504 John M. Olin Foundation, Inc., History and General Purposes, at http://w.
jmof.org/history-purposes.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2003).
LAWRENCE C. SOLEY, LEASING THE IVORY TOWER: THE CORPORATE TAKEOVER
OF ACADEMIA 137 (1995); Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tart
Monster: The American Civil Justice System as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOK. L.
REV. 1, 76 tbl.2 (2002).
506 John M. Olin Foundation, Inc., Total Grants Paid, 1999, at http://ww.
jmof.org/grants_1996.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2003).
507 John M. Olin Foundation, Inc., Schedule of Grants, 1999: H, at http://www.
jmof.org/grants/1999h.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2003). An Olin grant helped
establish Harvard Law School's Law and Economics Program in 1985. Olin Gift
Expands Law and Economics at HLS, HARv. L. BULL., Summer 1998, at 30. Further
support then led to the 1995 opening of the Olin Center at Harvard Law School,
"now the world leader in educating students, training academics, and promoting
scholarship in law and economics." Id. "Among [the Olin Center's] academic
offerings are three economic analysis seminars, courses on the economics on
regulation and antitrust, classe5 on law and economics and on empirical methods, and
a new course, Analytical Methods for Lawyers," for which the Olin Center faculty is
developing a textbook for adoption across the country. Press Release, Harvard Law
School, Harvard Law School Receives $10 Million Grant from John M. Olin
Foundation, at http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/2003/05/19_olin.php (May 19,
2003) [hereinafter Harvard Law School Press Release]. Beyond the classroom, "[t]he
Olin Center supports more than twenty John M. Olin Fellows each year to conduct
research on topics ranging from corporate governance to prenuptial agreements." Id.
Much of the sponsored scholarship has involved the application of economic analysis
to controversial issues, including Professor Kip Viscusi's criticism of tobacco and
smoking regulation. Id.; see also VISCUSI, supra note 15, at 145 (arguing that
government policy "should not be to deter smoking but to provide information
concerning the variety of smoking hazards" so that consumers can make their own
choice).
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$1.9 million grant," s and the University of Chicago Law School's
John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics was in the middle of a
six-year, $2.5 million grant. 5119 In May 2003, Harvard received another
grant from the Olin Foundation, this time for $10 million, "the largest
foundation grant in the law school's 186-year history."
510
Olin money, as we will describe in more detail in subsequent
work, has a significant influence not only in encouraging certain
types of scholarship," but also in increasing the credibility of that
scholarship. It establishes "centers" dedicated to law and economics
theory, provides funding for journals through which law and
economics scholarship can be stamped with the legitimacy of "peer
review" by other legal economists, finances a series of workshops to
encourage efficiency-oriented scholars to share and test their views at
elite law schools, and gives scholarships and fellowships to top law
students who participate in law and economics seminars and produce
law and economics scholarship512 In short, Olin money has helped
to create and advance a critical mass of legal scholars, who begin
with the strong dispositionist axioms of neoclassical economics, who
write largely for one another and policymakers, and who view
themselves (and are viewed by many others) as the only genuinely
social scientific members of the legal academy.
The success of the Olin Foundation's funding of law and
economics seems fairly dramatic. Professor Steven Shavell, the
director of Harvard Law School's Olin Program, recently provided
one measure of that achievement. Professor Shavell surveyed the
academic appointments at the "top 10" law schools over the last
508 John M. Olin Foundation, Inc., Schedule of Grants, 1999: Y, at http://www.
jmof.org/grants/ 1999y.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2003).509John M. Olin Foundation, Inc., Schedule of Grants, 1999: U, at http://www.
jmof.org/grants/1999u.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2003).
510 Harvard Law School Press Release, supra note 507. The gift is a testament to
the great success of the Center in achieving the goals of the Olin Foundation. In the
words ofJames Piereson, executive director of the Olin Foundation, "[t]he school has
made an impressive commitment to the field of law and economics and has created a
very strong program of teaching and research. We hope this gift will enable the school
to build on this record of success." Id.
511 For a recent critique of the John M. Olin Foundation's neoconservative
influence in law schools, see Rustad & Koenig, supra note 505, at 74-77.
512 SOLEY, supra note 505, at 5-6, 14041. Not all institutions have accepted the
Olin Foundation's handouts. "A short-lived program in Law and Economics was
offered at UCLA during the 1980s, but was abandoned after a curricultim committee
found that the program was 'taking advantage of students' financial need to
indoctrinate them with a particular ideology."' SOLEY, supra note 505, at 137, 140
(quoting UCLA curriculum committee).
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decade.513  Of forty-three total placements, he found that, twenty-
three were Harvard Law School graduates, and ten of those had been
Olin fellows. 1 4 As Professor Shavell told the Boston Globe, "[i]n the
long run, we're going to have a heck of an impact on who's teaching
at the leading law schools, and what the students are learning."5
We would go further. The Olin Foundation and the law and
economics scholarship that it has subsidized have already had "a heck
of an impact." Indeed, the scholarly project that the Olin money has
sponsored is the same project that is widely understood today to be
the dominant paradigm for policy analysis. 56 Professor Shavell has
emphasized that the economic analysis of law "has changed the
nature of legal scholarship, influenced legal practice, and already
proven its tremendous value in policymaking and business."
51 7
Furthermore, the Olin Foundation's Board of Trustees recently
declared that their contributions have "supported a wide range of
scholars and writers who significantly changed the content and
direction of American academic and political discussion. 
,5
18
Of course, the fact that the Olin Foundation poured millions of
dollars into promoting law and economics does not necessarily imply
that those investments played a significant causal role in the stunning
success of the now-dominant paradigm. It may be, as most of its
proponents presume, that law and economics was destined for
greatness solely on the merits, and that Olin money simply facilitated
an inevitable process that was already underway. 5
a. A market test
There are several reasons to suspect, however, that the Olin
Foundation's support, combined with numerous other situational
influences, has played a pivotal causal role in the success of the law
and economics movement. First, the success of law and economics
appears to map closely with the precise ambitions and strategies of
513 See Thomas C. PalmerJr., The Right to Self-Destruct, BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE, Apr.
29, 2001, at DI (discussing Shavell's work in the context of the Olin Foundation's
impending dissolution).
514 Id. at D3.
515 Id.
516 See supra text accompanying notes 57-64.
517 Olin Gift Expands Law and Economics at HLS, supra note 507, at 30.
518John M. Olin Foundation, Inc., Board Resolution (Sept. 20, 2000), available at
http://www.jmof.org/wes.htm.
51" See supra text accompanying notes 68-81.
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the key individuals behind the Olin Foundation: John Olin, the
founder of the organization, and William Simon, its longtime
president. After leaving his position as Treasury Secretary in the
Nixon and Ford Administrations, Simon wrote two best-selling books
that outlined his conservative and pro-commercial beliefs and his
agenda for implementing them. Simon was a prominent, early
exponent of the dispositionist, neoliberal worldview that seeks to
promote private enterprise and to minimize the role of
government-a worldview shared by John Olin. They also shared a
belief that American universities at the time produced ideas and
graduates that were dangerously antithetical to those ends. To
Simon, this problem was tantamount to a war of liberty versus
totalitarianism-a war with three fronts:
1. Funds generated by business... must rush by multimillions to
the aid of liberty, in the many places where it is beleaguered.
... [Foundations established by such funds must] serve explicitly as
intellectual refuges for the non-egalitarian scholars and writers in our
society who today work largely alone in the face of overwhelming
indifference or hostility. They must be given grants, grants, and more
grants in exchange for books, books, and more books.
2. Business must cease the mindless subsidizing of colleges and
universities whose departments of economics, government, politics and
history are hostile to capitalism and whose faculties will not hire
scholars whose views are otherwise.
... America's major universities are today churning out young
collectivists by legions, and it is irrational for businessmen to support
them.
3. Finally, business money must flow ... to media which are either
pro-freedom or, if not necessarily 'pro-business,' at least professionally
capable of a fair and accurate treatment of procapitalist ideas, values
and arguments. The judgment of this fairness is to be made by
businessmen alone-it is their money that they are investing.
These are the three fronts on which to act aggressively if we are to
create a sophisticated counter-force to the rising despotism. One of my
own first actions on leaving the post of Secretary of the Treasury was to
accept the job of president of the John N. [sic] Olin Foundation, whose
520 WILLIAM E. SIMON, A TIME FOR TRUTH (Berkley Books 1979) (1978)
[hereinafter SIMON, A TIME FOR TRUTH]; WILLIAM E. SIMON, A TIME FOR AcTION
(1980).
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purpose is to support those individuals and institutions who are
521
working to strengthen the free enterprise system.
Thus, Simon, with the support of the Olin Foundation, was trying
to alter the playing field on which academic debate takes place-and
trying to do so situationally. Furthermore, he understood that the
dispositionism of law and economics is pro-business and that many
alternative views, otherwise successful in the marketplace of ideas, are
not. Simon presented American individualism, much as ad agencies
presented the Marlboro Man, as the American tradition and the
source of America's greatness. However, like the Marlboro Man's
creators, Simon seemed to appreciate that such individualism, to be
embraced as deeply as Philip Morris, Simon, and others desired, had
to be heavily promoted, and reinforced if it is to be widely accepted.
And he further understood that the situation can and should be
manipulated by, among other things, choosing particular academics,
programs, and scholarly camps to give "grants, grants, and more
grants in exchange for books, books, and more books.'5
22
In light of Simon's (and thus the Olin Foundation's) pro-
business mission, there is good reason to believe that the Olin
Foundation's sizeable law and economics investment was money
well spent. The point is strengthened when one considers that the
Foundation engaged in a kind of "stage financing" of these
programs: grants were intended to last for only a few years, at which
point the Foundation would consider whether to renew its
523contribution to a particular program. The fact that the Founda-
521 SIMON, A TIME FOR TRUTH, supra note 520, at 246-50.
522 Id. at 247.
523 We suspect that such financing arrangements may have had some influence
over the kind of work that was produced under the auspices of each program, just as
economists generally tend to assume that such financing arrangements can have
incentive effects over those subject to them. See, e.g., Francesca Cornelli & Oved
Yosha, Stage Financing and the Role of Convertible Securities, 70 REv. ECON. STUD. 1
(concluding that venture capital financing can affect the short-term behavior of the
entrepreneur); see also Paul A. Gompers, Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging
of Venture Capital, 50 J. FIN. 1461, 1461 (1995) ("[T]he staging of capital infusions
allows venture capitalists to gather information and monitor the progress of firms,
maintaining the option to periodically abandon projects.").
John M. Olin, having witnessed the leftward trend of the Ford Foundation
during the 1960s and 1970s, specified that all resources of the Olin Foundation
were to be spent within one generation of his death in order to prevent its co-
option. Shawn Zeller, Conservative Crusaders, 35 NAT'L J. 1286, 1290-91 (2003).
Although currently allocating the remaining assets of the Foundation, with the
idea of closing down by 2005, the Olin board may be making further
arrangements to ensure that Olin's goals are not disappointed. In the same
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tion continued to renew many grants provides strong evidence that it
believed that its investments were generating worthwhile returns
in terms of encouraging pro-commercial worldviews (and discourag-
524
ing alternatives) among students, academics, and policymakers.
b. Re-imagining the marketplace of ideas
This leads to a second general reason to suspect that Olin's
investments have played a critical causal role in the success of law
and economics. As we noted at the outset of this Article, the
dominance of law and economics is puzzling when one attempts to
make sense of it without considering situational forces. Law and
economics has been subject to many (largely unanswered) criticisms
by extraordinarily respected legal academics, and its success seems to
have surprised both its critics and some of its proponents. 5 25 If the
success of law and economics does not square easily with the
idealized image of a neutral tournament of ideas, then that raises the
possibility that its success reflects some largely unseen situational
influences.
To advance this argument further, we ask the reader to consider
how to answer the following question: which bird, species A or
species B, has been more successful in the evolutionary process
of natural selection? If you are like us, we suspect that your
first thought would be to compare the relative numbers of the
two birds. With a little more time, you might decide that you
would also like to know about relative sizes since at equilibrium
the environment could probably sustain fewer large birds than
small birds. Controlling for habitat needs you would seem to
have a simple, but fairly accurate, measurement process.
Now let us make the question a little more concrete: which bird,
the bald eagle or the chicken, has been more successful in the
evolutionary process of natural selection? Shall we do the math?
There are approximately 70,000 bald eagles in North America, a
statement detailing the $10 million grant to Harvard Law School, the Center for
Law, Economics and Business announced that an "external advisory committee"
was being set up "to assist the faculty in guiding its programs" in the future.
Harvard Law School Press Release, supra note 507. While the structure of the
committee has not yet been discussed, it seems likely that one purpose of the
committee will be to serve as a substitute for stage-financing.
524 See supra note 510 and text accompanying note 518 (providing more direct
evidence that the Foundation's leaders believe that their efforts have been successful).
525 See supra text accompanying notes 35-64.
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number that is up considerably in recent years following the bald
5126eagle's near extinction . It is a little harder to know just how many
chickens there are in this country at any given moment, but our rough.1. 527
calculations put the number somewhere between 1.75 and 2 billion.
That means that for every bald eagle there are twenty to thirty
thousand chickens.
Even discounting the figure slightly to take into account the
eagle's larger size and habitat requirements, the numbers are clear:
the standard farm chicken is the bald eagle's evolutionary superior.
But that finding seems absurd. We know the bald eagle as our
national bird, a symbol of strength and power. Eagles are
extremely well adapted for survival in nature, given their superb
flying, hunting, and nest-building abilities . 2 8  For centuries, bald
eagles thrived, and according to one history, they may have once
numbered half a million .
They existed along the Atlantic from Labrador to the tip of south
Florida, and along the Pacific from Baja California to Alaska. They
inhabited every large river and concentration of lakes within North
America. They nested in forty-five of the lower forty-eight states. One
researcher estimated an eagle nest for every mile of shore along
526 Hope Rutledge, American Bald Eagle Information, at http://www.Baldeagle
info.com (last updated Aug. 26, 2003).
527 There are two general categories of chickens: "broilers," which are raised and
slaughtered for meat, and "layers," whose primary purpose is to produce eggs.
Livestock, Env't & Dev't Initiative, Poultry Production (Broilers and Layers), at
http://lead.virtualcenter.org/en/dec/toolbox/Indust/IndPProd.htm (last visited Oct.
26, 2003). Approximately 8.5 billion broilers were slaughtered in the United States in
2001. NAT'L AGRIc. STATISTICS SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., POULTRY SLAUGHTER:
2001 ANNUAL SUMMARY 2 (2002), available at http://jan.mannlib.cornell.edu/
reports/nassr/poultry/ppy-bban/pslaan02.pdf. Assuming that broilers have an
industry life expectancy of approximately two months, the number of broilers existing
at any one moment is something close to 1.5 billion. See Save Animals From
Experiments (SAFE), Profiling New Zealand's Shameful 'Clean, Green Living, at
http://www.safe.org.nz/campaigns/factory/animalprofiles.php (last visited Oct. 25,
2003). Their actual life expectancy-if they were not slaughtered-would be fifteen
to twenty years. Id. There are approximately 337 million layers alive at any one time.
NAT'L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., CHICKENS AND EGGS: 2002
SUMMARY 1 (2003) available at http://jan.mannlib.coriell.edu/reports/nassr/poultry/
pec-bbl/lyegan03.pdf [hereinafter NAT'L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., CHICKENS AND
EGGS]. Adding broilers and layers together, the number of chickens alive at any one
moment in this country appears to be somewhere between 1.75 and 2 billion.
528 NELTJE BLANCHAN, BIRDS THAT HUNT AND ARE HUNTED 326-28 (1905).
529 Hope Rutledge, History of the Bald Eagle, at http://www.baldeagleinfo.com/
eagle/eagle1 .html (last visited Oct. 25, 2003).
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Chesapeake Bay. They congregated on the lower Hudson, and were
extremely abundant along the coast of Maine.530
So then we have missed something. In determining that chickens
are more fit than eagles to withstand nature's trials and challenges,
we have ignored critical situational influences. Why are there so
many more chickens than eagles? The more obvious and correct
explanation is that humans value chickens in a way that they have
not valued bald eagles.
Indeed, there are robust markets in both chickens and eggs.53'
According to a recent industry-sponsored survey, Americans con-
sume, on average, eighty-one pounds of chicken per year-a figure
that appears to be going up and that represents "the highest per-
capita consumption of any of the major meats.''532 They also consume
approximately 260 eggs per year. Unsurprisingly, market pressures
ensure that there are many chickens alive at any given moment.
Well, if bald eagles are so fit, why did they nearly go extinct and
why are there still so few of them? The following history of the bald
eagle helps to shed light on a different sort of situational influence
on the bald eagles' stature than is imagined in any idealized,
unrealistic "natural selection" script.
There is no single cause for the decline in the bald eagle
population. When Europeans first arrived on this continent, bald
eagles were fairly common. As the human population grew, the eagle
population declined. The food supplies for eagles decreased, because
the people hunted and fished over a broad area. Essentially, eagles
and humans competed for the same food, and humans, with weapons
530 Id.
531 We have been unable to ascertain which came first.
532 Press Release, Nat'l Chicken Council & U.S. Poultry & Egg Ass'n, Boom in
Chicken Consumption Has Room to Grow (May 1, 2000), available at http://www.
eatchicken.com/statistics/pr_050100.cfm. According to John Bekkers, chairman of
the National Chicken Council, one important reason for the growing "success" of
chicken is its convenience. Id. "'The simple fact is that chicken fits, better than any
other meat, the hectic, harried, time-crunched lifestyle that so many people lead
toda." Id. (quoting Bekkers).
American Egg Board, Egg Consumption Through the Year, at http://www.aeb.org/
eggstravaganza/egg-consumption.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2003); see also INT'L EGG
COMM'N, INTERNATIONAL EGG MARKET: REPORT No. 67 (2002) (finding per
capita egg consumption in the United States was 251.8 in 2000 and 252.6 in
2001), available at http://www.internationalegg.com/html/reports/report67/
Iusa.pdf. There is a striking similarity between the 252 eggs consumed per person
and the 256 eggs produced by the average laying chicken. See NAT'L AGRIC.
STATISTICS SERV., CHICKEN AND EGGS, supra note 527, at 1 (providing estimate for
average laying chicken).
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at their disposal, had the advantage. As the human population
expanded westward, the natural habitat of the eagles was destroyed,
leaving them fewer places to nest and hunt, which caused the
population of bald eagles to decline sharply by the late 1800s.
By the 1930s, people became aware of the diminishing bald eagle
population, and in 1940 the Bald Eagle Act was passed. This reduced
the harassment by humans, and eagle populations began to recover.
However, at the same time DDT and other pesticides began to be
widely used. Pesticides sprayed on plants were eaten by small animals,
which were later consumed by birds of prey. The DDT poison harmed
both the adult birds and the eggs that they laid....
More than 100,000 bald eagles were killed in Alaska from 1917 to
1953. Alaskan salmon fisherm[e]n feared they were a threat to the
534
salmon population.
According to that history, the threat to eagles was not that they
were ill-equipped to survive in nature, but that their success as a
species did not appear to serve the interests of humans. Indeed, the
eagles competed with human interests, including commercial
interests.
As a result, the grand, and once ubiquitous, bald eagle was
pushed toward extinction. Meanwhile, chickens were raised in huge
numbers to meet the increasing demand for their eggs and meat.
The relative success of chickens over bald eagles, then, has little to
do with the survival of the fittest and a lot to do with "the survival of
the tastiest" or "the survival of the profittest."
In light of that competition among birds, look again at how legal
scholars tend to measure the success of various schools of thought.
As we reviewed earlier, legal academics generally assume that they
are competing in some neutral tournament wherein ideas evolve and
good ideas become more prominent while bad ideas disappear.
According to this view, the tournament benefits the outside world by
generating and announcing the winning ideas, which are then relied
upon to help make effective and desirable policy. Thus, when some
ideas are more commonly accepted, are attracting larger audiences
and are having more influence outside of law schools, the
assumption is often that those ideas, like the bald eagle, soar above
their ground-bound, clucking competitors.
But here is the problem: the competition among ideas may have
much in common with the imagined competition between chickens
534 Rutledge, supra note 530.
535 See supra text accompanying notes 12-18 (discussing the presumption that law
and economics emerges from a level playing field in a tournament of ideas).
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and eagles. That is, in both contexts there appear to be very
significant demand-side factors that help determine which ideas will
be most prevalent and seemingly most successful. For reasons that
we have already highlighted, the "winners" will be those ideas that
are valuable to the more influential participants on the demand-side
of the marketplace-specifically, pro-commercial interests.
With that in mind, consider again how legal economists measure
their own success. Richard Posner writes:
Economic analysis of law has grown rapidly, has become the largest,
most pervasive interdisciplinary field of legal studies in the history of
American law, has palpably influenced the practice of law and judicial
decisions, has launched lucrative consulting spin-offs, has spawned
courses and textbooks in economic analysis of law, has influenced
legislation (economic analysts of law played an important role in the
deregulation movement), has made it de rigueur for law schools of the
first and second ranks to have one or more economists on their faculty,
has seeded a number of its practitioners in university administration
and the federal judiciary, and has now crossed the Atlantic and begun
5i36making rapid gains in Europe.
Similarly, recall legal economist Thomas Ulen's brief history of
the triumph of law and economics:
Law and economics has been one of the most successful innovations
in the legal academy in the last century. This intellectual revolution
began modestly in the 1960s and 1970s with a few important and
innovative articles and a comprehensive, masterful text that showed the
possibilities of the field. Then, in the 1980s the field exploded into
respectability and prominence-becoming a regular course in the
curricula of the best law schools, a vibrant legal research style that
figured in a torrent of important books and articles, a force that
transformed many faculty from exclusive practitioners of traditional
doctrinal research to a more social-science-oriented research, and a
substantial justification for important public policy changes. By the
early 1990s, economic analysis suffused a modern legal education, even
one devoid of an explicit course in law and economcs.537
Posner and Ulen make no mention, and seem to have no
conception, of the role played by outside forces in creating the
appearance of successful ideas. Posner emphasizes the "rapid
536 Posner, supra note 11, at 275; see also POSNER, FRONTIERS, supra note 13, at 35
("It is not merely an ivory-towered enterprise, especially in the United States, where
the law and economics movement has influenced legal reform in such fields as
antitrust law, the regulation of public utilities and common carriers, environmental
regulation, [and] the calculation of damages in personal injury suits .. ").
537 Ulen, supra note 69, at 434.
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growth" of the discipline just as Ulen notes the field's "explosion" in
the 1980s. But neither seems mindful of possible situational contri-
butions to that explosive growth, much less the fact that it occurred
in the 1980s when the Olin Foundation began to invest significantly
in sponsoring various law and economics programs.5 Posner speaks
of the "spawning courses and casebooks," while Ulen comments on
the "torrent of important books and articles." But neither mentions
that the Olin Foundation's targeted efforts encouraged such a
spawning and a torrent through "grants, grants, and more grants.
'
,
539
Posner recognizes the "lucrative" consulting opportunities created by
law and economics, without considering what makes the ideas so
lucrative in the first place or what those lucrative opportunities may
indicate about why the school of thought is thriving. Ulen
emphasizes that law and economics provides a "substantial
justification for important public policy changes,"540 and Posner
highlights, more specifically, the fact that "economic analysts of law
played an important role in the deregulation movement.' '5 41  But
neither seems to notice just how valuable that justification for
deregulation is to large commercial interests or how it lines up with
the specific pro-market and deregulatory planks of the Olin
Foundation's mission. Ulen notes that "economic analysis suffuse[s]
a modem legal education," 542 while Posner maintains that it "has
palpably influenced the practice of law and judicial decisions...
[and] legislation. 543  But neither considers that such profound ef-
fects might well have been the precise ambition of powerful
individuals, entities, and groups in our society with the means to
influence those important institutions through the situation.
In short, as we stated at the outset of this Article, there appears
to be a blindness to situational influences over legal scholarship.
And Posner and Ulen are by no means unusual in falling subject to
this fundamental attribution error. Even the staunchest critics of law
and economics rarely, if ever, consider, much less challenge, its situ-
ational advantages.
538 See, e.g., SOLEY, supra note 505, at 137-40 (discussing various grants made by the
Olin Foundation to programs of law and economics in the late 1980s).
539 See supra text accompanying notes 521-22; SIMON, A TIME FOR TRUTH, supra
note 520, at 247.
540 Ulen, supra note 69, at 434.
541 Posner, supra note 11, at 2 7 5.
542 Ulen, supra note 69, at 434.
5 Posner, supra note 11, at 275.
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As we have been arguing, however, the situation is often as
significant as it is invisible. Where Posner, Ulen, and most legal
scholars tend to see a marketplace of ideas in which supply-side
participants determine the winners, we see a marketplace of ideas in
which demand-side actors are wielding an immense, unseen
influence over the playing field and, in turn, the winners. Where
Posner, Ulen, and most other legal scholars see a neutral, fair (and
perhaps even natural) competitive process separating the fit from the
unfit, we see large numbers of chickens, ensconced in elaborate
institutions devoted to promoting the birds' growth and productivity
for a particular end-an end that has little to do with a robust and fair
tournament of ideas.
We opened this Article asking why legal economists have tended
not to apply their own sort of market analysis to help them
understand their success. We posited several explanations, which we
have expanded on slightly in this Section. Before moving on, we
want to emphasize that we perceive ourselves to be providing what
legal economists have not: a type of economic analysis of the
economic analysis of law. The claim that legal academia is deeply
captured strikes us as consonant, not only with Stigler's shallow
capture theory, but also with the sort of "consumer sovereignty"
arguments that inform the vast majority of legal-economic analyses.
We end this Part with several assertions. First, the deep capture
of legal academia is the result of far more situational influences than
just those created by the Olin Foundation's funding efforts. Second,
the consequences of the deep capture of legal academia are many,
varied, and immense. And, third, the deep capture of legal
academia is, we believe, only a small, though important, part of a
much more comprehensive web of situational influence over
"regulatory" institutions in this country and, increasingly, around the
world. Evidence for those assertions is, again, the subject of future
work.
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VII. A THEORY OF ATIRIBUTIONAL PRESUMPTIONS
I started with the belief that every person who came to the laboratory was free to
accept or to reject the dictates of authority. This view sustains a conception of
human dignity insofar as it sees in each man a capacity for choosing his own
behavior. And as it turned out, many subjects did, indeed, choose to reject the
experimenter's commands, providing a powerful affirmation of human ideals.
-Stanley Milgram544
We have argued that law and economics is highly dispositionist
45
and that its success in legal academia and in policymaking has been a
function of the situational demand for such a dispositionist theory.
In that way, the exterior situation of the market for legal-policy
theory has strongly promoted law and economics because of its
generally pro-commercial dispositionist assumptions and analyses.
As we noted at the outset, however, the misbegotten attributional
tendencies that we are highlighting in this Article are by no means
limited to legal economists. The dispositionism of human beings is
fairly universal-though the particular contours of its manifestation
vary across cultures, groups, individuals, and situations. The funda-
mental attribution error is just that-a strong tendency in all humans
to see only the most salient, moving features of our exteriors and
interiors, like the sun moving across the sky, or our own behavior in
a moment, and to attribute cause and agency to what we see. This
urge to downplay the rest is an animalian tendency. Thus, dis-
positionalizing legal economists as dispositionists, while maintaining
the view that the rest of us are not, would only repeat that error. We
are all, because of our shared interior situation, more or less
dispositionists.
It is important that we are not misunderstood. The phrase
"more or less" in the last sentence is key. Our thesis is not that all of
us (or that any of us) are wholly dispositionist, unable in any
circumstance to recognize the possible role of the situation behind
people's behavior.546 Neither do we assert that all of us (or any of us)
544 Stanley Milgram, Issues in the Study of Obedience: A Reply to Baumrind, 19 AM.
PSYCHOL. 848, 851 (1964).
545 See supra Part I.B (introducing the idea that legal economists have
overestimated the role of dispositional influences on their success).
546 As emphasized above, cultural causal schemes, motives and other variables
influence the degree to which groups and individuals tend to appreciate the situation.
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are wholly situational, unable to act according to our own
preferences or attitudes and entirely driven by unseen forces. We
believe that we are all both dispositionists and situationists in
construing our world and that we are all, in fact, both dispositional
and situational.
Recognizing the significance of the situation does not imply that
disposition is irrelevant. Disposition often plays some role, and
sometimes a quite important role, in people's behavior. Indeed,
even in Milgram's famous demonstration of the power of the
situation, a sizeable minority (and, in some renditions, a clear
majority) of subjects refused to obey the experimenter's instructions
to continue the shocking.547 Moreover, if situational considerations
are substantial, stable, and consistent enough, the dispositional
assumption may become a more reliable heuristic for understanding
our world. 4 s
If dispositions can in fact play a major situation-independent role
in a person's behavior, or if the "as if' dispositional assumption can
sometimes be justified, then the question emerges: is the
fundamental attribution error really so important in legal questions,
in theory, in practice, and in social debate? Should policymakers
and policy theorists really concern themselves with it?
We have already begun our answer to that question in this
introductory Article and will continue to do so in subsequent articles.
Our answer has numerous components, including what follows here.
The tendency to see disposition and overestimate its significance,
while missing the situation or underappreciating its effect, is quite
robust. When the situation is observed, it is usually only a small,
particularly salient piece of the whole. Furthermore, the way an issue
is framed-as dispositional or situational-can have an immense
effect on what attributions people make about behavior. Here is
See supra text accompanying notes 415-23 (noting corporate motivation and cultural
variations in dispositionism).
547 See MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORrIY, supra note 86, at 35 tbl.2 (identifying
the various percentages of subjects who refused to obey).
548 And so it is that we treat corporations as having a set of stable preferences that
they pursue systematically over time. There is a strong and stable set of situational
forces, including corporate law, regulatory law, the single maximand of profit, and
the markets for products, managers, and capital. These fairly consistent situational
influences may allow for a relatively precise dispositionist perspective on corporate
behavior. See supra notes 253-54 and accompanying text (discussing how situational
forces make corporations behave as if their primary goal is profit maximization). Still,
we would caution that a more realistic analysis of corporate conduct is in order, a task
that is beyond the scope of this Article.
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where deep capture comes in: the framing of an issue is one of the
situational factors that can be disproportionately influenced by those
with the motive and power to do so. We have argued that those in
power have significant stakes in promoting, among other things, a
generally dispositionist framing of an issue. Those stakes have,
indeed, led to investments attempting to influence the situation,
including the production and distribution of legal-theoretic
knowledge that is strongly dispositionist in orientation. Taken to-
gether, those elements suggest that the fundamental attribution
error is playing an immense and influential role in our policyrnakers'
worldviews and in their policies.
Our thesis can thus be understood as a positive theory intended
to explain our presumptions about where the threshold between
disposition and situation lies and how high it stands. When do we
recognize the role of situation? And what portion of the situation
will we tend to acknowledge? Thus far, our primary focus has been
on describing, understanding, and critiquing the attributional
presumptions of law and economics. Our argument has been that
law and economics scholars recognize only a tiny portion-that is,
just a few of the most salient features-of the situation. We have
focused primarily on that theory, in part, because of its preeminence
and, in part, because we believe that its success both reflects and
critically reinforces deep capture. But our thesis has implications for
legal theory and for laws and policies that seem well outside the
purview of law and economics. In fact, the ubiquity of dispositionism
in our legal theories and laws likely facilitates the reception of law
and economics's more formal, axiomatic rendition.
A. Legal-Theoretic Presumptions
In this Section, we want to suggest how the fundamental
attribution error leads to dispositionist presumptions, not just in law
and economics, but also in other mainstream legal theories, and in
social policies that reflect such theories. Though we believe this
problem can be seen in many, if not all, areas of contemporary legal
scholarship, it suffices for our introductory purposes to illustrate the
point with reference to a familiar and important common law
subject: contract law.549  Consider the power of dispositionism
549 In an excellent article that we discovered only as this one was in its very final
stage, Lee Ross (the same Lee Ross whose work we have relied on throughout) and
Donna Shestowsky have recently considered the implications of situationism for
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lurking even in traditional, that is to say non-economic, scholarship
in contract law.
1. The Classical Theory of Contract
In his influential work, Contract as Promise, Professor Charles
Fried builds his case for a classical will theory of contract on a.... 551
foundation of positive presumptions steeped in dispositionism .
For theorists like Fried, a contract represents the legal
manifestation of "autonomous self-determination.' Contracting is,
from that perspective, a quintessential expression of individual
freedom. So central is the concept of autonomy in the classical will
theory of contract that, for Fried, it provides the very basis of moral
authority for the principle of contractual obligation. "The moral
force behind contract as promise is autonomy: the parties are bound
to their contract because they have chosen to be.'
53
Fried appreciates that, to sustain this view of contracts, we must
be confident that the choices embodied in contracts do, in fact,
represent the expression of the individual wills of the parties
involved. How can the traditional contract theorist be certain that
disposition is behind contractual decision making and not situation?
Enter the doctrine of duress." 4  In his attempt to explain modem
contract doctrines through his will theory, Fried insightfully
acknowledges that, far from playing an outcast or ancillary role in
conventional contract theory, the doctrine of duress and its
criminal law. See Lee Ross & Donna Shestowsky, Contemporay Psychology's Challenges to
Legal Theory and Practice, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1081, 1100-14 (2003). Their focus on
criminal law provides a useful complement to our analysis of contract law and confirms
our belief that dispositionism infects most, perhaps all, areas of law. Their article also
usefully considers some of the possible policy implications of situationism for criminal
law. Id.
550 CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLI-
GATION (1981).
551 See id. at 2 ("The regime of contract law, which respects the dispositions
individuals make of their rights, carries to its natural conclusion the liberal premise
that individuals have rights. And the will theory of contract, which sees contractual
obligations as essentially self-imposed, is a fair implication of liberal individualism."
(footnotes omitted)).
552 Id. at 94.
553 Id. at 57.
554 Fried also addresses related areas of contract law such as mistake and
unconscionability. Many of his arguments are overlapping and we believe that our
observations here readily apply to these related areas as well. See id. at 58-63, 103-09.
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counterparts are central.5' According to Fried, "these doctrines
perform distinct functions that are not only compatible with the
concept of contract as promise but even essential to it. ' Put in our
terms, Fried's treatment of the doctrine of duress plays an essential
part in defining the depth of his theory's dispositionism.
It runs deep. As he begins his discussion of duress, Fried never
questions the basic dispositionist conception of the contracting
agent. Duress is only identified as something that thwarts or exploits
a will that remains exogenous to the duress:
Certain contracts are claimed to be unfair although the parties
entered into them with their eyes open.
... The victim of duress is all too aware of what is happening and
what will happen to him. Duress relates not to rationality or cognition
but to freedom or volition .... [Contract as promise] excludes cases in
which a person's assent is not voluntary. If I am hypnotized into
signing a contract or if my hand is moved by another to make a mark
signifying assent, I have not promised.'
With such a starting point, only the most salient kinds of
situations, and not necessarily the most powerful, will find their way
into the doctrine of duress. Fried acknowledges that the forced
signature and the hypnotized nod are just "gross instances of
involuntary apparent assent" and claims that there are, in fact,
"many kinds of situations in which it does not seem right to treat a
knowing act of agreement as binding because in one way or another it
is felt that there was no fair choice."55"8 But this concession is not an
"open-ended invitation[] to rearrange the understandings people
have reached.,559 Indeed, Fried goes on to map a precise and rather
closed-ended set of situations that may, consistent with the will theory
of contract, be treated as constituting duress.560
Keeping close to the case law (as he must to sustain his project of
both explaining and justifying modern contract law), Fried
recognizes only the most salient kinds of situational impediments as
creating duress. The clearest case for Fried, beyond the two above, is
555 Id. at 93.
556 Id.
557 Id. at 92-93 (footnote omitted).
58 Id. at 93-94.
559 Id. at 93.
5W See, e.g., id. at 95-96 (offering examples of duress and noting that duress is
characterized by a high degree of coercion).
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that now familiar trope-the gun to the head: "An armed robber
threatens his victim on a dark and lonely street: 'Your money or
your life."5'"1
Fried explains that what is troubling about this case is not that
there is no choice, for clearly there is: "[t]he shrewd and brave man
who hands his wallet over to an armed robber makes a calculated,, •5656
decision. "' Rather, what is at issue is the fairness of the choice. 63
To fashion a principle through which to apply the doctrine of duress
in more difficult cases and across the sweep of contract law requires,
Fried concludes, a normative determination about what is a fair
choice. '54 For Fried, then, the doctrine of duress may be managed by
his theory of rights: "[a] proposal is not coercive if it offers what the
proponent has a right to offer or not as he chooses.
"
,
65
This rights analysis generates for Fried a relatively clear view of
the parameters of duress. Because the robber has no right to threat-
en your life to get your money, contracts made in such situations are
not enforced. But, at the other end of this spectrum, merchants
have a right to offer their wares on extremely onerous terms, so
contracts entered with them should be enforced. Our present
concern is not so much with showing why we disagree with this
particular doctrinal conclusion, but in demonstrating the narrow
dispositionist direction that the analysis has taken. Fried began with
a case in which the threatening situation was not only extremely
conspicuous, but where the element of choice was also clear. In
looking beyond that extreme case for a general theory of duress,
Fried presumes that the same basic function of dispositional choice
remains in place. 6 6  This dispositionism blinds the theory to the
enormous power of the situation. It ignores the fact that
situation shapes the very thoughts and behavior that manifest as the
561 ld. at 95.
562 Id. at 94.
563 See id. at 5 ("For promissory obligations to be truly self-imposed, the promise
must have been freely given. If this means no more than that the promisor acted
intentionally, then even an undertaking in response to a gunman's threat is
binding.").
564 See id. at 97 ("These conundrums should be sufficient to show that we cannot
escape using some normative criterion to distinguish offers from threats.").
Id.
566 In a footnote, Fried dismisses one source of opposition to the dispositional
presumption. "Sometimes it is said that poor people do not understand contractual
provisions or are unable to calculate risks rationally. Such arguments are often
patronizing as well as paternalistic. Where they are valid, the doctrine of mistake
offers some relief." Id. at 105 n.*.
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choices Fried crowns with a dispositionist presumption. For us, an
inquiry, which is clearly called for but wholly unanswered by this kind
of classical will theory, is whether and in what way the situation
influences choice.
Fried concludes his analysis without ever moving beyond the
"conundrums" raised by the most salient kinds of situational forces
-that is, beyond those "bad acts"567 that can fit within the basic
dispositionist framework. In an interesting parallel with economic
theorists, the closest Fried gets to taking up the situation on a
broader scale is with respect to poverty-when people do not have
enough money to properly manifest an otherwise dispositionally
determined will. 56s However, Fried, like the contract law he describes,
is very hesitant to allow the doctrine of duress to play much part in
ameliorating the challenges posed by that kind of situationist
consideration. Keeping the doctrine of duress from undermining
"the moral status of calculated choices as embodied in bargains" is "a
make-or-break challenge to the liberal economic theory of the
market.,561 It is a threat to the regime of "free men freely
contracting.
5
1
0
To the extent that poverty remains a situation in need of
attention, Fried offers what is also a familiar riposte, that the
situation should be handled by the tax-and-transfer system, not
contract. Hence, in the end, the dispositionism that Fried begins
with, and which he is so deeply committed to, not only drastically
limits what kinds of situations are cognizable within the concept of
567 Interestingly, Fried titles this section of his treatment Bad Samaritans. Id. at
109. See also supra text accompanying notes 163-81 (reviewing a social psychological
study replicating the biblical parable of the Good Samaritan and suggesting that
whether or not a person will act "as if' they are a Good Samaritan may have less to do
with the person's disposition than with the situation in which the person finds
herself).
568 See supra text accompanying notes 116-29 (summarizing economists' analysis of
the theoretical problem posed by poverty).
,69 FRIED, supra note 550, at 94. For Fried, the slippery slope of the poverty
situation is perilous. "If... duress focuses only on the relative wealth or advantages
of the parties to a transaction and disparities in these are held to undermine the
voluntariness of the choice, then we might just as well redistribute directly, holding
the rich but not the poor to their bargains." Id.
570 Id. Cf Chen & Hanson, Illusion of Law I, supra note 84 (describing the way the
perception of system threat has strengthened reliance on policy schemes); Hanson &
Yosifon, supra note 30 (describing the more general phenomena as discovered by
social psychologists); infra text accompanying notes 639-97 (using Southern slavery as
an illustration of how system threats help to promote dispositionism).
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duress, but also what can be done with the doctrine in those
situations that it does recognize.
Fried does not go much further than this with the concept of
duress, and we need not go further here to make our basic point.
Conventional contract theories, of which we believe Contract as
Promise is an influential and representative example, are steeped in
dispositionism even in those areas that purport to be most concerned
with the situation. The lack of any critical examination of the basic
dispositionist presumptions in such legal theories results in a
fundamental failure to account for the role of the situation in
shaping our conduct. It marks an abdication of any realistic inquiry
into the basic forces shaping our own behavior beyond what
571common sense and our intuitions will provide. Behind this ten-
dency is the fundamental attribution error, which social psychologists
have shown is widespread in humanity, that we have argued is at the
core of conventional economic theory, and that, as this example
suggests, is also robust in more traditional legal theories.
2. The Dispositionism of Post-Classical Contract Theory
The classical will theory of contract has been subjected to
withering critique by generations now of "modem" or "post-classical"
contract theorists. 72 The critiques, which will not be rehashed here,
571 Like many traditional theorists, as well as legal economists, Fried repeatedly
takes comfort in the fact that his analysis comports with common sense. See, e.g.,
FRIED, supra note 550, at 6 ("In developing my affirmative thesis I ... propose to
perennial conundrums solutions that accord with the idea of contract as promise and
with decency and common sense as well."); id. at 105 ("What needs probing is the
notion of substantive unfairness. Analysis reveals it to be two parts sentiment and one
part common sense."). As we have been arguing, common sense with respect to the
relative roles of disposition and the situation is fundamentally flawed.
572 The basic legal realist analytic critique of the classical approach has been the
claim that fundamental doctrines in contract law are far too public, and the intent of
parties far too difficult to discern, for the will theory to explain contract. The basic
political critique has been that so strongly privileging individual "will" in contract law
unfairly disadvantages those without bargaining power. Both of these critiques, while
not our focus here, are consonant with our views of both classical and modem contract
law. The historical and intellectual movement from "classical" to "modern" contract
theory has been a subject of sustained analysis by contract theorists. For an overview,
see P.S. AT1YAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979); HORWITZ,
supra note 200, at 33-63; Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedman, Introduction, From
"Classical" to Modern Contract Law, in GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT LAw 3 (Jack
Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds., 1995); see alsoJay M. Feinman, Promissory Estoppel
and Judicial Method, 97 HARv. L. REv. 678 (1984) (examining the development of
promissory estoppel as one of many reforms meant to resolve the contradiction in
classic contract theory between freedom and coercion).
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share a common legacy in the American legal realist tradition, which
provided both analytical and political reasons for doubting the
classical approach. Our purpose here is to show that although the
"modern" approach begins by rejecting the will theory of contract, it
continues to embrace an unwarranted, and profoundly limiting,
dispositionism. While the post-classical tradition has questioned the
clarity of central concepts in classical theory, the legal realist approach
has nevertheless held tightly to the basic tenets of dispositionism we
have been reviewing here. Our very limited goal in this Section is to
provide further evidence that dispositionism reaches far beyond law
and economics in contemporary legal theory.
We will sketch the dispositionism in modem contract theory
through the work of Karl Llewellyn, specifically in his concept of
"situation sense.,573 We take this approach for several reasons, not
only because an article that is entitled The Situation, and that makes
the claims we are developing here, would be remiss not to engage the
legacy of situation sense, but also because Llewellyn's work was
seminal and is prototypical of the basic legal realist approach.
Moreover, Llewellyn's work has been extremely influential in the post-
classical contract theories and positive law that have followed his
work. 74
573 Of course, we will not offer a comprehensive treatment of Llewellyn's great
contribution to legal theory. Wejoin a long list of commentators who have noted that
"[a]ny effort to summarize Llewellyn's elaborate theory and the importance of
'situation sense' is bound to fall short." David Shapiro, Continuity and Change in
Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 941 n.103 (1992). In our view, of all the
recent efforts to summarize Llewellyn's work, Professor Rakoff's comes closest to
accomplishing the feat. See Todd D. Rakoff, The Implied Terms of Contracts: Of "Default
Rules" and "Situation Sense," in GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT LAW, supra note
572, at 191, 214 (defining Llewellyn's conception of "situation sense" as a "process of
thinking" that considers "the implications of various legal rules, matched up against
reasonably intricate models of social situations, and brought together in light of the
force of all the claims to be made").
574 Llewellyn has also had a tremendous influence on the development of
contemporary contract theory and law through his contribution to the Uniform
Commercial Code. See Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2s
Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710, 712 (1999) (noting
that Llewellyn was a "principle drafter" of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code);
Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN.
L. REV. 621, 624-27 (1975) (offering examples of Llewellyn's influence on the Uniform
Commercial Code); Feinman, supra note 572, at 698 ("The method of analysis perhaps
most characteristic of the modern cases may be characterized in the language of its
principle exponent, Karl Llewellyn, as 'situation sense."'); Allen R. Kamp, Between-the-
Wars Social Thought: Karl Llewellyn, Legal Realism and the Uniform Commercial Code in
Context, 59 ALB. L. REV. 325, 370 (1995) (considering whether the Uniform Commer-
cial Code reflects Llewellyn's notion of "reasonableness").
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Llewellyn opens Part I of the Common Law TraditionF his most
sustained exposition of situation sense, with an announcement that it
is now common knowledge, 76 that psychologists have undermined the
epistemological ground on which the classical tradition once firmly
stood:
When the psychologists began to look into how people go about
reaching decisions, the question they were concerned with was: how do
people get to a decision at all, to any decision, when faced with a
problem-situation out of life? Roughly, they arrived at the conclusion
that if it was a true problem-situation, i.e., if it was really a puzzler, then it
was seldom that the actual deciding was done by way of formal and
accurate deduction in the manner of formal logic. The common process
was rather one either of sudden intuition-a leap to some result that
eased the tension; or else it was one of successive mental experiments as
imagination developed and passed in review various possibilities until
one or more turned up which had appeal. In any ordinary case a
reasoned justification for the result represented a subsequent job, testing
the decision against experience and against acceptability, buttressing it
and making it persuasive to self and others.
Today all of this is so familiar and obvious as to bore, but there were
reasons why, four or five decades ago, it shocked our legal world. 77
Llewellyn's actual account of modern contract theory, however,
reveals that legal scholars have been too quickly "bore[d]" by the
social scientists' challenge to conventional views about the human
mind, and so have failed to truly incorporate its teachings. To begin
with, interior and exterior situations influence far more than just our
ability to reason our way through "puzzlers." Logic and deduction as
the primary causal forces behind our behavior are, we now know, the
exception to the rule.
More generally, in the development of his notion of situation
sense, Llewellyn was unaware of the basic lessons about the situation's
unseen power, that psychology, especially social psychology, has now
578demonstrated. After opening the Common Law Tradition with a
575 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION (1960). Although the
book contains his most compendious discussion of situation sense, he developed the
concept in somewhat piecemeal fashion over the course of over three decades of
influential scholarship.
576 The phrase "announcement that it is now common knowledge," which aptly
describes the quote that follows, may in a sense sum up the task of the legal analyst in
situation-sense theory.
577 LLEWELLYN, supra note 575, at 11.
578 See supra text accompanying notes 82-100 (discussing early experimental
evidence of the situation's power to influence behavior); see generally Hanson &
Yosifon, supra note 30 (providing more extensive evidence of that power). Of course,
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recognition of the warning signs about our sense of ourselves,
Llewellyn readily disregards his own cautions by the middle of his
book, claiming that situation sense can clarify what psychology has left
obscure:
The argument has been, however, that whereas about other areas of
reaching tough decision the psychologists and sociologists and other
experts are still groping for more than indications.., yet in our area [of
study] the clustered steadying factors combine with our traditions of
craft... to provide the wherewithal to reasonably satisfy even the
seemingly unreasonable demands made upon judges] by the men of
law and by the citizens who are the law-consumers.5
9
Llewellyn sees the legal analysts' willingness to move ahead of the
social scientists' struggles with mere "indications" about human
decision making as a great advantage of modern legal theory. This
confidence is supported by his basic dispositionist presumption that
human thought processes are relatively transparent, and that there is
a fairly obvious causal relationship between men and women's
preferences and their behaviors or choices. To be sure, not every
influence is spottable, but, as Llewellyn puts it,
the unspottables either cancel out or operate rather on the surface than
at the root of the deciding, or else hit the crux ... too rarely to do more
than slightly decrease the percentage of available correct forecasts. This
includes such very occasionally vital factors as the day's news, insomnia, a
secretary's or clerk's sickness or blob, the euphoria from a son's engage-
ment to the right girl, and three hundred assorted other "irrelevant" but
real stirrers of the man. I discard them not as negligible, but as not
altering a basic workable reckonability from other and reachable factors
alone.
For Llewellyn, as with Fried, there is little cause for concern about
"unspottable" influences on the mind, and consequently little concern
for ever-present though "unspottable" situational influences on
behavior. In this way, Llewellyn's situation sense is a rejection of
when Llewellyn wrote, the power of the situation was much less well understood, even
by social psychologists.
579 LLEWELLYN, supra note 575, at 155.
580 LLEWELLYN, supra note 575, at 131. Llewellyn's comments here parallel the
reactions of many legal economists to the challenges posed by social psychology. See
Hanson and Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously I, supra note 251; Hanson & Kysar,
Taking Behavioralism Seriously II, supra note 251; Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism
Seriously II, supra note 257.
581 Unspottable, that is, within a strong dispositionist mindset.
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classical formalism to be replaced, not by social scientific inquiry, but
by "common sense" realism.8 2
Llewellyn's confidence in the reliability of common sense
situation-sensing is further boosted by his assurance that beyond those
assorted pedestrian distracters of humankind, there is no reason to
suspect that more venal distractions might make situation-sensing
problematic. His prose aroused to full flare, Llewellyn writes, "if you
take the personnel of the appellate bench as an entirety, arranged in
the familiar bell-shaped curve ... [and] knock on that bell, there may
be a bit of dullness in the ring, but it rings true. '5 3  So it is that
Llewellyn reassures himself and his readers thatjudges, like the rest of
us, are not "unduly easy to bamboozle." s4
We believe that Llewellyn's situation sense is badly underdevel-
oped. Our illusion of dispositionism and blindness to the power of
situation renders us all, Llewellyn included, more or less
bamboozled5"" Llewellyn reveals his own when he writes that "the
situation, however eloquent, [can] operate only insofar as its elo-
quence [can] reach ear and understanding of the particular court or
judge. '8 6 Yet it is precisely where attention to situation is blocked
582 Though a precise definition of "situation sense," is notoriously absent, see supra
note 573 and accompanying text, its common sense eclecticism is betrayed in
Llewellyn's description of the concept as a "compound[] of Isness and Oughtness and
what have you more .... [ LLEWELLYN, supra note 575, at 61. See also id. at 121 ("The
evidence for this [i.e., that otherwise good rules can be twisted out of shape by
attempts to do justice in 'hard cases'] draws on more than 'common knowledge'
(which can so often be unmasked as common superstition); it draws on that most
uncommon knowledge which I call horse sense, the balanced shrewdness of the expert
in the art."). As far as what goes into this compound, for Llewellyn, "the main guide is
felt sense and decency." Id. at 135. Professor Rakoff comments that "[i]t appears that
Llewellyn was in some fashion endorsing a method of practical wisdom." Rakoff, supra
note 573, at 202. The question though is just what method guides the practice of
situation sense. Llewellyn's explanation has often been characterized as
"unmethodical." See, e.g., id. at 203 (suggesting that Llewellyn offers "many examples
[but] no clear description of a method"). Our concern is not so much that it is
"unmethodical" but rather that the method it embraces is dispositionist.
583 LLEWELLYN, supra note 575, at 130.
584 Id. at 262. Llewellyn's claims about the abilities of judges often rest on an
implicit and sometimes explicit appeal to the reader to see that 'judges are like other
human beings...." Id. at 131.
585 We concur with Llewellyn that the problem with post-classical contract law is
not that it is naive about the extent to which judges are corrupt or the difficulties they
have paying attention. For us, the problem is in Llewellyn's presumption that, if those
factors alone can be discounted, there is little else to worry about.
E186 LLEWELLYN, supra note 575, at 157.
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from the ear and the understanding by dispositionism that situation
can have its greatest power.
In addition to shaping Llewellyn's conception of the situation-
sensing analyst, dispositionism further limits his conception of the
situation under inspection. Situation sense involves observing and
analyzing the "immanent law ',5s 7 of type-situations among contracting
parties. The raw material for this study, the focus of the type-situation
inquiry, is an inquiry into patterns of choices and conduct by
individuals. The search is for indications5s of dispositional intent
within different kinds of type-situations. When Llewellyn implores the
legal analyst to "see it as it works" he is asking the analyst to follow how
the type-situation has been composed by the dispositional actors that
make it up. There is no injunction in Llewellyn's method to seek and
account for unseen situational influences in type-situations. As David
Charny summarizes, "[i]t is apparent that Llewellyn thought that
custom was somehow expressive of the attitudes, preferences, and
'mentality' of the transactors themselves .... ,,589
This is because the situation-sensing analyst is urged to look at
that which is obviously there, rather than that which may be hidden.
And what is obviously there is individual behavior, evidence ready to
confirm the dispositionism of the sensor. Thus, Llewellyn counsels
that "the best safeguard against counsel's mispainting [of the
situation, in an effort to manipulate the judge] lies in visualizing the
hands-and-feet operations in the picture, seen as a going scheme, a
working setup. Such operating aspects are curiously hard to
fake .... ,,511 The judge is thus instructed that, in his search for the
"immanent law"9 1 of situation, a reliance on what is obvious will
587 See infra note 591 and accompanying text (briefly discussing the term
"immanent law").
588 See supra text accompanying notes 578-82 (discussing Llewellyn's brush past
social sciences' difficulties in discerning indications of human decision making).
589 David Charny, The New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 842, 846
(1999). Charny is interested in the extent to which the customary practices of areas of
industry are legislated or stipulated by hierarchical associations, and the extent to
which the trade customs promulgated through such associations have a formal quality
reminiscent of classical approaches to contract law-hence, the new formalism in
contract. Id. at 842-43.
590 LLEWELLYN, supra note 575, at 261.
591 Llewellyn initially quotes the term "immanent law" from the German legal
theorist Levin Goldschmidt:
"Every fact-pattern of common life, so far as the legal order can take it in,
carries within itself its appropriate, natural rules, its right law. This is a natural
law which is real, not imaginary; it is not a creature of mere reason, but rests
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"safeguard" against mlspaitlng. This "realism" is a strictly positive
realism, not a critical realism, and so it is another symptom of the
widely shared perspective in legal theory that begins by overlooking
situation .f
Were we to extend this discussion further, we would argue that
the unreconstructed dispositionism we find in classical and post-
classical contract theory can be seen in most other areas of
contemporary legal theory as well. The fundamentals of Llewellyn's
situation-sense approach remain highly influential in leading non-
on the solid foundation of what reason can recognize in the nature of man
and of the life conditions of the time and place; it is thus not eternal nor
changeless nor everywhere the same, but is indwelling in the very
circumstances of life. The highest task of law-giving consists in uncovering
and implementing this immanent law."
Id. at 122 (quoting Levin Goldschmidt, Der Entwurf eines Handelgesetzbuchs fir die
Preussischen Staaten [Draft Trade Code for the Prussian States], pt. 2, reprinted in 4 KRrISCHE
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR DIE GESAMMTfE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFr 289 (Dernburg et al. eds.,
Heidelberg, Bangel & Schmitt 1857)).
592 AsJay Feinman states:
The method of situation-sense begins with fact scrutiny, in which the court
analyzes and categorizes the facts as might a lay person familiar with the
context of the dispute. The fact scrutiny may reveal a consensus regarding
applicable values within the affected group or within society as a whole; at a
minimum, such scrutiny will limit the range of acceptable choices. The court
then determines the appropriate legal remedy for the situation.
Feinman, supra note 572, at 702.
593 Llewellyn rejects attempts by critics to categorize situation sense and legal
realism as a philosophy in general or as a form of positivism in particular. LLEWELLYN,
supra note 575, at 508-09. For Llewellyn, situation sense is an approach to decision
making that encourages the decision maker to see each situation "fresh" while
positivism is a philosophy giving legitimacy to law because it is law. See Karl N.
Llewellyn, The Normative, the Legal, and the Law-Jobs: The Problem of Juristic Method, 49
YALE L.J. 1355, 1370-72 (1940); see also HORWITZ, supra note 200, at 208-12
(summarizing the critique of Llewellyn's situation sense on grounds that it is
positivism). "Why should realism, which starts out as a reform movement, carry in its
loins [an] essentially reactionary principle?" Id. at 211 (quoting L.L. Fuller, American
Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 429, 461 (1934)).
Our critique is somewhat different. Beyond the question of whether other
concerns will inform the judgment, we claim that there is too much positivism even in
that component which is attempting to discern the "type-situation." Our claim is that
the type-situation cannot be properly seen unless it is viewed from a critical realist
perspective. Post-classical contract theory ultimately rests on the faith that "situation
sensing" provides, as Professor Rakoff puts it, "good ground" for legal decision making.
Rakoff, supra note 573, at 223; see also id. at 228 ("In short, situation-sense is a very good
method for determining what the default rules of contract law should be."). In our
view the trouble is that what is obvious to the situation-sensor will only confirm and
encourage dispositionist "mispainting."
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economic approaches to criminal lawY civil rights and constitutional595 596r• 5917 ewl o
law,595 statutory interpretation, and international law. We will not
pursue this exegesis further here, however. Our purpose has solely
been to illustrate that conventional legal theorists, like legal
economists, begin their legal analysis with dispositional assumptions
and, even when claiming to be situationally sensitive, set the threshold
unrealistically high.
B. Legal Presumptions
The attribution error does not stop there. Our laws and policies
reflect the same lopsided perceptions. That is, our laws and
policies-formal and informal-mirror our human perceptions and,
for all the reasons that people generally do, place the threshold for
recognizing the situation higher than they should.
To be clear, this is not a claim that our laws totally miss the role
of all situational influences. It is a claim that only the most salient,
unambiguous situational features-and only those that have fairly
straightforward implications for a generally dispositionist legal
regime-will be appreciated. As with legal theory, dispositionist
presumptions play a governing role in many, if not most, areas of
law. To continue this limited exposition, we will again limit our
focus to contract law.
The basic dispositionist presumptions seen in Fried's classical will
theory of contract are reflected in contemporary contract law.'" The
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, for example, fashions a theory of
594 See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33
STAN. L. REV. 591 (1981) (applying situation-sense approach to the analysis of criminal
law).
595 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First
Amendment Dog That Didn't Bark, 1994 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 40-41 (1995) (urging the
application of "contextualization" to constitutional law problems, although noting that
"[c]elebrations of situation sense and practical reason frequently dissolve into
philosophical mush").
596 See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 941 (1992) (noting that a situation-sense approach to statutory
interpretation is "not without defenders and not without force").
See, e.g., LEON E. TRAKMAN, THE LAw MERCHANT: THE EVOLUTION OF
COMMERCIAL LAW 93 (1983) ("Judges are compelled to synthesize how merchants
think and act if the common law is to progress as international commerce
pro resses.").
556s Of course, this is unsurprising given that Fried's project is in part a positive
theory of modern contract law. See supra text accompanying notes 551-71 for a
discussion of Fried's theory of contract.
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contract that is rooted in the principle of dispositional intent. A
contract "requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of
mutual assent. . . . ,,Q Assent is understood in terms of dispositional
intention: "[t]he conduct of a party is not effective as a manifesta-
tion of his assent unless he intends to engage in the conduct .... ,6
Of course, at the margins of contract law there are a few instances
when, because of intense situational forces, the dispositionist
presumption may be rebutted. For example, the Restatement (Second)
acknowledges the problem of "improper pressure in the bargaining
process, in the form of either duress or undue influence.
6 °
Nevertheless, even the doctrine of duress, the doctrine most
preoccupied with situation, is wedded to a strong dispositionist
foundation. Like legal economists and conventional legal theorists,
the law can see the situational power of a gun to the head, but it
602does not see very much more.
Consider the scope of the doctrine of duress as it has been
applied in Massachusetts, which has, like most states, long since
adopted the basic view found in the Restatement (Second).60  The
doctrine actually makes infrequent occurrences in the annals of
Massachusetts cases, no doubt because of the extremely narrow range
of situations to which it applies. This is not to gainsay its
fundamental importance, however, for as Fried recognized, even in
its absence, the doctrine serves to sanctify the great range of
599 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (1) (198 1).
600 Id. § 19(2). The Restatement consistently refers back to this section as stating
the Ieneral rule of assent in contracts.
Id. ch.7, topic 2, introductory note.
602 The same is true in other areas of the law. In tort law, courts recognize the
limits of property rights when salient situational conditions of "necessity" are in play.
A sudden, unexpected tempest, for instance, will mute the consequences of the
otherwise dispositional act of trespass. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 197(1) (1965) ("One is privileged to enter or remain on land in the possession of
another if it is or reasonably appears to be necessary to prevent serious harm to the
actor ... "). In criminal law, killing a person in the "heat of passion" is treated as a
less egregious offense than committing the same act in "cold blood." See, e.g., United
States v. Bradford, 344 A.2d 208, 215 (D.C. 1975) ("The purpose to kill is in legal
contemplation dampened where the killer has been provoked or is acting in the heat
of passion .... ).
603 See, e.g., Avallone v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 183 N.E.2d 496, 499 (Mass.
1962) (explicating the principle of duress as "[c]onduct by one party which causes
another to enter into a contract 'under the influence of such fear as precludes him
from exercising free will and judgment"' (quoting RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS
§ 492(b) (1932))).
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contracts the enforcement of which go unimpeded. °4 Where duress
is explicitly addressed, Massachusetts courts have adopted a highly
dispositionist conception of it. As a recent Massachusetts appellate
court summarized in Randall v. Rapoza, 60' "To avoid a contract on the
basis of duress, a party must show that conduct by the other party [to
the contract] caused him to enter into the contract 'under the
influence of such fear as precludes him from exercising free will and
judgment.' 60 6 The court further explained that:
[t]o show economic duress a party must show that he has been the
victim of a wrongful or unlawful act or threat, and such act or threat
must be one which deprives the victim of his unfettered will. As a
direct result of these elements, the party threatened must be compelled
to make a disproportionate exchange of values. °7
The defendant in Randall, who was sued on a promissory note he
had signed, told the court that he had entered the contract, under
duress "'because of [Randall's] attitude and demeanor' [and]
'his harassment."'6 8 He also told the court that he was having
marital troubles and was not "'thinking straight,"' and that he had
been on anti-depressant medication when he entered the contract.6°)
The Massachusetts court, unsurprisingly, found that these allegations
fell "far short of painting a picture of duress" because "[h]is decision
was not an 'arbitrary determination, capricious disposition or
whimsical thinking. '"'6 0
Randall provides a typical example of the role that duress plays
in reported cases in Massachusetts. Our purpose is not to provide an
exhaustive account of its application, but rather to highlight that the
"picture" of duress made out by the broad strokes of the doctrine
demonstrates the deep dispositionist presumptions of contract law
generally. It is presumed, for example, that in the typical case,
where duress is not present, the choices represented by a contract
are the product of "unfettered will." 61 1 While this might seem like a
604 FRIED, supra note 550, at 93-95.
605 Randall v. Rapoza, 2001 Mass. App. Div. 153 (2001).
606 id. at 156 (quoting Coveney v. President of Coll. of Holy Cross, 445 N.E.2d 136,
140 (Mass. 1983)).
607 Id.
608 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Rapoza Aff.).
609 Id. (quoting Rapoza Aff.).
610 Id. (quoting Bembe v. McKesson Wine & Spirits Co., 388 N.E.2d 309, 314
(Mass. App. Ct. 1979) (quoting Davis v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 126 N.E. 841, 844
(Mass. 1920))).
611 Id.
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high standard, the benefit of the dispositionist presumption actually
makes it the routine case. Despite Rapoza's contentions to the
contrary, the Randall court concludes that the contract he entered
into was in fact a manifestation of his "unfettered will," and refuses
to find that the doctrine of duress is applicable.12
As the law is described in Massachusetts, only the most
conspicuous external sources of influence will be recognized as
constituting duress. The court cites as its only example "signing...
at the point of a gun., 613 The fundamental attribution error at work
here sharply limits the range of relevant situations to only those that
can be narrowly attributed to the vivid "bad act" of another
individual. The court's explication also reveals a miserly view of what
kind of internal situation will be permitted to implicate the doctrine
of duress. Only the most palpable kind of internal situation will be
seen as evidencing duress-fear. As we have described, there are
certainly many other features of our internal situations that can
exercise as much influence over our conduct as does the more
palpable situation of fear, yet those remain hidden by our
dispositionism and are unseen in the law. Restricted by this
dispositionist framework, the common law of contract has not
developed categories of influence beyond salient external threats and
internal fears through which parties can formulate their claims.
Unless a choice can be shown to have been arbitrary, it is presumed
to be the expression of an unfettered will. With the presumption set
so high, parties can strive only to drum up those aspects of their
situations that catch the dispositionist eye. Against the situational
threshold of a gun to the head, harassing phone calls and anti-
depressant drugs will easily fail to rebut the strong presumption of
unfettered will.
Contract law, like many areas of law, recognizes a point where
the situation is seen to be so significant that it renders unreliable the
dispositionist assumptions that would otherwise govern. Making
someone liable for outcomes over which she wielded comparatively
little dispositional control and where her situation is relatively
controlling would be unjust, unfair, or inefficient, depending on the
theoretical focus. If, as we hypothesize, the threshold in the law is
fundamentally misplaced, then the law in many of these areas may be
fundamentally unjust, unfair, or inefficient. Put differently, if the
612 Id.
613 Id. at 155-56.
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situation was as profoundly recognized in our laws as it is influential
in our lives, the role of the situation would be presumptively
paramount, rather than presumptively irrelevant. t4
C. Social Policy Presumptions: Learning from History Again
There are other places to look to try to assess the significance of
dispositionism. If our hypothesis is correct that the fundamental
attribution error contributes to false impressions and self-understand-
ings, and misguided legal theories and laws, then it should find
support in the major social policy disputes that animate and define
our history. Furthermore, there should be some evidence that the
dominant view will typically be one that favors those in power-just
as the geocentric view so clearly served the interests of the Catholic
Church in the seventeenth century and, as we are arguing, the
person-centric view serves the interests of corporations today.
Providing such evidence is also a topic of further work in615
progress. For now, we can highlight the major thrust of that work,
which is that the power of the dispositionist presumption has had,
and is now having, an immense effect on both the framing and the
resolution of virtually every major social policy debate-from the
obesity epidemic to the War on Terrorism. Although we will
postpone defending that claim, it may be illuminating to highlight
one particularly revealing and tragic example from our history:
slavery. We have chosen that social policy issue to spotlight because
we have suggested in this Article that power-even oppressive,
totalitarian power-can be exercised through the unseen situation,
in part, through the creation and promotion of dispositionist
worldviews. Because slavery provides one of the most salient uses of
power in United States history, demonstrating the role of
dispositionism in enabling that oppression provides especially
compelling evidence for our claim.
6 14 We should not be understood as arguing that the outcome in Randall was
necessarily incorrect. Our point is that the reasoning is based on a flawed vision of
what moves us-a flaw with implications that may extend well beyond this case, the
doctrine of duress, or even the law of contracts.
615 See, e.g.,Jon Hanson, David Yosifon & Adam Benforado, Broken Scales: Obesity
andJustice in America (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
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1. The Teacher's View of the Learner
First, to set the stage, it may be helpful to return to Milgram's
basic research, in which he manipulated hundreds of subjects to
behave in a way that contradicted his and others' initial expectations
and thereby revealed the otherwise hidden power of the situation.
The teacher was given a situation-induced "preference" to shock the
learner, a "preference" that in most cases led teachers to continue to
increase the shocks all the way to 450 volts (beyond the point when
the learner fell silent after screaming in agony).' 6  The focus of
social psychologists analyzing those experiments has long been on
certain situational considerations, such as the authority conferred on
the experimenter by, say, his white lab coat, in creating that
"preference."6 7
But an interesting issue emerges-one that has received
comparatively little attention-about a different situational factor:
that is, the teacher's perception of the learner's dispositions. The
learner was one of Milgram's confederates, but he was assigned his
position as learner by an apparently (but not actually) random
process. The teacher then observed the learner voluntarily agreeing
to be strapped into the chair, understanding that he would be
shocked. 6" The fact that subjects in Milgram's study appeared to
make a free choice to enter into a "contract" may be central to
understanding the large number of teachers who administered the
maximum shock level of 450 volts.
6 19
Once they had committed to participating, the teachers felt as if
they were obligated to continue with and, in most cases, complete the
experiment even when they believed they were inflicting pain or
actually harming the learners. 620 The sense of obligation (and the
formal appearance of a contract) was likely strengthened by the fact
that teachers were paid $4.50 for their services prior to beginning the
experiment.6 2 ' It was also likely bolstered by the very structure of the
616 Milgram, supra note 88, at 376.
617 For a discussion of some variations of Milgram's experiment, see Hanson &
Yosifon, supra note 30.
618 Milgram, supra note 88, at 373.
619 Id. at 377.
620 Id.
621 Id. at 372, 378. However, Milgram also notes that the results of the experiment,
when conducted with unpaid subjects, were "very similar to those obtained with paid
subjects." Id. at 377 n.4.
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experiment, in which the shock level was increased in only very small
increments of 15 volts. Because the learner did not protest initially,
teachers continued to flip the switch, experiencing little internal
conflict. Once the learner did complain, however, it was difficult to•6 2 2
stop, even though many teachers experienced cognitive dssonance.
To reduce this dissonance, people seek ways to justify their
actions. In Milgram's original experiment, the teacher's initial agree-
ment to administer the first shock to the learner most likely created
internal pressure to continue with the experiment.6 2 1 With each
incrementally higher shock level, the teacher had tojustify his actions,
and once he justified a particular shock level, it became increasingly
difficult to determine the level at which he should cease shocking the
learner:
How could they say, in effect, "OK, I gave him 200 volts, but not 215
-never 215!"? Each succeeding shock and its justification laid the
groundwork for the next shock and would have been dissonant with
quitting; 215 volts is not that different from 200, and 230 is not that
different from 215. Those who did break off the series did so against
enormous internal pressure to continue.24
The fact that the learner willingly provided answers without
complaint through shock level twenty in the initial experiment
seemed to provide proof that he, too, had accepted the terms of the
agreement.62 5 It was only when things started not to go his way (when
he started to get many answers wrong) that he refused to honor the
terms-a repudiation of the rules of contract. From the teachers'
perspective, both they and the learner had voluntarily agreed to
participate in an experiment for $4.50; the learner had no reason to
complain (or void the contract) because his position was assigned
through a fair and random process.626 In the words of Milgram,
62 Id. at 377-78. Cognitive dissonance is a feeling of internal discomfort produced
when a person holds two or more inconsistent cognitions-in this case, the desire to
fulfill the terms of a valid contract and the desire not to harm another person-and
performs an action-here, shocking the learner-that is inconsistent with the person's
customary positive self-conception. See ELLIOT ARONSON ET AL., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
174-76 (4th ed. 2002) (defining and explaining "cognitive dissonance"); Hanson &
Yosifon, supra note 30 (discussing the cognitive dissonance and several related
phenomena and their relevance for law and legal theory).
623 Milgram, supra note 88, at 294.
624 Id.
625 Milgram, supra note 88, at 378.
626 Id. at 377.
20031
306 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
"[t] hat he later becomes an involuntary subject does not alter the fact•, 1• • - • ,,621
that, initially, he consented to participate without qualication.
It is noteworthy, we think, that in Milgram's film, Obedience, the
learner went out of his way in front of the teacher to stop and
carefully examine the shock generator, with all its levels and
6,28warnings. And we suspect that the teachers tended to see the
learner as someone who freely and knowingly chose to participate
and who, in essence, wanted, perhaps even deserved, to be
shocked-at least up to some level. Indeed, the situation-induced
preference to shock the learner might well have solidified that
629perception. In this sense, the learner could be understood as
having accepted his lot and having assumed the risk that it entailed.
Put differently, the learner appeared to "reveal his preference" for
getting shocked.
Of course, it is important to note that while theories of contract
can be powerful forces ofjustification, outweighing complaints by the
victim, they do not appear strong enough to overcome fully the voice
6320of credible authority. Milgram attempted to test the power of
contract notions by structuring a variation of the experiment in which,
before signing the release form, the learner paused and stated, "I'll
agree to be in it, but only on condition that you let me out when I say
627 Id.
628 OBEDIENCE, supra note 149.
629 Some anecdotal evidence provides loose support for this account. First, as
noted above, none of the teachers ever went to find out if the learner was okay. Supra
text accompanying note 180. It is as if the teachers felt that they were not
responsible for the learner's condition-in other words, that the learner was
responsible for himself. In addition, there is some evidence that the teachers
dispositionalized their own actions-blaming themselves for the bad "preference" that
was "revealed" by their actions. According to lore among social psychologists,
Milgram was able to include only one example of a person flipping the final switch
(450 volts) in his famous documentary about the experiments, Obedience, because
none of the many others who did so were willing to be shown on film. Presumably,
they did not want to be shown as "bad people." Milgram included several after-the-
fact interviews of subjects, some of which revealed how the subjects attributed
their actions to their own dispositions. See, e.g., MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO
AUTHORITY, supra note 86, at 54 ("As my wife said, '[ylou can call yourself
Eichmann.' I hope I can deal more effectively with any future conflicts of values
I encounter."). Given that they dispositionalized their own behavior-behavior that
was anything but flattering-it seems likely that they also would have partially
dispositionalized the learner's behavior. See supra note 110 (describing the heightened
tendency to attribute bad outcomes suffered by others-as compared to those we
stiffer ourselves-to disposition).
630 See MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY, supra note 86, at 66 (finding that "the
social contract doctrine is a feeble determinant of behavior").
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so; that's the only condition. ' '"s The changing of the contract seemed
to have some effect. Approximately a quarter of the teachers, who
defied the experimenter's authority, raised the fact that the learner
had explicitly conditioned her consent to participate in the
experiment.632 A number of other teachers mentioned their concern
with the "legalities" of the experiment.6 3 3 However, sixteen of the forty
teachers continued to the end of the experiment, as compared to the
twenty in the control, thus showing the enormous power of authority
even in the face of contract forces.634
But suppose Milgram had tested the issue further. Suppose that
the teacher arrived first and that he watched as the learner was
dragged to the room in shackles and strapped into the chair
involuntarily while begging, "Please, please, I never agreed to be part
of this experiment, I was just walking by on my way to the library!"
Or, for a less vivid version, suppose the teacher watched as the
learner willingly sat in the chair under the false impression that he
was going to participate in a sleeping experiment and that the straps
were on the chair simply to measure sleep patterns.
We suspect that such variations in the experimental protocol
would have had an even more significant effect than the
conditional contract on the teacher's willingness to shock the
learner. To put it in more general terms, we believe that a
person's willingness to harm another depends heavily on whether or
not that person perceives her victim to have dispositionally assumed
such a risk.
There is, as it turns out, considerable social psychological
635evidence that is consistent with that understanding. Perhaps more
importantly, however, there is also depressingly weighty support
within the annals of history. When, for instance, Nazis murdered
millions, many did so, secure in their belief that their victims
deserved to be exterminated, for the benefit of the human species
636
and the advancement of evolutionary trends. The tendency to
631 Id. at 64.
632 Id. at 65.
633 Id.
634 Id. at 66.
635 See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 30 (summarizing relevant evidence of the
'just world" hypothesis and the system-affirming motive in social psychology).
For a sample of that work, see authorities cited infra note 686.
636 See generally JOSEPH TENENBAUM, RACE AND REICH 3-28 (Greenwood Press,
1976) (1956) (relating German science of racial superiority to the Nazi
extermination campaign). See also Chen & Hanson, supra note 52.
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dispositionalize in order to oppress has been particularly strong in the
United States, where cultural notions of freedom, equality, and self-
evident, natural rights have been celebrated at the same time that
many of the humans within our borders have been grouped and• • • 631
subjected to bondage, conquest, and exploitation .
Dispositionism has been the legitimating salve.
2. The Master's View of the Slave
I have often been utterly astonished, since I came to the north, to find
persons who could speak of the singing, among slaves, as evidence of their
contentment and happiness. It is impossible to conceive of a greater mistake.
Slaves sing most when they are most unhappy. The songs of the slave represent
the sorrows of his heart; and he is relieved by them, only as an aching heart is
relieved by its tears. At least, such is my experience. I have often sung to drown
my sorrow, but seldom to express my happiness. Crying for joy, and singing for
joy, were alike uncommon to me while in the jaws of slavery. The singing of a
man cast away upon a desolate island might be as appropriately considered as
evidence of contentment and happiness, as the singing of a slave; the songs of
the one and of the other are prompted by the same emotion.
-Frederick Douglass
6
38
Let us return to the topic of slavery.3 9 When plantation owners
traded in human beings, they were confronted with a problem not
637 See generally RONALD T. TAKAKI, IRON CAGES: RACE AND CULTURE IN 19TH-
CENTURY AMERICA (2000) (examining the cultural and economic foundations of racial
subjugation in the United States); see also sources cited infra note 639 (examining
racism in America).
638 FREDERICK DOUGLASS, NARRATIVE OF THE LiFE OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS, AN
AMERICAN SLAVE (1845), reprinted in I THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF AMERICAN
LITERATURE 1874, 1887-88 (Nina Baym et al. eds., 3d ed. 1989).
639 There is a vast, sophisticated, and ever-expanding literature, across many
disciplines, that has contributed greatly to our understanding of the shocking reality of
slavery in the United States. For useful historical overviews of the ideas we discuss here
concerning the basic dispositionist ideology underlying "the peculiar institution," see
generally DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION,
1770-1823 (1975) (exploring the competing ideologies of anti-slavery and racist
exploitation during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries); GEORGE M.
FREDRICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND: THE DEBATE ON AFRO-
AMERICAN CHARACTER AND DESTINY, 1817-1914 (1971) (outlining the rise of formal-
ized racism in the United States from its nineteenth-century beginnings through its
apex during World War I); GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, RACISM: A SHORT HISTORY
(2002) (synthesizing over thirty years of historical scholarship on racism); THOMAS F.
GOSSETr, RACE: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA IN AMERICA (new ed. 1997) (surveying the
development of race theory and race relationships from the colonial period through
the twentieth century); STEPHENJAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN (rev. ed. 1996)
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unlike the one faced by the teachers in Milgram's experiment. In
antebellum America, plantation owners and slave traders, among
many others, exploited slaves for financial and social gain, while
maintaining their own perception of themselves as the sort of people
who would never unjustly exploit others.640 All who were more or
less complicit with the practices and systems of slavery needed
to believe that the groups and systems to which they belonged
were fair and just, and somehow not in tension with the
principles of equality to which so many subscribed.
a. The basic message-dispositionism
Faced with this situation, the plantation owners did what we
all tend to do-and what most of us in their situation would likely
have done at that time. They looked at their social world and
inferred dispositionist distinctions that made slavery not only
palatable, but natural, just, and in effect, Pareto superior. They
embraced the self-affirming faith that their captives were intended
(by God or nature) to be slaves, and that for their own good they
642needed to be slaves. It was the plantation owners that were
(explaining and refuting various "scientific" theories of racial superiority); WINTHROP
D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATIITUDES TOWARD THE NEGRO, 1550-
1812 (1968) (analyzing white men's attitudes towards black Africans from the pre-
colonial period through the early nineteenth century); KENAN MALIK, THE MEANING
OF RACE: RACE, HISTORY AND CULTURE IN WESTERN SOCIETY (1996) (linking
contemporary, post-Cold War racial ideology to the history of race and racial ideology
in the West). Legal scholars have also contributed significantly to our current
understanding of racism in general and slavery in particular. See generally CRITICAL
RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberl Crenshaw
et al. eds., 1995) (collecting seminal writings of critical race theorists engaged in legal
scholarship); A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND
PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS (1996) (surveying and analyzing the
history of racism in the United States and its impact on legal theory and
jurisprudence); THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, 1619-1860
(1996) (theorizing the role of race as a factor influencing the rulings of particular
judges in the American South during the two and a half centuries before the Civil
War); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY 1810-1860:
CONSIDERATIONS OF HUMANITY AND INTEREST (1981) (studying Southern case law
related to slavery); Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in
the Nineteenth-Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109 (1998) (examining the role of the law in
the construction of race and racism in the nineteenth-century American South).
640 See supra note 29-31 (providing brief summary of motive to self-affirm);
Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 30 (providing extensive summary of that motive).
641 See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 30 (summarizing evidence of people's
tendency to group-affirm and system-affirm).
642 HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 639, at 14.
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designed to be the masters, that could tame, train, and protect the
slaves from themselves. 43 They found ways to believe that slavery was
precisely what slaves preferred-for if a person sings, smiles, and
otherwise behaves "as if' she is happy, who can deny that she is?
644
And if the slaves were not outwardly happy, there was still no
good reason to conclude that they were unhappy. As Elizabeth
Cady Stanton summarized:
It is impossible to make the Southern planter believe that his slave feels
and reasons just as he does-that injustice and subjection are as galling
as to him-that the degradation of living by the will of another, the mere
dependent on his caprice, at the mercy of his passions, is as keenly felt by
him as his master. If you can force on his unwilling vision a vivid picture
of the negro's wrongs, and for a moment touch his soul, his logic brings
him instant consolation. He says, the slave does not feel this as I would.
Put differently, slaveowners (and, to some extent, most of
antebellum society)646 inferred dispositional qualities about the
slaves when they considered the situation of American slavery.
They compared those qualities with their views of their own
dispositions and concluded that the African race was
dispositionally inferior in almost every way. This subsection will
attempt to describe some of the manifestations of that fundamental
attribution error-missing the situation-in this human tragedy.
i. Revealed inferiority
The primary, and perhaps most powerful, tendency of those who
defended or were complicit with slavery was to see Africans in
America as a subhuman species, or at least as less-highly evolved
humans.647 The truth of the African slaves' inferiority was so obvious
643 Id.
644 See infra text accompanying notes 647-82.
645 Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Address to the Legislature of New York on Women's
Rights (Feb. 14, 1854), reprinted in ELIZABETH CADY STANTON, SUSAN B. A NTHONY:
CORRESPONDENCE, WRITINGS, SPEECHES 44, 50 (Ellen Carol DuBois ed., 1981).
646 See HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 639, at 12 ("The precept that African Americans
were, in some immutable way, inferior became a powerful principle around which all
white colonists, even those who did not own slaves, could begin to foster a common
identity ..").
A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. has identified dispositional inferiority as the first of
ten basic precepts of American slavery jurisprudence, and summarizes it as follows:
Presume, preserve, protect, and defend the ideal of the superiority of whites
and the inferiority of blacks.
By considering the black as a subspecies of man or, most often, a heathen
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as to usually be beyond debate. As Chief Justice Taney put it in
the infamous Dred Scott decision:
[Blacks] had for more than a century before been regarded as beings
of an inferior order, and altogether tnfit to associate with the white
race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they
had no rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that the
negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit.
He was bought and sold, and treated as an ordinary article of
merchandise and traffic, whenever a profit could be made by it. This
opinion was at that time fixed and universal in the civilized portion of
the white race. It was regarded as an axiom in morals as well as in
politics, which no one thought of disputing, or supposed to be open to
dispute; and men in every grade and position in society daily and
habitually acted upon it in their private pursuits, as well as in matters of
public concern, without doubting for a moment the correctness of this
S. 648
opinion.
The consequence of this dispositionist assessment of blacks was
staggering. There were two principle holdings in Dred Scott. First, it
meant that no African could be a citizen of the United States or even
of any state "within the meaning of the Constitution." 6 ' Second,
because blacks were not citizens in the eyes of the law, they could be
treated as any other kind of property. According to the Court,
Congress had no power to treat slaves differently from any other types
of property. ' ° Consequently, the Court held, Congress could not
exclude slavery from the federal territories, and therefore, that the
Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional. 5  But of course, the
from a less advanced, oppressed civilization, many whites could justify his
enslavement. The whites' "logic" went as follows: the African is different in
appearance and manner from us; he must not be human or at least not
equally as human as we are; therefore, he is inferior to us and can be enslaved
by us, his superiors.
A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., The Ten Precepts of American Slavery Jurisprudence, 17
CARDozo L. REv. 1695, 1697, 1700 (1996) (citations omitted).
648 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857). Taney was wrong
in his monolithic positive description of white attitudes towards blacks, and we do not
mean to suggest that these attitudes were indeed monolithic. But Taney's words
certainly represented the dominant view and the powerful role of dispositionism in it.
See generally HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 639, at 66 (analyzing Taney's opinion as an
argument that "slavery did not render African Americans inferior" because by Taney's
logic "African Americans, by their very nature, were inferior").
649 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 406.
650 Id. at 451.
651 See id. at 452 ("[T]he act of Congress which prohibited a citizen from holding
and owning [slaves] ... in the territory of the United States north of the line therein
mentioned,... is therefore void.").
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Court's holding in Dred Scott was considered common sense in much
of America at that time.6 2  We all see dispositionally, and this
dispositionism had long made people blind to the situation of slavery,
and to the situational influence on slaves.
Yet this common sense dispositionist presumption about Africans
had not always been the common sense. In fact, the dispositionism
emerged in America precisely because it was needed, as indicated65 655
above,654 to reconcile principles with practices. And few people, we
suspect, felt the dissonance and the need to reconcile more intensely
than did Thomas Jefferson 656-civil rights theorist, father of the
American Revolution, author of the Declaration of Independence,
President of the United States, and Virginian slaveholder.57 Indeed,
652 See HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 639, at 66-67 (showing that, although the legal
analysis was somewhat controversial, the presumption of black inferiority was
commonly held); DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED ScoTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS (1978) (noting that most white critics of the decision
railed against the Missouri Compromise restriction rather than the issue of Negro
citizenship).
653 See GOSSETT, supra note 639, at 29 ("The importance of Negro slavery in
generating race theories in this country can hardly be overestimated.").654
See supra text accompanying notes 63941.
655 Cf Barbara Jeanne Fields, Slavery, Race and Ideology in the United States of America,
181 NEW LEFT REV. 95, passim (1990) (arguing that the concept of race emerged, and
continues to this day, in significant part to resolve the contradiction between espoused
rights and ideals and actual practices).
656We do not mean to suggest, and would be incorrect if we did, that there was
any unanimity in public opinion about slaves and slavery. See Gossett, supra note 639,
at 53 (noting that, although "[t]he Negro would have to wait a long time," eventually
"impressive voices were raised in behalf of his innate intellectual and temperamental
equality with the whites"). There were always dissenters, visionary thinkers, courageous
social movements, and individuals of deep perception, who knew for themselves and
shouted to others that slaves were suffering from a degrading and dehumanizing
situation, not dispositional inferiority. Very often these voices in the dispositional
wilderness came from freed or escaped slaves themselves. See, e.g., DOUGLASS, supra
note 638, at 1887 (remembering slaves' songs as "tones loud, long and deep; they
breathed the prayer and complaint of souls boiling over with the bitterest anguish.");
BULLWHIP DAYS: THE SLAVES REMEMBER 41 (James Mellon ed., 1988) ("'That was all
the slave thought about, then: not being a slave. Because slavery time was hell."'
(quoting former slave Mary Gaffney)). Other oral histories reveal that many slaves
themselves internalized the dispositionist account of their predicament. See generally
FED. WRITERS' PROJECT, WORKS PROGRESS ADMIN., SLAVE NARRATIVES: A FOLK
HISTORY OF SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES FROM INTERVIEWS WITH FORMER SLAVES
(1941) (providing numerous examples from among more than 2,300 first-person
accounts of slavery), available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/ammem/snhtml/. This human
tendency is part of what makes dispositionism so powerful.
657 See Tania Tetlow, The Founders and Slavery: A Crisis of Conscience, 3 LOY. J. PUB.
IN'r. L. 1, 11 (2001) (noting thatJefferson owned 154 slaves in 1794, only ten percent
of whom he manumitted upon his death).
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Jefferson presumed to analyze the inherent nature of slaves'
inferiority through a neutral and scientific approach. In an
extended argument in his Notes on the State of Virginia, Jefferson
enumerated in remarkably dispositionist terms the evidence that he
found tojustify the maintenance of slaverypu We quote him here at
length, not only because his analysis is so revealing, but also because
it is his analysis, the careful work of a man whose desire for a shared
freedom for all men is so celebrated in our culture:
6
,,
9
The first difference which strikes us is that of colour.... Is it not the
foundation of a greater or less share of beauty in the two races? Are
not the fine mixtures of red and white, the expressions of every passion
by greater or less suffusions of color in the one, preferable to that
eternal monotony, which reigns in the countenances, that immoveable
veil of black which covers all the emotions of the other race? Add to
these, flowing hair, a more elegant symmetry of form, their own
judgment in favour of the whites, declared by their preference of them,
as uniformly as is the preference of the Oranootan for the black
women over those of his own species .... A black, after hard labour
through the day, will be induced by the slightest amusements to sit up
till midnight, or later, though knowing he must be out with the first
dawn of the morning. They are at least as brave, and more
adventuresome. But this may perhaps proceed from a want of
forethought, which prevents their seeing a danger till it be present.
When present, they do not go through it with more coolness or
steadiness than the whites. They are more ardent after their female:
but love seems with them to be more an eager desire, than a tender
delicate mixture of sentiment and sensation. Their griefs are transient.
Those numberless afflictions, which render it doubtful whether heaven
has given life to us in mercy or in wrath, are less felt, and sooner
forgotten with them. In general, their existence appears to participate
more of sensation than reflection. To this must be ascribed their
disposition to sleep when abstracted from their diversions, and
unemployed in labour. An animal whose body is at rest, and who does
not reflect, must be disposed to sleep of course. Comparing them by
their faculties of memory, reason, and imagination, it appears to me,
that in memory they are equal to the whites; in reason much inferior,
as I think one could scarcely be found capable of tracing and
(158 THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA (1787), reprinted in
THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 123, 264-70 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984).
659 Much has been written on Jefferson's views about slavery. See, e.g., Aaron
Schwabach, Jefferson and Slavery, 19 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 63, 77-87 (1997)
(summarizing Jefferson's views on slavery and collecting citations of scholarly work on
the issue); Tedow, supra note 657, at 10-24 (describing the hypocrisy of the founding
generation and examining Jefferson's use of racial inferiority to resolve it); see also
sources cited supra note 639 (containing extended analyses ofJefferson's thoughts on,
and contributions to, American racism).
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comprehending the investigations of Euclid; and that in imagination
they are dull, tasteless, and anomalous.... But never yet could I find
that a black had uttered a thought above the level of plain narration;
never see even an elementary trait of painting or sculpture .... Misery
is often the parent of the most affecting touches in poetry.-Among
the blacks is misery enough, God knows, but no poetry. Love is the
peculiar cestrum of the poet. Their love is ardent, but it kindles the
senses only, not the imagination.
... It is not against experience to suppose, that different species of
the same genus, or varieties of the same species, may possess different
qualifications. Will not a lover of natural history then, one who views
the gradations in all the races of animals with the eye of philosophy,
excuse an effort to keep those in the department of man as distinct as
" Jefferson is attaching himself explicitly to a particular school of thought in the
eighteenth century which held that Africans were in fact the same species as man,
rather than some lesser species. See, e.g., JORDAN, supra note 639, at 308 (citing a
debate at Harvard's 1773 commencement where one student argued that Africans
were the same species as white men). But notice how little difference it makes with
respect to Jefferson's dispositionism. Whether the Africans were an inferior species or
a lesser quality of human, Jefferson sees their condition as resulting from stable,
internal dispositional factors, and not from the situation. Later scholars would go
further than Jefferson and claim to demonstrate that Africans were, indeed, an inferior
race. Samuel Morton, one of the best-known antebellum scientists, amassed the largest
skull collection in the world in his scientific endeavor to demonstrate that racial
distinctions reflected deep genetic differences. More specifically, he applied this
theory of polygeny to "prove" that Africans were inferior. See SAMUEL GEORGE
MORTON, CRANIA AMERICANA 5-7 (1839) (describing the African race as "the lowest
grade of humanity"); see also Am. Philosophical Soc'y, Samuel George Morton Papers:
1819-1850, at http://www.amphilsoc.org/library/mole/m/mortonsg.htm (last visited
Oct. 30, 2003). "Morton's work met with a receptive audience in much of the United
States. Its massive empirical base was praised by the scientific elite, and his theories on
human relations were endorsed avidly by pro-slavery advocates." Id.; see also GOULD,
supra note 639, at 101-04 (illustrating the connections between Morton's work and
American slavery). For a relatively brief history of the emergence of polygeny in
America, and the role played by numerous scholars, including Morton and Harvard's
Louis Agassiz, see Robert Bernasconi, Introduction to AMERICAN THEORIES OF
POLYGENESIS, at v-xiii (Robert Bernasconi ed., 2002). Agassiz, a renowned European
scientist who came to America in 1846, had initially concluded that all humans were of
one race. Id. But after being in America and reviewing Morton's evidence, he
converted to polygeny. Id. Apparently, it was not just Morton's highly credible
statistical analysis that influenced Agassiz. In a letter that he wrote to his mother,
Agassiz indicated that his own personal encounters with slaves were having an effect.
Because they were, by their appearance, an evidently "degraded and degenerate race,"
Agassiz found it difficult "to repress the feeling that they are not of the same blood as
us." Id. For a more extended account of polygeny, see GOULD, supra note 639, at 71-
104 (exploring the development of polygeny throughout the nineteenth century);
JOHN S. HALLER, JR., OUTCASTS FROM EVOLUTION: SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDES OF RACIAL
INFERIORITY, 1859-1900 passim (1971) (describing the work of numerous American
scientists in the late nineteenth century who, inspired largely by Darwin's work on
evolution, attempted to use science to prove what they assumed to be true: that non-
white "races" were more or less inferior to the whites).
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nature has formed them? This unfortunate difference of color, and
perhaps of faculty, is a powerful obstacle to the emancipation of these
661
people.
Jefferson's blindness to the situation is obvious to us now. We
can, from our vantage, see the situation of slavery like we can see a
gun to the head. But, in Jefferson's time, the situation was obscured
by the more salient (and affirming) dispositions. While arguing that
white people were obviously more beautiful than blacks, Jefferson
cites blacks' "own judgment in favour of the whites,"66' 2 but does not
see the extreme power disparities that likely lead to this perceived
reaction. This is an egregious instance of dispositions wrongly
being thought to be "revealed" through behavior.6 3 Jefferson
does not see that the situation of forced labor might require the kind
of palliative function of song that Douglass spoke of,664 but rather
concludes that the singing is evidence of a "carefree" disposition.
Furthermore, he remarkably infers that blacks dispositionally
required less sleep than whites, ignoring the fact that sleep was
situationally less available to them. 6' Jefferson also concludes that
blacks had inferior reason and imagination, without appreciating
the situation-the fact that blacks were denied schooling, for
example, or the opportunity for creative expression _that created
667
that condition.
At the same time that blacks were perceived as inferior to whites
in reason, they were seen as dispositionally superior to whites in doing
661 JEFFERSON, supra note 658, at 264-67, 270 (footnote added).
662 Id. at 265.
663 See supra text accompanying note 32 (discussing the role played by "revealed"
preference assumptions in conventional economic theory).
664 See supra text accompanying note 638.
665 See, e.g., SOLOMON NORTHUP, TwELVE YEARS A SLAVE 167, 171 (Dover Publ'ns
1970) (1854) ("An hour before daylight the horn is blown.... [T]hey oftentimes labor
till the middle of the night"); cf WILLIAM GOODELL, THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 128-29 (Negro Univs. Press 1968) (1853) (citing South
Carolina's prohibition on forcing slaves to work more than fifteen hours per day in the
summer or fourteen hours a day in the winter).
666 See EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE
561-63 (1974) (outlining formal bans on slave education).
667 Of course, Jefferson was not only wrong in his dispositionist explanation of
slaves' lack of reason and imagination, he was also wrong to conclude that slaves lacked
those qualities. Scholars have unearthed an incredibly rich world of slave culture that
was, by situational necessity, largely kept hidden from slaveholders. Seminal studies of
the elaborate and extensive cultures built by slaves include, among many others,
GENOVESE, supra note 666, and LAWRENCE W. LEVINE, BLACK CULTURE AND BLACK
CONSCIOUSNESS: AFRO-AMERICAN FOLK THOUGHT FROM SLAVERYTO FREEDOM (1977).
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the sort of work that the slaveholders needed. As Jefferson noted,
they seemed to forget their afflictions, required less sleep, and were
more resistant to heat. Therefore, they were well-suited as forced
laborers.66
It is important to note that Jefferson does not entirely disregard
the influence of the situational effects of slavery. In fact, he purports
to examine and control for such evidence. He explains that "[the
improvement of the blacks in body and mind, in the first instance of
their mixture with the whites, has been observed by every one, and
proves that their inferiority is not the effect merely of their condition
of life."669  Jefferson continues his proof by comparing American
slaves to Roman slaves, who he claims were treated significantly worse
than American slaves-in other words, their situations were even
more stifling.70 But, as he then claims,
notwithstanding these and other discouraging circumstances among the
Romans, their slaves were often their rarest artists. They excelled too
in science, insomuch as to be usually employed as tutors to their
master's children. Epictetus, Terence, and Phaedrus, were slaves. But
they were of the race of whites. It is not their condition then, but nature,
which has produced the distinction.
6 7
1
668 This ability to see "superior" qualities in an "inferior" group helps reveal how
the tendency to dispositionalize is often motivated largely by a desire to justify existing
power relationships. See infra notes 685-86. By attributing superior physical strength
and athleticism to slaves, Jefferson further naturalized the division of labor. Some
argue, quite compellingly, that the same sorts of attributions are made today, to the
same effect. See, e.g, JOHN HOBELMAN, DARWIN's ATHLETES: How SPORT HAS
DAMAGED BLACK AMERICA AND PRESERVED THE MYTH OF RACE 31-51 (1996) (arguing
that the general success and superstardom of blacks on the athletic field have helped
to justify their exclusion and inferior status elsewhere while giving the reassuring
appearance of integration).
669 JEFFERSON, supra note 658, at 267 (emphasis added). Jefferson's suggestion,
here, that the inferiority of blacks is genetic, remains only an implicit suggestion.
Explicit "proof" for that proposition would await further scientific study by others. See
HALLER supra note 660, at 3-39 (describing the schools of thought and methodologies
that developed in the nineteenth century to classify races).670 JEFFERSON, supra note 658, at 267-68.
671 Id. at 268 (emphasis added). Jefferson again, ignored the situation. In
Ancient Rome, some slaves were given tasks requiring literacy, such as accounting and
education. See ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY 180 (1982) (noting that in Ancient Rome "skilled and literate slaves came to
dominate not only urban industries, but education, the arts, theater, and literature");
THOMAS WIEDEMANN, GREEK AND ROMAN SLAVERY 8 (1981) (noting that Roman slaves
were "entrusted with supervisory functions such as responsibility for the city accounts
or weights and measures"). By contrast, in many states in the American South,
especially after the Nat Turner rebellion, it was a crime to teach a slave to read or
write. See JANET DUITSMAN CORNELIUS, "WHEN I CAN READ My TITLE CLEAR":
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Thomas Jefferson, who announced to the world that "all men are
created equal,"6' who founded the University of Virginia and carried
the Enlightenment's torch through his lifelong emphasis on the
importance of education, who believed he was an objective natural
historian and scientist, still could not see the situation in the case of
slavery. Dispositionism runs deep, and we can know with fair
confidence that, were we living in Virginia at the time that Jefferson
wrote, our position likely would have been even less situationally
673sensitive than his was.
A review of Jefferson's justifications highlights the source and
destination of our dispositionist tendencies. When we miss or
downplay the situation, and see or exaggerate dispositions, we miss
the hurdles, holes, quicksand, and other obstacles that can influence
the outcome of any race, and instead attribute the outcomes to the
racers themselves. Given the existence of the fundamental
attribution error, it is very hard for us not to assume that we are all
competing on a level playing field, that the victor deserves the spoils
and the losers deserve their fate. And it is not just individuals that
are engaged in a dispositional race. Indeed, entire "races" are
competing against each other. The fact that one group dominates
another often carries its own justification. Superior races, as
measured by their ability to dominate, should dominate, as nature
appears to reveal.674 As Alabama physician Josiah Nott put it in 1854,
LITERACY, SLAVERY AND RELIGION IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 32-33 (1991)
(describing laws in Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, Virginia, Alabama, and South
Carolina prohibiting the education of slaves).
672 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
673 Likely, that is, because acceptance of slavery was the dominant view, as we have
noted, and will discuss below. What one thought about slavery may have depended,
importantly, not on who one was, but rather where one stood.
674 For many, however, it is not just revealed by nature, but by God as well. For
example, the religious justification for slavery was also extremely popular and
powerful. See generally FREDRICKSON, supra note 639, at 15-49 (describing the influence
of religion on the advent of racism). The typical religious justification generally
began with the claim that God recognized and sanctioned slavery in the Old
Testament. Abraham, the benevolent and powerful patriarch, held slaves himself
and was therefore considered the ideal for many slaveholders. See EUGENE D.
GENOVESE, THE SLAVEHOLDERS' DILEMMA: FREEDOM AND PROGRESS IN SOUTHERN
CONSERVATIVE THOUGHT, 1820-1860, at 38 (1992) ("Abraham loomed as the principal
Old Testament figure among the slaveholders."). The next step in the religious
argument was the assertion that God wanted Africans to become slaves. See
WILLIAM JOHN GRAYSON, THE HIRELING AND SLAVE 36-39 (1854) ("Hence has
the negro come, by God's command / For wiser teaching, to a foreign
land .... ). Indeed, even conceding that slavery was a harsh means, propo-
nents would argue that it was for good ends and part of a larger divine plan. See
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shortly before the Dred Scott decision: "Nations and races, like
individuals, have each an especial destiny: some are born to rule, and
others to be ruled.... No two distinctly-marked races can dwell
together on equal terms.... [H]uman progress has arisen mainly
,,676from the war of the races ....
id. at 36-37 ("And though the way be rough, the agent stern, / No other
mode, can human wits discern, / No better scheme, may wealth or virtue
find, / To tame and to instruct the negro mind .... " (footnote omitted));
id. at 38 ("So here, though hid the end from mortal view, / Heaven's
gracious purpose brings the negro too; / He comes by God's decree, not
chance nor fate, / Not force, nor fraud, nor grasping schemes of
State .... "). God worked in mysterious ways, and mere men were not to question
the motives of the Almighty. As in Galileo's time, it was very difficult to question the
teachings of various churches. See PETER KOLCHIN, AMERICAN SLAVERY: 1619-
1877, at 185, 186 (1993) (describing the South as the "home of religious and
social orthodoxy"). Not surprisingly, the notion that God chose Africans to be
slaves found its way into the legal system as well. See HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 639,
at 14 (describing how notions of the appropriateness of slavery worked their way into
court opinions).
675 See supra notes 648-51, and accompanying text (quoting Chief Justice Taney's
opinion).
676 J. C. NoTT & GEORGE R. GLIDDON, TYPES OF MANKIND 53, 79 (1854). For an
interesting biographical account of Josiah Nott's life as a humanitarian scientist
devoted to understanding and treating yellow fever, on one hand, and as a racial
scientist devoted to advancing racial prejudice and white supremacy on the other, see
REGINALD HORSMAN, JOSIAH NoTr OF MOBILE: SOUTHERNER, PHYSICIAN AND RACIAL
THEORIST (1987).
It is worth pausing to emphasize our belief that the very concept of "race" is itself
based mostly on a fundamental attribution error motivated by this larger motive to
justify inequalities. When groups of people appear to be doing better or worse than
other groups, those experiencing and observing the difference often have a strong
desire to attribute causation for it to a legitimating source. See infra notes 685-86 and
accompanying text. Salient group characteristics, if they exist, are often seized upon to
carry that weight. Racial differences, from skin color to hair texture, fit the bill nicely.
As so often happens, though, the most salient features do not necessarily have much
causal significance. And, as many geneticists, biologists, historians, and
anthropologists have argued, that appears to be the case with many of the "racial"
differences that we observe. See, e.g., JOSEPH L. GRAVES, THE EMPEROR'S NEW
CLOTHES: BIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF RACE AT THE MILLENNIUM (2003) (reviewing the
biological theories of "race" and the evidence that "race" has very little to no biological
origins beyond those few that are sometimes evident on the surface); AUDREY SMEDLEY,
RACE IN NORTH AMERICA: ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF A WORLDVIEW 22 (1993)
("[Race] was the cultural invention of arbitrary meanings applied to what appeared to
be natural divisions within the human species. The meanings had social value but no
intrinsic relationship to the biological diversity itself."). For an interesting and
readable on-line article on this topic, see Jonathan Marks, Scientific and Folk Ideas About
Heredity, at http://personal.uncc.edu/jmarks/interests/Baltimore.html (last visited
Oct. 26, 2003) (describing the naturalizing but false racial categories that most of us
have internalized and some of the effects of those categories). Again, there is a strong
tendency to miss the larger context and be fooled by the vivid particulars that stand
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ii. Consent-implied and revealed
Those justifications led to another separate, but related,
dispositionist justification of slavery-the myth that, were Africans
competent to choose, they would choose slavery for themselves. But
because they were not, the responsibility fell on whites to choose for
them. George Fitzhugh, a slavery proponent and celebrated
Southern polemicist wrote, "[the Negro] is but a grown up child,
and must be governed as a child, not as a lunatic or criminal. The
master occupies towards him the place of parent or guardian. 677
Proponents argued that slavery was the best thing for the Africans
because it allowed them to become "civilized," to become Christian,
and to live a comfortable life, free from the dangers of their former
life as African savages.6 Thus, there was at least an implied consent
on the part of blacks to the slavery system.
out. When Jefferson began his defense of slavery with the phrase "the first difference
which strikes us is that of colour," he was evincing what we would call the fundamental
racial attribution error.
677 GEORGE FITZHUGH, SOCIOLOGY FOR THE SOUTH, OR THE FAILURE OF FREE
SOCIETY83 (Burt Franklin 1965) (1854).
C7S This concept is vividly portrayed in verse:
And yet the life, so unassailed by care,
So blest with moderate work, with ample fare,
With all the good the pauper Hireling needs,
The happier Slave on each plantation leads;
Safe from harassing doubts and annual fears,
He dreads no famine, in unfruitful years;
If harvests fail from inauspicious skies,
The Master's providence his food supplies;
No paupers perish here for want of bread,
Or lingering live, by foreign bounty fed;
No exiled trains of homeless peasants go,
In distant climes, to tell their tales of woe;
Far other fortune, free from care and strife,
For work, or bread, attends the Negro's life,
And Christian Slaves may challenge as their own,
The blessings claimed in fabled states alone-
The cabin home, not comfortless, though rude,
Light daily labour, and abundant food,
The sturdy health, that temperate habits yield,
The cheerful song, that rings in every field,
The long, loud laugh, that freemen seldom share,
Heaven's boon to bosoms unapproached by care,
And boisterous jest and humour unrefined,
That leave, though rough, no painful sting behind;
While, nestling near, to bless their humble lot,
Warm social joys surround the Negro's cot,
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A more extreme version of that paternalistic dispositionist fallacy
was the view that slaves actually chose to be slaves-their consent and
support for the institution was actually revealed by their happiness
and satisfaction. In this view, there was really nothing paternalistic
involved. Slaves were perceived to have consented by the fact that
they seemed to like it. In this conception, slavery was contrasted with
the system of wage labor in the North, and was seen as clearly
superior. Fitzhugh again made the argument:
The negro slaves of the South are the happiest, and, in some sense, the
freest people in the world. The children and the aged and infirm work
not at all, and yet have all the comforts and necessaries of life provided
for them. They enjoy liberty, because they are oppressed neither by
care nor labor.6 '
In 1861, former United States Senator James Henry Hammond
from South Carolina explained the seemingly unchallenged "logic"
of the system:
"In all social systems there must be a class to do the menial duties, to
perform the drudgery of life. That is, a class requiring but a low order
of intellect and but little skill. Its requisites are vigor, docility, [and]
fidelity. Such a class you must have, or you would not have that other
class which leads progress, civilization, and refinement. It constitutes
the very mudsill of society and of political government.... Fortunately
for the South, she has found a race adapted to that purpose at her
hand. A race inferior to her own, but eminently qualified in temper, in
vigor, in docility, in capacity to stand the climate, to answer all her
purposes. We use them for our purpose, and we call them slaves."
6 s0
From where Hammond stood, the need for slaves was beyond
question. That was the way great societies had always done it. If you
accept as a starting point that certain people are inherently and
The evening dance its merriment imparts,
Love, with his rapture, fills their youthful hearts,
And placid age, the task of labour done,
Enjoys the summer shade, the winter's sun,
And, as through life no pauper want he knows,
Laments no poorhouse penance at its close.
GRAYSON, supra note 674, at 52-54.
679 GEORGE FITZHUGH, CANNIBAI.S ALL! OR, SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS 29
(Richmond, A. Morris 1857); see also DON E. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 652, at 428
(noting that Chief Justice Taney described the lives of slaves as "usually cheerful and
contented" (quoting SAMUEL TYLER, MEMOIR OF ROGER BROOKE TANEY, L.L.D. 660-64
(2d ed. 1876))).
CA0 CARL T. ROwAN, DREAM MAKERS, DREAM BREAKERS: THE WORLD OF JUSTICE
THURGOOD MARSHALL 10 (1993) (quoting SenatorJames Henry Hammond).
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dispositionally inferior, the best way to maximize the utility of society
is to put those people at the bottom."" And if it happens that even
the slaves prefer-or would if they were competent-to be slaves, then
the idea of emancipation is ludicrous.
b. Amplifying dispositionism: The anti-slavery bogeypeople
In addition to those dispositionist rationales, defenders of the
status quo of slavery also pointed to threats of bogeymen lurking in
any change to the situation. Change was frightening, and could be
made to seem even more so, not only to slaveholders, but to lower
classes as well, including non-slaveholding planters and poor white
laborers. Each of these groups viewed the maintenance of the social
system as essential to keeping their fears from becoming reality. As
historian James McPherson puts it, "[slaveholders] managed to
681 We can now see what might be called a "Pareto inefficiency bogeyman" to
justify slavery. It was widely held that the lives of blacks wouldn't improve much after
slavery, and that the lives of whites would get considerably worse. Proponents would
argue, why rock the boat when it would make some people worse off without making
others better? For instance, Alexis de Tocqueville surmised that:
If [a slave] becomes free, he often feels independence as a heavier burden
than slavery itself, for his life has taught him to submit to everything, except
to the dictates of reason; and when reason becomes his only guide, he cannot
hear its voice. A thousand new wants assail him, and he lacks the knowledge
and the energy needed to resist them. Desires are masters against whom one
must fight, and he has learned nothing but to submit and obey. So he has
reached this climax of affliction in which slavery brutalizes him and freedom
leads him to destruction.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 318 (J.P. Mayer ed., George
Lawrence trans., 1969) (1850). George Fitzhugh made a similar point:
Would the abolitionists approve of a system of society that set white children
free, and remitted them at the age of fourteen, males and females, to all the
rights, both as to person and property, which belong to adults? Would it be
criminal or praiseworthy to do so? Criminal, of course. Now, are the average
of negroes equal in information, in native intelligence, in prudence or
providence to well-informed white children of fourteen? We who have lived
with them for forty years, think not. The competition of the world would be
too much for the children. They would be cheated out of their property and
debased in their morals. Yet they would meet every where with sympathizing
friends of their own color, ready to aid, advise and assist them. The negro
would be exposed to the same competition and greater temptations, with no
greater ability to contend with them, with these additional difficulties. He
would be welcome nowhere; meet with thousands of enemies and no friends.
If he went North, the white laborers would kick him and cuff him, and drive
him out of employment. If he went to Africa, the savages would cook him
and eat him. If he went to the West Indies, they would not let him in, or if
they did, they would soon make of him a savage and idolater.
FITZHUGH, supra note 677, at 88.
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convince most non-slaveholding whites in the South (two-thirds of
the white population there) that emancipation would produce
economic ruin, social chaos, and racial war.",
8 2
Even those that perhaps philosophically favored emancipation
feared that, if blacks were released, hell might break loose. For
instance, in a particularly grave rendition of this concern,
Thomas Jefferson predicted that
[d]eep rooted prejudices entertained by the whites; ten thousand
recollections, by the blacks, of the injuries they have sustained; new
provocations; the real distinctions which nature has made; and many
other circumstances, will divide us into parties, and produce
convulsions which will probably never end but in the extermination of
the one or the other race.
682 JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATrLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 8 (1988).
This fear expressed is evident within the Dred Scott decision:
For if [slaves] were ... entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens, it
would exempt them from the operation of the special laws and from the
police regulations which they considered to be necessary for their own safety.
It would give to persons of the negro race, who were recognised as citizens in
any one State of the Union, the right to enter every other State whenever
they pleased ... and it would give them the full liberty of speech in public
and in private upon all subjects upon which its own citizens might speak; to
hold public meetings upon political affairs, and to keep and carry arms
wherever they went. And all of this would be done in the face of the subject
race of the same color, both free and slaves, and inevitably producing
discontent and insubordination among them, and endangering the peace
and safety of the State.
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 416-17 (1857); see also Bryan v.
Walton, 14 Ga. 185, 202, 206 (1853) ("[The freed slave] resides among us, and yet is a
stranger .... Generally, society suffers, and the negro suffers by manumission....
[Freedom] to the colored man ... is worse than slavery itself."); FEHRENBACHER, supra
note 652, at 428 (commenting on Taney's view that "sudden emancipation [of
African-American slaves] would mean 'absolute ruin.'"). Many social historians have
studied the part played by the putative advantage of racial superiority in non-
slaveholders' support for the social system of slavery, and the racial apartheid that
would follow in the Jim Crow period. See DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF
WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS 3-13 (Rev. ed.
1999) (summarizing predecessor scholarship and arguing that notions of racial
superiority allowed the white working class to distinguish and bolster itself vis-a-vis
blacks, thus encouraging poor whites' complicity in the social system and inhibiting
the development of social movements based on shared interests among poor whites
and poor blacks).
93 JEFFERSON, supra note 658, at 264. Abraham Lincoln also feared a version of
this bogeyman and, therefore, at one point early in the Civil War, suggested that
blacks be kept separate from whites after emancipation. See HIGGINBOTHAM, supra
note 639, at 67 (noting that Lincoln even considered repatriation of African
Americans).
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Defenders of slavery pointed to what they saw as the inevitable
and total destruction of the fabric of Southern society if slavery was
abolished. As historian Eugene Genovese notes, "[t]he proslavery
theorists never tired of proclaiming that the greatness of ancient
Egypt, Israel, Greece, and Rome had been based on slavery ....C68
The defenders of slavery assumed that there could not be a great
and prosperous society without slavery; they were unable to imagine
something that differed from the status quo. The only way to be
prosperous, they believed, was the "proven" way, and thinking about
alternatives was a dangerous endeavor. Of course, the views that
blacks were inferior, that a successful society depended on the
social system of slavery, and that only chaos would ensue from
changing it, were wrong.
But the fear-mongering served an important purpose for those
who engaged in it beyond simply predicting hypothetical future
outcomes. As we have hinted throughout this Article and as we will
describe in more detail in other work, s there is considerable and
growing social psychological research indicating that the presence of a
threat to existing systems activates in us a general motive to justify or
legitimate the system, as is.68 6 That research further reveals that one of
the most effective means of legitimating the system is to
dispositionalize those groups that might otherwise be seen as unjustly
victimized. By increasing fears that the system was at risk, and that any
change to the system would be calamitous, the defenders of slavery
were, consciously or not, acting to reinforce the system and the
dispositionism of slaves on which the system relied. And they were
likely having that effect on all groups, regardless of their relationship
with the system of slavery, including those who were in fact being
harmed.
684 GENOVESE, supra note 674, at 5.
685 See, e.g., Chen & Hanson, Illusion of Law I, supra note 84; Hanson & Yosifon,
supra note 30.
686 A useful sample of that work containing support for the propositions in this
paragraph and much more would include the following articles: John T. Jost & D.
Burgess, Attitudinal Ambivalence and the Conflict Between Group and System Justification
Motives in Low Status Groups, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 293 (2000); John
T. Jost et al., Non-Conscious Forms of System Justification: Implicit and Behavioral Preferences
for Higher Status Groups, supra note 215; John T. Jost, Outgroup Favoritism and the Theory
of System Justification, supra note 191, at 89; John T. Jost & Orsolya Hunvady, The
Psychology of System Justification and the Palliative Function of Ideology, 13 EUR. REV. Soc.
PSYCHOL. 11 (2002); John T. Jost & Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Role of Stereotyping in
System-Justification and the Production of False Consciousness, 33 BRIT. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 1
(1994).
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c. Dispositionalizing the opposition
We have thus far explored several ways in which knowledge
structures evolved tojustify the institution of slavery on behalf of those
Who sought to legitimize it. More specifically, we have emphasized
how slaves-and all identity groups for that matter-were more or less
dispositionalized in order to "make sense" of the systems of slavery,
and to inoculate them with the "patina of consent.""7 But the deep
capture of "knowledge" is not accomplished without the deep capture
of knowledge production, and that is also part of the unseen situation.
As was true during Galileo's struggles with the Catholic Church, as
Stigler argued was true four decades ago of administrative regulators,
and as we hypothesize is generally true today, conceptions of
ourselves, others, and our institutions do not just emerge from
bottom-up, individual analyses of the given facts. Nor do they emerge
from a fair tournament of ideas, in which the most meritorious ideas,
beliefs, and knowledge structures win out. Instead, the winners are
created, promoted, subsidized, and protected by the systems,
institutions, and individuals who enjoy the greatest power to define
the situation. Influencing the interior situation means influencing,
among other things, the information people have access to, how it is
framed, and its credibility. The success of pro-slavery dispositionism
required that dynamic.
688
In this subsection, we focus briefly on one of its many elements:
dealing with competing ideas and criticisms of abolitionists. Here was
the problem. Although dispositionalizing slaves helped many
Southerners ease the dissonance they felt from not permitting the self-
evident natural rights that they were preaching, it did not relieve the
dissonance created by the emerging abolition movement. Particularly
after the Nat Turner rebellion in 1831, those who justified and
endorsed slavery had to explain why so many other people were not
persuaded by the force of their seemingly air-tight arguments.
The dissonance was likely significant. According to social psy-
chologists, when such a conflict grows strong, something usually has to
687 The phrase is Duncan Kennedy's. See Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education as
Trainingfor Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAw: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 40, 41 (David
Kairys ed., 1982) ("Students act affirmatively within the channels cut for them, cutting
them deeper, giving the whole a patina of consent and weaving complicity into
everyone's life story.").
688 For a sample of some of the laws prohibiting or discouraging the promotion of
any ideas that might encourage questioning or criticism of slavery, see GOODELL, supra
note 665, at 384-86.
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give. Of course, a person could reconsider and alter her own views,
but that is a rare event, particularly when there is a lot at stake, as
there was on the issue of slavery. Research shows that an extremely
common means of extinguishing that sort of interpersonal or
intergroup dissonance is to attribute the gap between our outlook and
someone else's to a lack of objectivity on their part. We assume that
there is some dispositional source of their bias-stupidity, or laziness,
or corruption, or self-interest. 6 ° Again, dispositionism saves the day.
And that is largely what happened in the South. To defend
slavery and the entire worldview on which it was based, slavery's
proponents dismissed abolitionists and their ilk as ignorant,
hypocritical, and jealous of the success achieved in the South. As
historian James McPherson summarizes:
[Slavery] also established the foundation for an upper class of
gentlemen to cultivate the arts, literature, hospitality, and public
service. It created a far superior society to that of the "vulgar,
contemptible, counter-jumping" Yankees .... "Instead of an evil," said
John C. Calhoun in summing up the southern position, slavery was "a
positive good ... the most safe and stable basis for free institutions in
the world."
691
Southern newspapers echoed this sentiment. "'The great evil of
Northern free society,"' insisted a South Carolina newspaper, "'is, that
it is burdened with a servile class of MECHANICS and
LABOURERS, unfit for self-government, yet clothed with the attributes
and powers of citizens."'6 92 A Georgia newspaper was even more
emphatic in its distaste:
Free society! we sicken at the name. What is it but a conglomeration
of greasy mechanics, filthy operatives, small-fisted farmers, and moon-
689 See generally Lee Ross & Andrew Ward, Naive Realism in Everyday Life: Implications
for Social Conflict and Misunderstanding, in VALUES AND KNOWLEDGE 103, passim (Edward
S. Reed et al. eds., 1996).
690 See, e.g., Dale T. Miller & Rebecca K. Ratner, The Disparity Between the Actual and
Assumed Power of Self-Interest, 74J. PERSONALITY& SOC. PSYCHOL. 53, 60 (1998) (noting
that test-subjects commonly overestimate the impact of self-interest); Dale T. Miller &
Rebecca K. Ratner, The Power of the Myth of Self-Interest, in CURRENT SOCIETAL CONCERNS
ABOUT JUSTICE 25, 30 (Leo Montada & Melvin J. Lerner eds., 1996) (same); Emily
Pronin, Daniel Y. Lin & Lee Ross, The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus
Others, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 369 (2002) (demonstrating our
tendency to see other people as biased while assuming that we are unbiased).
691 MCPHERSON, supra note 682, at 56 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 25th Cong., 2d
Sess., app. 61-62 (1838) (remarks of Senator Calhoun)).
692 LAWRENCE R. TENZER, THE FORGOTTEN CAUSE OF THE CIVIL WAR: A NEW
LOOK AT THE SLAVERY ISSUE 126 (1997) (quoting a South Carolina newspaper),
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struck theorists? ... The prevailing class one meets with [in the
North] is that of mechanics struggling to be genteel, and small farmers
who do their own drudgery, and yet are hardly fit for association with a
693
southern gentleman's body servant.
In retrospect, such attacks on the dispositions of abolitionist
enemies appear to be a fairly transparent tactic to discredit them. At
the time, however, those who offered the critiques and those who
shared in them, undoubtedly believed that the attacks were a fairly
neutral assessment of the truth.
d. Our dispositionalization of slavery
In just that way, today, we look back with horror at slavery and
the institutions, customs, laws, and mindsets that made it possible.
We express outrage that "those people" could have embraced such
inappropriate dispositionist assumptions, when it is so clear, in
hindsight, that those assumptions were not only wrong, but self-
serving mechanisms of oppression.
The same central lessons of the Galileo story are all evident
here. We retrospectively witness powerful groups abusing their
power by creating and enforcing oppressive laws based on false, but
self-serving, dispositionist attributions. As with the Galileo story, we
manage to dispositionalize the people involved as "evil"-and
obviously different from us. Yet, we are nonetheless confident that
history is not repeating itself today, confident that we are not blinded
too by some false dispositionism, confident that we are not also
unduly missing the situation. In the examples of Galileo and Ameri-
can slavery we can, in hindsight, see situation as palpably as we can
see a gun to the head. And such a visible form of influence is, we all
agree, unacceptable. Because we can see the situation in retrospect,
we can take comfort in the belief that we are not subject to anything
similar and that, unlike those who advanced or participated in those
oppressive practices or "bad acts," we are dispositionally "good."
But here is the rub. Those are precisely the same dispositionist
assumptions that the groups who we see as "bad" made about
themselves. They did not see oppressive power shaping their society.
We suspect further that we take comfort in our own outrage at these
obvious evils of the past, comfort that helps convince us that we must
not be missing anything like it in our own situation.694 The problem is
693 MUSCOGEE HERALD (Georgia), reprinted in N.Y. TRIB., Sept. 10, 1856.
694 Today, one of the most well-known parts of Galileo's story is the legend that,
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that we do not understand that the best defense against such
patterns comes less from identifying flawed ideas than it does from
identifying the flaws in those who construct the ideas. The problem
is in the human animal and our faith that we are immune to that
which we generally neither see nor understand: the situation.
Indeed, instead of assuming that our current views about slavery
and Galileo's imprisonment provide evidence that we will not again
make such horrific errors, a more reasonable inference would be
that those examples, and the countless others like them, constitute a
compelling indication that history will continue to repeat-precisely
because we do not appear to know what is moving it. If humans are
capable of believing that those we directly harm (be they slaves, or
Milgram's "learners") deserve their fate, it should be even easier to
rationalize the harms imposed less directly, less saliently, and more
situationally.
3. Conclusion
We can thus see that the power of dispositionism, and the patterns
to which it gives shape, are witnessed again and again notjust in social
psychology's attributional experiments, nor just in the mundane basic
habits of our lives, but in large and central questions of social policy
and human society. We will not pursue this exegesis further here, but
the basic pattern is becoming clear. When we see disposition and miss
situation, we implicitly presume that the situation is neutral, that the
playing field is stable, and that everything else is equal. We see
outcomes, then, as dispositionally deserved. When the system is
challenged or threatened, all those involved in the system have a stake
in reinforcing it and, thus, reinforcing its legitimating rationalizations.
As this discussion has indicated, the institution of slavery emerged
first and was justified later. And the justifications came piecemeal as
the need arose. Jefferson's initial attempt to make sense of the
institution was, at least by comparison to later efforts, quite tentative.
as he was leaving his confession, after he had claimed that the Earth did not move,
Galileo said under his breath, "and yet it moves." It's just a legend; there is, as far as
we have been able to discover, no real evidence that Galileo said it. But, hundreds of
years later, we like to believe he did. It comforts us by illustrating how Galileo's
capture and ultimate vindication are so very obvious in retrospect. "Those people"
should have known better, and our hero, Galileo, did. What should be unsettling is
that, in Galileo's time, this part of the story was invisible. No one knew, or probably
would have even believed, that Galileo said such a thing. Those living through deep
capture are rarely able to see enough of the situation to realize it.
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By the middle of the nineteenth century, with the attacks on slavery
growing to a feverish pitch, the institution's justifications were fully
formed and robust. And they did the trick. What had once been a
"necessary evil" had been rendered a just, natural, and enviable path
to civilized greatness. And many in the South were proud of that
transition. South Carolina's Senator James H. Hammond spoke of
earlier times when Southerners "'believed slavery to be an evil-
weakness-disgrace-nay a sin.... [I]n fear and trembling [they]
awaited a doom that [they] deemed inevitable.' 695 But that belief was
temporary, as was the resultant fear. "' [A] few bold spirits took the
question up; they compelled the South to investigate it anew and
thoroughly, and what is the result?' [asked Hammond,] 'Why, it would
be difficult to find a Southern man who feels the system to be the
slightest burthen on his conscience.'-6 96 Hammond's fellow South
Carolinian, John C. Calhoun, recounted the same history from
dissonance to resonance as follows: "Many in the South once believed
that [slavery] was a moral and political evil; that folly and delusion are
gone; we see it now in its true light, and regard it as the most safe and
stable basis for free institutions in the world." 97 And so it is that
visible evil fades into the situation and, with it, becomes invisible.
D. The Situational Bogeypeople
If not before, it is usually at this point in the presentation of our
ideas to friends, family, students, and colleagues that we are stopped
with one or another version of "I hear what you are saying and I may
even agree, but I think you are going too far. Is it not dangerous to
take the situation so seriously?"
We suspect that many of our readers may be experiencing similar
reactions, and we understand the concern. To continue our argu-
ment, then, we think it is necessary to directly engage several versions
of this kind of reaction to our claims. We are doing so not only to
try to mollify our readers' worries, but also because these common
reactions harmfully narrow the boundaries of most social and political
debates in our society today.
695 WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, PRELUDE TO CIVIL WAR 299 (1966) (quoting Senator
James Henry Hammond, Oct. 29, 1858).
696 Id.
697 CONG. GLOBE, 25th Cong., 2d Sess., App. 61-62 (1838) (remarks of Senator
Calhoun).
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One of our main concerns with those arguments is that they are
not always what they purport to be. In our experience, they are not
offered as a concern that emerges once the power of the situation is
fully recognized. Rather, they are implication-based fears that pre-
vent people from truly understanding the nature of our argument
-that is, of the situation. Still, those responses are routine, usually
as a fallback position-a final trump card. So we will do our best in
this Section to respond to commonly held intuitions, which we call
situational bogeypeople--siblings of those that we encountered earlier.9 8
These intuitions seem to come in several varieties.
1. The Communism Bogeyman
The most popular version of the challenge goes like this:
The playing field is level. And, as long as everyone is starting the race
together, there is no reason to be concerned about the fact that there
will be some winners and some losers. That's what a fair competition is
designed to do: separate winners from losers as it creates incentives to
win in the process. Equality of opportunity does not guarantee equality
of outcome. If policymakers were to begin looking to outcomes as a
measure of opportunity, they would transform our free world into a
communist or socialist regime.
A major weakness of this challenge is that it is not actually a
response to, as much as it is a denial of, our point. Our claim that
situational influences benefit some groups and disadvantage others is
a claim that the playing field is, in ways unseen, not level and that we
are all operating under the wrong presumption. To assert that the
playing field is level may, in fact, confirm our point: people do not
see relevant situational influences (which would include many fea-
tures of the playing field) and overattribute outcomes to dispositions.
That basic challenge sometimes finds some reinforcement,
though, by retreating to the following version of the communist
bogeyman:
Even if the playing field is not perfectly level, it is level enough for us
to attribute success or failure to the participants' dispositions. After all,
many people who appear to start with situational disadvantages outrun
those who appear to begin with situational advantages-simply because
they were dispositionally inclined to overcome those disadvantages.
698 See supra text accompanying notes 219-25, 682-86 (discussing the concepts of
the totalitarian and anti-slavery bogeymen); see also supra notes 312-13 and
accompanying text (discussing the Catholic Church's fear of heresy).
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This response is just a more nuanced form of denial.
Acknowledging trivial unevenness on the playing field can often be a
disarmingly effective means of justifying ignoring that unevenness.
Of course, it is possible that the field is only trivially uneven, but the
evidence typically adduced for that claim tends to be very thin and
seems to be based more on shared intuition than situational
sensitivity. We do not want to deny that Horatio Alger, and many
like him, have successfully managed to turn adversity into
opportunity-or, in other words, have dispositionally chosen to
overcome significant situational opposition. Nor do we want to deny
that the hope of just such an outcome is inspiring for many poor
and hard-working people in our society.699 But neither do we believe
that such exceptional success stories are much more than that
-exceptional. The fact that there is some movement across socio-
economic groups does not imply that situation does not immensely
700affect outcomes.
First, when members of disadvantaged groups compete against
advantaged groups, the situation will influence the outcome even if
there are exceptions. An extremely fast and driven runner with a
brick tied to his foot may well outpace a slower, unencumbered
runner. But a class of brick-laden runners will tend to seem
plodding or malingering as they fall behind their brick-free competi-
tors.
Moreover, what may be true individually almost certainly cannot
be true generally. For instance, the fact that some hard-working
people manage to climb out of poverty does not mean that all could,
if only they worked as hard. The point about a competitive race is,
699 See BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMED: ON (NOT) GETTING BY IN
AMERICA 118 (2001) (recounting the response of one of her maid service co-
workers to the question of how she feels about working for people with so much
when she has so little: "All I can think of is like, wow, I'd like to have this stuff
someday. It motivates me and I don't feel the slightest resentment because, you
know, it's my goal to get to where they are.").
700 Perhaps a parallel argument may be useful to help make our point. The
tobacco industry for decades successfully clouded the causal connection between
smoking and diseases such as lung cancer by emphasizing two key facts: many
smokers do not die of lung cancer, and many non-smokers do die of lung cancer. See
RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES 203, 209-11 (1996) (discussing the debate
over the link between smoking and lung cancer in the 1950s). By focusing on
those individuals, cigarette companies succeeded in distracting us from the fuller
situation-which was that the trends in lung cancer closely tracked smoking habits,
the incidence of lung cancer among smokers vastly exceeded that of non-smokers,
and the amount that a person smoked correlated with her probability of contracting
lung cancer. Id. at 193-97.
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after all, to separate winners from losers. The situation of the
competition creates a meaningful limit to the number of winners. If
everyone ran as hard as Horatio Alger, the speed of the race would
increase to be sure, but the number of winners and losers would
701
not.
In any event, the claim that policyrnakers should not look to
outcomes to help determine if there is a problem with the playing
field simply denies a major feature of our argument. Because the
playing field is part of the situation, there is little reason to be
confident that we can know when it is level and fair.
Recall that nobody believed that the teachers in Milgram's
experiment would shock the learners all the way up to 450 volts.
7 2
The fact that two-thirds of them did suggests that even the experts,
including Milgram, misperceived the power of the situation and
overestimated the role of disposition. What social psychology and
history teach us is not to trust our perceptions, but to doubt them.
Of course, claiming that we should learn from outcomes is a very
different claim than "from each according to his ability, to each
according to his needs[.] ' '70 3 Our argument is not that we should all
finish the race together, but that where people finish may reveal
more about the race than it reveals about the racers. Outcomes can
serve an immensely valuable evidentiary role in any serious attempt
to ensure that the playing field is level.
Moreover, the deference to outcomes as a measure of the process
is nothing new. Indeed, it was Stigler who introduced that very
methodology in assessing whether regulations were serving their
purported goal of advancing the public interest. This outcome-based
701 For example, at Harvard Law School, new students are encouraged to believe
that by working hard, they can substantially increase their chances of getting A's in
their first-year courses. They are encouraged to attend exam-preparation sessions and
to heed feedback on mid-semester assignments. What students and faculty often
seem to forget, however, is that those efforts will do little to influence the grade
distribution, which is largely determined by a curve. What they may influence,
however, is the sense of dispositional control and responsibility that students may feel
for their grades. A common complaint among second- and third-year students is that
grading is, in fact, not well correlated with how much energy they put into their
courses-a belief that may help explain why so many seem to reduce their efforts.
702 See supra text accompanying notes 87-99 (describing Milgram's experiments).
703 Karl Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, inJUSTICE 162 (Alan Ryan ed., 1993).
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assessment, as we indicated above, is one of the most important
foundational insights of conventional economic theory.
0 4
Finally, the idea that taking situation into account will somehow
reduce the incentives of the situationally disadvantaged to try to win,
strikes us as counterintuitive and contrary to the most basic
assumptions of those who promote free competition. If, in fact, the
playing field is uneven, it seems that all competitors gain, not lose,
incentive to run faster by leveling the field. Those who are
disadvantaged on the current field will be given a fair chance, and
those who are advantaged will be given a meaningful challenge.
2. The Personal-Responsibility Bogeyman
A second popular version of the situational bogeyman goes like
this:
If we begin to take situation into account, people will no longer be
held personally responsible for their actions. Criminals will be able to
blame almost anything they do on the fact that they had a bad
situation. "It wasn't me, it was the situation; I'm a victim of circum-
stances" will be heard in all the courts of the land and criminals will
run free.
We have several responses to this bogeyman.
First, as we summarized above, the law already takes situation
into account, through doctrines like duress in contract,70 necessity in
,,707 708
trespass, and "heat of passion in criminal law. The problem, as
we see it, is that the situation is far from being an occasional,
glaringly obvious gun to the head, as the current law treats it. It is a
704 Supra text accompanying notes 263-82. Similarly, market-oriented critics of the
welfare system motivate their criticisms largely by arguing that the welfare system has
failed to achieve its ends.
705 Another version of the argument to which we are responding is that even if
situational influences are significant, it is better to pretend that they are not, because
otherwise doing so would remove any self-help incentive from those who are
situationally disadvantaged. This version of the personal responsibility argument has
several problems. First, it assumes that nothing can be done about leveling the
playing field. Clearly, if the playing field could be leveled, there would be no need to
pretend or to create the added incentive. Second, it is an argument that seems in
direct tension with the pro-freedom assumptions that most of the people who offer it,
claim to embrace. In the name of individualism, they are basically calling on us to
embrace paternalism: "let's not tell anyone what we admit to be true, for their own
benefit."
706 Supra text accompanying notes 554-614.
707 Supra note 602.
708 Id.
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force of greater or lesser magnitude in nearly every human interac-
tion. When we argue that the law must take situation into account,
we are asking the law to continue to function as it always has, but in
a way that gives the situation the weight that social science dem-
onstrates it possesses in human affairs.
Second, there is a strong element of stereotype in the account of
this bogeyman. The stereotype is that the situational character-our
model of the human animal-is a puppet on the strings of the
situation, entirely lacking in disposition or volition. But this is a false
picture of our model. We fully agree that humans possess disposi-
tions and that dispositions likely play some role in a great portion of
our behavior. But, as we argue above, current legal theory and the
law overestimate the point at which disposition ends and the
situation begins. No one wants criminals to run free, but at the same
time, we do not want to lay blame where it is not due. A law that takes
a nuanced view of the roles of situation and disposition will be better
able to correctly assign dispositional responsibility and blame where
they belong.
Nevertheless, it might seem that, if the law were to expand its
acknowledgement of situational factors, the result would be to
expand the avenues for evading responsibility. Far from it. As we
have shown, people systematically-and often quite erroneously-
attribute causation, responsibility, and blame to the most visible
actors in a given situation. They compound their mistakes through
the fundamental attribution error, by assuming that action is
attributable to disposition, rather than situation. Judges, juries, and
legislators are as vulnerable to these cognitive biases as anyone else.
If we are truly committed to the principle of personal responsibility,
then we should be deeply troubled by the prospect that we are
applying it without taking these biases into account. For the
damages to fit the tort or the punishment to fit the crime, we must
first be sensitive to the situation.
It is our contention that, by ignoring situation, we may be
ignoring the true role of disposition and letting those actors who are
most responsible for the harms we seek to redress off the hook. To
better illustrate this point, we offer a thought experiment, a variation
on an actual experiment. Imagine an alternate world in which
Stanley Milgram is actually interested in studying the effects of
negative reinforcement on learning. Having seen the power of the
situation, he designs an experiment identical in every respect to the
actual one, with one difference: the learner receives real electric
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shocks. Unfortunately, when Milgram runs these experiments, the
learner receives third-degree burns and sues for damages. Who
should be held responsible?
Under commonly held notions of "personal responsibility," some
might blame the learner. He was an adult and ought to have known
what he was getting into. After all, everyone knows that elec-
tricity is hot! Therefore, he should be made to deal with the
consequences of his decision, instead of looking to blame others for
them. Some people, also citing "personal responsibility," might
blame the teacher who flipped the switches because she had many
opportunities to stop. There were teachers who refused to go along
with the experiment when they saw the learner's suffering; no one
held a gun to this teacher's head. Shouldn't she be responsible for
the (quite visible) consequences of her actions?
A typical "personal responsibility" view of this lawsuit would likely
stop at that analysis in either allowing the loss or imposing liability.
But what of Stanley Milgram? Shouldn't he have known of the risks
to the learner? Shouldn't he be held "personally responsible" for
setting up a situation in which the teacher was quite likely to flip the
switches? Or perhaps Yale University should be held responsible for
not better monitoring Milgram. Milgram apparently conducted his
original experiments with the university's knowledge and may have
been motivated by the university's tenure standards to perform this
sort of research. Doesn't Yale profit, even to this day, from the
attention garnered by Milgram's work?
If any part of this account conflicts with your intuitions, then
consider the famed McDonald's coffee case of a few years ago.709 In
that case, hot coffee spilled on Stella Liebeck's lap, giving her third-
degree burns.' When she won a verdict against McDonald's,
Liebeck became a symbol of the law's role in absolving citizens of
711
personal responsibility and the poster child for tort reform.
"[R]adio talk-show hosts around the country... lambasted the
plaintiff, her attorneys and the jurors on air. Declining to be
interviewed[,] ... one juror explained that he already had received
709 See Andrea Gerlin, A Matter of Degree: How a Juy Decided that a Coffee Spill is
Worth $2.9 Million, WALL ST.J., Sept. 1, 1994, at Al (recounting the events leading up
to the lawsuit and the trial).
710 Id.
711 See, e.g., This is True, Inc., The TRUE Stella Awards, at http://www.stella
awards.com (last updated Apr. 2003) (showcasing abuses of the tort system in America
and naming an award for such abuse after Stella Liebeck).
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angry calls from citizens around the country. 71 2 Under the common
sense "personal responsibility" view, Ms. Liebeck was responsible for
knowing the coffee was hot and ought to have been more careful in
handling it. After all, "she spilled it on herself. 71 3 However, when
the jurors were forced to look at the situation, they were able to see
that McDonald's shared responsibility for the burns.1
We present this case and our hypothetical to make clear that the
term "personal responsibility" does not resolve difficult questions of
fault. It merely begs them. Our point is not that people should
never be held responsible for their acts, but that one should not
assume that their "common sense" can be trusted to assign respon-
sibility.7"' The law must be concerned with questions of situation.
712 Gerlin, supra note 709, at Al.
713 Aric Press et al., Are Lawyers Burning America?, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 20, 1995, at 32,
34.
714 See Gerlin, supra note 709, at Al, A4 (summarizing jurors' views). Contrary to
popular perceptions, seventy-nine-year-old Liebeck was not driving, nor was the car in
motion, when the accident occurred. Her "absurd" conduct was simply to place the
coffee cup between her legs as she tried to remove the plastic lid. CARL T. BOGUS,
WHY LAwSUITS ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA 19 (2001). Furthermore, McDonald's served
its coffee at between 180 and 190 degrees Fahrenheit, whereas the average household
cup of coffee is between 130 and 140 degrees Fahrenheit. Id. A doctor testified that
lower temperatures would have slowed the rate of burning. Gerlin, supra note 709, at
A4. Although McDonald's had received 700 complaints of coffee bums in the
preceding decade, it did not sufficiently warn consumers of the possibility of burns or
intend to reduce its coffee temperature. Press et al., supra note 713, at 35; see alsoJohn
F. Bramfeld, Spilled Coffee and a Shot in the Foot, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., May 18, 1995, at 6
(suggesting that keeping temperatures high despite complaints was a justified,
deliberate, profit-maximizing business decision).
Before ever filing a suit, Ms. Liebeck reported her injuries to McDonald's and
requested compensation for her medical expenses (she spent eight days in the hospital
and underwent a series of skin grafts, leaving her with permanent scars over sixteen
percent of her body). BOGUS, supra, at 19-20; Press et al., supra, at 34. Rebuffing
Liebeck's request for $2,000, McDonald's offered $800 to close the matter. Id. At trial,
Ms. Liebeck only sought damages based on the difference in injury between spilling
140-degree coffee and spilling 180-degree coffee. BOGUS, supra, at 20. Furthermore,
despite media coverage suggesting a "rogue verdict," the jury did not ignore Liebeck's
role in the accident or absolve her of responsibility. They found her to be twenty
percent comparatively negligent and reduced the compensatory damages for medical
costs and disability to $160,000 from $200,000. Id. Moreover, the punitive damages
were not quite as arbitrary as commonly depicted-the $2.7 million reflected two days
of coffee sales revenues for McDonald's. Gerlin, supra note 709, at A4. The judge
later reduced the punitive damages to $480,000. BOGUS, supra, at 20. Finally, to avoid
an apeal, Liebeck settled the case for an undisclosed amount. Id.
For similar arguments about other products, see Hanson & Kysar, Taking
Behavioralism Seriously II, supra note 251, at 1467-1553 (providing evidence of how the
tobacco industry manipulated-and thus shared responsibility for-consumer smoking
habits); Hanson & Logue, supra note 402, at 1350-52 (challenging the conventional
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How much does the situation influence individuals? Who controls
and profits from particular situations? How might the situation be
altered to influence individuals in other ways? These are not easy
questions, but to avoid them may be to encourage personal
irresponsibility.
Put differently, the concern that taking hard-to-see situation into
account may "encourage criminals to run freely through our streets"
ignores the less visible possibility that disregarding situation may
encourage even more.
3. The Paternalism Bogeyman
No contingent of bogeypeople would be complete without the
paternalism bogeyman. Unlike the prior bogeypeople, the figure of
paternalism appears more prominently and openly in legal theoretic
discourse. Although its precise definition often remains shrouded in
mystery, that has not stopped it from exercising a powerful influence
716in legal-theoretic debate.. Generations of theorists have agreed that
paternalism is no friend of the dispositional human actor presiding at
the core of the traditional liberal picture. John Stuart Mill, who early
laid down the line against paternalism in a "civilized" society, stated
that, "the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to
prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not
a sufficient warrant.,
71 7
Professor David Shapiro, in his famous article on the subject,
claimed that the concept of paternalism can be conceived of in a
number of weaker or stronger formulations.1 But the basic anti-
paternalism suspicion has, by now, attached to almost any version of it.
In his article, Shapiro set out, in part, to challenge Duncan Kennedy's
seminal claim that paternalism was actually quite widespread in
private and public social arrangements, including, importantly, many
"personal responsibility" argument against cigarette liability); Hanson, Yosifon &
Benforado, supra note 615 (describing the situational manipulations by the food
industry that have contributed to the obesity epidemic).
716 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 388-92 (describing the ALI Reporters'
rejection of hard-paternalism in favor of consumer sovereignty).
7:7 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 68 (G. Himmelfarb ed. 1982) (1859).
718 David L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REv. 519, 520
(1988).
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areas of the law. Shapiro gave a renewed voice to the traditional
view of paternalism as showstopper, arguing that legal justifications for
many of the kinds of arrangements Kennedy had pointed to were
actually well grounded in anti-paternalism (at least rhetorically).
Professor Shapiro claimed that, in fact, "anti-paternalism (which [we]
should perhaps... [be] calling 'pro-autonomy') is a dominant strain
in our tradition."7 21 Moreover, as we have already indicated, legal
economists, when met with claims they perceive as threatening to
individual autonomy, are quick to retreat behind, not economics per
se, but an anti-paternalistic defense of individual freedom.7 2 Much of
the most recent law and economics-oriented scholarship on
paternalism has been directed at defining the boundaries and types of
paternalistic social policies that can be justified, assuming that strong
deference should be given to the basic "libertarian" view of individual123
autonomy. The paternalism bogeyman, despite the efforts of
Kennedy and others, reigns.
719 Shapiro was primarily responding to the argument found in Duncan Kennedy,
Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to
Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 624-49 (1982).
This was also the iew taken by H.L.A. Hart. See H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND
MORALITY 30-34 (1963) (advocating the separation of law from morality in certain
areas of personal conduct).
720 Shapiro, for example, notes that courts have consistently rested their
upholding of "seat belt" or "helmet laws" on public policy grounds such as efficiency,
and even, with respect to the upholding of laws against sodomy, on the ground of
supporting public morals or public will. Shapiro, supra note 718, at 541-42. Neither
type of law has been justified on the ground that it forces people into behavior that is
good for them despite their thinking to the contrary. Shapiro himself claims that "one
reason" he voted in favor of Massachusetts' seat-belt law was that it would lower
insurance rates. Id. at 530 n.37.
721 Shapiro, supra note 718, at 572. While ultimately coming down as a strong anti-
paternalist, see id. at 572-75, part of Shapiro's purpose was to present an analysis from
the perspective of "legal process," an approach to thinking about the law that Shapiro
argued had suffered unwarranted neglect by the critical legal scholars who he saw as
emergent in 1988 when he wrote his article. Id. at 521.
See supra text accompanying notes 551-70; see also Hanson & Yosifon, Missing the
Situation, (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (describing this pattern in
legal economists' writings).
723 See, e.g., Paul Burrows, Analyzing Legal Paternalism, 15 INT'L REv. L. & ECON.
489, 497 (1995) (advocating an expanded emphasis on people's preferences and
choice of behavior); Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral
Economics and the Case for Assymmetric Paternalism (forthcoming) (on file with authors);
Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism and the Law
(forthcoming) (on file with authors) (contributing a new perspective to welfare
economics); Eyal Zamier, The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REV. 229, 230 (1998)
(arguing that paternalism is "compatible with theoretical foundations of normative
economics" and that "efficiency analysis provides a centraljustification" for it).
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A central effect of its reign is to scare away potential interventions
in the apparent dispositional choices of individuals or arguments that
would put the meaning of such choices into doubt. To do so, the
paternalism bogeyman patronizes the dispositional actor by
highlighting only the most salient kinds of situational exercises of
power over individuals, calling these paternalism, and demanding
they yield in the name of the freedom that is assumed otherwise to
govern. In this way, the paternalism bogeyman, like the others,
succeeds against our argument only by denying what social science
teaches (and markets reveal) about the power of the unseen situation.
Shapiro, for example, provides a vivid but profoundly
dispositionist picture when he "lay[s] out some baselines" for the
724
study of paternalism. Adopting the axiom of "consent" as central to
the analysis, Shapiro discerns the quintessential form of what he and
most theorists find to be a permissible kind of paternalism-self-
paternalism.725 The guiding figure here is Odysseus, that hero of the
disposition human journey, binding himself to the mast of his ship as
it passes by the Sirens, and instructing his crew that they should not
726untie him no matter how vigorously he demands to be unbound.
Odysseus fears his future-self will, if set free, choose to stay forever
72,7among the beautiful, seductive voices of the Sirens. In contrast to
this permissible "baseline" of self-paternalism is an even more vivid
dispositionist vision of the sinister paternalism bogeyman-the Grand
Inquisitor:
[T] he case for a claim of weak paternalism is itself weakened ... when
the asserted incapacity exists on a question of basic values or
assumptions, especially (but not exclusively) when those values or
assumptions are shared by a large group of mature adults. The Grand
Inquisitor who is convinced that the souls of the heretics can be saved
only if they are coerced into recanting their heresy may see the case as
the quintessence of weak paternalism. But I do not.v-
Shapiro accepts as a premise that power can be exercised to alter
people's opinions even on "basic assumptions," but this power is
pictured as a salient external power, in the figure of the Grand
724 Shapiro, supra note 718, at 523.
725 Id. at 522-25.
726 HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 146-47 (Walter Shewring trans., Oxford Univ. Press
1980) (n.d.).
727 Id.
728 Shapiro, supra note 718, at 529.
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Inquisitor.7!"1 The possibility that power is exercised in unseen ways
over "basic assumptions" is not even imagined; and the charge of
paternalism becomes a bulwark against examining the power
operating in the formation of those assumptions. If paternalism is a
troublesome exercise of power when implemented through salient
situational influences, then critical realism suggests that we ought to
begin our analysis at exactly the place where Shapiro places the
bogeyman's barricades. Put differently, if our ambition is to foster a
world in which people are encouraged to act according to their
values, attitudes, and assumptions, then legal analysts need to look far
deeper than just the obvious tip of the situational iceberg.
Further examination reveals that Shapiro's conventional
"baselines" are the product not of analysis or theory, but of the
fundamental attribution error. Defending his decision to "embrace
,,130the anti-paternalist position, Shapiro falls back, as do so many, on
intuitions and common sense perceptions: "on so basic a question of
human relations I am not sure how feasible it is to do more than chart
my own course.,,131 Indeed, most defenders of anti-paternalism,
Shapiro admits, have offered weak justification for their urge "to
defend freedom against its critics., 73 1 In charting such a course,
Shapiro argues, "[e]ventually, a leap of faith is inevitable. 7 33  In
addition, the stakes in this leap are profoundly important, for "under
prevailing community standards, the paternalist has the burden of
persuasion .734
The problem, of course, is that the prevailing community
standards reflect a fundamental flaw in human attributions, a flaw that
appears to be greatly encouraged and enhanced by those who can best
influence our situation. Thus, in the name of avoiding obvious (that
is, paternalistic) influences on people's choices, we may be turning
ourselves over to less obvious, but no less powerful, influences. Or,
put slightly differently, in the name of protecting dispositionism from
729 Id. Readers will no doubt be reminded that the same salient inquisitorial
power was actually present in the Galileo story. See supra text accompanying notes 297-
301.
730 Shapiro, supra note 718, at 545.
73 Id. The metaphor of navigational charting may not be coincidence. It implies
the kind of choice-contemplating, choice-making dispositional figure that sets the
"baselines" of his view of paternalism and who, like Odysseus, straps himself to the
mast when anticipated temptations loom.
732 Id. at 546.
733 Id.
734 Id. at 545.
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blatant situational threats, we may be unleashing hidden, but deeply
captured, situational forces that leave us feeling as though we chose
our lot.
Our purpose here is not to propose or defend a strong form of
paternalism. Indeed, we think our argument would demand a
thorough reconceptualization of such conventional categories
(strong-form paternalism, weak-form paternalism, self-paternalism,
and so on) before such a discussion could be fruitful. What we are
arguing is that the charge of paternalism, as it is typically made, is an
inadequate response to the claims we have presented. What we
propose is a more realistic exploration, and acceptance, of the
powerful situational influences over human behavior that go far
beyond the ropes of Odysseus and the fires of the Grand Inquisitor.
When we yield in our inquiries to the paternalism bogeyman, we may
be yielding to basic assumptions that are themselves contestable and
the subject of powerful situational influences. The problem of
paternalism is profound, but it cannot be answered with the
conventional bogeyman response.
4. Summary: The Bogeypeople as Response to, and Creation of,
Threat
Some of the owner men were kind because they hated what they had to do, and
some of them were angry because they hated to be cruel, and some of them were cold
because they had long ago found that one could not be an owner unless one were
cold. And all of them were caught in something larger than themselves. Some of
them hated the mathematics that drove them, and some were afraid, and some
worshipped the mathematics because it provided a refuge from thought and from
feeling ....
-John Steinbec7 3 5
Although there are others, 36 the previous Sections provide a fair
sample of the bogeypeople. We are less interested in providing a full
735 JOHN STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH 42-43 (Viking Critical Library ed.
1972) (1939).
736 Broadly speaking, virtually any human motive, we suspect, might be tapped into
in order to generate a bogeyperson. For instance, the human motive for closure, see
Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 30, is often activated by those who seem unwilling to
take "the situation" seriously unless its precise implications for policy and legal
doctrine are made explicit. Similarly, the motive for control, see id., is often tapped
into by those who assert that situational causation is far more difficult to influence in
predictable ways. (As an aside, we suspect that the combined motives for closure and
control may help explain the fundamental attribution error.)
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catalogue of the beasts than we are in understanding what motivates
them. People invoking the bogeypeople often begin by claiming to
concede that the situation can have an immense, unseen effect on
people's conduct. They then follow that concession with a gen-
eral "so what?" or, more specifically, with the invoking of one
or more of the bogeypeople to make their case that it is better
to pay no more attention to the situation than people already
do. Upon closer inspection, however, this technique of responding is
better seen as a disarming means of denying our basic argument
about the power of the situation. It is not surprising that our
audience would tend to disbelieve our claims. Indeed, it is to be
expected-just as it is easy to understand why so many people
initially found Galileo's claims to be fanciful. Without the telescope,
it was one person's claim against the obvious.
We do not believe that our arguments are immune to critique.
We strongly suspect that they are in many ways flawed. But our worry
and our experience is that they are not given a chance largely
because people reject them because they are hard to see, and, more
importantly, because they do not want to see them. The specter of
the bogeypeople provides a mechanism for evading the situation.
Indeed, we suspect that one major reason for the success of
neoclassical economics and disposition-driven theories of law is not
simply that they are good for business, but also that they serve to
protect us all from the disquieting possibilities that many of our basic
systems are both harmful and rigged. With that possibility in mind, it
is illuminating to consider Milgram's career.
After revealing, to his own surprise, the power of the unseen
situation, Milgram's findings spawned an enormous hullabaloo. In
the words of Thomas Blass, "more than any other research in social
psychology, the obedience experiments have been embroiled from
the beginning in a number of controversies in which they have played
a central and enriching role. These include the ethics of research, the
social psychology of the psychological experiment, and the deception
versus role-playing controversy., 73 7 It seems likely that much of the
criticism found its source in the threat that Milgram's results posed to
the notion that these systems are just. To defend against that threat,
Milgram's work had to be denied, challenged, and minimized in any
way possible.
737 Thomas Blass, Understanding Behavior in the Milgram Obedience Experiment: The
Role of Personality, Situations, and Their Interactions, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
398, 398 (1991) (citations omitted).
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The upset generated by a Milgram ... in part stems from ethical
concerns. But another part of [his experiments'] power lies precisely in
their demonstration of how strong situational determinants are in
shaping behavior. No resort to a correlation between 'those' people who
do 'evil' things is allowed: the subjects were randomly assigned.
Despite his profound influence on psychology and the importance
of his work to the fields of philosophy, political science, and
education, Milgram was never granted tenure at Harvard.739 As Blass
suggests, "[s]ome of the opposition toward Milgram came from
colleagues who felt uneasy about him, ascribing to him certain
negative properties of the obedience experiment. " 740 Focusing on
Milgram's protocol may well have been a cover for a deeper
uneasiness about his findings, as well as, a means of de-legitimating his
work and, more importantly, legitimating our world.
There is another, perhaps more telling, means of demonstrating
that those who conjure the bogeypeople are, perhaps unconsciously,
denying or minimizing our claim. Consider the likely reaction to our
argument if we were describing more visible, salient, and obvious
forms of situational constraints. Suppose, for example, that we were
writing about antebellum slavery. It does not seem controversial to
argue, as we did, that slavery placed an immense and unjust
situational constraint on slaves, or that slaves' conduct-including
their singing--did not reveal dispositional consent to their fate. We
do not believe that the situational bogeypeople would be invoked in
response to those claims. Nobody would accuse us of being
communists for arguing that the situation of slaves should be taken
seriously or that slavery should be abolished. There is no tendency
to invoke the communist bogeyman in that context because, in
retrospect, the situational constraints that caused the unequal
outcomes are clear. If we truly accept the idea that the situation
wields a commanding influence, then the idea of attending to that
influence seems obvious and unobjectionable.
Similarly, the personal-responsibility bogeyman remains dormant
when the situation is slavery. It should be remembered that slaves
exercised some freedom under slavery: they developed their own
738 Robert Helmreich et al., The Study of Small Groups, 24 ANN. REv. PSYCHOL. 337,
343 (1973).
739Thomas Blass, The Man Who Shocked the World, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Mar.-Apr.
2002, at 72, available at http://www.psychologytoday.com/htdocs/prod/proarticle/
pto-200203.
740 Id. In 1967, Milgram was given full professor status as head of the social
psychology program at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York.
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cultural patterns and practices; they found or created items of value
to trade and sometimes earned money to buy things; they negotiated
in various ways with their masters for, among other things, freedom
upon their master's death; they plotted and executed escapes; and in
some circumstances they bought their own freedom. So, while
slaves undoubtedly operated under severe situational constraints,
they were not without recourse to influence their own lives. There
was room for disposition, and it undoubtedly played a role in their
experiences.
Yet nobody today would claim that slaves should have taken
personal responsibility for the conditions in which they lived.
Frederick Douglass, among others, bought his own freedom, and yet
we do not blame those who did not for their predicament. In such
cases, the situation is obvious, and personal responsibility lies less
with those enslaved by it, and more with those who created it.
Placing personal responsibility on the slave is offensive. When, on
the other hand, the situation plays a significant role in the lives and
conditions of those who enjoy "freedom" (here defined as "not
slaves"), invocations of Horatio Alger and the personal responsibility
bogeymen emerge. If we recognized the full sweep of the situational
influences over our lives, we might be more hesitant with the charge
of "personal responsibility," and the emergence of this bogeyman
742might be less automatic.
741 See, e.g., IRA BERLIN, GENERATIONS OF CAPTvVIY: A HISTORY OF AFRICAN-
AMERICAN SLAVES 5 (2003) (depicting the cultural habits and beliefs which
transformed the experience of slaves into a culture which joined them together as a
class); FRIEDMAN, supra note 36, at 224-27 (discussing the family life and rights of
slaves); GENOVESE, supra note 666, passim (illuminating the "world the slaves made");
WALTERJOHNSON, SOUL BY SOUL, LIFE INSIDE THE ANTEBELLUM SLAVE MARKET 63-77
(1999) (commenting on the development of a slave community and the launching of
slave revolts).
742 This, of course, is not to say that we are all slaves, or that the situational
constraints on slaves were not more dramatic and severe than those that surround us
today. It is, however, to suggest that just as the "personal responsibility" trope loses
much of its force when situational constraints are salient, we should be suspicious of
its use where situational influences are less visible.
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CONCLUSION: FACING OUR FEARS
"It may be that we are puppets-puppets controlled by the strings of society. But
at least we are puppets with perception, with awareness. And perhaps our
awareness is the first step to our liberation."
74
-Stanley Milgram74
Man is the only government-making animal in the world.
-Frederick Douglass
44
We all got to figure. There's some way to stop this. It's not like lightning or
earthquakes. We've got a bad thing made by men, and by God that's something
we can change.
-John Steinbeck
745
The inferno of the living is not something that will be; if there is one, it is what is
already here, the inferno that we live every day, that we form by being together.
There are two ways to escape suffering it. The first is easy for many: accept the
inferno and become such a part of it that you can no longer see it. The second is
risky and demands constant vigilance and apprehension: seek and learn to
recognize who and what, in the midst of the inferno, are not inferno, then make
them endure, give them space.'
-Italo Calvino71
We understand that there is reason to be frightened and to feel
threatened. In fact, that is our point. There is much at stake. But
to thwart the real dangers of the situation-the vulnerability to
manipulation, the complex legal, social, ethical, and personal
problems that it raises-we should look beyond the bogeypeople and
face our fears.
The goal of this Article is to encourage us to take seriously the
situation. We, and we hope others, will say more in future work
about its implications. Regardless, the most important implication
743 http://www.stanleymilgram.com/quotes.html (attributing quote to Stanley
Milgram).
44 Frederick Douglass, Appeal to Congress for Impartial Suffrage (Jan. 1867),
available at http://www.law.ou.edu/hist/suff.html.
745 STEINBECK, supra note 735, 42-43.
746 ITALO CALVINO, INVISIBLE CITIES 165 (William Weaver trans., Harcourt & Brace
Jovanovich 1974).
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should be evident: there is not going to be a salient, simple policy
solution to our predicament. The belief or hope that such solutions
exist is a manifestation of the problem-seeing a tiny portion of what
is moving us and assuming that nothing else does.
The problem is akin to another problem that is easier to
imagine. Who was responsible for slavery in this country? Clearly, it
was not the slaves. Their situation was too vividly powerful-like a gun
to the head-to conclude otherwise. The most obvious answer is the
slavemaster, and for good reason. Slavemasters bought and sold
slaves, controlled slaves' environments, and dictated-often using
brutal force-much of the slaves' conduct. 4 7 There is more, how-
ever, to the situation than just the most prominent actors. Slavery
was, among other things, a social system-a powerful situation-that
was larger than both the slaves and the masters. Slavery was a highly
profitable industry, not only for the South, but also for the North,
where textile mills, for example, relied on the availability of cheap
cotton. A plantation owner who freed his slaves would not only lose
the economic value of his chattel but also the ability to produce his
crops profitably.
Moreover, freeing slaves was illegal in some states and highly
discouraged by social norms and conventions in all slave states.74 In
that and countless other ways, the laws and the customs that slave
owners lived under were highly constraining. But those situational
constraints were not, any more than the others, a natural, inevitable,
or even random circumstance. The situation was itself the conse-
quence of a profitable economic system that created institutions and
individuals with an interest in maintaining it.
As we have described, slave owners held situationally influenced
"knowledge" and beliefs that also acted to reinforce the system
and justify their place in it as powerful as the economic and social
forces that they faced. As we indicated above, a freed slave was, by
some accounts, unhappy. If a freed African slave could not function
outside of the paternalistic protection of the "peculiar institution," or
if they would almost certainly be kidnapped and sold again into
slavery and perhaps down the river, or if, at best, "freedom" meant
laboring in the North where the working conditions were far worse,
how could a plantation owner-even a "social welfare-maximizing"
plantation owner-justify freeing his slaves? Furthermore, if
747 HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 639, at 50-51, 201-02.
748 See GOODELL, supra note 665, at 338.
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slaveowners faced the threat that without slavery their society
would not prosper and evolve, then the emancipation of slaves
might come at a cost to freedom. 49 In short, slaves were not the
only people who were subject to powerful situational influences.
Slaves, their owners, and their shared society, were all deeply
captured. So, who do we blame?
The point is that this may be the wrong question. Suppose we
were given the task of developing a means of emancipating African
Americans from slavery and the many situational chains that have
hindered them since. Suppose that we had to accomplish that end
without the horrors and shame of the Civil War, of Reconstruction,
of Jim Crow, of segregation, and of disparate opportunities and
outcomes that remain with us. What would we do?
Whatever our answer, it won't be simple, and it will require
gaining a better understanding of the situation.
749 See MCPHERSON, supra note 682, at 56 ("'Indeed', said Senator Robert M. T.
Hunter of Virginia, 'there is not a respectable system of civilization known to history
whose foundations were not laid in the institution of domestic slavery.' 'Instead of an
evil,' said John C. Calhoun in summing up the southern position, slavery was 'a
positive good.., the most safe and stable basis for free institutions in the world."').
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